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This essay presents a n overview of an emergent culture of ecological
consciousness and sensitivity for nature within and without humans. The
inquiry pertains to the interdisciplinary field of human ecology.
The essential methodological approach is eco-systemic, implying the
basic interrelatedness of entities and their environment. The essay explores the
interconnections at various levels of human-ecological interaction, analyzed
from the perspective of the basic components of an ecological culture:
sustainability - as an economy of metabolic exchange with the environment and
inclusion into natural cycles of renewal; post-domination - a s human relations
based on individuals' responsibility for their social and natural environment,
and on surpassing the authoritarian structures of subordination of humans and
nature; and a spirituality of immanent ethic and sensitivity.
Individual responsibility is the core of an ecological culture, and the
basis of a n ecological consciousness - an awareness of the ecological context of
the individual's life process

- the

impact which the ways of satisfymg the indivi-

dual's needs have on the immediate, and also the wider social, biological and
physical environment. Ecological culture involves the revitalization of the local
community and the household a s the levels of immediate human-ecological
interactions.

The lack of individual responsibility is both caused by and expressed in
domination patterns. Domination is based on dualism. Its essential routines are
inferiorization and exclusion of mutuality which entail a lack of empathy and harmony - thus hindering a positive relation to the social and natural environment.
When domination structures are deconstructed, a possibility of a new
integration emerges in the reconsidered sphere of spirituality, involving
immanence (re-comection of spirituality and nature), and integrative
epistemology (inclusion of other-than-rational modes of comprehension and
communication).
An essential epistemological component is a sensitivity which links life

processes in and around us, thus enabling us to feel that we are part of natural renewal and energy exchange. Such a sensitivity is the basis for individual
responsibility which is no longer a matter of reliance on external authority and
imposed morality of prescribed rights and duties. Responsibility becomes an
individual's inner ethic of joy as an ultimate expression of liveliness.
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Chapter

Introduction
We can only rediscover a d~ferentrelation to
nature by making cultural choices. 1

Throughout the process of conceiving and writing this essay, a n image has
been coming up in my mind: the waterfalls and lush vegetation in the national
park "Plitvice Lakes". This natural reservation is a n outstanding ecological
phenomenon of symbiosis, of natural conviviality and of continuous change and
transformation. It displays, in overwhelming beauty, the endless possibilities
and wealth of natural diversity in its creative evolution. The national park is in
the part of Yugoslavia (now Croatia) where homfyrng genocide went on during
World War I1 and where killings and exodus took place again during the last
civil war. Unfortunately, this was not a n isolated or rare manifestation of
violence. But it makes more apparent the deep rift between the creativity and
conviviality of nature, and the mindless destructiveness of humans.

-

1

Melucci and Chorover, 1997: 80

The conflicting relationship between humanity and nature is the principal
underlying theme of this dissertation, and a n obtrusive and daunting
characteristic of the current predominant culture.

The Topic: Aspects of an Ecological Culture
The objective of this essay is to defme and examine different aspects of a n
ecological culture. By ecological culture I consider a new, different cultural
pattern, toward which the process of cultural development is heading.
This statement can imply two questions: first, what is a n ecological cultural
pattern? and second, how do I know that cultural development will evolve
toward it? The way the second question is framed, however, is not quite
applicable to the methodological approach of this essay and I will explain why
later on in this introduction

2.

I have chosen the term "ecological culture" a s my synthesis of various

views and concepts addressed in the literature which pertain directly or
indirectly to this issue. In the process of defining the basic notions of my
essay, I have encountered the terminological problem of making clear
connotational delineations, a task which is particularly difficult with some
words that have become fashionable and lost their precise or original meaning.
Their meaning becomes paradigmatic, a symbol of a n array of attitudes, which
is often a n attempt to denote new notions for which there is little or no
previous experience. This terminological issue will be repeatedly addressed
along with the development of the thesis.
2

This project does not include experiential research. A most recent evidence of an
emerging cultural change in the direction which is in general terms congruent with
the framework of my essay is presented in the book The Cultural Creatives, by Paul
Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson, published in 2000. It offers an extremely
optimistic outlook at the number of people in the U S . (26 percent of adults) who
support change toward a more ecological world view. This outlook is based on
extended surveys b n more than 100,000 Americans, hundreds of focus groups. and
about sixty in-depth interviews that reveal an entire subculture I...]They are the
drivers of the demand that w e go beyond environmental regulation to real
ecological sustainability, to change our entire w a y of l$e accordingly. " (Ray and
Anderson, 2000: 4-5)

When a process of innovation begins but we lack the words to identi& the

new,ureoftenfind it necessary to ransack our cultural attic for the language,
practices, and symbols required to give voice to needs for which suitable
names do not exist as yet

3

The choice of the word "ecological" presents such a terminological problem.
The original meaning pertains only to the biological sciences, and does not
directly imply any connection to the social and anthropological notions of
culture (itself a term with broad and often imprecise meaning). However, the
term "ecological" has considerably widened its connotational scope. It has
become a symbol of a new way of thinking that observes the systems, rather
than isolated entities, not only in the context of biology, but also in the human
interactions with the social, biological and physical environment. Such a wider
connotation of the word has been used by a great many authors (in my
literature list alone, there are 31 titles where the word eco, ecology, or
ecological is used with this broader meaning).
By choosing to use the term "ecological culture", I have had in mind this
symbolic, paradigmatic meaning of the word ecological, a meaning that contains
the awareness of the broader context and of the wider environment in which
human life processes evolve.
The emerging new paradigm may be called a holistic, or an ecological
world view, using the term ecological here in a much broader and deeper sense
than it is commonly used. Ecological awareness, in that deep sense, recognizes
the fundamental interdependence of all phenomena and the ernbeddedness of
individuals and societies in the cyclical processes of nature. 4

The broader meaning also entails the awareness of the impact which the present cultural patterns have had on this comprehensive social, biological and physical environment. This impact has brought us into the current state of crisis. It
is perceived primarily as an environmental crisis, as a threat to the physical and
biological environment, a possible destruction of life on the planet. But it also
reflects the crisis of values and of world views. On the primary level, environmental crisis invokes an awakening to the problems of pollution and resource
depletion caused by the current technology and way of life. This level of con3
4

Melucci, 1996: 87
Capra, 1988: 335

cern reflects a perception of the outward, physical manifestation of the crisis a concern which is an expression of the prevalent preoccupation of the current
culture with external, physical aspects of life. This one-sidedness will be addressed in this essay by pondering into a more comprehensive context of cultural change.
Why has ecology become an issue? Not simply on account of the pollution
obviously enough threatening our existence, with the environmental disaster
visible on aU sides: but also as a consequence of a profound change in our
cultural and social perception of the reality in which we live. Unless we take
account of this qualitative leap in the way the world is experienced through
our minds and emotions, we may mistakenly restrict our concern solely to the
environment. 5

"Ecological culture" is perceived as a different cultural pattern, different in
the sense that it questions present cultural patterns and offers new perspectives. I am using the term "ecological culture" as an "umbrella"for diverse
movements, ideas, concepts, which have emerged simultaneously, but have not
always been perceived as parts of the same process. Such a perception is the
central concept of my thesis - that ecological culture encompasses three
essential notions: sustainability, post-domination and spirituality.
Sustainability is the notion that comprises the current response to the challenge of the environmental crisis. This response entails an environmental/ecological consciousness. Through a comprehensive exploration of sustainability and
its economic, social and technological aspects, I will follow the thread of seeking a basis for an ecological consciousness. On this quest, I will analyze the
complex alienation which amounts to an individual's disconnectedness from interactions with her or his environment - both natural and social. I will discuss
the immediate levels of interaction, the local community and the household and
will arrive at the individual responsibility for the natural and social environment

as the basis for ecological consciousness. Individual responsibility is primarily
situated in the household which is the basic human-ecological unit of interaction with the (social and natural) environment. Positing individual responsibility
as the key issue of an ecological culture is the central tenet of this essay. Thus

5

Melucci. op.cit.: 58

it differs from the majority of treatises on sustainability which offer solutions.
or envision paths to change at the institutional end - as the responsibility of
various institutional entities, or communities: business, government, regulation,
administration. Often the realm responsible to bring about change is not specified, but it is assumed that the path to change has to be imparted to the undifferentiated mass of individuals as a new moral prescript which would take the
environment into consideration. I will argue that a genuine ecological consciousness can be fully achieved only with individuals empowered to have responsibility for their environment. The problems of instigating or imposing responsibility necessitate a thorough insight into domination. I will address the authoritarian characteristic of human relationships which presents a systematic hindrance to a full development of individual responsibility. Individual responsibility
for the environment (natural and social) brings up the link between domination
over nature and over humans. When perceived as interconnected, domination
over nature within and without humans emerges also as a possible origin of a
repressed, unexpressed, or frustrated inner sense of nature - a sensitivity for
nature within and without ourselves which can be conceived of as a spiritual
basis for an ethic toward nature, or toward the eco-systemic web of which we
are an integral part.
The previous paragraph presents, in a concise form, the core argument of
this essay. The essay follows the development of this core argument and thus
it will become an inquiry into an array of different aspects of an ecological
culture within its three basic issues - sustainability, domination and spirituality. This inquiry will seek an integrative, eco-systemic view of ecological culture.
I will explain further on how such an integrative perspective is distinctly

relevant for an insight into ecological culture. This perspective implies an
overview and integration of a broader scope of interrelated issues. However,
the integrative approach of this essay is primarily determined by the vision of
ecological culture a s an emerging consciousness based on individual responsibility and sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves.

For all three basic elements of ecological culture, I will be using words
which present the same kind of terminological problems that I have mentioned
before. I have decided to use the terms sustainability and spirituality because
of their wide acceptance a s symbols of notions, which are not, however, clearly
and unambiguously defined. The term post-domation is my own compound.
The dissertation will attempt to clarify the connotational scope of these notions.

Personal Views and Objective Evidence:
Methodological Approach
My interest in ecological culture stems from a preoccupation with the current
environmental crisis and the potential ways out of it. This preoccupation is both
emotional and rational, and as such, it is subjective. The intentional inclusion
of the emotional component might be reflected in the manner of writing, which
could sometimes express approaches to the subject other than only rational contrary to the usual academic style (particularly in this part of the world).
Scienttfic education I...]simpl~fies'science' by simpl~ji$ng its participants I.. .I A person's religion,for example, or his metaphysics, or his sense of
humour [...I must not have the slightest connection with his s c i e n t i . activity. His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own
This is again reflected in the nature of s c i e n t i . tfacts' which are experienced
as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background. 6

This inclusion of rationality and emotionality is more than just a matter of

writing style. It involves a change of attitude toward scientific objectivity which
I find closely related to the issue of domination and post-domation as part of
a n ecological culture. The conflict between "objective" reality and "subjective"
judgement, as well as the problem of "value-free" analysis, pertains to a basic
epistemological issue. This issue will emerge in the course of this essay as critical for a n ecological culture that is based on a n ethic of individual responsibility and sensitivity for nature both within and without ourselves. This ethic will
entail the concept of a n integrative epistemology, inclusive of both rational and

6

Feyerabend, 1978:19

non-rational modes of comprehension. So it involves a paradigm shift, a
departure from the perspective that has been in use since the Enlightenment:
The kind of knowledge that scientists had of the world was essentially
disembodied. It was as ifthe scientist was not involved in what he was doing,
as fi he was seeing the worldflom outside. I...I The idea that scientists are
somehow disembodied, not bodily or emotionally involved in what they're
doing, is part of the style of science to this day. Scientific papers are full of
language like "observationswere made," [...I "a test tube was taken " No one
actually does anything; things just happen inflont of the observing, detached
scientist. Of course, the reality of scientific research is very diflerent. 7

I do, however, find that a certain level of objectivity can be confirmed in

the literature. This dissertation has been developed a s a search for shared
views with other authors, a search for c 1 a . g my own initial sense (as a
unity of emotional and rational knowledge) of what is ecological culture.
The members of [the Project on Ecological and Cooperative Education
(PEACE)] shared the conviction that more than everything else our planet
needed an ecologically conscious cultwe that might overcome the
flagmentation and specialization that is typical of the world view dominating
societies of today. We shared the conviction that humankind needed to
cultivate the attitude of caring and cooperation instead of encouraging
competition, conflontation, and threats of violence. 8

In this essay I have adopted a method of presentation which uses direct
quotations extensively. The reason is not only that ideas are better conveyed in
their original wording than retold (in the conventional academic style). An
emphasis on a diversity and juxtaposition of voices is intended a s a different
conception of objectivity - a s a n integration of actual subjective viewpoints
adding u p to a web-like interaction of ideas akin to what F'ritjof Capra and
David Steindl-Rast term network knowledge

9.

In this way, the existing literature, pertaining to the topic, can be regarded
a s evidence of the relevance of my own preoccupation with ecological culture.
Such a regard entails another important aspect of the subjectivity/objectivity
issue: relevance based on the authority of published authors.
The man who reads a science text can easily take the applications to be
the evidencefor the theory, the reasons why it ought to be believed. But science
-

7
8
9

Sheldrake and Fox. 1996: 19-20
Nordland, 1994: vii (emphasis mine)
See quote (paragraph number 4) related to footnote 70 in chapter 2. At the end of
this essay (in footnote 3 in the Epilogue) I have given additional explanation which
will become clearer after the entire discussion has been elaborated.

students accept theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of
evidence. 10

I am bringing this up, not to question the relevance of the authors that I

will be referring to in my essay, but to hint upon an expression of authoritaria-

nism ingrained in our present cultural pattern. Authoritarianism is often another reason for the suppression of the subjective voice, which adds up to epistemological reductionism, and - in the context of ecological culture - calls for
a more integrative epistemology which I will address in the last chapter of this
essay. In the following sections. I will elaborate on the context of culture and
cultural change, and of human ecology, and in the next chapter. I will present
systems theory as the conceptual and methodological framework of my essay.
The ensuing chapters will contain the discussion of the principal components
of an ecological culture - sustainability, post-domination and spirituality.

Ecological Culture:
Human-Nature and Culture-Nature Relationships
The ecological question also highlights the cultural
dimension of human action. Industrial society organized
its experience around the inevitability of economic laws
and technical power. The ecological issue shows that the
key to survival is no longer the s ystem of means founded
on purposive rationality. [. ..I Culture - as the capacity to
lend meaning to objects and relations - is the
unbreachable conjhe within which questions concerning
the destiny of humankind must be posed. 1 1

By defining the topic of my essay as "ecological culture", I have chosen to
view the emergent environmental/ecological consciousness as a form of culture.
A similar scope of issues has in the literature been also considered in terms of

"society", "world", "paradigm", "world view" or "identity"12. A most simplified
explanation for my choice of the notion of an "ecological culture" is that it

10

11
12

Kuhn, 1962: 80
Melucci, op.cit.:58-59
Capra. 1988; Milbrath. 1989; Pirages, 1977; Platt, 1977; Ruckelshaus, 1989;
Thomashow, 1995; Tucker and Grim, 1993

should primarily mean a way of life which is based on an environmental/ecological consciousness and sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves.
The term culture is often used in a very broad sense and such breadth is
quite appropriate to the perspective of this essay. (Culture is also sometimes
used interchangeably with all of the above mentioned notions, except possibly
"identity".)Nevertheless, I will explore in this chapter the more precisely
defined meanings of the term.
The etymology of the word culture (in all Indo-European languages, I
believe) is Latin cultura = tillage, husbandry, cultivation, tending - and it is
derived from cultus - colere = inhabit, cultivate, protect, honor with worship.
Through the history of its use in the English language, the word culture has
included (according to the Oxford Dictionary) the notions of "the cultivating or
development of mind, faculties, manners", "reverential homagen,"the training of
human body", "improvement or refinement by education and trainingn. This
etymological framework is relevant to the complex connotational scope which
will be elaborated throughout the thesis.
Culture is certainly an encompassing notion and it includes
not only the arts and sciences, religions and philosophies to which the word
culture has historically applied, but also the system of technology, the
political practices, the small intimate habits of daily lve, such a s the way of
preparing or eating food, or of hushing a child to sleep, a s well a s the method
of electing a prime minister or changing the constitution. 13

Mead, therefore, contends that culture is a systemic and integrated whole

14.

This view indicates an ecological/systems theory approach which
perceives entities or persons in context. Such a contextual aspect of culture is
manifest when it is perceived as a set of norms or behavioral standards for the
social life of a group that shares them

15.

These norms are learned and

therefore continuously transmitted and reproduced from generation to

13
14
15

Mead, 1959: 10
ibid.: 9
Dobriner, 1969; Haviland, 1978

generation 16. Consequently, culture is a dynamic, evolutionary process and
thus it is not universal either in spatial or in temporal terms.
It is important, however, to distinguish between cultural patterns - as
varying forms that these behavioral standards can take in different times and
at different places - and the function of culture which is common to all of them
and therefore universal. Seeking such a universality of culture should not be
confused with cultural universalism which marked the early developments in
anthropology and which perceived the Western/Christian cultural pattern as an
ultimate achievement of cultural development, to be followed by other "less
developed" cultures.
It was Malinowski who explored the universal function of culture and who
thus arrived at its basic definition. Humans organize to satisfy their vital needs
and organizing for this purpose is a universal human characteristic

17.

Vital

needs are biologically determined, but the ways of satisfying them are defined
by the cultural pattern of the social group who share such ways as a behavioral
standard.
The satisfaction of the organic or basic needs of man and of the race is a
minimum set of conditions imposed on each culture. The problems set by
man's nutritive, reproductive, and hygienic needs must be solved. They are
solved by the construction o f a new, secondary, or artificial environment.
This environment, which is neither more nor less than culture itself; has to be
permanently reproduced, maintained, and managed. This creates I...I a new
standard of living, which depends on the cultural level of the community, on
the environment, and on the emiency of the group. A cultural standard of
living, however, means that new needs appear and new imperatives or
determinants are imposed on human behavior. 18

The analysis of transformation of primordial, organic needs into derived cultural necessities is defined by Malinowski as functionalism

19.

For the context

of an ecological culture, with a principal focus on the relationship between
humans and nature, Malinowski's functionalism has a particular relevance. It is
a concept of culture distinctly congruent with the systems theory perception of
interactions and exchange between humans and their environment.
16
17

18
19

Mead, op.cit.: 9
Malinowski. 1944: 38
ibid.: 37
Malinowski. 1961: 291

The processes of food intake, digestion, the collateral secretions, the
absorption of nutritive substances, and rejection of waste matter are related
in several ways to environmental factors and the interaction between the
organism and the outside world, an interaction culturally framed. 20

The relationship between humans and nature is one of the key issues of
cultural inquiries. It is specifically addressed by cultural ecology as
a s M y of how and why h u m use Nature, how they incorporate Nature into
Society, and what they do to themselves, Nature, and Society in the process. 2 1

A fundamental question to start from is the distinction and the separation

of culture from nature. Why should human activities, artifacts and interventions into natural processes be considered un-natural, or external to nature? If
humans are biologically part of nature, why should some aspects of human life
be perceived as if they do not belong to natural processes? What is the
meaning of the differentiation between humanity and nature? These questions
are of paramount importance for the discussion of an ecological culture which
is most directly involved with the current environmental crisis and the impact
that humans make on natural environments and eco-systems.
If Culture comes to embrace more and more of Nature, we are left with a
dilemma: on the one hand, it becomes more d~ficultto work with theories
that assume a permanent distinction between Nature and Culture - Humanity
and Environment - Man-made and Natural environments. On the other hand,
fi Culture absorbs Nature, then what general theory of ecology shall we
choose? [...I I believe that the long-term trend will run I...I toward a theory that
assimilates Humans and Nature into a common social frame of reference. 22

The next question is how the nature/culture distinction is determined. If it
is not defined at a transcendental level, external to humanity (a proposition,
however, not entirely incompatible with some views which will be discussed in
the last parts of this essay), then the notions of nature and culture are
themselves cultural constructs 23, and therefore as dynamic and changeable as
culture itself.
Such categories are always represented,perceived and understood
within the conceptual frameworks of particular languages, and thus within
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the boundaries of human systems that are themselves the ever-evolving
products of the incessant interplay between nature and culture. 24

Consequently, the dividing line between nature and culture is also
culturally defined - determined by the context of the current world view. World
views are included in the encompassing, integrative notion of culture (which
also accounts for their apparent connotational overlap).
A major world view, or conceptual framework, that long characterized our

civilization (another term sometimes used as homogenous with culture), is the
dualized perception of humanity and nature, and consequently of culture and
nature. They are construed as conflicting and mutually exclusive. A s I will
elaborate further on, dualism between culture and nature has been identified
(mainly by eco/feminists) as primarily related to patriarchy:
With the advent of patriarchy, the social divide between male and female
created a split between mihd and body, culture and nature, which destroyed
the symbiosis with the natural environment on which a circular regenerative
world view depended. 25

In the context of an ecological culture, the dualist construct of the
culture/nature relationship has to be questioned.
Redefining "humanity"and 'naturewbecomes a central scienhjic and
cultural problem. Where are the boundaries to be set? How are 'human' and
'natural' systems related? What shall we recognize as being 'natural'? When
should we intervene? When refrain from intervention? 26

If a new relationship between humanity and nature has to be defined in
terms of an environmental/ecological consciousness which would be based on
individual responsibility and sensitivity for nature within and without humans it would have to be established on the interrelatedness and interconnectedness
of the eco-systemic perspective, rather than on a dualist construct of opposition
and exclusion. Consequently, the boundaries between humanity and nature, as
well as between culture and nature, are defined as those between entities and
their interrelated environment, or context, where the entity has its integrity,
but is, at the same time, fully interconnected with the larger whole, environ-
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ment, or context. Boundaries are then flexible and permeable for interactive
relationship. From such a perspective, the problem framed by Bennett (quoted
above) in terms of either/or (culture or nature), emerges as resolved when
reframed in a both/and mode - which he seems to refer to in terms of "a
common social frame of reference".
Such a systemic concept of culture and its relation to nature corresponds
fully with Malinowski's functionalism which perceives the two realms as
necessarily dynamically interrelated - exempllfvmg the "interplay" which
Melucci and Chorover speak of in the paragraph quoted above.
A pertinent expression of the static and dualistic concept of the

nature/culture relationship is the notion of "human nature". Its usage typically
reveals a sharp divide between what is considered as naturally given human
traits and those that are culturally defmed. Often the notion of "human nature"
implies a conviction that human behavior is innate or genetically determined
and, therefore, unrelated to social conditions of a person's life. Such views,
most often shrouded in a "value-free" scientific guise, present a defense of
social status quo and resistance to social change.
Critical discussions of biological and environmental determinist
thought in comparative psychology I.. .I recognize the extreme scient~jlc
inadequacy and potentially profound social implications of the tendency to
conceptualize and describe psychological phenomena as Ji they were completely reducible to expressions of insensate forces deriving from ElTHER innate
(e.g., genetic) OR acquired (e.g., environmental/experimental)sources. I...] By
contrast, within the broader ecosystemicfrarneumrk I am trying to develop,
the organization and development of human systems is seen in composite
synchronic (contextual) and diachronic (evolutionary) perspective. 27
Even the most sophisticated contemporary discussions of behavior
control are based upon false and misleading ideas about human nature,
versions of which have beenfostered since antiquity for the sole purpose of
just~jijingthe power ofsomepeople to control the behavior ofothers. 28

From the viewpoint of the nature/culture relationship, the static view of
"human nature" fails to comprehend the evolutionary and interactive character
of both nature and culture. They both continuously change in their "interplay".
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I will put forth a n assumption here that the difficulty of comprehending a

more relational concept of nature and culture, or nature and humanity, could
very possibly result from a systematic disconnectedness of humans from
nature

29.

This disconnectedness is closely related to the dualist construct of

humanity and nature. The causal interaction between dualism and the disconnection from nature, a s well a s their forms and impacts, will be discussed in
detail throughout this essay.
The perception that we are lacsomething seems to be one of the
main springs of our behaviour. The human species ceased to betong entirety to
nature as only one animal species among many when, through developed
language, it learned to give a symbolic representation to such a perception of
lack and absence and the accompanying urge to overcome it. A culture is a
symbolic universe which contains the gestures, the actions, and the words
with which the fundamental experience of absence - as limit, death, and
otherness - can be expressed 30

In addition to the basic Malinowskian definition of culture a s organized ways
of satisfylng vital human needs, culture also has a symbolic, paradigmatic
aspect. It clearly ensues from the fact that the culturally defined ways of satisfymg vital needs imply a set of habits, attitudes and rnindsets that create a
non-physical cultural sphere - a "symbolic universe" described in the previous
quotation.
Culture includes also some elements which apparently remain
intangible, inaccessible to direct observation, and where neither form nor
function is very evident. We speak more or less glibly about ideas and values,
about interests and beliefs; we discuss motive infolk tales, and dogmatic
conceptions in the analysis of magic or religion. 31

This symbolic aspect of culture has been a primary focus of both
structuralist and postmodernist perspectives

32, but

it is possibly best defined

by Melucci a s its "capacity to lend meaning to objects and relations"

33.

In this sense, culture is also a paradigm, a world view. Therefore, a n
ecological culture would give a different "meaning to objects and relations", and
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to human lives - different from the meaning bestowed upon u s by the cultural
pattern that we currently live.
In this essay, I will focus my attention to the Western industrial-consumer
culture and discuss ecological culture as a departure from that cultural model.
Such a focus might seem a t odds with the rejection of the universalist anthropological approach to cultural inquiry which I pointed at earlier. However, it is
again important to distinguish between an anthropological paradigm which
upholds a belief in the superiority of the Western cultural model, and the
reality which clearly indicates that this cultural model has now become an
overwhelmingly dominant one, and has invaded and colonized most other cultures. It is necessary to note in this connection that supremacy of a cultural pattern at a certain stage of cultural development does not imply its superiority
A cultural pattern can very well be unsustainable or otherwise inadequate

-

34.

or

rather become so in the course of evolutionary processes which thus induce
cultural change. The basic aspects of the industrial-consumer culture have by
now penetrated almost every society, and the comprehensive environmental
and social crisis related to that cultural model has become global.
I will not, therefore, in this essay, look much into cultures other than the in-

dustrial-consumer (and, of course, the emerging ecological culture). If I did,
such a n outlook would need to include a n analysis of the relationship between
cultures, religions and ecology 35. Some pre-consumer cultures (e.g. NativeAmerican) had a more ecologically-minded world view than the Judeo-Christian
tradition and the cultures that evolved within its framework, particularly toward
the later stages of their development

36.

It should be noted, however, that some

crucial aspects of the Christianity-based paradigm - like patriarchy,
domination, violence - appear in barely different forms in other major religions.
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The following statement exemplifies a non-dualist concept of the relationship
between humans and nature:
Native American ethic with respect to the physical world is a matter of
In the? mind, nature is not something apartfrom
reciprocal appropriation. I...]
them They have existence within the element. (Momaday, 1976: 80, 84)

It is doubtful that the ecologically-minded pre-consumer cultures - even in
the case of the Native-American, which is historically most recent - can have
much influence under the dominance of the industrial/consumerism reality,
other than a n indication that the current model is not the only available one.
The levelling effect of the omnipresence of the consumer cultural model
still does not entirely obliterate the differences of the historically distinct
cultures into which consumerism has now invaded. Likewise, the development
of a new ecological cultural pattern does not have to follow identical paths, and
will not have to occur everywhere at the same time and a t the same pace.
These considerations bring up the issues of cultural evolution, transformation and change.

Cultural Change
The concept of cultural evolution seems to be confusing in the context of
ecological and environmental issues and of the relationship between humans
and nature:
While I express some criticisms of evolutionary conceptions of cultural
development, I have to some extent relied on such interpretations in
developing a n approach to the problem of why Homo sapiens has exploited the
physical environment to a n increasing extent. 37

How can cultural development not be evolutionary? Obviously, the criticisms
implied here are related to the application of Social Darwinism to cultural concepts. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the anthropological field was
predominated by Social Darwinism, although, already when it emerged, it was
vigorously disputed (notably by Kropotkin 38). Social Darwinism contended that
human relations were subject to Darwin's laws of natural selection, according
to the notion of "the survival of the fittestn (actually coined by Herbert Spencer,
the principal proponent of Social Darwinism, not by Darwin), and, therefore,
the "strongn,domineering cultures naturally influenced and prevailed over the
37
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"weak". The essential domination-based cultural concept has, however,
survived through subsequent development of anthropological "schools", and is
still present in various, more or less disguised universalist perspectives.
Ecofeminist and feminist writers 39 put a lot of emphasis on rejecting the
universality of the cultural patterns which just@ domination over women and
over nature.
In the last hundred years, anthropology has produced a wealth of evidence about the symbols of other cultures very d~fferentfrom our own. Potentially
this could allow us to see that symbols are not a universal order [...I But anthropologists [...I have tended to assume that westem culture is superior to those
under investigation, which are seen as more 'primitive',and which could come
to see the world our way ifonly they were more 'intelligent' or 'developed'.40

Goodison explains how an often unconscious, or at least unrecognized application of the prevailing standards of our culture prevents a recognition that there
are other possible avenues of cultural development, and that the attitudes of dualistic perception of masculinity/femininity and humanity/nature, and the consequent domination-based relationships, are only a stage in cultural evolution.
I will argue that symbols are not universal or inevitable, but are the
product of a particular society at a particular time; and that they serve to
validate and perpetuate the status quo in that society. 41

The critique of cultural universalism, in the context of cultural evolution,
becomes substantially different from cultural relativism, which stems from the
same critical starting point. In its extreme form cultural relativism emerges as a
"value-free" perspective, and its proponents "maintainthat aU diverse cultural
values are equally valid"42. This approach implicitly (in most cases) prevents eva-

luation of the current dominant cultural pattern and consequently defends the
status quo. Thus an anti-universalist perspective becomes anti-evolutionary.
The cure is not to reactivate the tribal form of ecological ignorance (take
away our means), nor to continue the modem form of that ignorance (thefree
market will save us), but rather to evolve and develop into an integrative mode
of awareness that will - also for thefirst time in history - integrate the
biosphere and noosphere in a higher and deeper union. 43
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The concepts of cultural evolution, transformation and change are a key
framework for the discussion of an ecological culture, not only because its
emergence could not be contemplated without an evolutionary perspective, but
also because in this essay, the evolutionary paradigm will constitute an
essential context for understanding sustainability, post-domination and
spirituality a s components of a new cultural pattem.
Cultural transformation and change are implicit in Mahowski's functionalist concept of culture. The dynamic process of emergence and continuous redefinition of secondary needs - which are culturally determined ways of satisfymg
basic vital human needs - points to a constant and ongoing cultural change.
Human beings live by nonns, customs, traditions, and rules, which are
the result of an interaction between organic processes and man's
manipulation and re-setting of his environment. 4 4

Cultural transformation indicates a likelihood that a new cultural pattern
(e.g. an ecological culture) could offer different ways of solving the problems of
human interaction with the social and physical environment, create new needs
in the process, and - what is particularly important in the context of the

current environmental/ecological crisis - abandon some of the needs that
previous cultures have created, or render them obsolete, unethical, or
dangerous - a s it happened with, for example, ritual cannibalism, or ritual
witch hunt and burning. I t can also happen that some of the newly created
cultural expressions could have negative impacts when analyzed in specific
contexts. Such a n analysis would not imply a n embracing of cultural
universalism a s the "value-free"approach mentioned above would suggest.
An array of ideas exists, available to a given age; some of these for
unarticulated or even unconscious reasons seem plausible to individuals or
social groups; others do not. Some ideas spread; others temporarily die out.
[...I Out of this d~fferentialappeal of ideas that seem most plausible under
particular social conditions, cultural transformations develop. 4 5

The process of cultural transformation has been very much visible in the
infusion of the prevailing consumerist model into non-industrial societies:
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When social constraints on consumption break down as a result of
acculturation or other economic pressures people are subject to the seduction
of the marketplace. Acculturating peoples may be emulating admired foreigners, or they may be victims of advertising and cultural imperialism. I.. .I
What is the adaptive value of selling rice to buy Coca-Cola?I...] The very
concept of economic utility is premised on a set of preferences and values that
are cultural and therefore partially symbolic. New goods acquire new
symbolic values that are used in economic and political competition, and they
become tools in contests over reshaping society. 46

The predominance of symbolic over productive aspects of the economic
exchange, and its deeply and increasingly alienating effects have been the
subject of an extraordinarily insightful analysis by the postmodernist social
theorist Jean Baudrillard

47.

Such analyses indicate that cultural transformation is equally manifested
within the dominant culture. The formidable environmental crisis with its
daunting social and ecological aspects generates a pervasive despair of
pandemic proportions:
From news reports and from our environment we are bombarded by signals of distress - of toxic wastes and famines and wiring species, of arms
and wars and preparations for war. These boggle the mind and stir within us
feelings of dread, anger and sorrow even though we may never express them 48

The profound helplessness, hopelessness and apathy has become probably the
most worrying symptom of the current crisis.
However, a crisis can cut both ways. In Chinese the notion of crisis is
depicted by juxtaposing danger and opportunity 49.
The notion of cultural transformation can inspire a sense of optimism and
positive change. Riane Eisler uses the term to denote the emerging shift from
the long-lasting domination-based cultural pattern to a partnership model of
human relationships toward each other and toward nature

50.

Evolution toward an ecological culture can offer a more hopeful outlook.
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Human Ecology:
The Human-Environment Relationship
Through the extension of our understanding of the
ecological context, it will ultimately be possible to
develop a sense of belonging with a more expansive
perspective: ecospheric belonging. 51

Human ecology is defined as the study of interrelationships between
humans and their "total environment including other human beings" 52.
Consequently, my essay has to be situated within this field of inquiry. I am
describing human ecology as a field of inquiry, rather than as a scientific
discipline, because one of its primary characteristics is its interdisciplinarity.
Likewise, it is not only scientific, a s its interdisciplinarity entails a n integration
of sciences with other forms of human creative activities. It is, however, a n
"ecology", which is a science in its original meaning and scope.
The term ecology was coined in 1866 by the Gernzan biologist Ernst
Haeckel, who defined it as "the science of relations between the organism and
the surrounding outer world." In 1909 the word Umwelt ("environment")was
used for the _first time by the Baltic biologist and ecological pioneer Jakob von
Uexkiill. 53
Although ecology was originally limited to the study of non-human species,
its definition has become more inclusive.
In Viennafrom 1967 onwards an attempt was undertaken to establish a
framework of guiding principles for dealing with human ecological problems
in practice as well as in theory. I...I Dejhitions are provided for I...]Human
Ecology: The ecology of the species Homo sapiens. I...]
Species Homo sapiens: The living being with the characterization "nosce
te ipsum" Fnow thyself)(Linnaeus 1758, p. 20). 54

The initial exclusion of humans as subjects of ecological inquiry reflected
the reductionist epistemological paradigm of scientific objectivity (which I
mentioned in the first section, and I will discuss its transcendence in the last
chapter). Another reason for the late inclusion of humans into ecology has been
that their relations with the environment could not be studied only in terms of
-
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biology (as ecology initially emerged as a sub-discipline of biology). Therefore,
the interdisciplinary perspective is requisite for human-ecological inquiry.
Although a more systematic interdisciplinary approach was developed in
the later half of the 20th century, the basic principles of interrelatedness and
interconnectedness have been developing in scientific inquiry since the
eighteenth century

55

or even earlier 56. One of the pioneers of human ecology

was the American chemist and home-economist Ellen Swallow Richards (18421911). who, as the first women admitted to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, founded there the discipline of home economics. Her approach
was distinctly eco-systemic and human-ecological in considering the
interactions between humans and their environment, and she was one of the
first scientists to pay attention to the issues of pollution

57.

More recent

background to the development of human ecology as a distinct field of inquiry
includes the Chicago school of human ecology from the 1920s, and the
emergence of social ecology, anthropological ecology and cultural ecology in the
'70s and '80s 58. Human ecology is inherently integrative and interdisciplinary
It is, therefore, necessary (as this essay will demonstrate) to consider it in the
scope of a much broader conceptual framework.
The central issue of human ecology - human/environment relationship necessarily entails the systems theory perspective which regards the entities,
or individuals (human or other) together with their environment as basic units
of inquiry. This methodological approach derives from the ecological background, wherefrom its application has been broadened to humanistic disciplines.
Ecological anthropology was profoundly inJuenced by the advent of
systems thinking in biology I...] his was part of an attempt to replace the
conceptual units "culture"and "environment"with 'ecosystems " and
component "populations." so that the work of anthropology was fully
integrated into an ecological approach that included the emergingfilds of
systems theory, ethology, and population biology. 59
55
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For the context of this essay, the most salient expression of the relational
eco-systemic approach of human ecology is its preoccupation with human belonging to nature

60.

An awareness, a sense of belonging and connectedness to

nature is the central premise for contempleting a n emergent environmental/ecological consciousness, and the principal foundation of the ecological culture a s I
perceive and discuss it.
In Carolyn Merchant's view, the systemic perspective (and she specifically
refers to Bateson's concept of "the pattern that connects" 61) has linked a new
ecological self with the traditional Buddhist concept of interconnectedness:
The new ecological self is a self connected to the world, bringing new resources
of courage, ingenuity, and endurance to combat despair and engage in healing
our body - the world. 62

The new ecological self has to regain what is often perceived a s a loss:
The myth behind human ecology is one of the oldest of all, the myth of
lost connectedness or lost wholeness that goes back to thefist chapters of
Genesis and is repeated in most cultures of the world: a myth of separation or
alienation from nature and from our own history. 63

Most of us have lost that sense of un* of biosphere and humanity which
would bind and reassure us dl with an a t a t i o n of beauty. 64

A s pointed out before, the problem with human belonging to nature and

with the sense of lost connectedness derives from the dualist perception of
humanity and nature:
The real question is: where have humanity and nature been pitted into
antagonism or simply detachedfrom each other? The history of civilization
has been a steady process of estrangementfrom nature that has increasingly
developed into outright antagonism. 65

Humanity and nature are the basic antagonistic pair in a comprehensive
dualist mind-kame which consistently encompasses a whole spectrum of polarities and schisms. According to ecoferninist philosopher Val Plumwood, dualist
structure is a n essential characteristic of western thought. She discerns the
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following oppositional pairs: culture/nature, reason/nature, male/female,

tion, mind and spirit/nature, freedom/necessity, universal/particular, hu-

subject/object, self/other

66.

Feminist writer Lucy Goodison begins her book

with dualities:
Good/ bad. mind/body;pure/irnpure: white black; male/female; active/passive; sun/moon; up/down; spirit/matter; culture/nature; spirituality/sexuality. This book is about divisions in our thought and society - and about exploring possibilities of connection. The inequalities and splits in our society are
echoed in aseries of symbolic divisions which shape the way we think and imagine. Society is split between haves and have-nots, dominant and oppressed
races, leaders and followers; and we recreate those splits inside ourselves. 67

Systemic examination of the dualist paradigm and avenues to overcome it
present an eminently human-ecological project. The basic dualist split between
humans and nature and all the related schisms are deeply implicated in the
present environmental crisis in all its complex and interrelated social, ecological
and ideological aspects.

Human Ecology as an
Interdisciplinary and Integrative Field
Any good poet, in our age at least, must begin with
the scientin view of the world; and any scientist
worth listening to must be something of a poet.
must possess the ability to communicate to the rest
of us his sense of love and wonder at what his work
discovers.

Edward Abbey
Human ecological inquiry into interactions and interrelations between
humans and their environment in their entirety, entails necessarily an
approach of interdisciplinarity and integration. What do these notions exactly
connote?
66
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68

Interdisciplinarity is a difficult issue because the traditional scientific
approach has long been deeply emersed in disciplinary divisions. Therefore,
interdisciplinarity emerges from a recognition about the inadequacy of separate
disciplinary viewpoints - their narrowness and lack of interrelational
perspective. It has become necessary to understand not only that other
disciplines have different perspectives, but that they are interrelated, and not
engaged in issues that are entirely distinct and irrelevant to other disciplines.
Physicists have [..I focussed their attention on the[...wlds at the opposite
ends of the scale of magnitude: on the one hand the&& of universal extent,
gravitational and electro-magnetic, and on the other hand the submicroscopic_fields of subatomic particles [...I So far, physicists have hardly begun to
consider the idea of _fieldsof sys tems that lie between these extremes, partly
for the simple reason that the natural sciences are divided into departments:
the study of molecules and crystals is the province not of physicists, but of
chemists, crystallographers, biochemists, and molecular biologists; living
organisms lie in the realm of biology, and minds in psychology. 69

The increasingly restricted focus of narrow specialization and disciplinary
and subdisciplinary fragmentation often develops into a systematic impediment
to communication among scientists. As a reaction, a common saying has
cropped up in academic circles that too much in-depth study can lead to
knowing more and more about less and less, until it - in mathematical terms nears asymptotically the point when (or where) each narrow specialty will
"know everything about nothing".
However, interdisciplinary breadth can seemingly lead to the other extreme:
While the scope of human ecology may be confusing for some people, it is
also its strength. As the professional literature and contacts expand those of
us committed to this new_field are encouraged by the range of interests drawn
to it. 70

The broad range of interests might verge on "knowing nothing about everything". Obviously, interdisciplinarity is not merely a multiplicity of views, a
composite perspective drawing upon a wider pool of data.
The integrative interdisciplinary approach entails crossing of disciplinary
boundaries. It can create confusion as Wright et al. observed, or, sometimes,
69

70

English biologist Rupert Sheldrake frames this issue (Sheldrake, 1988: 299-300)
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from a more dogmatic perspective, it can be taken for a transgression into
jealously defended disciplinary domains. Sheldrake observes that
chemists, crystallographers, biologists, and psychologists do not usually feel
free to postulate new kinds of fundamental Jields, because fundamental Jield
theory is the province of physics. 71

The necessity of an integrative interdisciplinary perspective is best (and
pertinently for this essay) exemplified in the approach to the current
environmental crisis. The traditional fragmentation of scientific disciplines, and
the (consequent) dividedness and disconnectedness of policy making and
implementation, typically hinder insights into interrelations and
interdependencies requisite for understanding of complex interactions between
humans and their all-inclusive environment.
Global environmental change presents a special challenge and
opportunity for human ecology. Central to the practical and intellectual
challenges is the need to integrate knowledge across the sciences. [. ..I
It is also clear that all the major problems facing humanity in the
twenty-first century, and especially those related to global change, will
require a broad, interdisciplinary understanding. Problems of con.ict
resolution, social and economic development and of the environment cannot
be solved using the knowledge of only a single discipline or specialty. 72

Interdisciplinary integration entails several levels of synthesis. The integration of scientific disciplines is only the first level. Even more important for the
human-ecological perspective is the cross-scientific connection between natural
and social sciences (humanities). It overcomes the dualized concept of
humanity and nature. A further significant integration is between sciences
(natural and social) and art. The transcendence of this traditional and rather
strictly posited boundary can be a manifestation of rapprochement between
objectivity and subjectivity.
The nature of lve and conscwusness are not in practice taken into
account in the actual theories of physics. These are the concern of other
departments. But fi a truly un~fiedtheory is ever to emerge, living organisms
and conscious minds must be included within it along with the particles and
Jields of physics. There is a need for a new natural philosophy that goes
further than physics alone can go but remains in hannony with it. 73
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Life is the utmost level of integration of the human-ecological perspective.
It involves an understanding of interrelatedness between human consciousness
and human belonging to nature - a most controversial issue which lacks
consensus among those who seemingly talk about the same thing when they
consider the connection between noosphere74 and biosphere:
As a transdiscipline, human ecology acknowledges the existence of
human intellect and therefore incorporates the noosphere as well as the
biosphere as altered consciously or unconsciously by human activities. 75

Interdisciplinary integration assumes an eco-systemic meaning which
offers the distinction between multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. The
systemic perspective entails an approach which starts from the whole and
proceeds toward specific aspects. Interdisciplinarity thus transcends the
fragmentation of disciplinary divisions and reaches the comprehensive
wholeness of ecological processes and human life processes a s their part.
Multidisciplinarity represents the old paradigm - a mere accumulation of
already fragmented perspectives.
Without this clear systemic determinant, some authors find it necessary to
devise a term to distinguish the integrative approach from mere accumulation.
It ultimately becomes a matter of different terminological choices:
Beyond interdisciplinarity, human ecology also provides a
transdisciplinary overarching framework from which problems involving
human-environment relationships are approached and examined. Relatedly,
Tengstrom [...I questions whether 'the principle aim of human ecology is to
restructure knowledge already gained, or is it to produce fundamentally new
and spec~fwhuman ecological knowledge or both...". 76

Regardless of how it is defined, interdisciplinary integration has to be
perceived not a s exclusive of in-depth, narrowly focused and analyhcal
methods of inquiry, but rather a s complementary to them. Interdisciplinarity
reflects the fundamental holistic meaning that a whole is more than the sum of
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Griffore and Phenice. op.cit.: 145. See also the quote by Wilber above (footnote 42)
whose explicitly dualistic concept of these notions will be criticized in the last
chapter.
ibid.: 144-145

parts. An overall view can put some of the disciplinary issues into a new
context, which would help their better understanding.
Interdisciplinarity is the primary methodological approach of this project.
The thesis is built u p on insights and research that pertain to diverse disciplines, and there is much overlap between them. The main disciplines that I focus on are the following: political science and environmental policy in particular;
anthropology, which covers primarily the issues of culture, cultural development, community and household, but in its wider context, and for the purpose
of this project, it can be perceived a s embracing also the issues of psychology
and sociology. The economic problems addressed in the thesis can be seen as
pertaining both to anthropology and to the conceptual framework of environmental policy. The third field I have focused on is technology, a s a n engineering discipline, but touching also a lot upon architecture, which is my original
field of academic and professional involvement. Architecture, in its broader context, also involves the issues of sociology, psychology and economy. The issues
of technology are connected to the more fundamental questions of physics,
which also presents a link to philosophy - the last, and most encompassing of
the disciplines I focus on, a s it embraces the overall conceptual issues and also
the ethical and epistemological questions that I address in this essay.
Consequently, the form of this thesis is a n integrative overview, a n overarchingframework a s described in the previous quotation. Therefore, in this
essay I will not attempt in-depth examination and discussion of any of the
raised issues. I wiU offer a n initial insight into the comprehensive scope of
essential aspects of a new world view and way of life - a n ecological culture.

Chapter

Conceptual Framework:
Systems Theory and Holism
Major theoretical interventions such as Bateson's
"ecology of mind," Bohm's theory of the implicate
order, Sheldrake's theory of formative causation
I.. .I LovelocKs Gaia hypothesis, Prigogine's theory
of dissipative structures and order by fluctuation,
Lorenz and Feigenbaum's chaos theory, and Bell's
theorem of nonlocality have pointed to new
possibilities for a less reductionist scientijk world
conception. I.. .I
A further crucial development encouraging
these integrative tendencies in the postmodern
intellectual milieu has been the epistemological
rethinking of the nature of imagination, carried
out on many fronts - philosophy of science,
sociology, anthropology, religious studies 1.. .]
Imagination is no longer conceived as
simplistically opposed to perception and reason;
rather, perception and reason are recognized as
being always informed by the imagination. 1

Interdisciplinarity is the central methodological departure point of this project. It reflects, as I have already indicated, a more fundamental systemic, holistic and ecological conceptual framework fiom which to approach an ecological
culture.

Basic Concepts: Integrity and Interaction
The basic principle of systems theory is that the unit of inquiry is never a n
isolated entity, but the unity of entity-in-its+nvironrnent

or in-its-context.

Such unity is a system and its fundamental characteristics are inter-related-

ness; inter-connectedness;inter-dependence;and inter-action between the
entity and its environment or context. Consequently systemic units exist and
evolve within larger or wider units a s nested levels of complexity.
The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality ( 1 928)
[...I views the world as an organism comprising individual organisms existing
in relationship to the environment. 2

Systems theory, ecology and holism share the basic concepts, or can be
perceived a s congruent, if not homogenous.
The emphasis on the whole [has been called] holistic, organismic, or
ecological. In twentieth-century science the holistic perspective has become
known as "systemic"and the way of thinking it implies as "systems thinking."
I shall use "ecological"and "systemic"synonymously, "systemic"being merely
the more technical, scientific term. 3

The original ecological meaning of the basic unit of inquiry is organism-inits-environment. In human-ecological terms it also entails the individual (or per-

son)-in-her/his-environment,
or context.
Holism is also one of the words - now very popular - that present terrninological vagueness which I was mentioning in the first chapter. The etymology is
simple - holos means whole in Greek - but the connotation of the concept is
somewhat controversial. There is a widespread assumption that holism means
only a perception of wholes, which flattens everythmg into undifferentiated indistinguishable mass

4.

There is also a concern that holism can be given a totali-

tarian interpretation - understood a s a leveling unification, and a rejection of

2
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Merchant, 1994: 16
Capra, 1996: 18. See also the quote in previous chapter (footnote 52).
Wilber, 1995

contrasts and diversities

5.

Even the (1977 edition of) Fontana Dictionary of

Modern Thought defines holism as "hostileto the philosophical technique of ana-

lysis," which is a misconception (or, even more, an emotionally framed judgment
in stark contrast to a "value-free" discourse that should be expected from a

dictionary: Why hostile?!). As usual with encyclopedic compilations, it represents
a conservative view, derived from the perspective of the current paradigm.
These confusions and misconceptions arise because holism, systems
theory and broadly conceptualized ecology are relatively new concepts, and
because they shake the foundations of the presently prevailing world view.
The basic and most widespread meaning of holism/eco-systems approach
(in the Fontana Dictionary too) is that a whole is more than the sum of its

parts. Therefore, analysis is not sufficient, it cannot give conclusive knowledge.
A holistic/eco-systemic view is also needed.
Systems theory looks at the world in tenns of the interrelatedness and
interdependence of all phenomena I.. .] An integrated whole whose properties
cannot be reduced to those of its parts is called a system 6

The relational perspective is the essential systemic and ecological precept.
It means that any property, quality or characteristics of a n entity cannot be
derived from the entity itself, but only from its relation to its environment or
context. Many writers relevant to the human ecological context consider Alfred
North Whitehead most important in developing the relational concept

7.

His

philosophy of organism is "based upon the notions of 'system', 'process'"8, and
what he terms extensive continuum - "acomplex of entities united by the vari-

ous allied relationships of whole to partw 9 . He considered that the perception of
physical attributes a s internal and external relationships presented the shift
from a materialistic to a n organismic paradigm lo.
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Marcuse, 1964
Capra, 1982: 43
Capra, 1982; Capra, 1996; Cobb, 1982; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Sheldrake,
1988;Wilber, 1995
Whitehead, l929/ 1978: 128
ibid.: 66
ibid.: 309

However, the essential elements of systems thinking can historically be
traced much earlier. Giordano Bruno appears (in the sixteenth century) as one
of the first systemic and holistic thinkers. In Carolyn Merchant's view
Bruno's dialectic stressed the unity rather than the struggle of opposites,
anticipating idealist rather than materialist dialectics. He emphasized the
harmony of the whole, pointing out that an organic whole is always more
than the sum of its parts. His plurality of worlds within the infinite universe
formed a living whole. 11

Wilhelm Reich perceived Bruno as a principal precursor of what he will
have developed a s a functionalist-organic-systemicperspective of the integrity
of inner and outer spheres of organisms-in-their-environment.I will present
Reich's work in the last chapters of this essay
Bruno had in the sixteenth century, [. ..I discovered and captured in a
system of thought, the interrelations between the body and the mind, the
single organism and its environment, the basic unity and multiplicity of the
universe, an infinite universe embracing infinitely numerous worlds.
Everything exists for itself; and yet it is an integral part of a whole. Therefore,
the individual unit or sod existsjbr itrevand, at the same time,is a part of
the whole I...]To Bruno, the universe and all its parts had qualities identical
with lge. In his system there was no unbridgeable contradiction between
individualism and uniuersalism, since the individual was an integral part of
an all-encompassing whole. 12

An important system thinker (whose work is very pertinent to some of the

main issues of my essay) was the French philosopher Henri Bergson (18591941),who first developed a process philosophy (and influenced Whitehead) by
introducing the non-deterministic notion of becoming.
We cannot reason about the parts as we reason about the whole; [...I the
same principles are not applicable to the origin and to the end of a progress;
[. ..I in the concrete duration, in which alone there is true generation and not
only a composition of parts [. ..] the material world melts back into a simple
_flu,
a continuity of _flowing,a becoming. 13

He perceived a holistic property of life a s duration and becoming, which cannot
be entirely grasped by rational and analflcal methods. From there he developed an epistemological theory which I find very appropriate to the discussion
of an emergent ecological consciousness based on sensitivity for nature within
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Merchant, 1980: 114
Reich, 1951/ 1980: 104 (emphasis mine)
Bergson, 1983: 368

and without ourselves. (I will examine these epistemological issues toward the
end of the essay.)
The focus on life processes is essential for a n eco-systemic perspective.
The concept of open systems conveys the interactivity which is characteristic
of self-organizing processes. These present the link between systems theory
and non-equilibrium thermodynamics which has recently thrown new light on
the relation between entropy and life processes

14.

(Entropy and life processes

have a bearing on sustainability and will be reviewed in the following chapter.)
Before the 1940s the terms "system" and "systems thinking" had been
used by several scientists, but it was Bertalanm's concepts of a n open system
and a general systems theory that established systems thinking as a major
scientific movement. [.I
Ludwig von Bertalanm is commonly credited with the first formulation
of a comprehensive theoretical framework describing the principles of
organization of living systems. 15

The fundamental interactivity, interrelatedness and interconnectedness of
systems reflect the exchange of matter, energy and information between the entity and its environment. Consequently the boundary between the entity and its
environment is always permeable, it never completely isolates the entity from
its surroundings. The boundary is best conceived of a s a n interface, a sphere
of interrelations and interconnections. This aspect of systems is often perceived a s the characteristic which goes beyond the tangible physicality of entities:
The materiality of a body does not stop a t the point a t which we touch it:
a body is present wherever its influence is felt; its attractive force, to speak only of that, is exerted on the sun, on the planets, perhaps on the entire universe.
The more physics advances, the more it effmes the individuality of bodies and
even of the particles into which the scienti$c imagination began by decornposing them bodies and corpuscles tend to dissolve into auniversal interaction. 16

Bergson's observation came out of his awareness of the early developments in physics - primarily quantum physics - which later led to a critique
and reevaluation of the concept of clear-cut, isolated corpuscules:
Particles can be called atoms or sometimes these are broken into electrons, protons, and neutrons; now the most elementary particles are called
quarks, maybe there will be a subquark. Whatever they may be called, the
assumption is that a basic element exists which we either have or hope to
14
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Prigogine and Stengers, 1984
Capra, 1996:43,46
Bergson, op.cit.: 188

haue. I...]These elements are basically external to each other; not only are
they separate in space, but even more important, thefundamental nature of
each is independent of that of the other. 17

The interconnectivity of boundaries is most obvious in living organisms,
and, indeed, ecology is intrinsically systemic (and therefore the principal origin
of the systems theory).
The entire cell unit's dynamics extend far beyond its observable boundary. Electrical charges and chemical processes occur over an extensive area so
that it is meaningless to isolate 'the cell itself" from an environment. The cell
walls are not independent of their surroundings - they are not walls in a
commonsense way. We are dealing with an 'all-pervasive network" of forces
and interactions. 18

This dynamic concept of boundaries a s spheres of division and connection
at the same time, indicates the basic character of systems: they are integral
wholes and at the same time they are parts of larger wholes. Their integrity
does not preclude their interrelations, interconnections and belonging to more
complex wholes. Or vice-versa, their belonging to broader levels of complexity
does not deny their integrity. This has been pointed out above in Reich's
account of Giordano Bruno's systemic concept a s a n overcoming of contradiction between individuality and universality - a fundamental tenet of systems
theory with significant implications for eco-environmental issues, particularly in
the domain of ethics (which I will discuss in the last chapter). The term holon
has been devised by Arthur Koestler

19

to depict this holistic or systemic

property of simultaneous integrity and belonging to larger whole.
An important aspect of systemic/holistic logic emerges from this dual

property of wholes (or holons). The conventional linear logic where there is
always a n either/or alternative, is replaced by a both/and logic which throws a
different light on many oppositional dichotomies.
Such a defmition of holism clearly delineates it from both reductionism and
"wholism". "Wholism" is a non-systemic view which disregards the integrity of
entities and collapses everything into a n undifferentiated whole 20. Some
-
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Bohm, 1988: 344 (emphasis mine). See also quote at footnote 34 below.
Naess, 1989: 79
Koestler, 1978: 18
Wilber. op.cit.: 35

proponents of ecocentric concepts have fallen into this fallacy 21 in a n attempt
to overcome the current egocentric practices which are perceived a s
responsible for the negative impact humans exert on the environment.
Reductionism, on the other hand, fails to perceive that the properties of a
whole cannot be revealed from the analysis of its constituent components:
It is one of the main tenets of analytical atomism and mechanisticreductionism that the best (indeed the only scientifically respectable) way to
understand things is to divide them up or break them down into their smaller,
supposedly simpler (and hence ostensibly more conceptually and materially
manageable), constituent elements or parts. 22

Reductionism and atomism have for a long time been the basic precepts of the
current scientific paradigm. They tend to reduce all knowledge to divisions and
classifications, which miss the outlook of the whole. What is particularly significant, is that reduction hinders the possibility of perceiving life processes, a s
they are typically killed by dissection for the purpose of analyhcal examination.
However, this does not mean that analysis is always inadequate and unnecessary. On the contrary, it is a n appropriate method for acquiring insights into certain aspects of things. But it is important to understand its limitations and acknow-

ledge that some analyhcal procedures can impair integrative perspectives. So
there is no place for hostility, a s the Fontana Dictionary described it. Rather, analysis and systemic integration represent complementary scientific methods

23.

A method, to some extent comparable to analysis, has emerged with post-

modernism, and is known a s "deconstruction". I t is specifically focused on the
relationship between language and meaning, and, by taking apart (deconstruc-

ting) the logic of language, it scrutinizes and re-evaluates the deeply rooted
assumptions of traditional mind sets (primarily Western) 24. I will use the
21
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See quote at footnote 56 in chapter 8.
Chorover, 1990: 89-90
Reductionism and holism analysis and synthesis, a r e complementary. (Capra,

1982: 267)
24

Deconstruction was initiated by Jacques Derrida in France, who, in a series of
books published beginning in the late 1960s, launched a major critque of
traditional Westem metaphysics. He introduced the words deconstruire ('to
deconstruct") a n d deconstruction ('deconstruction") in De la grarnmatologie
(1 967). Derrida's deconstructive strategies have subsequently established
themselves as a n important part of postmodemism, especially in poststructural
literary theory a n d text analysis. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)

deconstructivist approach, primarily by referring to postmodernist analysis of
Jean Baudrillard, but also, to a limited extent, in my own discussion of dualism
and domination. However, in the last chapter, I will point to limitations of
deconstruction, and to the necessity of a re-construction, consequent to the
integrative systemic approach to a n ecological culture.
An interesting linguistic connection between the notions of whole, healing and

health points to the reductionism of the current medical model which has abandoned the traditional meaning of health a s a state of wholeness of the organism
in an integrative, systemic sense - its integration into the eco-systemic web of

interrelations with the comprehensive social and natural environment 25.

More than the Sum of Parts
The great shock of twentieth-century science has
been that systems cannot be understood by
analysis. I...] Thus the relationship between the
parts and the whole has been reversed. In the
systems approach the properties of the parts can be
understood only from the organization of the
whole. Accordingly, systems thinking
concentrates not on basic building blocks, but on
basic principles of organization. 26

The realization that reductionist and analytical methodology is inadequate
has not by itself made it easy to adopt a new way of thinking. The tendency to
break reality into components has been so deeply ingrained in our way of
thinking, that it becomes difficult to conceive what wholeness really means:
The question is then how to understand this wholeness. The entire language of physics is now analytic. Zfwe use this language, we are committed to
analyzing into parts, even though our intention may be quite the opposite. 27
25

26
27

[...I of modem scient~j%medicine [regards] human body as a
machine that can be analyzed in terms of its parts: disease is seen as
malfunctioning of biological mechanisms [...I The doctor's role is to intervene
physically or chemically to correct the malfunctioning [...I
The term 'healer" is viewed with suspicion and the concepts of health and
healing are generally not discussed in medical schools [...I Healing I...] cannot be
understood in reductionist terms. I. .] The broad concept of health I...] needed for
our cultural transformation [...I includes individual, social and ecological
dimensions.(Capra, 1982: 123-124)
Capra, 1996: 29-30
Bohm, op.cit.: 350 (emphasis mine)
The biomedical model

The analytic thinking leads u s to perceive reality a s if it is composed of fragments, rather than considering wholes a s primary states, which can be divided
into parts. When we assume that components are the basic units, we fail to understand that properties of wholes cannot be derived from observing the parts.
'The mechanistic physicist says that light consists of seven basic colors,
that it is "composed"ofthern Thefunctionalist says: $ 1 put a ray of light
through a prism it takes on the appearance of a seven-colored scale. Without
prism or without a screen formed by rain, ie., without any artificial
interference, light is a unitary phenomenon. [...I I can kill a n animal and
dissect it this way or that. No one would say that the animal consisted ofthe
parts into which I have dissected it. 28
According to the systems view, the essential properties of an organism
or living system, are properties of the whole, which none of the parts have.
They arisefrom the interactions and relationships among the parts. 'These
properties are destroyed when the system is dissected, either physically or
theoretically, into isolated elements. Although we can discern individual
parts in any system these parts are not isolated, and the nature ofthe whole is
always d~zerentfromthe mere sum ofits parts. 29

It is in the inquiry into life processes that the inadequacy of the analfical,
reductionist approach became most apparent. Fragmentation of life processes
results in losing sight of coordinating and integrative activities which make
systems the units of organization - of interrelations and interactions. The
properties of the whole, or of the system, emerge from these interactions. The
whole is not a quantitative category a s it can be implied from the reductionist
approach which can perceive wholes only a s agglomerations of parts. Whole, or
wholeness, as Bohm put it, is a quality, a n emergent property of systems.
The concept of "organized complexity" became the very subject of the
systems approach. At each level of complex@ the observed phenomena
exhibit properties that do not exist a t the lower level. For example, the concept
of temperature, which is central to thermodynamics, is meaningless a t the
level of individual atoms, where the laws of quantum theory operate.
Similarly, the taste ofsugar is not present in the carbon, hydrogen, and
oxygen atoms that constitute its components. 30

The properties of wholes emerging from their integrity should be perceived
within nested levels of complexity that characterize the systemic interrelatedness. Consequently, the fact that essential properties of the whole disappear
when a system is analyzed into its constituent subwholes, does not imply that
-
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Reich, 194911973: 100, 102
Capra, 1996: 28
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the subwholes (or subsystems) will not have their own properties which reveal
significant information unavailable when observing the whole. These properties
can provide important information about the whole. It is only critical to
understand that the properties of components cannot reveal the essential
qualities of the whole. This is another example of both/and logic and a clear
indication of the compatibility of analytic and integrative approaches.
The emergent properties of systems imply a relational logic. It follows from
the recognition that characteristics of an entity are not derived from that entity
perceived in isolation, but from its relationship to its environment or context 31:
Language continually asserts by the syntax of subject and predicate that
"things"somehow "have"qualities and attributes. A more precise way of
talkurg would insist that the "things"are produced, are seen as separatefrom
other "things,"and are made "real" by their internal relations and by their
behavior in relationship with other things and with the speaker. 32

Arne Naess points out the fundamental significance of relational thinking for
the ecological and environmental context:
All statements "about the thing" are relational statements: statements
like "thingA is B" are I...] abandoned infavour of "thingA is B in relation to
C" [...I Relationalism has ecosophical value because it makes it easy to
undermine the belief in organisms or persons as something which can be
isolated from their milieux. [.. I Organisms and milieu are not two things.
Organisms presuppose milieux. 33

From all the characteristics of the systemic perspective presented above, it
is possible to arrive at a definition of wholeness. The essential alternative to the
analytxal/reductionist view is the integrative approach - from wholes toward
parts, rather than the other way around:
Fragmentary thinku-g is giving rise to a reality that is constantly
breaking up into disorderly, disharmonious, and destructive partial
activities. Therefore, seriously exploring a mode of thinking that starts from
the most encompassing possible whole and goes down to the parts (subwholes)
in a way appropriate to the actual nature of things seems reasonable. 34

The distinctive character of the integrative approach is that it starts from
the undivided whole and thus enables the comprehension of the holistic quali31
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Systems thinking is "contextual." which is the opposite of analytical thinking.
Analysis means taking something apart in order to understand it; systems
thinking means putting it into the context o f a larger whole. (ibid.: 30)
Bateson, 1980: 67
Naess, op.cit.: 55-56
Bohm, op.cit.: 350

ties which disappear with disintegration into constituent sub-wholes. This
makes the integrative approach substantially different from synthesis. Synthesis connotes an a posteriori recombination of previously fragmented pieces into
a new (artificial)whole. Therefore, synthesis is a typically reductionist procedure. It can be selective in the composition of the new whole and some substantial aspects can be neglected - consciously, unconsciously or inadvertently.
The term synthetic conveys the meaning of artificiality, indicating that the
distinction from an integrative approach is important for the context of human
interventions into natural processes. This aspect of human interaction with the
environment is salient for the discussion of an ecological culture.
What is even more important, according to the systemic perspective, a
posteriori synthesis cannot arrive at the essential qualities of the undivided
whole because they cannot be reassembled from the qualities of the parts.
Bergson perceives that the gist of the reductionist method is that it does
not enable the grasping of duration - which is an essential holistic quality. He
likens reductionism to cinematograph which reassembles an artificial duration
out of irnrnobilities 35. This reduction of duration, movement, or change - or
becoming - into broken fragments of immobility is characteristic of the mathematical concept of infinitesimality. (Bergson discussed Zenon's rabbit and turtle
aporia from the viewpoint of duration and its artificial representation

36.)

An infinitesimal quantity is the result of a limiting process; it is typically the variation in a quantity occuning between two successive instants when
the time elapsing between these instants tends toward zero. In this way the
change is broken up into an infinite series of infinitely small changes. [...I
The qualitative diversity of changes in nature is reduced to the study of
the relative displacement of material bodies. 37
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ibid.: 329. See quote at footnote 106 in chapter 9.
Kitchin, 1914: 64
Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit.: 57. 62

Complexity, Hierarchy and Dualism
Systems theory generates a comprehensive understanding of holism a s a
concept of organized complexities. From the fact that a system can be
perceived a s a whole in one context and a s a part in another, and that systems
are interrelated wholes/parts (or holons), it ensues that they can be integrated
a t different levels. So we can speak of levels of integration of different
complexity which are stratified and nested, or embedded within each other.
An outstanding property of all l$e is the tendency to form multileveled
structures of systems within systems. Each of these forms a whole with
respect to its parts while at the same time being a part of a larger whole. I...]
Throughout the living world wefind living systems nesting within other
living systems. 38
The organism-in-environment is further d~fferentiatedin terms of
levels of integration At the least complex level, we refer to the organisrn-inenvironment as respondent-in-ambience.[...I At the next level, the organismin-environment is referred to as an agent-in-habitat [...] (e.g., social and
nonsocial objects and resources) I...] At the most complex level, we
characterize the organism-in-environmentas a person-in-world. 39

This classification offers a possible view of how different levels of complexity can be distinguished. Rupert Sheldrake situates his theory of morphic fields
in the framework of systemic levels of complexity:

Living organisms show a similar hierarchical arrangement, with
organs, containing tissues, containing cells, containing organelles such as
nuclei and mitochondria, containing complex molecules, and so on.
Arthur Koestler has proposed the term holon for such organisms I...]
Another term with a meaning equivalent to holon is morphic unit. The
word morphic emphasizes the aspect of form, and the word unit emphasizes
the unity or wholeness. 40

This concept of interconnectedness implies a perception of the whole universe a s a n interrelated system of different levels of complexity and integration.
It presents a n essential conceptual framework for understanding the key
issues of ecological culture.
Bubolz and Sontag (1993) have found it useful to conceptualize
environments as natural physical-biological human built, and
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social-cultural environments. While conceptually distinct, these
environments are actually embedded within each other. 41

It is important to realize that the interrelatedness of systems at different levels can divers@ beyond mere increases of size or scale. More complex wholes
or systems are not necessarily always bigger. Different levels of complexity
interact in a web-like framework of intricately interwoven relationships.
Furthermore, the levels of complexity that we choose to regard are merely
foci of observation 42. Particularly when living systems are concerned, it is irnpossible to put sharp boundaries between interacting units and their complex
environments. Therefore, the levels of complexity are really a matter of perception, and we can concentrate our attention on different interactions. Bergson
argues that we can only talk of partial views:
The diviswn of unorganized matter into separate bodies is relative to our
senses and to our intellect, and matter, looked at as an undivided whole, must
be a flux rather than a thing. I. .I
The only question is whether the natural systems which we call living
beings must be assimilated to the art~fiialsystems that science cuts out
within inert matter, or whether they mus t not rather be compared to that
natural system which is the whole of the universe.I...]The real whole might
weU be,we conceive, an indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within
it would, properly speaking, not then be parts at all; they would be partial
views of the whole. And, with these partial views put end to end, you will not
make even a beginning of the reconstruction of the whole. 43

This is indeed a controversial epistemological issue of the subjectivity/objectivity relationship 44. David Bohm offers a compelling way of looking at the issue:
I f you watch a whirlpool or a vortex, you see the water going around and
you see that the movement gets weaker the farther away it isfrom the center,
but it never ends. Now the vortex does not actuaUy exist; there is only the
moving water.The vortex is a pattern and aform your mind abstractsfrom
the sensationsyou have of moving water. I f two vortices are put together, they
will aflect each other; [...I You can say that two exist, but this is only a
convenient way of thinking. I.. .I When you have flowing water with patterns in
them, none of those patterns actually has a separate existence. 45
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Capra, 1982: 282
Bergson, op.cit.: 186, 30-31
I will address it in the last chapter.
Bohm. op.cit.:345-346 (emphasis mine)

Ken Wilber establishes his very elaborate and comprehensive theory of
holism on a n extremely opposite assumption about the character of the
systemic levels of complexity:
Reality is composed, not of things nor processes nor .wholes nor parts.
but of whole/parts, of holons. [...I Before an atom is an atom, it is a holon.
Before a cell is a ceU, it is a holon. Before an idea is an idea, it is a holon. 46

His argument seems a t first sight to be congruent with the systems theory
perspective which postulates a s object of inquiry the unity of entities-in-theirenvironment, rather than isolated things. However, Wilber's fascination with
the concept of holons is such that he promotes them into a fundamental
ontological category. It is quite absurd (although consequent to a n extreme
idealistic viewpoint which Wilber fully endorses) that a mode of perception, or
a n intellectual construct should be identified a s reality. It is a s absurd a s to
assign reality to meridians and parallels of the globe and deny it to physical
and biological structures and processes of the planet.
From there, Wilber constructs a complex and intricate intellectualistic system which offers some interesting insights into the ways of contemplating holism and related problems, but it turns into a rigid logical speculation. His point
of departure is the understanding that holons are entities which can be wholes
in one actuality and a t the same time parts in another. Holons thus form a sys-

tem of concentric nested hierarchies, which he calls holarchies, and he perceives absolutely everything consisting of these interrelations and interconnections. From this premise, Wilber logically derives the question: what is inside
what? How to deliberate which holon contains which? He offers a n extremely
speculative causal criterion:
We could destroy all humans and the biosphere would still exist (but not
vice versa), showing that the biosphere is a lower and shallower, not deeper or
i
s profoundly confuses ecotheorists; they seem to have no
higher, reality. h
coherent way to honor the biosphere without absolutizing it. [...I
his allows us to easily determine what is lower, and what is higher, in
any holistic sequence: destroy the particular holon, and everything else that
is also destroyed is higher; those holons not destroyed are lower. 47
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He gets so much carried away with his purely cerebral speculations that
he fails to notice that he is contradicting the systems theory premise which he
previously started from: the interrelatedness and interdependency of all phenomena. His observation that an isolated destruction of one holon, without affecting others, can only be an intellectualistic hocus-pocus to support a conceptual construct. And his principal conceptual construct is a strict hierarchical
structure of the universe with transcendental noosphere on the top.
I will further discuss his views in the context of spirituality in the last

chapter. Here I will only focus on his notion of hierarchy of holons:
Hierarchy, then, is the fundamental structural principle. This is also
why normal hierarchies are ofen drawn as a series of concentric circles or
spheres or 'nests within nests." 48

The notion of nested hierarchies has now become rather carelessly adopted by many writers, despite the fact that hierarchy has a connotation clearly
related to domination. This connotation makes the notion of nested hierarchies
entirely inappropriate for the interactive context of systemic relationships.
Fritjof Capra is very explicit in rejecting the term on these grounds:
Since the early days of organismic biology [...I multileveled structures
have been called hierarchies. However, this term can be rather misleading.
since it is derivedfrom human hierarchies, which are fairly rigid structures
of domination and control, quite unlike the multileveled order found in
nature. 49
We may reserve the term hierarchy for [...I systems of dominion and
control, in which orders are transmitted from the top down. I...] Most living
systems exhibit multileveled patterns of organization characterized by many
intricate and nonlinear pathways along which signals of information and
transactions propagate between all levels [...I A tree [is]a more appropriate
symbol for the ecological nature of stratifiation in living systems. [...I
The important aspect of the strahfied order in nature is not the transfer
of control, but rather the organization of complexity. 50

Nevertheless, Wilber takes a lot of effort to justifL his adherence to
hierarchical structures. He puts forth an untenable claim that
you cannot have wholeness without hierarchy, because unless you organize
the parts into a larger whole whose glue is a principle higher or deeper than
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the parts possess alone - unless you d o that, then you have heaps, not wholes.
You have strands, but never a web. 51

However, webs and networks are metaphors that are meant to convey lateral
relationships, exactly opposite to the verticality of hierarchies. Furthermore, he
attempts to assert that his concept of hierarchical holons is entirely different
from domination hierarchies, which he describes a s pathological hierarchies,
allegedly distinct from sacred governance :
Hiero- means sacred or holy, and -arch means governance or rule. [. ..]
The 'Hierarchies' referred to nine celestial orders, with Seraphim and
Cherubim at the top and archangels and angels at the bottom [. ..I These orders
were ranked because each successive order was more inclusive and more
encompassing and in that sense "higher.""Hierarchy" thus meant, in thema1
analysis, "sacred governance," or "governing one's l$e by spiritual powers."
In the course of Catholic Church history, however, these celestial orders
of contemplative awareness were translated into political orders of power. 52

Actually arch means supreme, and indicates supremacy or domination rather
than governance which does not have to imply any hierarchy. However, the
fact that domination is exerted by spiritual powers (which very much need
political power agencies of flesh and blood to get implemented) does seem to
make a difference for Wilber who perceives external spiritual entities a s
decisive determinants of human lives. All these issues are of paramount
significance for the discussion of complex intricacies of domination which I
consider essential for the context of ecological culture.
Hierarchies are directly related to the dualistic way of thinking. Dualism
establishes not only polarized constructs, but depicts them first a s
hierarchically posited into superior and inferior, then a s antagonistic because
of their differences, and finally a s mutually exclusive. The ecofeminist writer
Karen Warren describes dualistic constructs a s
disjunctive pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional [rather than
as complementary) and exclusive [rather than inclusive) and which place
higher value [status,prestige) on one disjunct rather than the other. 53

Dualism is not merely a logical issue (if logic can a t all be perceived a s
isolated from its social/cultural context). Dualistic constructs emerge from the
51
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context of domination and are manifested in the relationships of competition,
confrontation and subjugation, relationships which shut out any equality,
closeness, unity, mutuality and coexistence. Therefore. I will examine dualism
in more detail in the chapter on domination.
Dualism is incompatible with the interactive and interrelational essence of
the systemic perspective. Holism therefore implies a transcendence of dualistic
constructs and the related relationships of domination. Holism has to integrate
dualized patterns. Such a non-dualistic view of holism is an appropriate
conceptual framework for the emerging ecological culture.
A frequent reaction to dualism is the attempt to resolve dualistic constructs

of antagonistic differences by abolishing the differences. Val Plumwood calls
this reaction uncritical equality

54.

Although it is easy to demonstrate rationally

the inadequacy of such a strategy, it still occurs because dualistic constructs
are not logical abstractions. They involve often fiercely affective reactions to
domination relationships which are the expression of the dualistic mind-set.
The problem is misinterpreted as one of differences, rather than of positing the
differences as basis for superiority/inferiority and thence domination.
What happens in the case of uncritical reactions is that the dualistic
structure remains unrecognized and unresolved. Likewise, reductionism and
analysis are often perceived as dualistic opposites to holism. Holism is
consequently understood as "wholism",which (as I pointed out earlier) equalizes
all differences and individual distinctions.
The logic of dualism is always exclusive - "either/or" - because dualism construes differences as mutually exclusive. A systems/holistic perspective, as
shown above, entails an inclusive logic of "both/and"55. Furthermore, dualism
reduces all diversities to polar antipodes and thus abolishes the multitudinous
variety and gradations of qualities. The result is a drastically impoverished perception of reality.
54
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Plumwood, 1993: 59
Plumwood offers a more intricate analysis of the dominant logical system and
demonstrates how it is defined by domination/dualism paradigm (ibid.: 55-57).

Inclusive logic is dialectical: it does not imply equalization of differences.
but rather a dialectic interplay between or among contrasting or divergent
states, levels of integration or processes. The essential characteristic of
systemic-ecological holism is that it is dialectical. The primary dialectical
contrast is the tension between integrity and integration. It ensues from the
fundamental character of systems which are integral wholes and at the same
time are integrated into other levels of complexity. The relationship between
individuality and universality, as perceived by Giordano Bruno, is not
antagonistic, but dialectic.
The dialectical character of an eco-systemic perspective is primarily
manifested in life processes which are both the origin of ecological and systems
theory, as well as its principal object of inquiry. The notion of tension is closely
associated with this meaning of dialectic:
Not only can there be no one-sided resolution of the tension between
opposites (as dialectical thinking has long recognized), but that this tension
constitutes the very energizing factor keeping the human system in
continuous motion. 56

Life processes can be defined as alteration of tension and relaxation- a constant pulsation. This essential dynamism of life processes is expressed in continuous interaction between the organism and its environment. The interaction is
manifested as exchange of energy and matter

-

the process of metabolism.

Metabolism is the essential ecological process, and it will be discussed in
the following chapters as the basis for understanding sustainability.

Paradigm Change
I have already explained why I have chosen to contemplate the emerging

environmental/ecological consciousness in terms of a new cultural pattern, and
pointed out that it can also be considered a new world view, or a new
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Jantsch, 1975: xviii

paradigm. Paradigm has emerged as a popular and widely used term, to the
extent that its connotation has become rather indefinite and flexible.
The etymology is quite simple and it can actually allow a broad usage of the
word. It is derived from Greek and means pattern, example, or model

57.

Therefore, "cultural pattern" and "paradigm" can have the same meaning.
However, the present usage of the word is closest in meaning to "conceptual
framework", and thus this whole chapter is an elaboration of the paradigm in
which the emergent ecological culture will be examined.
The use of the term in this context has been associated with Thomas Kuhn
and his renowned study of scientifk revolutions, although he used it in a
narrower sense of scientific conceptual framework, or even more specifically.
the basis for current scientific practice

58.

He perceived paradigms as related

to what he qualified as "normal science", and defined them as
accepted examples of actual scientrfic practice 1.. .I which [. ..I provide models
from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientr* research These
are the traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics as 'Ptolemaic astronomy' (or 'Copernican1),'Aristotelian dynamics' (or 'Newtonian'),
'corpuscularoptics' (or 'wave optics'),and so on. The s M y of paradigms I...] is
what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientrfic
community with which he will later practice. I...] His subsequent practice will
seldom evoke overt disagreement over fwrdamentals. 59
A paradigm change, or shift in Kuhn's language, does not, in these

institutional circumstances, occur as smoothly as he seemed to envision:
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly. [...I It then
continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly.
And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the
anomalous has become the expected. [. ..I
The transitionfrom a paradigm in crisis to a new onefrom which a new
tradition of normal science can emerge is [...I a reconstruction of the field
from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's
most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm
methods and applications. I.. .I When the transition is complete, the profession
wiU have changed its view of thefield, its methods, and its goals. 60
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Rupert Sheldrake defines paradigm simply as a model of reality (Sheldrake, 1995:
166)
Kuhn. 1962: 80
ibid.: 10-11
ibid.: 52-53, 89, 84-85

Paul Feyerabend, in his controversial book Against Method,seriously questions
scientific authoritarianism and argues that only creativity can bring about new
perspectives and progress in science:
The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree
with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory,
and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting w e l l c o n ~ e dtheories
give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. 61

Rupert Sheldrake points at scientific dogmatism:
Unfortunately, many committed Skeptics confuse the defense of science
with the defence ofa particular worldview. [...They]tend to equate the
mechanistic worldview with reason itself and are passionate in its defense.
They are scient~ficfundamentalists. I...]
Because institutional science has become so conservative, so limited by
the conventional paradigms, some of the mostfundamental problems are either ignored, treated as taboo, or put at the bottom of the scientrfic agenda 62

And David Bohm argues for a continuously evolving paradigm:
We constantly must look at our world views as provisional, as
exploratory, and to inquire. We must have a world view, but we must not make
it an absolute thing that leaves no roomfor inquiry and change. We must
avoid dogmatism. 63

The most recent major paradigm shift (in Kuhnian terms) occurred - according to Sheldrake's compellingly argued account - in the 1960s, following the
adoption of the Big Bang theory of the genesis of the universe.
In the 1960s the theoretical universe ofphysics broke out of its eternity.
It looks no longer like an eternal machine, but more like a developing
organism Everything is evolutionary in nature. The evolution of lqe on earth
and the development of humanity are no longer a local Juctuation in an
eternal physical reality; they are aspects of a cosmic evolutionary process. I...]
We inherited a dual vision of the world from nineteenth-centuryscience:
on the one hand a great evolutionary process on earth, and on the other, the
physical eternity of a mechanistic universe. I...] From this dual perspective,
life ewlued on earth within a physical eternity. I...]
What is emerging in its place is an evolutionary vision of reality at every
level: subatomic, atomic, chemical, biological, social, ecological, cultural,
mental, economic, astronomical, and cosmic. 64

The fundamental principle of evolutionary cosmos implies a non-determjnistic perspective and the concept of "becoming" a s defined by Bergson:
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The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we
shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the
continual elaboration of the absolutely new. 65

The most profound consequence of this new paradigm in the context of a n
ecological culture is that it establishes a basis for a new non-dualist relationship between humanity and nature. It involves a new possibility for integration
of social/humanistic and natural sciences (a human-ecological project 66), and a
radical epistemological paradigm shift:
The driving force behind the work of the Greek atomists was not to
debase nature but tofree menfrom fear, the fear of any supernatural being, of
any order that would transcend that of men and nature. I...]
Modem science transmuted this fundamentally ethical stance into what
seemed to be an established trutk and this truth, the reduction of nature to
atoms and void, in turn gave rise to what Lenoble has called the "anxiety of modem men"H m can we m x q n k e owsetues in the random world of the atoms?
Must science be defied in terms of rupture between man and nature? I...I
The emergence of new conceptual structures 1. ..1 now appear as essential
to our understanding of the physical world - the world that includes us. 67

An essential eco-systemic meaning of this integration of sciences is the

refocusing on life processes:
Today the paradigm s h ~ 3in science at its deepest level implies a ship
from physics to the life sciences. 68
It emerges that living matter, while not eluding the 'laws of physics' as
established up to date, is likely to involve 'other laws of physics ' hitherto
unknown, which, however, once they have been revealed, will form jus t as
integral a part of this science as the former. 69

A summary of the conceptual framework for discussing the issues of an

ecological culture includes the following essential points:
eco-systemic holism implies entities-, organisms-, or individualsin-their-environment or context a s units of inquiry;
the concept of interconnectedness perceives the whole universe a s a n
interrelated system of different levels of complexity and integration;

65
66
67
68
69
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as I have indicated in the previous chapter - see text between footnotes 70 and 71.
Prigogine and Stengers. op.cit.: 2-3 (emphasis mine)
Capra, 1996: 13
Schrijdinger, 1943: 73

the essential dynamism of life processes is expressed in continuous
interaction between the organism and its environment - the process of
metabolism;
the interactive and interrelational essence of systemic perspective implies
a transcendence of dualistic constructs and related relationships of
domination;
the fundamental concept of evolutionary cosmos establishes a basis for a
new non-dualist relationship between humanity and nature.
Fritjof Capra and David Steindl-Rast offer another summary of the
emerging paradigm change:
The old scientific paradigrn may be called Cartesian, Newtonian, or
Baconian, since its main characteristics were formulated by Descartes,
Newton, and Bacon
The new paradigm may be called holistic, ecological, or systemic, but
none of these adjectives characterizes it completely.
New-paradigm thinking in science includes the following five criteria thefist two refer to our view of nature, the other three to our epistemology.
1. Sht%@orn the Part to the Whole
2. Sht%@orn Structure to Process
3. Sht3 ji-orn Objective Science to "EpistemicScience"
In the old paradigm scientific descriptions were believed to be objective,
ie., independent of the human observer and the process of knowledge.
4. Sht3ji-om Building to Network as Metaphor of Knowledge
The metaphor of knowledge as building -fundamental laws.
fundamental principles, basic building blocks, etc. - has been used in Western
science and philosophy for thousands of years.
In the new paradigm this metaphor is being replaced by that of the
network. As we perceive reality as a network of relationships, our
descriptions, too, form an interconnected network representing the observed
phenomena.
5. Shifi ji-om Truth to Approximate Descriptions. 70

The notion of network knowledge is particularly interesting and I find it
congruent with the method of presentation which I adopted for this essay.
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Sustainability
In 1994 Pepsico announced that [...I it would spend
a further $50 million to reinvent its Doritos-brand
tortilla chip - intensifying the flavor on the outer
surface, rounding the chip's comers, and
redesigning the package. I...I The expenditure of
more than $50 million to ensure that Pepsico's
Doritos outsell Pepsico's own competing Tostitos,
represents approximately _five times the total
annual U.S. investment in community-based
research A society that can afford $50 million to
reinvent the Doritos chip can do better than that! 1

As I have indicated in the Introduction, sustainability is now a widely used

term with unclear and often controversial connotation. An indication of its terrninological vagueness is the fact that a notion is defined by an adjective. What is
or has to be sustainable, or to be sustained does not come immediately into the
connotational picture. Thus the term becomes susceptible to conceptual confusion. In the following quotation the use of the word "sustain" shows that it can
confuse the meaning of sustainability. However, maybe that is exactly the reason for its appeal and wide-spread use.
Economists, entrepreneurs, and academics differ over what proportion
of pro@ constitutes 'surplus' and hence what should be a 'reasonable' rate of
return on investment, but few deny that some degree of investment is vital to
sustain economic growth and enhance productivity. I...]
To many modem economists and businessmen effective management is
of crucial importance in sustaining economic power and influence. 2

The term sustainability is derived initially from the notion of sustainable economic development - a development which can be continuously sustained by natural resources. The sustainability concept thus seems opposed to growth, to an
1
2

Sclove and Scammell, 1998
O'Riordan, 1976: 38-39 (emphasis mine)

economic development which depletes the natural resources and disregards its
impact on the physical, biological and social environment. However, sustainable
development and sustainable growth are often connoted a s synonymous:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. 3
Sustainable growth is a d~fficultconcept with which to deal, but it seems
to be the best guide to thefuture that we have at present. It means economic
growth that can be supported by physical and social environmentsfor the
foreseeable future. 4

This confusion, a t best, indicates a need to contain current economic growth
within some constraints which are denoted by the notion of sustainability.

Sustainability and Growth
It has become increasingly and alarmingly conspicuous that current growth
is leading to depletion of resources and to pollution of the environment. In
other words, growth - such a s it is - cannot be sustained by the available
resources. Consequently, discussion has focused on limits to growth, or how to
make growth sustainable.
Economic growth is presently equated with development and, according to
generally used economic indicators, development is identified by the rate of
consumption. We are living in a consumer economy, so the more we consume,
the more economically developed we think we are

5.

A consumer economy is

predicated not merely on consumption, but on a constantly increasing rate of
consumption. So it seems that sustainable development aims to sustain the
increasing rates of consumption and a t the same time contain them within the
constraints of available resources - which does not look very reconcilable.
The perception of growth and development a s identified by the rate of consumption is justified by the conviction that consumption is equivalent to life -
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i.e. that in order to live humans have to consume. Thesaurus gives the following synonyms for the word consume: exhaust, dissipate, waste, annihilate,
devour, destroy.. .
Identifymg growth by rate of consumption explains and justifies increasing
consumption as causally related to increasing population. At the same time, sustainablity is often perceived as a demographic issue, or at least an issue of
interplay between economic and demographic growth. Instead of questioning
the underlying structure of the economic system within which demographic
problems arise, some analysts fall back upon a Malthusian strategy of identifymg demographic growth as a primary issue, and of proposing vigorous
procedures to control and limit it.
One of the prominent students of sustainability. Herman Daly, does recognize the interactive relation between economic and demographic problems, as
well as the need for a different value system as a basis for addressing them.
However, his solution on the demographic side does not transcend the values
which underlie current economic relationships, but rather pushes them to a
totalitarian extreme:
I_f; as often happens, the rich limit their numbers and the poor do not,
then birth control worsens the distribution of income. Both sharing and
population control are basically moral problems whose solutions require
sound values far more than clever techniques. I...I
The licenses can be bought and sold on afree market. Thus macrostability is attained, microvariability is permitted. Furthermore, those having more
than two children must pay for an extra license, those who have fewer than
two children receive payment for their unused license certijkates. 6

This intervention would transform natural processes of propagation not only
into bureaucratic regulation and totalitarian leveling, but also into trade. Such a
system would practically encourage all sorts of more or less clandestine
trafficking with children

7.

At the same time, it would establish the category of

illegal children (or re-establish it on different grounds).
It is now generally believed that one of the major menaces to world suruival, population growth, is linked to poverty, malnutrition, and despair I...]In
this context, it is now recognised that many 'hard line' solutions to environmen6
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See the quote marked by footnote 2 in the next chapter.

talproblems [especiauy such allocative devices as depletion taxes, residuals taxes, throughput taxes, and the like) are economically and socially regressive. 8

When demographic problems are recognized as a consequence of the current
world economy, solutions are not sought at the demographic end. To relate the increase in consumption to population growth is a misplaced identification of the problem, as the levels and rates of consumption are so disproportionally greater in
the "developed" (or rather consumer-developed)world, where demographic growth
is vastly smaller(andoften even negative) in comparison to the "undeveloped". This
misplaced focus of analysis indicates a disinclination to ponder the deeper problems of the economy which result from unlimited increase in consumption rates.
The current economy has pushed into a pathway in which the rate of turnover
is perpetually increased. Such a course expresses an obsession with growth,
with limitless expansion. This obsession has been so repeatedly presented as an
inevitable social requirement, that it is not clear any more whether such a justification is hypocritical, or has come to be believed by those who perpetuate it

9.

So what is this growth about? Is it a growth of our desire to consume, or is
it driven primarily by the striving for continuous enlargement of profits, which
entails increasing production and consumption? Consumerism, as the present
(most dominant and prevailing) cultural pattern, is a growth of spending and
squandering, stimulated to speed up the buying of ever newer commodities and
to quicken production, turnover and expansion. Once the process is set up for
perpetual increase, the result is exponential growth and the vicious cycle of
consumption and profit enlargement. This notion has become so much
imbedded in the prevailing mindset, that in the thesaurus lo the word increase
is identified as synonymous with profit.
Keynes said. "alittle ingation is a good thing."By this he meant that,
with infrcltion, people are encouraged to spend more, and spending stimulates

9
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Economists have [. ..] built elaborate theories around the dangerously circular
reasoning that growth is the solutionfor problems caused by growth" (ibid.: 85)
Nelson RockefeUer asserted as late as 1976 I...] "Moregrowth is essential ifaU the
millions of Americans are to have the opportunity to improve their quality of lije".
(Capra, 1982:215)
ingredient of Word Perfect software

the economy. He did not, of course, explain that intation can lead to
disasters, perhaps worse disasters than unemployment. 1 1

This perpetual increase in consumption is not only manifested in rewarding
consumers for spending more - like frequent flyer discounts and other inducements, the invention of which draws a n incredible amount of energy, ingenuity
and money - but the production/business side is also pressured to rapidly
increase the turnover rate. This results in faster obsolescence of equipment a s
well a s in loss of value for industries which cannot keep up with the demand
for turnover increase and therefore become depreciated by the stock market.
Depreciation is a regular and justified cost of doing business: indeed, a
high rate of capital consumption is ofen taken as a measure of business efficiency and progressiveness. In the stock market it is awarded high price. 12

The increasing devaluation of goods has obvious detrimental impact on the
environment - primarily on the depletion of resources and accumulation of
waste - and is, therefore, incompatible with sustainability-oriented strategies.
By making the entire world economic system exchangeable on a moment's
notice, ule have in essence set up anew standard against which all economic activity is measured. We have created a common global value system that is measured in monetary terms alone,one that has little or nothing to do with the search
for a sustainablefuture that will support human civilization. What should the
world earn on its money? Seven percent? Five percent? Nine percent? 13

The consumer culture has become so overwhelmingly pervasive, that
people are compelled to buy into it, consciously or unconsciously. A retail
analyst is reported to have declared that "our enormously productive economy ...

demands that w e make consumption our way of lge, that w e convert the buying
and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual satisfaction,our ego

satisfaction, in consumption ... We need things consumed, burned up, worn out,
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Morehouse et al., 1989:5
In a n eflort to stimulate purchasing power, installment buying, loans, and credit
card purchases h a v e become a way of l$e in m y industrial countries. In the
United States alone, private consumer debt increased 210 percent in the 1960s and
268 percent during the 1970s. Today it is more than $4 trillion According to a 1994
reportfrom the Federal Reserve Board, middle-classfamilies are paying nearly a
quarter of their income to creditors, a substantially higher level than in previous
periods. (Rifkin. 1995:34-35)
Bums,1975:65
Hawken, 1993:93

replaced, and discarded at an ever increasing rate." 14 Increasing consumption
becomes identified with life

15.

This is not only a vastly reductionist proposition

from a scientific viewpoint, but is also a hornfylngly impoverished notion of life.
A depressing number of Americans believe that fi only they had twice as
much, they would inherit the estate of happiness promised them in the
Declaration of Independence. The man who receives $15,000 a year is sure
that he could relieve his sorrow fi he had only $30,000 a year; the man with $1
million a year knows that all would be well fi he had $2 million a ye ar....
Nobody ever has enough 16

It is interesting to note that the word fortune, which primarily means luck,
has become synonymous with wealth, riches and affluence. Actually this has
occurred (as far a s I have found out) only in the English and French languages,
which derive the word from Latin fortuna, and only since the rise of the
bourgeois world view. (In Italian fortuna still means only luck.)
Notwithstanding the popular attitudes, a correlation between wealth and hap- .
piness is not sustained by data. Despite the doubling of GNP and consumption
per capita between 1950's and 1990's, national surveys do not indicate any increase in the number of "happynAmericans in the same periodl?. At the same time, it might be important to note that the Census Bureau report of 1994 shows
that the percentage of Americans workuzgfull time but earning less than a
poverty level incomefor a family of four - about $13,000 a year - rose by 50
percent between 1979 and 1992. 18

Nevertheless, faith in economic growth has not become much suspect. Jean
Baudrillard seeks a n explanation in the cultural sphere. He perceives that consumerism has reached the stage where production of commodities is so excessive, that production of demand becomes the priority. He argues that, consequently, production is no longer a purely economic category, but has become a
cultural reproduction of consumer symbols - "the culture of the signn 19.
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quoted in Durning, 1995: 69 (emphasis mine)
Higher levels of consumption or living yield higher levels of satisfaction or wellbetng. (Magrabi et al., 199 1 : 9)
Durning, op.cit.:70
ibid.: 71
Rifkin, op.cit.: 169
Baudrillard, 1976: 14, 21

The Cost of Growth
Beneath the luster of consumer symbols and the excitement about growth
prospects, there lurk tremendous environmental and social problems. These
take the form of pollution; of deterioration of life quality; of psycho-social
problems like crime, violence, drug and alcohol abuse; of physical, psychic and
mental disturbances and illnesses; of despair, depression, loss of meaning and
values. The overwhelming data about these problems have, for the last couple
of decades, become a daunting pressure on our minds to the extent that we
are often frightened away from thinking about them.
Looking both a t our reactions and our lack of reaction to the perils of our
time, LU~W
three widespread behaviors:disbelief.denialand the double lge. 20

There is a large and diverse pool of information resources about the status
of the environment. Among the most renown is the Worldwatch Institute which
publishes annual State of the Earth reports

21.

Environmental problems can be classified by different criteria. From the viewpoint of sustaining economic development by available natural resources, the first
level of concern is the depletion of material and energy resources caused by exponential growth of interdependently self-perpetuating production and consumption. Thus sustainability appears a s primarily a matter of resource managementzz.
Even if the resource problem is solved by technological breakthroughs which
would make availablehitherto inaccessible terrestrial or extraterrestrial resources,
exponential growth will still threaten to bury us under heaps of waste. In 1986
a prognosis of household consumption development for the purpose of market ana-
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Macy, 1983: 5
n7e Worldwatch Institute is a n independent, nonproj3 environmental research
organization based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to foster a sustainable
To this end, the Institute conducts interdisciplinary research on
society I...]
emerging global issues, the results of which are published a n d disseminated to
decisionmakers and the media. (Flavin and Lenssen, 1994: back flap)
The ability to over-exploit the earth's stored-up supply of resources is what we call
economic progress. One statistic makes clear the demand placed on the earth by
our economic system: every day the worldwide economy b u m a n amount of
energy the planet required 10,000days to create. (Hawken, op.cit.:21)

lysis expected the household solid waste, which was then 3.6 lb/capita/day in
the U.S. (excluding autos and construction debris), to reach 4 lb by 2000
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The waste problem is, of course, not just a matter of garbage and where to
put it. It is the concern about pollution, climatic disturbances and changes, the
threat of irreversible impairment of conditions that make life possible on the planet. Global warming is just one of a disquieting array of interrelated environmental imbalances. The ten hottest years according to records have all occurred since 1980. Despite the continuous disinclination of some scientists to draw conclusions about long-term climatic change, in a 1995 report to the United Nations,
2500 climatologists from all around the world have agreed that increased combustion emissions are the major cause of the heating of Earth's atmosphere 24.
The biological and ecological disruptions seem to be even more far-reaching:
Today the activities of one species, humans, are reducing the diversity of
all others a n d transforming the global environment. Ecosystems subjected to
the stresses of "gbbal change" (including climate change and altered weather
patterns, the depletion of stratospheric ozone, deforestation, coastal pollution, and marked reductions of biological diversity) become more susceptible
to the emergence, invasion, and spread of opportunistic species. When subject
to multiple stresses, natural environments can exhibit symptoms that indicate reductions in resilience, resistance, a n d regenerative capabilities. 25

The promise of technological progress is increasingly contradicted by evidence of how artificial interventions into natural processes get out of hand. But even
when technological advances seem to offer new possibilities of human liberation,
the current practice indicates that technology is primarily in the service of profit growth. While repeatedly reporting the increase of profits and of global competitiveness, companies are also announcing extensive layoffs of employees:
In thesingle month of January 1994,America's largest employers laid off
more than 108,000workers. Most of the cutbacks came in service industries,

23

Magrabi et al., op.cit.: 153
The tale of the garbage barge (attempting what was thought a cheaper solution - to
_find someone to accept the New York trash in Louisiana, Florida, Mexico, Belize,

24
25
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burned) symbolizes one of the environmental protection problems often
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102)
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where corporate restructuring and the introduction of new laborsaving technologies are resultrng in greater productivity, larger propts, and fewer jobs. 26

In his book The End of Work, Jeremy Rifkin gives a revealing cross-section
of the social impacts of the growth economy (although he does not adopt a'sustainability perspective). He presents an abundance of very grim data, primarily
to show the social consequences of technological developments which have, in
the later decades of this century, reached what he terms the "Third Industrial
Revolution". After the first Industrial Revolution, which started with steam
power, and the Second, which was marked by the introduction of oil a s energy
resource and utilization of electricity that expanded immensely the physical
capabilities of technical devices, the Third Industrial Revolution was unleashed
by automation and electronic control and communication technologies 27.
Much of the productivity gains and increased profit margins of the past
half century since automation and numerically controlled equipment were
@st introduced have gone into the coffers of top management. I...] In 1979
CEOs in the United States made 29 times the income of the average m u f a c t u ring worker. By 1988 the average CEO was making 93 times the earnings of the
average factory worker [...IHad the nation's manufacturing workers shared in
the productivity gains and profits to the same extent as management, the
averagefactory laborer today would be earning more than $81,000a year. I...]
According to the [I993Census Bureau report], in 1992,36.9 million
Americans were living in poverty, an increase of 1.2 million over 1991 and 5.4
million more than in 1989.[...IOne child in four growing up in the United
States goes hungry. 28

Although Rifkin discusses the social disruptions in the context of emerging
automation and communication technologies and their utilization in the current
economic system, some of the most disturbing data that he presents reflect a
broader context of dysfunction of the growth- and consumption-oriented
economy. He finds that the rising unemployment entails hopelessness, and he
perceives a connection between hopelessness and increasing involvement in
crime and violence among teenagers:
Police estimate that more than 270,000students carry guns to school every day in the United States [...] In 1992 nearly a million young people between
the ages of twelve and fourteen were "raped,robbed or assaulted, o$en by their
peers."
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In Washington, D.C, where several hundred young people have been shot
in the pastfive years, and where random killings on school playgrounds and
on the streets is a regular occurrence, a growing number of youngs ters are
planning for their ownjherafs [...I Eleven-year-oldJessica has already told
parents andfriends what she'd like to wear at herfuneral. 29

When these dysfunctions of the growth/consumer economy are at all
acknowledged, they are at best regarded as a cost of growth, i.e. the price that
has to be paid for economic and technological development.
The standard economic assessment avoids to take into account environmental or social disturbances. These costs also have not been reflected in the
actual market prices of commodities. On the contrary, the principal direction of
the current economy toward gains induces a practice of economic assessment
(primarily the Gross National Product indicator) through which the costs of
social and environmental dysfunctions are perceived as gains. This procedure
results in a falsified picture of growth and of the entire economy:
IGNP performs] the inclusion in growth calculations of economic
activities that only exist because of the malfunctioning ofgrowth Thus
pollution control, garbage collection, and all the costs of keeping an
ecologically unstable and delinquent society in order (police,fire services.
social workers, bulletproof equipment) are all counted in GNP, so serving to
maintain the illusion that growth is infinite. 30
GNP does not differentiate between wealth and "illth, it includes all
social and environmental costs. 3 1

Hazel Henderson is making her point here by invoking the connotation of
the word "wealth" that includes its original meaning: well-being, welfare of the
community. But, in the same way a s it happened with the word fortune 32,
wealth has come to mean primarily material affluence, which is thus equated
with well-being.

Fritjof Capra takes a systemic view of well-being. He perceives social illnesses as a consequence of a cultural pattern primarily defined by growth, consumption and competition:

The acute infectious diseases that plagued Europe and North America in
the nineteenth century, and that are still the major killers in the Third World
29
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See the paragraph after footnote 16.

today, have been replaced in the industrialized countries by illnesses no
longer associated with poverty and deflient living conditions but, on the
contrary, with afluence and technological complexity. These are the chronic
and degenerative diseases - heart disease, cancer, diabetes - that have aptly
been called "diseases of civilization,"since they are closely related to the
stressful attitudes, rich diet, drug abuse, sedentary living and environmental
pollution characteristic of modem life. 33

The endeavors to include environmental and social costs in the current practice of economic calculations create fierce confrontations of interests. The
profit-making interest (most powerful in the current economic system) is defended by threatening consumers with increase of commodity prices if external
costs get "internalizedw.The consumers are the primary target of these threats
because the fact is thus concealed that the business community is also
troubled by the prospect of receding consumption rates and consequent
decline of profit growth, should the external costs become included in market
prices. In these negotiations, only consumers are considered a s bearers of the
environmental and social costs of economic growth (the costs which they have
not primarily induced). A decrease of profits in order to meet the costs of
profit-making is never seriously contemplated

34.

Therefore, the issue of externalities (the term itself reflects the initial
denial that these costs are a n inherent component of the economy) becomes a
political impasse. The current policies are stuck up in the attempt - a s a n
ethnic folklore saying goes - to keep the wolves satiated and the sheep intact,
i.e. to resolve the problems of environmental and social dysfunctions, and a t
the same time leave the profit growth substantially undisturbed.
There have been different attempts to devise alternatives to the GNP. One
of these attempts was made in the 1970's by Nordhaus and Tobin. They devised a comprehensive inidicator which they termed the Measure of Economic
Welfare (MEW). It is significant because it emphasizes the distinction between
waste and growth By applying this indicator for the U.S. in the years 1929 and
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1965, Nordhaus and Tobin concluded that there was a much greater increase

in social costs than in social gains. 35

The realization that an increasing number of current economic activities
are essentially more a waste than gain (not only in terms of producing pollution
and depleting resources) has become another insight into the dysfunctions of
the growth/consumer economy:
Work that produces unnecessary consumerjunk or weapons of war is
wrong and wasteful. [...I Work that deceives or manipulates, that exploits or
degrades is wrong and wasteful. Work that wounds the environment or makes
the world ugly is wrong and wasteful. ?here is no way to redeem such work by
enriching it or restructuring it, by socializing it or nationalizing it, by
making it "small" or decentralized or democratic. 36
Manufacturers spend enormous amounts of money on advertising to
keep up a pattern of competitive consumption; many of the goods thus
consumed are unnecessary, wasteful, and often outright harmful. The price we
pay for this excessive cultural habit is continual degradation of the real
quality of life - I...]the environment we live in, and the social relations that
constitute the fabric of o w lives. 37

Life Processes and Entropy
The recognition that there is waste and loss occurring along with gains and
growth seems trivial, but it is systematically ignored within the current economic
paradigm. A much less trivial issue is that all the social and environmental costs
of the growth/consumer economy can be perceived as manifestations of entropy.
When we read that rounding the comers of Pepsico tortilla chips, intenslfymg the
flavor on the outer surface and redesigning the package would cost $50 million,
that can strike us as sheer entropy of industrial, profit-oriented economy.
The second law of thermodynamics (entropy law) suggests itself as
applicable when we consider depletion of resources, pollution and other
environmental disruptions, and social derangements.
Growth is a process that depletes sources of low-entropy matter Cfossil
fuels) andflls waste systems with high entropy. 38
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Entropy is the piling up of unusable forms of energy by continuously
exhausting its available forms, transforming them into less productive ones
until there remains only the dispersed thermal energy which cannot be turned
into any work. Gregory Bateson offers a definition of entropy in a context
broader than that of physics:
the degree to which relations between the components of any aggregate are
mixed up, unsorted, undiflerentiated, unpredictable, and random 39

The concept of entropy was first introduced by Rudolf Clausius in 1865.
He immediately pointed out the connection to economy and consumption, and
was one of the first scientists who assumed a sustainability perspective:
"In economics there is the general rule that consumption in one period of
a n y good should not exceed its production in the same period. Therefore, we
should consume only the fuel that is reproduced through the growth of forests.
although in practice we go about things in a completely different way [...I
behaving as happy heirs. So much is takenfrom the soil as human strength
and technical means allow, and it is consumed as fi it were inexhaustible. The
amount of railways, steam boats and factories equipped with steam engines
increases astonishingly so that when we look at thefuture the question
inevitably arises of what will happen once coal reserves are exhausted." 40
As the current environmental crisis has become rampant, entropy has been

increasingly a context in which economic dysfunctions and negative social and
environmental impact of the growth/consumer economy have been described,
discussed and attempted to be explained. Can social phenomena be regarded
in terms of natural sciences a t all? This issue has been debated since Clausius.
Capra contends that economic development which incurs expenditures to
maintain itself to such a n extent that the whole system 'winds down of its own
weight and complexity" has to be perceived in terms of entropy

41.

This price

of enabling the economic system to function is described by Daniel Brornley a s
transaction costs 42.
Small markets are extremely modest entropy producers. And the small
entropy debt is paid largely by the market participants themselves, and the
beasts of burden (wives, etc.) who buck the produce to market. The rise of
complex fully developed economies is entirely another matter. [...I The
39
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modem capitalist economy, when looked at in these terms, is a strategy
premised on an infinite bankroll. 43
A pertinent example is the government regulation often struggling to support

the profit-oriented economy - and emerging with what Clausius called the
happy heir gambit, less evident only because money appears a s a limitless
resource. For example, the U.S. government used to borrow
one dollarfor every four dollars that it [spent].Interest payments on the
national debt [were]nearly $300 billion per year, or more than 20 percent of
government spending. 44

However, transaction costs can be manifested in a variety of indirect forms.
For example, when you want to watch a two hour movie on a commercial
television channel, it takes you three hours because you waste a n hour of your
time avoiding unwanted advertisements.
Efficiency can, thus, be perceived in terms of entropy. A thermodynamic
interpretation has been attempted, albeit on a level which abstracted it from
any social or ecological context. It has been applied primarily for the
assessment of technical efficiency (exemp-g

the current out-of-context

conception of technology and science):
The second-law e_fficiencyis the ratio of the least available work that
could perform the task to the available work actually consumed in doing the
job with a given device or system. 45

Herman Daly bases his theory of sustainability on entropy. His key concept is "throughput", which is defined a s a n inevitably entropic process - a
decline of usable resources:
The eflect of theentropy law is as immediate and concrete as thefacts that
you can't bum the same tank of gasoline twice, that organisms cannot live in
a medium of their own waste products [...I The entropic_flow,beginning with
depletion and ending with pollution (the throughput), is the necessary cost of
maintaining the stocks of commodities and people. Too large a throughput
can disrupt the biosphere and impair its capacity to assimilate wastes. [...I
To bum up ourfossil capital in trivial and unnecessary consumption (such
as transporting nonnutritional foods in plastic throwaway containers in trucks traveling 7Omph acrosspavedoverfarmland) isfolly on wheels, not to mention the great technological circuses of moon shooting and arms racing. 46
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Consequently, he derives a sustainability strategy which is emphatically
conservationist (seeking to minimize the consumption of resources), but also
predicated on institutional regulation 47 - itself rather entropic, a s shown
above. His approach reflects the way he perceives entropic processes - a s
evolving in a closed system:
From the second law (increasing entropy) it is clear that our rearrangement implies a continual reduction in potential forfurther use within the
system as a whole. 48

The second law of thermodynamics has been defined and applied within
the reductionist and mechanistic paradigm, which primarily means that the
processes of decline of available energy were perceived in closed and mechanical systems. The conditions of a closed system actually make it vastly easier to
observe entropic processes. However, closed systems represent a very limited
part of reality

-

it is solely the mechanical artifacts that can be perceived in

isolation from their environment. And they have become a noticeable part of the
human environment only during the industrial era - now culminating in a n
environmental crisis which is pertinently debated in terms of entropy.
While mechanical entities can be viewed a s isolated from their environment.
it does not mean that they do not exist in a natural and social milieu or context49.
This is the key to discussing the issue of the validity of applying natural
science concepts to social phenomena. As I have pointed out before, the basic
systemic and human-ecologicalapproach entails a n integrative view of social
and natural environment. The fundamental issue of human ecology is the
belonging of humans to nature. The relationship between humans and nature
has been historically disrupted by the dualistic paradigm which has dominated
our mindsets for a long time
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50. The

sharp dualistic divide between humans

His suggested demographic control has been presented earlier - footnote 6.
ibid.: 109
Science is still the prophetic announcement of a description of the world seenfrom
a divine or demonic point of view. It is the science of Newton, the new Moses to
whom the truth of the world was unveiled; it is a revealed science that seems alien
to any social and historical context idenfiiing it as the result of the activity of
human society. (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984: 76 - emphasis mine)
See text between footnotes 63 and 65 in chapter 1.

and nature and the corresponding separation between social and natural
sciences has created confusion which Rupert Sheldrake terms dual vision of
the world

51.

An expression of this dualistic paradigm has also been the

persistent out-of-context, isolating perspective characteristic of the study of
phenomena a s closed systems.
Human-ecological and natural systems, however, cannot be regarded a s
isolated entities. These systems manifest eco-systemic properties of
interrelatedness, interconnectedness, interdependence and interaction, and,
thus, they are open systems. Furthermore, they are characterized by selforganization - which makes a substantial difference in terms of entropy:
To maintain their self-organization, living organisms have to remain in
a special state [. ..I A clockwork [. ..I needs energy to run, but does not
necessarily need to interact with its environment to keepfunctioning. Like all
isolated systems it will proceed by second law of thermodynamics from order
to disorder until it has reached a state of equilibrium in which all processes motion, heat exchange, and so on - have come to a standstill. Living
organisms [...I are open systems [. ..I they have to maintain a continuous
exchange of energy and matter with their environment to stay alive. [...] The
process known as metabolism I...]allows the system to remain in a state of
nonequilibriLlm, in which it is always 'at work". A high degree of
nonequilibrium is absolutely necessary for self-organization. 52

In thermodynamic terms, to stay alive means to avert entropy. Living
systems thus exhibit a capability to reverse entropy, or a t least to keep it a t a
level low enough to maintain the energy processes. This counterentropic effect
is denoted by different terms: negative entropy or negentropy, free energy, or

ektropy 53. (In this essay, I will be using the latter term.)
In 1902, the physicist Felix Auerbach proposed the term Ektropismus to
denote life (including human life) processes a s ucontrary to the dissipation of

energy - a notion which applied the results of thennodynamics to biology" 54.
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Capra, op.cit.: 270 (emphasis mine)
A technical measure of energy available to do work, which decreases with time, is
free energy, and the technical measure of disorder, which increases with time,is
entropy. (Frautschi, 1988: 12)
The opposite [of entropy] is negentropy, the degree of ordering or sorting or
predictability in a n aggregate. In physics, certain sorts of ordering are related to
quantity of available energy. (Bateson, op.cit.: 250)
Martinez-Alier, op.cit. : 78, 123

The key concept of Bergson's theory of creative evolutionary thrust
inherent in living nature is the "life impetus" ( k hvital). He regarded it as an
essentially ektropic (counter-entropic)capacity of life processes.
The vision we have of the material world is that of a weight whichfalls:
no image drawnfiom matter, properly so called, will ever give us the idea of
the weight rising. 55

The self-organizing aspect of open systems is perceived by Bergson as an
ektropic manifestation of life impetus:
It is one thing to recognize that outer circumstances are forces evolution
must reckon with, another to claim that they are the directing causes of
evolution. This latter theory is that of mechanism. It excludes absolutely the
hypothesis of an original impetus. 56

There is a conceptual contradiction between the entropic character of the
material world, considered as heading toward a decline of energy state and
eventual standstill, and the evolutionary, ektropic thrust of self-organizing life
processes. This contradiction is another manifestation of the dual vision of the
world

57

that was a distinctive feature of the prevailing scientific paradigm

during the last two centuries - "evolutionary process on earth" against "the
physical eternity of a mechanistic universe".
A fundamentally new concept of thermodynamics has been developed by

the Nobel-prizewinner Ilya Prigogine. He framed the dual paradigm problem in
terms of entropy:
Our scient~fkheritage includes two basic questions to which till now no
answer was provided. One is the relation between disorder and order. The
famous law of increase of entropy describes the world as evolvingfiom order
to disorder; still, biological or social evolution shows us the complex
emergingfiom the simple. How is this possible? How can structure arisefiom
disorder? Great progress has been realized in this question We know now that
nonequilibrium, theJow of matter and energy, may be a source of order. 58

Prigogine indicates that thermodynamic processes appear in three distinct
regions: the equilibrium, or maximum entropy, where there are no energy
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fluxes nor forces that cause them; the close-to-equilibrium region where the
relationships are linear; and the far-from-equilibrium, non-linear region 59.
When the thermodynamicforces acting on a system become such that the
linear region is exceeded, however, the stability of the stationary state, or its
independence from fluctuations, can no longer be taken for granted. Stability
is no longer the consequence ofthe general laws ofphysics. [...I In such a state,
certainfluctuations. instead of regressing, may be amplrjkd and invade the
entire system, compelling it to evolve toward a new regime that may be
qualitatively quite drferent from the stationary states corresponding to
minimum entropy production. 60

Prigogine has discovered that it is in the far-from-equilibrium, or non-equilibrium conditions that the self-organizing capability of open systems is manifested. Thus, the complexity and amplitudes of thermodynamic interactions offer a
potential for order and integrated behavior of particles:
Znfarfrom-equilibrium conditions [. ..I particles separated by macroscopic distances become linked. Local events have repercussions throughout the
whole system I.. .I This type of behavior I...I gives a molecular basis to the problem of communication I...] The system is organized through these long-range
correlations. [...I Nonequilibrium [is]a source of order. [...]At equilibrium molecules behaue as essentially independent entities; they ignore one another.61

This is a conclusion of far-reaching significance, not only a s a thermodynamic basis for the system theory concept of interrelatedness and interactivity,
but also for epistemological issues, some of which are pertinent to the topic of
this essay and will be touched upon in the last chapter. The importance of
Prigogine's conclusion for understanding sustainability and ecological processes
is consequent to the interrelatedness that is manifested in open systems
through thermodynamic interactions. The lack of a sustainability perspective
emerges a s akin to ignoring interactions and interrelations - a characteristic of
processes close to maximum entropy, or dead matter.
Non-equilibrium thermodynamics has generated considerable controversies
about some notions that have commonly been related to entropy. One set of such
notions is complexitychaos~rder/disorder.Chaos and disorder, and consequently complexity, have been identified with states of high entropy
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62.

Even Bateson's

definition of entropy in terms of mix-up, lack of differentiation, unpredictability,
and randomness, seems to confuse randomness, complexity and disorder 63.
These confusions reflect the remnants of the mechanistic concept of
thermodynamics. In the context of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, however,
increased complexity is characteristic of far-from-equilibrium states where
entropy is low and ektropic (counter-entropic)processes very pronounced.
Complexity is thus a potential for the emergence of self-organization and
spontaneous order. Chaos and order begin to be perceived as states in
dialectical interplay. On the other hand, the ultimate thermodynamic
equilibrium as the condition of maximum entropy can be exceedingly orderly in
the sense of being devoid of any disturbances - a sheer thermodynamic
boredom. or total lifelessness.
Another set of notions that has become confusing is equilibrium-balanceharmony-stability. Sustainability and ecological processes have been typically
associated with balance and stability - in contrast to imbalance of exponential,
boundless economic growth and of the disrupted natural and social
environment. However, in thermodynamics, equilibrium has apparently an
opposite meaning - not only as the state of maximum entropy. Furthermore,
in order to produce equilibrium, a system must be "protected"from the fluxes
that compose nature. I...I In the world that we are familiar with, equilibrium
is a rare and precarious state. 64

Here, the word equilibrium is used as a technical term to indicate an absolute lack
of energy fluctuations, and its usage reflects the mechanistic, static paradigm
from which it initially originated. In the context of (sustainable) ecological processes that behave as open systems, the notion of balance has a dynamic connotation which is most often implied when sustainability is discussed or defined:
A [sustainable] society by &$nition would depend not on expansion but
on stability. This does not mean to say that it would be stagnant; indeed, it
could well aflord more variety than does the state of un$ormity that a t
present is being imposed by the pursuit of technological emiency. 65
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Self-organizing systems have a high degree of stability [... It] is utterly
dynamic and must not be confused with equilibrium. It consists in
maintaining the same overall structure in spite of ongoing changes and
replacements of its components. 66

In this context, balance emerges a s a dialectical category. Life processes
involve a dialectic tension of entropy and ektropy. The necessary constant amplitude of non-equilibrium is the dynamic balance. It is the dialectic opposition of
entropy and ektropy, the pulsation of breathing and other living functions a s
alternation of tension and relaxation. Both tension and relaxation are the necessary, dialectic harmony of life processes, of pulsations, vibrations. Pulsation
and vibration manifest the dynamic existence of all processes above the thermodynamic equilibrium which is maximum entropy, the total cessation of all activi-

ty. Life can, therefore, be regarded a s a far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic
process, characterized by ektropy which results from exchange of energy and
matter with the environment.
Life is defied as a low entropic, open thermodynamic system that plays
a role in creating and maintaining thermodynamic order in the ecosystem. 67

This view was clearly anticipated by Bergson, in terms of his life-impetus concept:
Theevolution of life really continues I...] an initial impulsion: this impulsion I...] has determined the development of the chlorophyllianfunction in the
plant and of the sensorimotor system in the animal I...] These I...] represent
I...] a storing-up of the solar energy, the degradation of which energy is thus
provisionally suspended on some of the points where it was being poured forth
I...] It would have been expended sooner if an organism had not happened to be
there to w e s t its dissipation, in order to retain it and save it up. 68

Prigogine and Stengers put the thermodynamic definition of life in the context
of nested systems:
We know today that both the biosphere as a whole as well as its
components, living or dead, exist in far-from-equilibrium conditions. In this
context life,farfrom being outside the natural order, appears as the supreme
expression of the self-organizing processes that occur. 69

Capra, op.cit.: 270-271 (emphasis mine)
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A Systemic/Ecological Approach
to a Definition of Sustainability
Sustainability could simply be defined a s equivalent to ektropy, to the counterentropic process which organisms (or systems that exhibit spontaneous selforganization) perform to stay alive. In the extremely complex and large scale
systems characteristic of the current economic and social structures, this
simple strategy might be overlooked or appear trivial and undeniable. However,
the current economy is conceptualized and managed a s a closed system without
taking into consideration the interactions and interrelations that are distinctive
of open, living systems.
When we examine a biological cell or a city I...] not only are these systems
open, buf also they exist only because they are open Theyfeed on theflux of
matter and energy coming to themthe outside world We can isdate a
crystal, but cities and cells die when cut offfrom their environment. 70

This means that, although the current practice is predicated on detachment
from, and negligence of, ecological/systemic interactions - in actuality, whatever we do, open systems (social and economic) will always behave in terms of
a non-equilibrium thermodynamic regime. Yn such a state, certain _fluctuations,

instead of regressing, may be arnplzfied and invade the entire system, compelling
it to evolve toward a new regime that may be qualitatively quite dzfferentji-om the
stationary states corresponding to minimum entropy production." 71 I am
repeating here part of the paragraph already quoted before because, in the
context of the present unsustainable practices, it points out how humanecological systems under stress can conceivably induce unpredictable adverse
environmental disturbances. This fact tells against a possible argument that.
since current economic activities are not actually closed-system thermodynamic
processes, they cannot present a n entropic threat.
The gist of the ektropic defmition of sustainability (ensuing from nonequilibrium behavior) are the perpetual processes of renewal that are implied
by the counter-entropic activities of living organisms.
70
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The unpredictability of non-equilibrium processes indicates the probabilistic character of living organisms and other self-organizing systems. It exemplifies the integrated evolutionary paradigm applied to both physical and biological
processes - thus transcending, as pointed out before, the "dual vision of the
world". Another controversial issue that surfaces out of this new perspective, is
the relationship between sustainability and permanence.
The majority of definitions of sustainability perceive it in terms of indefinite
maintainance of the status. One of the first comprehensive views of sustainability is the renowned Blueprint for Survival, where "a stable society" is described
a s "onethat to all intents and purposes can be sustained indefinitely while giving
optimum satisfaction to its membersw72.Pirages also contends that "a sustainable
society is one in whichfuture growth can be indefinitely sustained by available
sources of energy." 73 Thayer adopted the definition from the 1991 United Nations

publication Caring for the Land: A S t r a t e v for Sustainable Living, which regards
sustainability a s "aprocess or state that can be maintained indefinitely" 74.
The Worldwatch Institute, however, puts the definition of sustainability in
more evolutionq terms:
a sustainable society - in which human needs are met in ways that do not
threaten the health of the natural environment orfuture generations. 75

The thermodynamic perspective brings up the issue of irreversibility and
time, which has been typically neglected in the current conceptualization and
practice of economy. For example, Dyke states that
orthodox economic theory I...I makes use of techniques that play down or obscure the essential time dependence of economic processes I...] treat the p r c
cess of economic exchange as fi it were reversible, I...assumes] that there are
no exogenous constraints on the results of trading. I...]We cannot seal ourselves offfrom the changes except temporarily and at extremely high cost. 76

The concept of steady state, which is commonly identified with sustainability, can add confusion to the controversy of permanence and determinism ver72
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sus evolution, indeterminacy and probability. Daly, in his comprehensive argument for sustainability, depicts it a s steady state, but some of his defmitions of
steady state are couched in terms that convey a deterministic view:
The steady-state economy is a physical concept. It is characterized by
constant stocks ofpeople and physical wealth maintained at some chosen,
desirable level by a low rate of throughput. 77

At other instances, he indicates a more evolutionary perspective:
Once a steady state is attained at some level ofpopulation and wealth, it
would not beforeverfrozen at that level. I.. .I Growth (positive or negative) would
always be seen as a temporary passagefrom one steady state to another. 78

Bateson understands steady state a s a clearly dynamic process:
The living thing escapes change either by correcting change or changing
itself to meet the change or by incorporating continual change into its own
being. I.. .I When we say that the system exhibits "steady state" fie., that in spite
of variation, it retains a median value), we are talking about the circuit as a
whole, not about the variations within it. 79

And Capra points at a system theory perspective, wherefrom steady state
emerges as a self-regulatory mechanism of open systems (self-organizing,living)
based on exchange with environment which is a n ektropic process:
Bertalanffy correctly identrfled the characteristics of the steady state as
those of the process of metabolism, which led him to postulate self-regulation
asanother key property ofopen systems. This idea was refined by Pngogine thirt y years later in terms of the self-organizationof "dissipativestructures." 80

Metabolism and cycles of changes indicate that sustainability and steady
state cannot be regarded in terms of indefinite permanence in a linear sense.
The linear perspective consequently generates a notion of eternal growth. Sustainability rather is a process (and therefore the term steady state can be a rnisnomer) consisting of cycles of renewal - or the dialectic relationship between
order and chaos, life and death, ektropy and entropy. Thus sustainability does
not have to be equated with permanence, but with evolution. Eternal (linear, or
exponential) growth is unsustainable.
If we can talk of sustainable growth, we have to redefine the notion of
growth, or rather simply return to its original connotation related to life proces77
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ses. Wendell Berry offers a n argument against using the term growth in the
current economic context:
The pattern of industrial "development" on the fm and in the forest, as
in the coalfields, is that of combustion and exhaustion - not "growth," a
biological metaphor that is invariably contradicted by industrial practice. 8 1

The current notion of economic growth is based on the assumption that if
something is good, more of it must be better. This is a n untenable generalization of the obsession with ever increasing profits, which has come to permeate
and determine the basic values of our culture. The generalization has become
so ingrained in the common outlook, that the nonsense is no longer noticed:
How can a n endless increase of anything be possible?
Desired substances, things, patterns, or sequences of experience that are
in some sense "god"for the organism - items of diet, conditions of lge, temperature, entertainment, sex, and s o forth - are never such that more of the something is always better than less of the something. Rather, for a U objects and
experiences, there is a quantity that has optimum value. Above that quantity.
the variable becomes toxic. To fall below that value is to be deprived. 82

Ivan Illich puts the same argument into a more social context:
For the primitive, the elimination of slavery and drudgery depends on
the introduction of appropriate modem technology, and for the rich, the
avoidance of an even more horrible degradation depends on the effective
recognition of a threshold in energy consumption beyond which technical
processes begin to dictate social relations. Calories are both biologically and
socially healthy only as long as they stay within the narrow range that
separates enoughfrom too much. 83

The "more is better" attitude is not just a generalization of a very limited
aspect of human behavior, it is possible only upon detachment from the
context of life processes, or natural cycles of renewal.
The fact of growth adds another order of complexity to the problems of
bigness in living things. [...I A coconut palm, whose only growing tissue is a t
the apex of the trunk (the so-called millionaire's salad, which can only be got
a t the price of killing the palm), simply gets taller and taller. with some slow
increase of the bole a t its base. For this organism, the limitation of height is
simply a normal part of its adaptation to a niche. The sheer mechanical
instability of excessive height without compensation in girth provides its
normal way of death [...I
Among some higher animals, growth is controlled. The creature reaches
a size or age or stage a t whichgrowth simply stops (ie., is stopped by chemical
or other messages within the organization of the creature). The cells, under
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control, cease to grow and divide. When controls no longer operate b y failure
to generate the message or failure to receive it), the result is cancer. 84

The utter detachment from the relations and limitations of life processes
and natural cycles of renewal is exemplified by the abstractness of money:
This characteristic of biological value does not hold for money. Money is
always transitively valued. More money is supposedly always better than less
money. I...] When we consider money, not by itself, but as acting on human
beings who own it, we may_find that money, too, becomes toxic beyond a
certain point. In any case, the philosophy of money, the set of presuppositions
by which money is supposedly better and better the more you have of it, is
totally antibiological. 85

Baudrillard perceives this characteristic of money as consequent to its basic
meaning as a sign and therefore one of the most salient expressions of the
current culture which is dominated by signs:
The monetary sign is severedfrom every social production and then
enters a phase of speculation and limitless inflation. I...]
Purged ofjinalities and the affects of production, money becomes
speculative. [...I Money can thus be reproduced according to a simple play of
transfers and writings, according to an incessant splitting and increase of its
own abstract substance. 86

With his controversial concept of life (orgone) energy, Wilhelm Reich
developed one of the most integral systemic inquiries into life processes as
ektropic interrelations of organisms with the environment. In that context, he
perceived the natural regulation of growth as an issue of undisturbed
charge/discharge function of organisms - their energy metabolism:
Each type or species of organism possesses its spea$ic energy levek it has
a special "orgonoticcapacity." Otherwise, the lwing organism would not stop
accumulating energy and would burst or grow indefinitely. All swplus of
energy is discharged I...I in mechanical movement, in orgastic convulsions, in
radiation of heat, etc.
There exists, accordingly, an orgone energy metabolism, a continuous
exchange of energy in the cohesive unit called organism. To summarize its
mainfunctions: maintenance of a certain capacity level by means of charging
from the surrounding orgone ocean and from foodstuffs, and by energy
discharge into the surrounding energy ocean. I...] In the dying organism the
capacity to charge and to maintain the level offunctioning is slowly lost. 87

Metabolism is the essential ecological characteristic and, thus, the
principal determinant of sustainability
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T h e m w in NET [non-equilibriumthermodynamics] tenns [requires] a
sink as w e l l as a sowce. ?2ash, soot, and sZudge seem an annoying and
inconvenient by-product of our lives and activities rather than a necessary
feature of then But without a gradient down which materialmw can cascade,
no dissipative structure can remain stable. 88
The essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in
freeing itselffrom all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive. 89
A primary criterionfor a successful culture is to realize a balanced
relation between the processes of growth and the processes of decay. [...I Our
society, which exclusively values growth and looks upon the processes and
products of decay as waste, is radically out of balance. 90

This chapter will conclude by suggesting a definition of sustainability as
life processes characterized by cycles of renewal and metabolism which maintain the dynamic balance of entropy and ektropy. Sustainability thus entails
interaction between organisms (and other self-organizing systems) and their
natural and social environment which supports their metabolic processes.
Sustainability is distinguished by creativity and liveliness - ektropy 91.
Consequently, the term sustainability is not entirely appropriate. Sustain is
synonymous with endure, tolerate, bear, withstand, and with uphold, support.
bolster, maintain, preserve. These notions indicate a possible initial intention
that the meaning of the term should convey endurance and tolerance - but of
what? Environmental and social costs? Restrictions on consumption? The
maintenance and preservation of profit-oriented economic growth?
Whatever the level of approximation this might be, it is evident that a
systemic definition of sustainability is largely contradictory to the meaning of
the word. The best alternative would probably be the word ecological (or
integrative, systemic) - economy, technology, social organization. However, a s
stated in the Introduction, the term is retained in this essay because of its
wide-spread use. The following chapters will discuss the economic.
technological and social aspects of sustainability a s life processes.
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Purpose of the Economy
How can one buy or sell the air, the warmth of the
land? That is d ~ m u lfor
t us to imagine. If we don't
own the sweet air and the bubbling water, how can
you buy itfi-om us? 1
Posner concludes the analysis [of baby-adoption
market] by suggesting that "the baby shortage and
black market are the result of legal restrictions
that prevent the market fi-om operating as fi-eely in
the sale of babies as of other goods. " 2
Money may not continue to be the ultimate
criterion of wealth because the nonmaterial
aspects of l$e seem to be becoming increasingly
important. 3

The evidence of the deep problems of the current unsustainable practices
indicates a need for questioning the purpose of the consumer/profit-oriented
economy.
Purpose of the economy?! Such a question is not commonly asked.
Economics is a value-free discipline. It does not inquire into purposes and
goals. Shunning the social and (more recently) environmental impacts of profitmaking, economics has gradually excluded any ethical considerations and has
proclaimed itself the science of means.
Emiency is appealing to economists because it seems to require the
fewest value judgments. I...]Doing what is e m n t requires the strong
assumption that income is optimally distributed, not j u s t acceptibly
1

2

3
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distributed. Hence the common belief that by advocating e m n c y the
economist is avoiding valuejudgments is clearly false. 4

It is a confusion or a hypocrisy that a discipline, whose basic
preoccupation is to study how value of things is determined, should declare
itself value-free. The confusion seems to arise over what is meant by value. In
the compound 'value-free", the word value obviously connotes the world view,
the social and ecological context, ethical considerations. It is interesting (or
indicative of the confusion I am talking about) that my word processor's
thesaurus does not offer these meanings of the word value, but gives the
following synonyms: caliber. merit, significance, worth, cost, expense, price.
benefit, advantage, utility. It is evidently in tune with the current utilitarian
concept of the economy, where valuing is identified a s willingness to pay:
Posner proudly makes willingness to pay the very bedrock of his wealthmaximizing emiency. In [...]The Economics of Justice (1981)- and by
"justice"he means nothing other than wealth maximization - we read: "The
individual who would like very much to have some good but is unwilling or
unable to pay anything for it -perhaps because he is destitute - does not value
the good in the sense in which I a m using the term 'value'."The only
preferences that have ethical weight in his system of wealth maximization
are the ones backed up by money. 5

Despite the overt focus on means (rather than purposes or goals) - which
is manifested as preoccupation with efficiency, indicated also in the previous quotation - utilitarian economics obviously perceives wealth-maximization (or profitgrowth) a s the purpose of the economy. However value-free this utilitarian
orientation might look to economists who purport it, utilitarianism is itself the
basic underlying value of current economics. The broader value-system from
which it emerges has actually been stated quite clearly by no less than one of
the greatest authorities of the economic mainstream, John Maynard Keynes:
Keynes admitted that before this blissful state [economic progress] could
be attained (he forecast soberly that it might take a hundred years) a quite
opposing morality would hold sway: "For at least another 100 years we must
pretend to ourselves and to everyone thatfair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is
useful and fair is not.Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a

-
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little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic
necessity into daylight". 6
A s opposed to Keynes' delayed bliss, the maximized utility - wealth,

consumption - is already equalled with well-being and happiness

7,

so

justifications of moral transgressions do not seem to be relevant any more.
[Roy] Harrod is advising caution, but he concludes nevertheless - equal
capacity for happiness should be assumed, unless the contrary can be shown
I...] and I...] that application of the concept of diminishing marginal utility
recommended moves towards the equalization of wealth, 8

I have already touched upon the tendency of consumer culture to turn

consumption into ultimate pleasure in life. However, standard economics
operates with utility rather than pleasure, a s the former appears to be a more
objective notion - which primarily means that it is quantifiable in monetary
terms. So consumption is perceived as "extraction of utility":
Economists tend to give [the notion of lifestyle] a quantitative meaning a count of material goods and assets. Indicators are the purchased stocks of
appliances, homes, automobiles, and other goods, as well as monetary assets,
including income, savings, insurance and bene_fits.[...I
Another way would be [. ..I to discern to what ends the things and assets
are used and,further, the subjective feelings about what the things do to
contribute to happiness, convenience, comfort, feelings of self-worth, control
over one's destiny, and in general, satisfaction with lge. 9
In equating "living weU" with living affluently, capitalism has made it
extremely d~fficultto demonstrate that freedom is more closely identljkd
with personal autonomy than with afluence, with empowerment over l$e
than empowerment over things. 10

Utilitarianism is succinctly defined a s the behavior of the "rational economic
man" (women seem to be exempt). An unbelievably ludicrous example of utilitarian consumption (or extraction of maximized utility) emerges from a mainstream
source of the "science of means" (another "gem" found by Lutz and Lux):
A paragraph from The New World of Economics I...] concerns itself with
the rational way to die: "It is only humanfor one tofeel sympathetic toward
the person who dies with everything going wrong: a malfunctioning liver,
6
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arteriosclerosis, a defective kidney, ulcers, respiratory problems, and waning
eyesight. However, such a tumultuous exit may indicate that the individual
involved has more thoroughly enjoyed life than the person who dies with only
a failing heart and everything else in perfect order. If this is the case, the
sympathy may be misplaced. Thefact that all of one's organs are
malfunctioning at the time of death may indicate that one has fully utilized
his organic capital assets in the pursuit of utility; the person who dies with a
perfect liver may have foregone a number of drinks during the course of his
life that could have contributed signifxantly to his own welfare: a liver in
good order is useless if the heart goes first. " 11

Value a s utility is determined by exchange value - the willingness to pay.
Standard economics uses only these two meanings of the word value. However,
apart from ethical, social, ecological and other non-material values, the value of
things should primarily make sense a s use value - which involves purpose and
its social and ecological context. Taking these contexts into consideration is
avoided by current economics a s a "value-leadenn approach (letting in the
ethical meaning of value for the occasion). Exchange (and utility) value is
defined by the market, which is perceived with disregard of social and
ecological contexts, and such perspective is notably reductionist.
Some critics of conventional economics use the notion of inherent value. It
seems to present a n opposite to exchange value which ignores the qualities that
things might have outside of the market context. Inherent value implies qualities
that things have in or by themselves. However, a s the systems theory indicates,
quality or value of a n entity can only be defined from its relation to the environment or context

12.

Therefore, inherent value is also a reductionist notion.

It is important to emphasize that market exchange should not be confused
with exchange in terms of systemic interactions - with metabolism. Market
exchange is certainly part of social exchange, of social metabolism - but that
context is excluded by the current economic conceptualization and practice.
Metabolism inevitably involves the state of enough - there is charge/discharge,
in/out, source and sink, take and give. With the concept of exchange value,
which is defined by utility maximization, there is only more and more, without
limits put by any context or interaction with the environment.
11
12
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Exchange value is certainly determined in the market, which thus represents a context - or, more precisely in systemic t e r n s , one of the nested levels
of context. Exchange value was initially a n abstraction, a reduced view for the
purpose of determining relative value or worth in the process of exchange, but
it gradually became pervasive, prevalent and almost exclusive, a s the market
assumed the position of the sole context for determining any value.
For the whole of the modem era, people's worth has been measured by the
market value of their labor. 13

Turning a partial view into a n exclusive view is a typical reductionist
approach. Yet, it is upheld either a s the illusion or hypocrisy (or both) that
markets represent a n environment which presumes and entails full freedom of
choice, and where, consequently, exchange value is determined spontaneously
and "naturally" by willingness to pay. As willingness to pay is considered a
rational decision of the "rational economic man", markets are, thus, regarded
a s utterly objective.
These assumptions stem from a heavily stretched generalization which
perceives the complex markets of the capitalist economy a s a n extension of the
mechanisms characteristic of simple barter relationships. However, barter
relationships involve direct personal interactions which cannot possibly result
in unlimited wealth maximization, nor be intended toward such a goal.
It is often easy to imagine that market processes, because they are so
conducive to the purposeful and volitional behavior of millions of buyers and
sellers, are vast unstructured arenas in which anything goes. Nothing could be
furtherfrom the truth. The essence of markets is order, predictability,
stability, and reliability. 14

Daniel Brornley has elaborately demonstrated the falsity of the view upheld
by conventional economics that it is the market which spontaneously enables and is the best possible environment to support - the maximization of profits.
He turns the picture upside down and shows that the market economy is not
only a n expression of a social system oriented toward wealth maximization, but
that it is a n institutional structure to enable and maintain such a system.
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The role of the legal foundations of an economy is to provide a
predictable structure within which exchange activity might occur and
_flourish. This legal foundation is required whether the economy is organized
along lines that give the government a dominant role, or whether it is
organized so that the private sector is the dominant active agent. 15

Furthermore, this institutional structure has to be paid for:
D~serentforms of property rights (institutions) will require d~fferent
levels of supporting infrastructure to d e m e rights and duties, to demarcate
boundaries, and to enforce that structure of rights; [...I therefore the
economically appropriate structure, whether private property, state property,
or common property, is afunction of the economic surplus available to
support those d~serentialcosts. [. ..I
The economic surplus available from the summer pastures of
Switzerland is insumient to make it economically feasible to divide those
pastures into privately held parcels. To do so would require extensivefencing
and water development so that each small parcel would be self-contained. [...I
The current level of economic surplus from the summer pastures makes
common property the most efficient property arrangement. [...I
It seems more plausible to argue that rather than private property giving
rise to wealth new wealth possibilities provide the economic surplus
necessary to further articulate institutional arrangements. 16

Brornley identifies these costs of the institutional structure as transaction
costs because they reflect the institutional transactions which necessarily exist
along with commodity transactions that are the overt and primary manifestations of economic activities 17.
Most often transactions costs are internalized external costs. In other words,
the internalizing of social or environmental costs is typically interpreted as recognizing them as costs of doing business. This interpretation entails a metamorphosis of the essential character of the quality or value that is expressed by the cost
- a transformation from social or environmental value into exchange value. That

is to say, a social or environmental value - which is defined by a broad context
of social meanings and attitudes, and which reflects complex human-ecological
interactions, interrelatedness and interconnections - is translated into value
defined solely in monetary terms. The following example is seemingly extreme
in its audacity and impact, but nevertheless illustrative of this transformation:
W M X , Inc. I...I the largest trash hauler in the world [...I has dumped PCBs
[a highly toxic component of lubricants] in lagoons, mixed PCBs with waste
oil and resold it as heating oil, and contaminated groundwater with chemical
15
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and nuclear wastes. The legal entity and a number of its executives haue been
convicted of bid-rigging, jked for price-fixing, fined for conspiracy against
trade, fined by the EPA numerous times for numerous violations of
environmental laws, and jailedfor bribes. All the while. W M X continues to
grow nicely, returning 20 percent pretax profits that have made its top
executives rich. It has paid approximately $45 million in_Fzes a n d settlement
costs to resolve litigation in the Last ten years. But those costs can be written
oflagainst p r o m - essentially, as a cost of doing business.In other words, the
freedom of the outsized global marketplace means that corporations are even
free to break the law, especially when the penalties and litigationfees arefar
outstripped by th12 material advantages gained by illegal practices. 18

This transformation mechanism shows that internalizing should not be characterized as recognizing the costs, but rather as refusal to recognize their real meaning, and readiness to pay that refusal in order to continue business as usual.
Because markets are a price-based system, they naturally favor traders
who come to market with the lowest price, which often means the highest
unrecognized costs. 1.. .I
The more able acompany is to externalize its cost ofdoing business and to
be ruthless in its practices, the greater return on capital it may achieve in the
short term. 19

The typical way of recognizing the social and environmental problems and
dysfunctions of the current economic system is to turn them into new
businesses and s e ~ c e which
s
are perceived as needed in order to alleviate
the problems - or rather cater to their symptoms. This is (most of the time) a
perfectly human and humane purpose and motive. However, the frenzied
competition for profits (cut-throat is the grim, but usual adjective) - into which
the prevailing orientation of the current economy pushes every entrepreneur has the effect of the value transformation that I have described above. Costs
are, thus, converted into gains (the GNP and other accounting procedures
support this conversion, as I indicated in .the previous chapter) and, actually,
turned into additional cost of living borne by consumers.

Life as the Purpose of a Sustainable Economy
The characterization of market mechanisms as "natural" - which Hawken
too uses in the previous quote - manifests the erroneous perception of the
18
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position of the market in the current economic system demonstrated by
Bromley. It also presupposes that the reductionist view of the utilitarian
("rational economic man's") willingness to pay is the sole criterion for
determining value. Cost/benefit analysis is performed in this narrow context of
profit making, where the only benefit is the profit. Everything else - quality,
beauty, liveliness - is either external, or relevant to the extent that it affects
profits. From there emerges the utterly reductionist and rather hornfylng
exercise of defining the exchange value of human life, or life in general:
Because industry insists that poisonous compounds are economically
vital, it compares the "need"for toxins with the "cost" of the estimated number
of fatal forms of cancer that will resultfrom human exposure. Companies
claim that the cost of saving lives has become prohibitive. 20
Because some forms of pollution are harmful to human health and may
increase mortality, economists have had to confront the question of the
economic value of lge.21

This ultimately anti-life orientation, stemming from utilitarian economics,
points to the broader context of human relationships - the issue of domination
over humans and nature (which will be discussed in chapter 8).
T h e destruction of lives devoid of value," I...]was the official overall
designation of the Nazi project aimed at the administrative mass killing of
mental patients. 22

In the case of external costs, administrative regulation attempts to solve
the problem within the market economy - by retaining the reduction of social
and environmental values to exchange value. Thus, solutions are sought
through the same process of internalizing which transforms problems into
transaction costs:
Pgou's solution was to impose a "tau to correct maladjustments" on
producers, a tau that would be comparable to the avoided cost or unbome
expense I...]the actual damage caused by one production system to another
system, person, or place. I...]Harder to measure but equally important, is the
cost tofuture generations, as in the case of global warming, deforestation,
erosion, and depletion of groundwater. Not surprisingly, most environmental
harm - such as the harm caused by radiation, persistent pesticides, and clearcutting - cuts across the two categories. 23
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When turned into taxes, social and environmental problems are no longer perceived as what they really are, but as additional payment burden. Furthermore,
the extremely reductionist (or, rather, impossible) task of interpreting systemic
human-ecological interactions in monetary terms, requires an enormous and costly bureaucratic apparatus - on top of what is already a Babylonian structure
(thus also adding to the transaction cost, with addition internalized in the tax).
As money is the measure of exchange value, the pervasive and daunting

characteristic of the current economy is that all human activities are expressed
and represented by and turned into money. This perversion is a manifestation of
detachment of the economy from eco-systemic processes - a disconnectedness
from life.
The shift of focus from life to money has now begun to reveal its Frankensteinian character. Money becomes the goal in itself, and turns against the
values that it was supposed to express or measure.
We are turning over thefinancing of the world, fi we haven't already, to
money lenders whose interests and incentives revolve around minute
increments gained in the sale of abstracted financial instruments. 24

Hawken contends that, with the predominance of money, there actually is no
longer any commerce, any trade, just financial transactions:
Let us say a company owns a forest in which if has chosenfor many generations to selectively harvest the trees. [...] It consistently delivers to shareholders a 9 percent return on equity, considered below averagefor theforest products industry. Meanwhile, world financial markets have heated up. [. ..] The
price of lumber is 30 per cent lower than in previous years. Now our company's
return on equity isjust 6 percent, and its stock has been hammered by traders
who no longer see it as a valuable company to own With its stock price cut in
half, shareholders angry,and analysts baying at the door, management does
the "rational" thing. It clear-cuts large sections of timber. [...I In short, the
money theforest represented became more valuable than thefirest itsew So
theforest is gone, and the money it has earned has entered the international
pool of capital, thereby putting just a little more pressure on the owners of
a n o hfores t to conuert their assets on the ground into cold cash 25

Money has undergone a transformation from a measure of value into value
by itself. Baudrillard argues that the domination of signs (primarily the
monetary signs, but also the other symbols of consumer culture) have effaced
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the meaning of exchange value. Dominant values become fictitious, what he
calls simulacra - deceptions and substitutes.
A revolution has put an end to the 'classical' economics of value, a revolution of value itself, which carries value beyond its cornmodityform [...I
Referential value is annihilated I...I The s ys terns of reference for production,
signification, the affect, substance and history, all this equivalence to a 'real'
content, [. ..I all this is over with. Now the other stage of value has the upper
hand, a total relativity, general commutation, combination and simulation in the sense that,from now on, signs are exchanged against each other rather
than against the real [...I The annihilation of any goal as regards the contents
ofproduction allows the latter tofunction as a code. 26

The economy has, thus, lost its connection with life processes and natural
cycles. By stepping over into the virtual reality of money-defined values, the
economy has "freed" itself from the real social, environmental and ecological
limitations, and flung itself into limitless growth. This "freedom" is manifested
as irresponsibility for the social and natural context of the economy.
A redefinition of the economy should primarily involve a questioning of its

purpose - questioning the goal of the economy in which every human activity is
perverted into money making, commodity selling, consumption and profit;
questioning the utter utilitarianism, materialism and reductionism, the utter
rejection of any spiritual a s well as biological content and context of life.
The narrow conception of lge which consisted in thinking that profits
are the only leading motive of human society; and the stubborn view which
supposes that what has existed yesterday would lastfor ever, proved in
disaccordance with the tendencies of human lije. 27

Why would the market be the only expression of the economp Even without the virtuality into which the dominance of money has pushed it, the market
has become corrupt and dysfunctional - and inflated out of proportions.
Can we imagine a market system that achieves exactly the opposite
result, that creates, increases, nourishes and enhances lge on earth? Can we
imagine competition between businesses that improves living and cultural
systems? 28

Despite his very critical insights and severe exposures of business
malpractices, Hawken does not look beyond the market and business as the
primary purposes of the economy. Yet, the market economy is only a
26
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component of a broader process. Scott Bums has argued for a concept that
would perceive three basic components of the economy - the household, the
collective and the market economy - and he has contended that the present
disproportional prevalence of the market component is a major imbalance 29.
According to the systems view, the economy is a living system composed
of human beings and social organizations in continual interaction with one
another and with the surrounding ecosystems on which our lives depend. 30

Furthermore, even in such a broader perspective, the economy itself is
still only one aspect of complex human-ecological interactions. Capra's view
clearly indicates the systemic approach. In such a context, it would be
necessary to define an integrative purpose of the economy. The most succinct
definition points at life processes - or simply life - as an integrative purpose of
the economy. I have concluded in the previous chapter that sustainability is
manifested in interactions between humans and their social and natural
environments - interactions which support life processes. A sustainable or
ecological economy has, consequently, to be conceived and practiced as part of
natural cycles of renewal. In that sense, the purpose of the economy is life

processes as natural cycles of renewal.
Such an integrative purpose of the economy brings back its original
meaning:
The Greek notion of economics referred to the science of administering
the household (oikos) and its propern. 31

Daly and Cobb argue that the economy still has to be identified as "oikonomia"
and thus distinguished from chrematistics - "manipulationof property and
wealth to maximize short-term monetary exchange value to the owner" 32 - which
describes much more correctly the practice currently denoted as the economy.
Their argument is based on the key issue of the meaning of value:
Chrematistics deals with exchange value in the short run. Oikonomia
deals with use value in the long run. 33
-
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This meaning of the economy is adequate to its integrative purpose defined
above, a s life processes in the household are primarily to be perceived in their
integrity - and not as fragmented and divided into unrelated aspects, a s it has
been characteristic of the current reductionist concept and practice of the
economy.
A sustainable, ecological economy can be again defined a s household management, but the connotation of the household in this re-definition - still starting
from the actual primary household - extends to wider human-ecological units.
This extended view perceives the economy as an interrelated management and
care of a nested range of interconnected units or levels of complexity: the household - the neighborhood - the community - the bioregion - the planet. According
to this integrative, holistic meaning, the economy and ecology emerge as almost
synonymous notions, a s the morphology of the two words suggests 34.
The argument for an integrative concept of the economy and against its
modem meaning and practice has been ongoing along with their development.
The following quotes present two examples:
[Ruskin's]Munera vuluer& 118633 is a crihque of economics as the study
of transactions in the market, pointing out that economics really should
mean the study of material provisioning in human societies. 35
Ellen Swallow Richards [...I proposed an interdisciplinary view of
Oekology which focused on the human organism and its relationships with
the environment. [...I She referred to Oekology as the "scienceof living [...I the
worthiest of aU the applied sciences which teaches the principles on which to
found ... healthy ... and happy @en.36

Identifymg the economy with life processes presents a n eco-systemic
approach as life is a continuous and constant exchange of energy and matter
with the environment. The process of exchange, of metabolism, is the
prerequisite for the existence of life - it is, indeed, vitality itself.
Energy/matter metabolism is, therefore, the central concept of
sustainability. It entails a perception of the energy/matter flow, rather than
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Ristic, 1990a
Martinez-Alier. 1987: 91; see also the quote marked by footnote 27.
Griffore and Phenice, 1993:143-see also the section of the text related to footnote
56 in chapter 1.

expenditure or use. This encompasses the whole process of energy/matter
flow: intake - functioning - output. This basic matrix should be the starting
point of a sustainable (or ecological) economics - the analysis of the economy of
life processes. As Prigogine and Stengers contend, "theflowof matter and

energy, may be a source of order" 37.
In the remainder of this and in the following chapters, I will discuss the aspects of an integrated, or integrative economy, consisting of: the economy of
(human) life processes - human needs; the technology of life processes - the
ecology of technology; the social organization of life processes - the community
and the household.

Human Needs
The discussion of the economy of human life processes should first
address the issue of anthropocentrism that seems to be related to such a
formulation. The absence of the context of human life processes from the
current concept and practice of the economy (demonstrated earlier) appears to
make the anthropocentrism issue less obtrusive. However - while the current
economy (or chrematistics) can definitely be described a s entirely
anthropocentric, or maybe more correctly a s not even concentrated at human
(or any other) lives at all - the integrative (sustainable, ecological) economy (or
oikonomia) can be easily argued out of the anthropocentrism objection. I will
examine this issue in more detail in chapter 8. Here I will only indicate that the
economy of human life processes is certainly focused on the exchange with the
environment (social and natural) performed by humans, but the systernic-ecological perception of the unity of a human-in-her/his-environment
or context
and its interrelatedness and interdependence, resolves the dualistic/oppositional conceptualization of humans versus the eco-system of which they are part.
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See the end of the quote marked by footnote 58 in the previous chapter (emphasis
mine).

Analysis of the economy of human life processes has to focus on life
functions - human needs. Human needs are, however, completely disregarded
by the current mainstream economics.
he main subject of social economy, ie., the economy of energy required
for the satisfaction of human needs, is consequently the last subject which
one expects tofind treated in a concrete form in economical treatises. 38
The objection is still being raised after almost a century:
Undeniably, human material need is part and parcel of everyday human
existence and yet, paradoxically, human material need is uniuersally rejected
as an authentic concept by mainstream economics. 39

Why does the current mainstream economics disregard human needs? Allegedly, because the notion of need is considered value-leaden and, therefore, unscientific 40. AS I pointed out earlier, this methodological approach contains an
underlying evasiveness about taking into consideration social dysfunctions and
disruptions caused by the current practice of the profit-maximization economy.
There is, behind this attitude, a significant conceptual controversy, or, rather.
a connotational reduction of the word need. It is perceived merely as the condition of bare survival in the context of poverty and welfare care for those
segments of population which are incapable of partaking in the consumer
culture

41.

Thus, if need a s deprivation were included in the vision range of

economics, it would entail the examination of social distribution of wealth which
is considered to involve value judgments, or rather a questioning of the current
socio-economic system.
However, a prevailing number of theoreticians of human needs - who
argue for introducing the social economy into economics - accept this negative
definition of need a s equated to deprivation or disadvantage 42.
This understanding of need is fundamentally a n expression of the dualistic
construct of humanity and nature. Biological need is reduced to survival, and
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Kropotkin, op.cit.: iv
Davis and O'Boyle. 1994: xiii
ibid.: xviii
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There is no social economics or social economy without the principle of
subsidiarity. (Davis and O'Boyle, op-cit.:xxvi)

considered - as a sphere of nature within and without ourselves - a lower level
of satisfaction which humanity has to rise above 43. Remaining on the level of
biological need has, thus, been identified with bare survival, poverty and
deprivation. Conversely, the ascendance from this level has come to be viewed
as a liberation from the lower and disgraceful state of neediness.
Furthermore, this liberation is considered a display of human ability to
control his or her biological self and to subordinate it. (This is a key issue of
domination over nature which will be discussed later.)
In the consumer culture, this liberation has been interpreted as riddance
of the natural, ecological (and social) constraints, but it should rather be
perceived as licence to disregard the eco-systemic interrelatedness of
individuals and their social and natural environment. Thus, the road has
become open to limitless consumption and wealth maximization.
As I explained before, the vehicle for this trip to "freedom" has been the

distortion of the concept of value.
Since water and diamonds s a t i s - two quite different kinds of needs it is
ridiculous to talk about their units as comparable and to say that the
consumer consumes more water than he does diamonds. There is simply no
commensurability between these two goods. I...] The point of view of standard
economics [is]that fi we take a supposed need, such as water, and we increase
its price, then people will use less of it,just like anything else. Therefore, the
economist reasons, it is not a need. 44

What standard economics does not reveal is that it performs an "illusionist's trick of converting needs into commodities. I have discussed the "scientific methodology" of that process - the modification of use values into exchange values. Here, it is important to understand the underlying psychological
mechanism and its purpose. The following situation describes what happens
when any need - like water, mentioned in the previous quote - is turned into a
commodity:
One partner [in the transaction] is compelled by need, the other
motivated by want; the latter can wait while theformer, pressed by needs,
cannot. As a result, the tenns of trade will mirror the distribution of power.
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This type of problem remains inuisible within the theoretical apparatus of
mainstream economics. 45

This is indeed the gist of the issue of need in the wealth-maximization
economy - showing that the whole hocus-pocus with needs a s value-leaden
category identified with deprivation is performed to conceal the underlying
power relationships. Once it is turned into a commodity, a need can be
manipulated. It takes at least one party to step out of perceiving it a s a need.
This can be achieved by sacrificing one's own need. For example, here's what
my grandmother told me was an occasional "transaction" between my father
and his brother when they were kids: They would both get a piece of, say,
watermelon heart for lunch, and my father would eat it up, while his brother
would put it in the ice box and, in the evening, tease my father for not having it
any more, and offer to sell it to him

46.

The other way of stepping out of the position of need is to claim more of the
resource than is necessary to satisfy one's need. In both cases, the motive is to
gain a position of advantage in order to be able to manipulate with the need. In
the context of the consumer economy this manipulation becomes a market
mechanism:
The market has a built-in tendency to under-supply the needs of a
population, while at the same time over-supply its desires. 47

The purpose of manipulation with needs is to instigate unlimited
consumption of commodities, and, thus, enable unlimited profit-maximization.
Needs are, however, defined by natural limits of satiation. Therefore, to justlfy
unlimited consumption of commodities, standard economics
denies that the concept of need has any legitimate standing in economics
whatsoever. I.. .I In [its]place, conventional economists substitute the concept
of indiuidud wants, or tastes and preferences. Wants, it is assumed, may be
identied, analyzed, and discussed without eualuation orjudgment. They
require no interpretation, are regarded as pure data, and are thought to be
factual in nature. 48

-

45
46
47
48

ibid.: 27
My father became an artist, and my uncle an accountant and a gambler.
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This pretended objectivity of wants stems from the objectivity of exchange value which is considered guaranteed because exchange value is expressed in quantitative terms and the translation is preformed by utilitarian interpretation49.
Heyne tells us that The 'law of demand' is preferable to the concept of
need, because demand relates the amounts that are purchased to the sacnfies
that must be made to obtain these amounts. " 50

This "conceptual" distinction is supported by acceptance of the reduced
connotation of needs as deprivation and condition of bare survival. Thus,
anything above survival is no longer a need, but a want. This delineation is
deeply based on the dualistic construct of humanity and nature, a s I pointed
out earlier, but at the next layer, it plays with the psychological effect of
polarization of need versus want a s deprivation versus abundance. Wants are
thus identified with unlimited abundance, boundless consumption and
maximized utility. Wants are detached from the constraints and determinants
of social and ecological contexts, from eco-systemic interrelatedness of life
processes and natural cycles of renewal. Wants depend entirely on the market
mechanisms of offer and demand. They are fully controllable by the profitmaking, growth economy. This control is possible because, abstracted from the
context of needs as life functions, wants become malleable and impressionable,
completely susceptible to advertising propaganda. Consumerism is not based
on what we need, but on what we are impelled to want.
Exploitation of wants becomes a major strategy for those who seek power
and wealth when industrialization causes society to become strahjied into

competitive socioeconomic classes. 51

This strategy is applied a t the earliest age, implanting the consumerism model into young impressionable psyches. It is done, not only at the level of
concerted efforts of business advertising, but, most effectively at the level of
cultural reproduction:
Brother Bear was just crazy about Space Grizzlies. Space Grizzlies were
little toy actionfigures that you could couect. Brother cared about them a lot.
He cared about them so much that he did chores for neighbors to make extra
49
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See the text and quotes between footnotes 8 and 1 1.
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money s o he could buy more. He had quite afew. But the store had more. A lot
more. He was saving up to buy Sleezo's Cloud Castle. Sleezo was the evilest of
all the Space Grizzlies, and the wicked-looking Cloud Castle was where he
planned all his evil deeds. 52

Growth of consumption and profits requires constant creation and rearing
of new wants or increasing satisfaction of the existing ones. Wants seem to
imply something that one can consume but does not need to. However,
consumerism and imposition of wants create addictions. Addictions are based
on constant reccurent dissatisfaction, and it is systematically created by the
consumer economy:
'The key to economic prosperity, " said Kettering, "is the organized
creation of dissatisfaction." The economist John Kenneth Galbraith put it
more succinctly years later, observing that the new mission of business was to
"create the wants it seeks to satis&."53

This strategy creates an addictive vicious circle which expresses the psychological basis of the growth paradigm:
Wants mangestly exceed our means.

54

If wants are perceived as a departure from the level of bare survival and
deprivation, and from the constraints of biological relations and limits - this
'freedom" has as its counterpoint the slavery to imposed consumer needs (or
wants). Thus it turned out to be a failed hope that consumerism as a liberation
from poverty would be an achievement of the freedom to have control over our
own lives 55. The previous forms of reducing large sections of population to
dependent social status by deprivation have now been largely (not yet entirely)
replaced by dependency to imposed consumption. Rather than recognizing
their own needs, people have become slaves to commodities.
Ivan Illich discusses this issue in the context of transportation as a
commodity:
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Berenstain. Stan and Ian. The Berenstain Bears and the Bad Dream, Random
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Rifkin, op.cit.: 19-20
Davis and O'Boyle, op-cit: xix
As long as we remain within thefiamework of a civilization based on inequality,
growth will necessarily appear to the mass of the people as the promise - albeit
entirely illusory - that they will one day cease being "underprivileged." (Gorz, 1980:
7-8)

Addicted to being canied along, [man] has lost control over the physical,
social and psychic powers that reside in man's feet. [. ..I He has lost faith in the
political power of thefeet and of the tongue. As a result, what he wants is not
more liberty as a citizen but better service as a client. He does not insist on his
freedom to move and to speak to people but on his claim to be shipped and to
be informed by media. 56

The imposition of needs (or wants) in the consumer culture generates a major aspect of alienation which is a characteristic of the current cultural pattern.
This has been argued by the members of the "Frankfurt School"57 and their
contentions to some extent anticipate the postmodem accounts of the consumer culture, particularly Baudrillard's simulacrum theory 58. By imposed needs
(or wants), consumers are alienated from their genuine needs, and consequently from natural cycles of renewal and from natural processes in general:
Holiday brochures promise us tropical sun or winter snow all year
round,feeding to the illusion that we can ignore the cycle of the seasons. Even
birth and death, the paramount events of natural time, have lost their
inevitability and become products of medical and social intervention. 59
A very simple example of our detachment from natural processes is the' current

food consumption pattern. As a child, I used to identify the year's seasons by
(locally available) fruits I liked: strawberries in May, cherries in June, apricots
in July, watermelons in August, grapes in September, apples in October, tangerines around Christmas. Now you enter the supermarket and there is always
everything available, shipped by airplanes from all over the world (not to comment upon the unsustainability of such production/consumption approach).
Consumers' disconnectedness from natural cycles of renewal is also
manifested in their significant contribution to the wastefulness of the current
economy:

56
57

58
59

Illich. 1974: 25-26
The economic apparatus [...I equips commodities with the values which decide
human behavior. Since, with the end offree exchange, commodities lost all their
economic qualities except for fetishism, the latter has extended its arthritic
influence over aU aspects of social lqe. Through the countless agencies of mass
production and its culture the conventionalized modes of behavior are impressed
on the individual as the only natural, respectable, and rational ones. (Horkheimer
and Adorno, 1944: 48-49)
See footnote 26.
Melucci, 1996: 17 (I have emphasized the connection to Baudrillard's theory of
simulacra.)

Prosperity rests on the fas ter and fas ter transformation of mountains of
junk into mountains of debris. And the happy agents of this transformation,
known as consumers, are the same ones whojoylessly give their energy to
make these things they hope t o w time to use between coming home and
going to sleep. 60

The alienation from our genuine needs - from identifymg and acknowledging them without the mediation and distortion by consumerist pressures
and impositions - results in psychological and psychosomatic disturbances.
They constitute a large portion of the social disruptions caused by the current
economy. The following account by Melucci presents these consumption
syndromes as a n expression of the pressures for limitless growth of the profit
maximization economy:

If there are so many opportunities, fi things change so rapidly, then we
must pursue everything, consume everything asfast as we can and forgo
nothing. A kind of Don Giovanni syndrome impels us to chase afer every
opportunity, only to then sw~j?lyabandon each one of them in favour of
another one beckoning next to it. The tension induced in the process produces
stress symptoms, as the body's response to the lack of time and to o wfear that
we may have missed our chance. In its most severe form, stress may
precipitate a breakdown of the selJ and ultimately schizophrenia. 61
Twisting needs into wants thus generates consumption disorders

62

(or

imbalances of metabolism) from obesity to limitless greed for endless
quantities, endless possessions. Consumerism has a debasing effect on the
quality of life. Needs are part of metabolism - of exchange of energy and matter
with the environment. Consumerism does not involve that kind of exchange,
just gobbling up, grabbing more and more, and returning only garbage. The
metabolic imbalance occurs on the level of individuals, a s well a s of social and
ecological systems - consequently to systemic interrelatedness.
Consumption disorders have the function of a cultural basis and cultural
reproduction of the notion of growth as utility/consumption/wealth
maximization. This notion becomes the overbearing cultural model and thus
creates a general myopia for the relationships of domination and exploitation
that wealth maximization (still achieved only by very few) is based on.
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I have concluded above that the economy of human life processes is prima-

rily characterized by eco-systemic interactions - metabolism of matter and ener-

gy. These metabolic processes are determined by life functions, by human
needs which require the exchange of matter and energy.

Theories and Classifications of Human Needs
There is an array of theories and classifications of human needs. I will
restrict my attention here to three issues around which some of these theories
are developed. These issues, which I find pertinent to the discussion of human
needs in the context of an ecological culture, are: objectivity, hierarchy and a
non-dualist concept of needs which overcomes the hierarchical perspective 63.
Much ink is spilled to discuss the possibility of perceiving human needs a s
objective 64, and to dispute the position of standard economics which denies
that needs are a scientific category (i.e. objective) because they are valueleaden. These attempts to establish the objectivity of needs do not address or
question the meaning of objectivity - not even its positivist connotation of a
value-free approach. Thus, this argument leaves untouched the whole problem
of values that is implicit in the denial of needs by standard economics.
Beyond the framework of the value-free approach, the claim of objectivity
of human needs runs into the epistemological problem of the objectivity/subjectivity relationship 65. With human needs, this problem becomes apparent a s
the analysis moves from basic physiological needs to those that are described
as psychological 66. This problem is rarely addressed in depth by theories of
needs, but the distinction between physiological and psychological needs
typically leads to the other issue: the hierarchy of needs.
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I have shown in chapter 2 - between footnotes 47 and 52 - that the hierarchical
perspective is closely related to the dualist paradigm.
Doyal and Gough, 1991
I will discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 9.
Maslow. 1968: 152

A want/need distinction would to Leiss suggest that needs are objective
and in principle quantitatiue, while wants are subjective and ephemeral.
liable to ebb andflow in rhythm with satisfactions. He rejects all attempts in
the literature to establish either lists of or hierarchies of needs,or to
distinguish cultural from biological needs. 67

Maslow's basic classification of human needs (the physiological needs - the
safety needs - the belongingness and love needs - the esteem needs

-

the

needs for self-actualization)68 does not indicate a sharp divide between lower
and higher needs. The notion of hierarchy rather reflects a conception of levels
of priority, as the satisfaction of the needs positioned lower in the classification
is perceived as a prerequisite for expressing the "higher" needs.
It has been argued and demonstrated that this priority principle does not
always apply strictly and invariably to all human situations and relationships 69.
The deviations are not merely individual exceptions, as the following quote
suggests; they reflect diverse cultural meanings attributed to survival and
priority needs.
Some individuals, provided they have once known satisfaction of
physiological and safety needs, will sacrifice the former for love,for selfesteem or for truth Thus a man such as Gandhi may deny himself food
because "higher" needs have become more important but, according to
Maslow, a person who has never had enough to eat, could not activate or
articulate his "higher"needs. I...]The specific form that all these needs take
will vary greatly from person to person. 70

The exceptions, deviations and cultural interpretations do not, however,
deny the fact that some needs are more biologically essential for survival than
others, and are, therefore, prioritized in most situations. Yet this biological
determination in no way implies that some needs are "lower" and less worthy of
human esteem because they reflect the biological necessity to keep the bodily
functions going, while some other needs are "higher" because they represent
humans' ascendence from the biological level of existence into "higher" spheres
of spiritual fulfillment. Nevertheless, a number of theoreticians of human needs

-
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(including previously quoted Fitzgerald and Bay) adopt such an interpretation of
the hierarchy of needs:
Maslow's original conception of a hierarchy of needs is really an extension of the idea that the human being has two poles or endpoints in his or her
motivational makeup I...]a material pole [deficiency needs) on one end of
human nature to a spiritual pole @rowth needs) on the other end. I...]For Plato
there were two categories of human motives, the passions and reason, and the
human being had to use the latter to subdue and override the former. [...IWe
are not just one harmonized integrated self, but face conflict between parts of
ourselves, or d~flerentvalues, or a dual-self. 71

This hierarchical concept of needs is clearly based on the dualist paradigm
(and its origin in Platonic philosophy, indicated in the previous quote, will be further discussed in the later parts of this essay). The sharp divide between the
sphere of nature, of biological necessity, and the realm of spirituality is the
core of dualist constructs, and it establishes anything belonging to nature within or without humans as inferior. The basic dualistic split of humanity versus
nature has as one of its primary expressions the body/soul schism. It is here
explicitly manifested in considering food, sexuality and procreation as lower
bodily functions (or even despicable indulgences of the flesh), above which
humans have to rise with spiritual pursuits and thus achieve self-actualization.
Another manifestation of the dualistic perspective is the distinction
between cultural and biological needs

72.

It typically tends to identify

physiological needs as biological and all other needs "above" the biological level
of existence as the sphere of culture. Thus, the culture/nature duality (as an
extension of the basic dualist pair of humanity/nature) is brought into the
perception of human needs.
Malinowski's functionalist definition of culture is based on perceiving
human needs as biologically defined, but culturally interpreted 73. The dualized
construct of culture versus nature is thus entirely rejected and replaced with a
perception of an interactive, or dialectical relationship between culture and
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Lutz and Lux,op.cit.: 16- 17. See also the paragraph after footnote 42.
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nature, consequent to the eco-systemic approach and its "both/andw,rather
than "either/orwlogic74.
The perception of human needs a s biologically defined, but culturally
interpreted, is the basis for understanding both the consumer culture we are
grappling with now and a possible transition to a n ecological culture. Such a
perception regards the ways of how human needs are satisfied a s the essential
determinant of culture. Therefore, these ways - the ways of life - are also the
core of the emerging ecological culture.
Mahowski's theory of human needs is derived from the analysis of life
functions. He classifies life functions/human needs along with their cultural
interpretations - cultural responses

75:

BASIC NEEDS

CULTURAL RESPONSES

1 . Metabolism
2. Reproduction
3. Bodily Comforts
4. Safety
5 . Movement
6. Growth
7. Health

1 . Commissariat
2. Kinship
3. Shelter
4 . Protection
5 . Activities
6. Training
7. Hygiene

Even his classification is not entirely free from the bias of prevailing
cultural patterns, but it emphasizes the concept of cultural interpretation of
basic needs. Most of the other classifications do not convey the awareness of
this fundamental characteristic of human needs 76.
McHale and Cordell have developed one of the most comprehensive
theories of human needs. They touch upon the key issues, but yet, they
somehow lack a clear conceptual framework to base their different and
complex classifications and categorizations on. Thus, they come up with very
74
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See the paragraph around footnote 55 in chapter 2.
Malinowski, 1944: 91
e.g.: Doyal and Gough simply offer a (rather random) list of human needs which
confuses the basic life functions and the culturally created needs: 1 food and water
(nutritional intake); 2 housing (shelter, sanitation facilities); 3 work; 4 physical
environment (air, water, land, radiation, noise pollutants); 5 health care; 6
childhood needs (security in childhood: safety from abandonment, abuse, neglect;
child development: stimulation, positive feedback, responsibility); 7 support
groups (significant others, social contacts); 8 economic security; 9 physical
security (crime safety, safety from state violence); 10 education; 11 safe birth
control and child-bearing (Doyal and Gough. 1991: 2 19)

intricate divisions and matrices that present an elaborated mapping of diverse
aspects of understanding human needs, and yet they still convey some
confusions and inconsistences.
McHale and Cordell do dispel the concept of strict objectivity of needs by
introducing the notion of felt needs - needs that they describe as, for example,
sense of welfare, or sense of participation 77. They do not elaborate this as far
as even putting it clearly into the context of the objectivity/subjectivity issue,
but, nevertheless the notion of needs in terms of feeling and sensing indicates
what I consider the fundamental epistemological aspect of ecological culture - a
sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves as a basis for an environmental/ecological consciousness.
On the other hand. McHale and Cordell implicitly retain the Maslowian
approach by making the distinction between biophysical and psychosocial
needs. Although they do not explicitly adopt a hierarchical concept of needs,
this distinction still reflects the dualist construct of humanity versus nature
which is further manifested in the confusion between basic needs and their
cultural interpretations, evident in the following classification:
biophysical needs (basic needs): food, health, shelter (and clothing);
psychosocial needs: education, employment, communications, mobility,
recreation, security 78

It is clear that employment cannot be a basic need, but only a cultural
interpretation emerging in certain cultural patterns. This problem is less overt

with their other categories in this classification, but when they elaborate them
into a list of "human functions to be served", the confusion of basic
needs/functions and what Malinowski terms secondary, or culturally derived
needs

79

becomes quite obvious. I will, however, reproduce that list in its

entirety here despite its deficiences because attempts to devise a categorization
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A theory can be developed in which the basic needs and their cultural satisfaction
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1944.38)

of human needs/functions are important for understanding sustainable (or
ecological) economy, technology and social organization:
physical needs/functions:
eating, sleeping, bathing, excretion.
cooking, laundering, cleaning, waste disposal.
storage for food/utensils, clothes, personal household and work
equipment, books, etc.
psychosocial needs/functions:
sexual relations, privacy, sociability, conversation, reading, religious
practices, personal and child care, creative pursuits, communications,
play, recreation and entertainment, overall aesthetic amenity of
dwelling and surroundings.
environmental control:
management of heat and cold, protectionfrom extremes of sun, wind,
rain, dust and other external impingements such as insects, vermin,
rodents, etc.; energy for lighting, cooling, heating and ventilation
internal structures and surfaces:
furnishings and equipment for physical and social needs.
surfaces of floor, walls, ceiling to aid internal environmental control.
external structures and surfaces:
to control externally impinging environmental factors - walls, roojhg,
screened windows /doors, porches and balconies.
drainage, waste disposal, sewage, energyfuel storage, work/play
equipment storage.
play and recreation areas.
adjacent kitchen garden and livestock area where appropriate.
walls,fences, etc.. where required for physical security and for cultural
purposes.
external service aspects:
ease of access to roads, shops, markets, transportation, work place; to
neighbors and community; to health, education, communications and
other services. 80

I contend that it is impossible to make a categorization of human needs

that would be entirely free from the bias of the culture within which the categorization is made. The way of defining categories has necessarily to reflect the
current views that determine how we define what life processes depend on and
consist of. Furthermore, from the eco-systemic viewpoint (another culturallydefined perspective), it is important to realize that the integrity of life process is
broken by analyzing it into its constituent elements. As I pointed out before,
analysis is a complementary approach to the integrative view, and it can
provide important additional information only as far as one keeps in mind that
it is not the only source of knowledge about a phenomenon - particularly when
80

McHale and Cordell, op.cit.: 50

the phenomenon is life process. Otherwise, analysis becomes a reductionist
procedure. When applied to human needs, it most often leads to providing for
fragmented, isolated needs and treating them symptomatically - i.e. without
perceiving the integrity of life process and the interdependency of its
interrelated functions.
I have, consequently, undertaken to suggest a categorization of human

needs which would reflect a perception appropriate to an ecological culture.
The key principle upon which such an analysis has to be based is metabolism.
McHale and Cordell introduce the notion of metabolism and establish the
distinction between internal and external metabolic processes, but through a
rather complicated and confusing matrix titled 'needs environment", and
without a deeper elaboration of the meaning of metabolism in the context of
human needs

81.

Human needs have to be conceived of a s a metabolic process - exchange
of energy and matter between the human and her/his environment. The analysis of human needs thus emerges from the basic matrix of metabolic processes
- the energy/matter flow: intake - functioning - output. This metabolic flow

can be also perceived a s charge - functioning - discharge 82, and, pertinent to
the consumer culture context, a s acquisition - use - disposal. Such an
analysis will be truly complementary to the initial eco-systemic view, starting
from metabolism as the integrative characteristic of living systems. In that
context, the flow can be most generally perceived a s birth - life - death.
Malinowski's theory of human needs is substantially based on metabolism83
and he even introduces a notion of vital sequence which indicates the flow of
matter (energy is not explicitly mentioned) related to human needs:

81
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ibid.: 30
See the quote marked by footnote 87 in the previous chapter
All human beings [...I as organisms must exist under conditions which not only
secure survival, but also allow of healthy and nonnal metabolism I...] We can
&_fine the term "humannature" by the fact that all men have to eat, they have to
breathe, to sleep, to procreate, and to eliminate waste matterfrom their organisms
wherever they live and whatever type of civilization they practice. (Malinowski,
1944: 75)

PERMANENT VITAL. SEQUENCES INCORPORATED IN ALL CULTURES 84
IA) Impulse
Act
IC) Satis-faction
Drive to breathe
Hunger
Thirst
Sex appetite
Fatigue
Restlessness
Somnolence
Bladder pressure
Colon pressure
Fright
Pain

Intake of oxygen
Ingestion of food
Absorption of liquid
Conjugation
Rest
Activity
Sleep
Micturition
Defecation
Escape from danger
Avoidance by effective act

If the metabolism/flow principle of intake

-

Elimination of CO2 in tissues
Satiation
Quenching
Detumescence
Restoration of muscular energy
Satisfaction of fatigue
Awakening with restored energy
Removal of tension
Abdominal relaxation
Relaxation
Return to normal state

functioning - output, or charge

- functioning - discharge, is applied, Malinowski's chart presents some

inconsistencies. Another problem that becomes conspicuous from the viewpoint
of the metabolism/flow principle, and which appears in Malinowski's matrices,
a s well a s in most of the other classifications of human needs, is health
conceived as a need. Health in the form of a service (or in its worst form a s a
commodity) is certainly a culturally derived need. However, its initial meaning
originates from whole, healing, and in that sense health implies unimpeded
energy/matter metabolism and it includes all life functions

85.

My suggestion for a categorization of human needs/functions follows
primarily Malinowski's conception of human needs, and is based on the
integrative metabolic flow matrix of intake - functioning - output, or charge functioning - discharge:

breathing/drinking/eating/personal care

taking space (and time) - living space/environmental control and cornfort/

84

85

ibid.: 77; also: ibid.: 137
See footnote 25 in chapter 2.

Sustainable Technology
A sound man is good a t salvage,
At seeing nothing is lost.
Lao Tze, 500 B.C.
The major component of a n ecosystem, that is,
interaction, involves attention to the
measurement of inputs a n d outputs of
matter-energy a n d information to and from the
ecological unit, respectively. 86

I have indicated above that sustainable (or ecological) technology should be

conceived as a component of an integrated economy of life processes - i.e. as
technology of life processes. It is, thus, perceived in context. The conventional
view, by contrast, perceives technology as isolated from and independent of
social and natural milieu in which it develops, and, therefore, as another valuefree discipline. (It is solely linked to the economy, and only in terms of costs in
the market, i.e., exchange value.)
Conceptualization, practice and assessment of sustainable technology has
to be established on the basic principle of energy/matter flow, the intake

+

functioning + output matrix 87. This means that technology is conceived as
technical solutions to energy/matter exchange with the environment, or to the
fulfillment of human needs/functions. Technology is, thus, defined as
culturally determined ways of satisfying human needs/functions.
Consequently, the basic metabolic flow matrix expands to include technology:

intake

+

culturally
defined
technology
of intake

+

life function

+

culturally
defined
technology
of output

+

output

This matrix should be the starting point for the design and implementation
of sustainable (ecological)technology, as well as for the assessment of its
impact on the natural cycles of resource renewal.
86
87

Sontag, et al., 1993: 152
I prefer to use the word intake than input. Input can connote external agency and
passiveness of the recipient. This issue of passiveness is pertinent to the
discussion of alienation in the next chapter.

Renewal is a key notion for understanding sustainable technology. It is
primarily a characteristic of metabolic processes which are depicted by the
intake + functioning + output matrix. Metabolic processes are repetitive
cycles. Breathing (the first life function from the classification I suggested
above) is an intake-output, or charge-discharge repetitive metabolic cycle which
can be described as a pulse (charge/discharge) - a pulse of continuous
renewal. Every metabolic process can be perceived as a pulse - with different
frequency of charge-discharge, or intake-output.
After each breath, we need to breathe again - after each intake/output
cycle, metabolic processes need available intake resources. Sustainability has
been mainly concerned with availability of resources, which has become a
conspicuous problem with the expansion of economic and technological
practices that entail steep rates of resource depletion.
One of the determinants of sustainability has been termed "carrying
capacity" and defined as:
capacity of an ecosystem to support healthy organisms while maintaining its
productivity, adaptability, and capability of renewal. 88

Consequently, in the majority of texts that discuss sustainability, the distinction
has been introduced between renewable and non-renewable resources 89:
The environment is man's supplier of resources. We can distinguish
between renewable and non-renewable resources. The environment's ability
to renew resources has the character of a capital good. By overuse or
investment it can be negatively or positively affected by man. 90

This distinction is often presented in terms of income versus capital
sources - a terminology which obviously reflects the current utilitarian
economic paradigm invading the "objective scientific perspective" of physics:
[Energy sources] may be grouped into two general categories - celestial or
income energy, which is the energy reaching the earthfrom outer space, and
capital energy, which is energy that already exists on or in the earth 91

88

89
90
91

From Caring for the Land: A Stratew for Sustainable Living, a 1991
IUCN/UNEP/WWF publication - quoted in Thayer, 1994: 100 (emphasis mine)
Flavin and Lenssen, 1994; Henderson, 1981; Martinez-Alier, op.cit.; Thayer, op.cit.
Faber, et al., 1987: 14
Culp, 1991: 7

The renewable/non-renewable distinction can, however, be taken only as
provisional because, at the cosmic level, neither of the material/energy
resources is non-renewable. The ultimate pulse of renewal is the Big Bang:
Most cosmologists now believe that the universe began in a primordial
explosion sornejjteen billion years ago and that it has been growing ever
since. [...I The speed at which the galaxies are rushing apart is gradually
declining under the in-tuence of gravitation. If the matter density of the
universe is sumiently low, the expansion will continue forever. But fi there
is more than a certain amount of matter in the universe, the expansion will
stop, and the universe will begin to contract ultimately resulting in a reversal
of the Big Bang in a terminal implosion called the Big Crunch. Most physicists
seem tofavour continued expansion; but some prefer the Big Crunch, a n d f i d
in it a way to return to a repetitive eternity:for the Big Crunch could be the Big
Bang of the next universe,and so onforever. 92

Consequently, rather than considering renewable/non-renewable resources, one has to perceive them in terms of the rate and scale of renewal. In the
context of sustainability, the relevant scale is the human-ecological level of interactions (which is part of the nested levels of renewal cycles, up to the cosmic
level) 93. Renewability rate is thus one of the aspects of the impact of a technology assessed by analyzing its intake-functioning-output sequence. Expenditure

in excess of the rate of renewal creates ecological imbalance. Unsustainable
practices can, thus, be described a s discomectedness from, or ignoring the
natural cycles of renewal.
Human-ecological scale and the level of deliberating the renewal processes
is represented by the intake+life function+output matrix. The forms of energy
and matter usable as intakes for each functioning process typically differ from
the forms in which they are available as sources. Therefore, some technology is
necessary to convert resources into the needed form of energy or matter. Accordingly, the matrix takes the following form 94:

92

93

94

Sheldrake, 1988: 7-8 (emphasis mine)
The debate between proponents of these two views is, of course, very speculative.
but the notion of eternal expansion is most probably a reflection of the linear
paradigm, which is likewise expressed in the concept of endless and limitless
economic growth (albeit on a vastly different scale). To me, the idea of a pulsation
(explosion/implosion) on a cosmogenic scale seems much more consequent to a
new paradigm.
AS I have already pointed out, such a focus does not have to imply a n
anthropocentric perspective.
Ristic, 1986

technology for

energy/matter
resource

+ conversion

+

life function

into usable
form of intake

+

technology
for
sustainable
output

+

output

The energy intake presents some controversial issues. In mainstream
physics, the availability of resources and their conversions are related to the
categorization into two types of energy:
transitional energy and stored energy. nansitional energy is energy in
motion, and as such can move across system boundaries. Stored-energy
forms, as implied, are energy forms that exist as mass, position in a force
field, etc. These stored forms can usually be easily converted into some form
of transitional energy. 95

In this context, energy is very rarely discussed in connection with life
processes. In the following quote, a link between the realms of biology and
physics is indicated by the use of the same concept of stored energy:
On earth the ultimate source of animal food is plant lge, which acts as a
potential energy store. I...I Photosynthetic plants may thus be considered the
major source of food, and hence energy for heterotrophs. 96

I have repeatedly pointed out that the divide between physical and living

spheres is one of the most consequential characteristics of the current scientific paradigm and the world view in general

97.

Their reconnection is a key

issue of ecological culture.
The role of life in storing energy, presented in the previous quote, is
exactly what has earlier been described as the ektropic (or counter-entropic)
effect of life processes.
Furthermore, the systemic conception of life functions or (human needs) as
exchange of energy (and matter) with the environment has to apply to all
human life functions. If "non-physical" interactions are to be perceived as
energy exchange between the individual human system and its environment
(social and natural), such a perspective introduces the most controversial issue
of life energy 98 as the form of energy that is exchanged in such interactions.

95
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Culp, op.cit.: 4
Philipson, 1966: 2-3
See the dual vision problem at footnote 57 in the previous chapter
It will be discussed more extensively in the last chapter.

Human interactions have been described in terms of energy, particularly in
humanistic psychology and psychotherapy, and attempts have been made to distinguish these forms of energy from those encountered in the non-living realms:
Subtle energy connections I...]link us not only to the natural world but
also to other humans. 99

Rupert Sheldrake indicates this issue in his theory of fields, which he applies
both to living and non-living realms (thus overcoming the "dual vision"
controversy):
Fields are the medium of "actionat a distance," and through them objects
can aflect each other even though they are not in material contact.I...]Fields
cannot be explained in terms of matter; rather, matter is explained in terms of
energy within_fietds.100

However, it was Wilhelm Reich who developed the most comprehensive theory
and experimental practice of life energy which he named "orgone energy". He
also framed the concept in terms of reconnection of the dual vision of the world
- as "thefunctional law that merges organic and inorganic nature into

onew101. Reich's work is not yet fully acknowledged because his insights were
too radical for the time when they were made. However, there have recently
been indications of direct and indirect acceptance of, and continuation of
research on the life energy concept:
Today, there is a growing awareness that the body expresses a vital
energy which brings us into contact with reality and with others, an energy
which enables us to create and to transform reality. 102

In 1987, German scientist, Arnim Bechmann, founded the Institute for
Ecological Perspectives of the Future which
under the title of post-material natural science, deals with concepts of
theoretical and empirical levels that target the comprehension of lge's
vitality. I...]
Nature, and especially living systems possess at least two dimensions:
(1) a material dimension, meaning the matter level in the sense of existing
natural science (mangestation level); (2) a transmaterial dimension of
organising energies, forces or working factors (transmaterial
organisation-level)I...]
It is obvious that Reich's work can be interpreted from the viewpoint of
post-material natural science. In dealing with thetwo-level schemata,
99
100
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Goodison, 1992: 259
Sheldrake. op-cit.: 97-99 (emphasis mine)
Reich, 1949/ 1973: 78 (emphasis mine); see also footnote 87 in the previous chapter.
Melucci, op-cit.:71-72 (emphasis mine)

orgon-energy shapes the organisation-level.That means that orgon-energy
generally organises the material world.
Besides Wilhelm Reich there have [...I been other attempts to describe this
organisation-level [.. I RudolfSteiner or Viktor Schauberger, [...I holistic
biologists Cfor example Adolph Meier-Abich, Hans Driesch or Jakob von
Uexkiill) or traditional far-eastem teachers of vitality or inner energy. 103

Bechmam has continued some of Reich's experiments, but it is also important
that he perceives the concept of life energy in terms of the self-organizing
capability of life processes which has been studied by Prigogine

104.

In this essay, I have adopted the concept of life energy, and the conception of human life functions (or human needs) a s exchange of energy (and
matter) with the environment - including life energy. Consequently, the basic
forms of intake sources can be distinguished as:
air
water
land
energy:

** from physical environment
** from other living beings:

*** food
*** contacts with living nature
*** social/sexual/love interactions

organic matter.

Metabolic Cycles of Technology
When the intake +function +output matrix with technologies of conversion
is applied to this inclusive perspective of life functions, the assessment of
technologies can offer more comprehensive (or systemic/integrative) insights. It
becomes possible to assess the impact of technologies that mediate human
interactions and to reveal how some aspects of those interactions are enhanced
- but also how technologies can impede, or otherwise affect the flow of life

energy. This kind of assessment will be increasingly salient as human
interactions get more and more mediated by technology, and a s the quality of
the environment (social and natural) is perceived in more comprehensive terms.
103
104

Bechrnann, 1997: 3-5
See the text and quotation marked by footnote 61 in the previous chapter.

The integrative quality of the environment is assessed by the energy/matter flow matrix. The matrix looks equally a t intakes and a t outputs. Technology
has usually been more concerned with resources that enter the processes of
production. Sustainable technology has to be conceived of in terms of source
and sink - intake and output. Therefore, in the matrix that introduces
technologies of conversion into usable forms of intake, the technologies for
conversion into sustainable output are equally essential. The insight into the
metabolic flow of matter and energy enables the assessment of the inclusion of
technologies into natural cycles of renewal.
This examination of technology is integrative or holistic in the systemic sens e a s it starts from the integrity of the metabolic process and then proceeds toward the ramifications of the intake + life function + output sequence into its interrelated subprocesses. In other words, each technology of intake or output also
involves its own metabolic flow of intake +technological process + output. Thus
the assessment of sustainable technology becomes a comprehensive control of
the impact of all the energy/matter flow involved in human life processes.
Technology assessment may be d e N d
impact of a technology on society. 105

[...I as an analysis of the total

The metabolic approach has been increasingly adopted in sustainable
building:
A green approach to the built environment involves a holistic approach
to the design of buildings; all the resources that go into a building, be they
materials,fuels or the contribution of the users, need to be considered i f a
sustainable architecture is to be produced. [...I Everything used in the
construction of the houses is biodegradable. Should a house reach the end of
its useful life, all its materials can be re-used,or be allowed to rot naturally,
without environmental harm. 106

However, this kind of thinking is not as new as Brenda and Robert Vale seem
to think. J u a n Martinez-Alier points to Patrick Geddes (1854-1932).the
Scottish biologist, sociologist and urban planning theoretician, who perceived
the matter/energy flow in terms of the stages of production:
Geddes also proposed the construction of a type of input-output table in
physical tenns [. ..I Energy and materials are transformed into products in three

stages: the extraction of fuels and raw materials; the manufacture; and the transport and exchange. The intermediary products usedfor the manufacture or transport of thefial products must be subtractedfrom thefial products. We need
an estimate of the losses (dissipation and disintegration) at each stage. 107

The metabolic flow assessment expresses the basic question: what
happens to matter and energy on their "path" through technological processes.
The intake + life function + output matrix, which I propose here as the basic
cycle, focuses the assessment on human life functions, or human needs, in
contrast to the majority of assessment approaches which focus on technologies
or production processes. The basic matrix can be expanded to include the
production phases, but still keep the life functions as the conceptual focus. In
an earlier study

108,

I have established a technological sequence through which

matter or material passes in the process of use for human needs:
(1)natural resource +(2)element or component (semi-finalproduct) +(3) com-

modity (finalproduct)+(4)use (life function)+(5)recycling (returning the rnatter/material back to technological process, or to natural cycles of renewal).
As I have indicated above, every stage of this sequence involves a subprocess

of energy/matter intake + technological process + output which can also be
expanded into resource-through-recycling sub-sequences.
The phases of the sequence after the use/life function are most questionable in the current economy and technology, and they are generally addressed by
the theory and practice of sustainability as the issue of recycling. Furthermore.
these phases are commonly considered as a separate concern of waste management 109, organizationally disconnected from resource management. The entire metabolic flow should be conceived of as integral, and the intake

+ functioning +

output matrix is meant to express that integrity. By contrast, in the current consumer culture, this integral flow is divided into three separate activities: production, consumption and communal services which are supposed to solve the
waste problem.
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Martinez-Alier, op.cit.: 94
Ristic. 1986
Porteous, 1977

Despite continued fears about hazardous waste, communities throughout
the nation we_finding that their most pressing disposal problems were caused
by ordinary garbage. There was nowhere to put it. Low prices ofraw materials
had rendered recycling by and large economically infeasible. Increased public
opposition had made siting new dumpsites extremely d ~ m u l t1.10
Only 20% of the landflls in operation in 1986 are expected to be open in
the year 2008, despite increasing amounts of waste. I...I
Refuse-derivedfuel plants have advantages over other municipal disposal options because they require no change in waste collection patterns. 111

However, change in waste management practice should rather be seen a s
requisite. The current idea that garbage has to be removed and placed (hidden)
somewhere out of sight is most questionable and ecologically untenable

112.

Actually, the very notion of refuse after use is a misconception:
Nature admits no waste. Nothing is left over; everything is joined in the
spiral of lge. Perhaps other cultures know this better than we, for they have
no concept of; no word for, waste. 113

Recycling is a different technological approach, not a waste disposal
option. The recycling phase in the technological sequence should be considered
in terms of:
reuse (in different context)
- returning into the sequence at phase 4
disassembly in order to:
** reassemble into new final products 114
- returning into the sequence at phase 3
** recycle into secondary resources
- returning into the sequence at phase 2
recycling into natural cycles of renewal
- returning into the sequence at phase 1
The introduction of the notions of assembly and disassembly, a s relevant
for the integrally conceived technological sequence, involves the assessment of
the impact of technologies a t different phases of the sequence. In simplified
terms, if the final product is designed and produced so that it involves excessive energy and pollution at disassembly, then such technology is not sustainable. The assessment of what is recyclable is currently based on market evaluations which externalize most of the human-ecological assessment criteria. The
110
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Landy. et al.. 1990: 256; see also quote in footnote 23 in the previous chapter.
Switzer, 1994: 106-107
Ristic, 1989~
Van Der Ryn, 1980: 1
The notion of new product has to be redefined and rid of the consummerist
obsession with new commodities. See in this connection the quote at footnote 127.

current extremely low recycling practices are the result of the current technological solutions along the whole technological sequence which do not assume the
imperative of recycling or inclusion into natural cycles of renewal

115.

Of

course, such negligence of the current technology is dictated by the marketeconomy criteria of what is economically feasible to recycle.
The following figures
illustrate the potential for
board, glass and metals:
20 - 45%
15 - 3096
6 - 13%
4-11%
3-896
3 - 5%
remainder:

for average composition of municipal waste
materials recovery, particularly for paper and
paper and board
vegetable and animal wastes
glass
metals (mainly ferrous; aluminium 0.5-1%)
plastic materials
textiles and wood
various and small particles. 1 16

The assessment of technology as a metabolic cycle can ascertain how it
achieves reinclusion of matter and energy into natural cycles of renewal. On
the cosmic level, as I have already pointed out, everythmg eventually enters
into a cycle of renewal. Therefore, both at the output and the resource end of
the input + functioning + output flow, the inclusion into natural cycles of
renewal has to be considered in terms of rate of renewal. Sustainable
technology thus involves the human-ecological scale of the renewal rate, which
defmes the assessment of the impact of pollution and environmental disruption
that technologies can have at the human-ecological level of life processes.
To suppose that we can ensure thefunctioning of the ecosphere ourselves
with the sole aid of technological devices, and thereby dispense with the elaborate set of self-regulating mechanisms that has taken billions of years to evolve, is an absurd piece of anthropocentric presumption [...I If, for instance, the
insecticides we use to replace the self-regulating controls that normally ensure the stability of insect populations were to destroy nitrogen-fiwing bacteria
orpollinating insects -all the money and all the technology in the world would
not suffie to replace them and thereby prevent l$e processes from grinding to
a halt. Yet this substitution is implicit in the aim of industrial society. 117

The human-ecological determination of technology has to be interpreted in
terms of culture. I have established earlier that technologies of conversion into

115
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Some of the more recent solutions, like the industrial ecology concept and practice
(see between footnotes 239 and 241 in chapter 8), are still addressing only the preconsumer recycling involved in the production stages of the sequence.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1983: 9
Goldsmith et al., 1972: 73

usable forms of matter or energy. as well as into sustainable forms of output,
are culturally determined. In fact, cultures are most often defined by these
technologies. Consequently, consumer culture uses technologies which entail
considerable problems both at the intake end (resource depletion), and at the
output end (pollution and environmental disruption).
Sustainable technology, or technology for an ecological culture, would therefore have to be designed, implemented and assessed according to the
metabolic cycle principle. This principle has to be applied in evaluating entire
technological sequences involved in satisfymg human life functions. Of course.
such an analysis becomes very complex and entails a reconsideration of human
needs, and their emancipation, so to speak, from consumption disorders
created by consumer culture - an analysis along the lines of insights into the
problems of human needs that I presented earlier in this chapter.
There is no human activity, concerted or individual, which we could
regard as purely physiological, that is. "natural"or untutored. Even such
activities as breathing, the work of internal secretions, digestion, and
circulation happen within the arkficial environment of culturally
determined conditions. I...] There is a constant interaction between the
organism and the secondary milieu in which it exists, that is, culture. I...]
In the case of breathing, this occurs within enclosed spaces, a house, a
cave, a mine, or a factory. [...I The organs of breathing are also, to a large
It would be equally easy to show thatfatigue,
extent, organs of speech I...]
somnolence, thirst, and restlessness are determined by such cultural factors
as a call to duty, the urgency of a task, the established rhythm of activities.
Similar factors obviously also affect bladder and colon pressure and impulses
of pain and fear. 118

I will suggest here a possible pattern of an analysis of technology for ecological culture based on metabolic cycle principle and technological sequence approach. I will show this analysis on exemples of only two of the basic human
needs/functions which I listed in my suggested categorization 119:

air intake

+ breathing + discharge:

Technologies involved are for air purification (indoors and outdoors) and
ventilation. The current overuse of artificially ventilated spaces in the
"developed countries" is an obvious example of unsustainable technologies
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Malinowski. 1944: 68. 85
See text after footnote 85 above.

which consume enormous quantities of energy and infrastructure and result in
health hazards from colds and flues to allergies and respiratory problems. This
seeniingly very simple living function can involve rather complex technological
sequences, where the outputs are material waste, entropy and environmental
impact resulting from technological processes involved in the production and
functioning of air purification and ventilation infrastructure.
water intake

+ drinking + urine discharge 120:

Technologies involved are for water accumulation, storage and distribution (if
spring or aquifer water is considered), a s well a s water purification (now
prevalent technology of converting available resources into usable form). The
principal reason for complex water purification is the current technical solution
to the output of the drinking function: the waste water treatment. Before it
comes to that, there are toilets which have to satisfy the culturally defined
needs for privacy and comfort, and the necessary infrastructure.
The predominant cultural mode of resolving the output of human excretory
functions (and that involves also the next basic function of food intake + eating

+ excretion) is to use water as the medium for removing human waste from the
living space. This solution entails most difficult ecological problems. Their
complex interrelatedness is best summarized by Sirn Van Der Ftyn:
Mix one part excreta with one hundred parts clean water. Send the
mixture through pipes to a central station where billions are spent in futile
attempts to separate the two. Then dump the effluent, now poisoned with
chemicals but still rich in nutrients, into the nearest body of water. The
nutrients feed algae which soon use up all the oxygen in the water, eventuaUy
destroying aU aquatic li$e that may have survived the chemical residues.
All this adds up to a strange balance sheet: the soil is starved for the
natural benefits of human manure, garbage and organic materials that go
down the toilet, the drain and to the dump. So agribusiness shoots it up with
arti_ficialfertilizers made largely from petroleum These synthetics are not
absorbed by the soil and leach out to pollute rivers-and oceans. We each use
eight b ten thousand gallons offresh water toflush away material that could
be returned to the earth to maintain its fertility. Our excreta - not wastes but
misplaced resources - end up destroyingfood chains,food supply and water
quality in rivers and oceans. 121
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This is, of course, a simplification as urination is not physiologically related only
to drinking.
Van Der Ryn. op.cit.: Introduction

The interrelatedness and interdependency of technology and human needs
it satisfies becomes so obvious, and the systemic approach to its analysis so
appropriate, when the basic resources like air and water are considered. As
they are the principal media of life processes, they are also the main vehicles
for transmission of pollutants. And both aspects are relevant for the humanecological context of perception of these physico-chemical entities.
Water,at once the most vital and the most abused urban resource, best
illustrates the precarious relationship that now exists between cities and
natural systems. [...I Few incentives exist to conserve water or protect itfrom
pollution. Toxic heavy metals and organic chemicals now threaten to taint
urban water supplies in much the same way that waterborne diseases did
during the Industrial Revolution a century or more ago. Neurological damage
and mutagenic birth defects may increase as more and more toxic wastes are
assimilated and concentrated in urban environments. 122
A major issue with water is that the current practices do not consider it at

all in terms of natural cycles of renewal, but largely regard it as an inexhaustible resource. It is indicative of our present view of the environment and natural
processes that such a striking misconception is adopted of a natural element
whose circulatory movement in nature is so conspicuous and so much part of
our everyday experience. Sustainable approaches have, however, recently
begun to consider the recycling of water and the categorization of different
kinds of water requirements in terms of its purity. (This issue is particularly
pertinent to the human life function which I classified as personal care.)
Of the water used by urban development, more than half is spent on
irrigating ornamental landscapes, and most oflen this water is of potable,
drinkable quality. [. ..I An American household of four people typically uses
about one acre-footof water per year [...I
Waterfor landscape irrigation can be reclaimed and partially treated fi
necessary for landscape use after being used initially for "higher quality"
functions in kitchen and bathroom sinks. 123

All these issues overlay with the life function of living space which involves
complex technologies of building and using built space. In a sustainable or ecological cultural mode, these technologies include consideration of energy flow.

-
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Brown and Jacobson, 1987: 36-37
Thayer, op.cit.: 257-258

Solar technologies have been regarded a s particularly appropriate

124. Special

attention has been paid to building materials used for enclosures and their impact on inhabitants. Furthermore, enclosures themselves should be assessed
a s energy systems (taking into consideration also life-, or subtle-energies).
Buildings should be designed to work with climate and natural energy
sources.125

A pertinent aspect of considering built space in terms of the metabolic cycle

is the shift of perspective to regarding buildings themselves a s metabolic processes - not only a s changeable physical enclosures in the way that the following quotation depicts them - but as integral infrastructures for human life processes 126.
It is useful to remember that traditional buildings last for centuries not
because they are so sound, but because they are continually repaired. 127

The above examples of the analysis of technology based on the metabolic
cycle principle should suffice to present the assessment approach that I
consider appropriate in the context of sustainability or ecological culture. It is
important to reiterate that this analysis should never loose sight of the integrity
of life processes and natural cycles of renewal.

Some of the vast array of literature on sustainable building technologies includes:
Boyle and Harper, 1976; Crowther, 1977; Mazria, 1979; Olkowski, et al., 1979;
Bainbridge, 1980; Butler, 198 1; Andrejko, 1989; Walter and Crenshaw, 1992; Potts,
1993; National Audubon Society, 1994; Vale and Vale, op.cit.
125 Vale and Vale, op.cit.:84
126 See also quote at footnote 86 in chapter 7.
127 Alexander and Jacobson. 1974: 45
124

Chapter

Alienation

Matters of li$e and death did not worry Ippolit Matveyevich Vorobyaninov, although by the nature of
his work he dealt with themfrom nine till$ve
every day, with a half-hour break for lunch
Ilf and Petrov, The Twelve Chairs 1
The social crisis we are living through is basically
due to the inability of people in general to govern
their own lwes. 2

Problems of Alienation
in the Context of Sustainability
The insights into the ecology of technology offered by the metabolic cycle
analysis are entirely alien to consumers in the current cultural setting. Consumers are typically aware of matter or energy only in the form of commodities
that are sold to them. In the culture where there is a sharp divide into production, consumption and communal services (waste management), consumers
1
2

Ilya Ilf (1897-1937) and Yevgeny Petrov (1903-1942). Russian (Soviet) satirists
Reich, 195 1b: Introduction

have no involvement in the phases of technological sequence before or after the
use (consumption) of final products. Consequently, they are disinterested in
and negligent of where the energy and matter that they use to satisfjr their life
functions come from and go to:
The typical technology of urban water supply and wastewater treatment
is [...I located out of sight and as farfrom the center of town as possible,
hopefully somewhere people rarely go. It is no wonder thatfew people. when
asked, can tell you where their wastewater goes once their washing machine
cycle is operated or their toilet &_flushed."Out-of-sight,out-of-mind"is the
guiding principle. 3

A most important issue about human needs and the ways by which they

are satisfied, is the problem of involvement and control. That emerges a s an
issue of alienation. Humans have become thoroughly alienated from the ways of
satisfying their own vital needs. They have lost control over the process

4:

Unlike our ancestors we have little control over the creation of our
power, food, clothing, or shelter and this loss may be harmful to the human
psyche. This oversimplification and impoverishment of the lives of most of
us could lie close to the rmts of much of the chaos, violence, and
disintegration that threatens modem society. 5

The loss of control over the process of satisfymg one's own needs is a
disconnection from the basic eco-systemic relationship - the exchange between
individuals and their environment. In the current cultural pattern humans have
become alienated from their awareness of and control over this basic ecosystemic interaction, and, consequently, from natural metabolic cycles of
renewal. This alienation is both a n expression and a reinforcement of the
dualized construct of humanity versus nature, and it is closely related to the
distortion of human needs into commodities 6 which I elaborated in the
previous chapter.
The loss of control over the ways humans satisfjr their needs has been a
gradual process - a process of escalating institutionalization of human lives.
For important matters in their lives, humans have been increasingly dependent

3

Thayer, 1994: 259, 261

4

Ristic, 1982; Ristic, 1985; Ristic, 1989

5

Todd. 1977: 364
Gorz, 1980: 77

6

on more and more complicated, and less and less intelligible social and
technological mechanisms.
The rnos t important dimension of advanced technological institutions is
the social one, that is, the institutions are agencies of highly centralized and
intensive social control. 7
Any industry exercises this kind of deep-seated monopoly when it
becomes the dominant means of satisgijng needs that formerly occasioned a
personal response. 8

Humans are increasingly detached from the immediate functioning of the
social environment in which they used to be competently involved in the process of satisfymg their own needs. This immediate social environment - which
is the essential part of the systemic unity of the individual and her or his environment - has now turned into impersonal and depersonalizing institutions 9.
Different forms of institutionalized provision for human needs - care, service,
commodities - have not only distorted to various degrees the character of
needs, but have created social, economic and technological relationships where
humans no longer have control over their own lives. In the context of an
ecological culture, this is the central issue of alienation. Alienation was extensively discussed in these terms by the members of the "Frankfurt School"
(especially Marcuse

lo).

They expanded upon the initial Marxist concept of

alienation which primarily implied estrangement of proletarian work that was a
result of their exclusion from sharing the surplus-value created by their labor.
Jean Baudrillard's postmodernist analysis of alienation is based on a reevaluation of the basic Marxist laws of value

11,

and on his argumentation that

the overt and direct forms of exploitation have been blurred and surpassed by
a pervasive domination of the symbols of consumer culture over the entire
scope of everyday life. He compellingly conveys a picture of the current stage

7

8
9

10
11

McDermott, 1969: 158
Illich, 1974: 45
Ristic, l99Oa
The decisions over l$e and death [...I are made at places over which the individuals
have no control. (Marcuse, 1964: 32) See also footnote 57 in the previous chapter.
See quote at footnote 26 in the previous chapter.

of Western civilization where humans are entirely devoid of personal control
over and responsibility for all aspects of their lives:
From birth control to death control, whether we execute people or compel
their survival, [...I the essential thing is that the decision is witMrawn from
them that their life and their death ate m f i e e l y theirs, but that they live
or die according to a social visa. It is even intolerable that their lijie and death
remain open to biological chance, since this is still a type of freedom [...I
Death proper has been abolished to make room for death control and
euthanasia [...I It m t be possible to operate death as a social service,
integrate it like health and disease under the sign of the Plan and Social
Security. [...I 'You die, we'U do the rest' is already just a n old advertising slogan
used forfuneral homes. 12

Alberto Melucci puts the issue in terms which emphasize the loss of
personal experience that is the utter consequence of depersonalizing alienation
of the institutionalized social and technological environment:
Intensive a n d unremitting care, unequalled in human history, is thus
taken of our everydq lives. No longerfields of experience and of relations,
our lives have turned into spacesfor attention and manipulation by teams of
specialists circumscribing problems a n d manufacturing solutions. 13

The perception of institutions and of institutionalization a s an imposition of
control over human lives, requires an examination of the meaning of the term
institution

14.

Malinowski uses a broader definition which conceives all forms of

human organization for the purpose of satisfymg their needs a s institutions,
but he also observes that the term is "not a l w a y s clearly defined o r consistently
used"

15.

Daniel Bromley distinguishes two types of institutions: conventions; and
rules or entitlements 16. The second category should entail the regulatory
character of institutions which he elaborated in the context of economic
structures

17.

However, he subsequently confuses the regulatory aspect of

institutions with more spontaneous forms of social organization and behavior:
Regularizing institutions exist and they are called habits or norms
most countries individuals respect the sanctity of queues. 18
12
13

14

15
16
17
18

Baudrillard, 1976: 174 (emphasis mine)
Melucci, 1996: 83-84 (emphasis mine)
instihere - stituere - statuere (Latin)= set up (Oxford dict.)
Malinowski, 1944: 38
Bromley. 1989: 41
See the quote marked by footnote 15 in the previous chapter.
Bromley, op.cit.: 38

[...I In

The example Bromley has chosen can point exactly to the difference between institutionalized regulation as an imposition of behavior (or ways of satisfjmg
human needs), and spontaneous personal responsibility for the relations and
interactions between individuals and their social and natural environment. The
respect for queues reflects an individual sense of responsibility for others. The
moment the queue becomes institutionalized, prescribed by an institution, that
sensitivity is lost and substituted by authoritarian obedience.
The key criterion for understanding institutions and institutionalizationin the
context of alienation is responsibilityl9. Marcuse offered a definition most
pertinent to this perspective. He distinguished institutions as formalized,
inflexible structures that do not exhibit, nor enable spontaneous, direct and
unmediated social relationships and that are, therefore, prone to creating
alienation:
Society I...] exercises its independent power over the individuals, and this
Society is no unidenhjiable "ghost."It has its empirical hard core in the
system of institutions, which are the established andfiozen relationships
among men. 20

The spontaniety of following one's own genuine needs. and the related
individual reasponsibility are contrary to the purposes and interests of the
current economy - as I showed in the previous chapter. Therefore, alienation
from control over the ways of satisfjmg one's own needs takes the form of
distortion of needs into manipulatable wants.
The idea is always the same. People have to be keptji-om satisjijng their
needs in a spontaneous and independent way. They must depend for their
satisfaction on institutional and industrial objects that they can only get by
buying or rentingji-om institutions that control them in what nlich calls a
"radical monopoly." 2 1

Although human needs are turned into wants and treated as extremely
malleable, they are still a form- however perverted- of life functions. The mostly
unconscious internalization of these imposed wants is a crucial aspect of
alienation:
19

20
21

The issue of individual responsibility is crucial for my view of ecological culture
and I will further elaborate on it in the following chapters.
Marcuse, op.cit.: 190-191 (emphasis mine)
Gorz, op.cit.: 88; see also quote at footnote 8.

Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to havefun to behave and consume
in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and
hate, belong to this category of false needs. Such needs have a societal content
andfunction which are determined by external powers over which the
individual has no control I...]No matter how much such needs may have
become the individual's own, reproduced and fortiified by the conditions of his
existence; no matter how much he identifies himself with them andjinds
himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they werefrom the
beginning - products of a society whose dominant interest demands
repression. 22

Marcuse's comprehensive analysis of alienation in the current social systems
of Western civilization is based on revealing the dependency on and slavery to
imposed needs of a totalitarian consumer culture. He perceives the necessity
for humans to regain control over their own needs and their own lives a s a
requisite for their growth toward freedom, self consciousness and
responsibility.
The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its eflectiue
suffiation of those needs which demand liberation - liberation alsofrom
that which is tolerable afluent society. Here, the social controls exact the
overwhelming need for the production and consumption of waste; the need for
stupefying work where it is no longer a real necessity; the need for modes of
relaxation which soothe and prolong this stupefiation; the need for
maintaining such deceptive liberties as free competition at administered
prices, afree press which censors itself,free choice between brands and
gadgets. 23

Baudrillard's analysis 24 presents a more pessimistic picture of the consumer culture, without much room left for liberation that Marcuse still held to. It
seems that alienation has developed further and deeper, and has reached a
stage when reality is dominated by consumer symbols which pervade the entire
span of life functions. So people not only adopt and internalize the ways of life
over which they have no control, but the consumerist life style effectively gives
them a n illusion that they participate in a world of consumer symbols which
renders their control and responsibility utterly irrelevant. They buy into a system of images and symbols which creates a simulated reality that Baudrillard
identifies by the term simulacra 25.
Marcuse discussed the possibility that
22
23
24
25

Marcuse, op.cit.: 4-5
ibid.: 7-8;see in this context the quotes at footnotes 36 and 37 in chapter 3.
Baudrillard, op.cit.
simulacrum (from Lat. sirnulare) = deceptive substitute (Oxford dict.)

the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals
identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have
in it their own development and satisfaction.

But, here, he had in mind the concept of alienation derived from Manrism - an
alienation which involves a direct repression by institutions that impose control
over human lives. However, he concludes that this further development is "a

more progressive stage of alienation"

26. Marcuse

perceived that this new stage

of alienation was characterized by a new language of imposed images which
does not searchfor but establishes and imposes buth and falsehood. [...I It
seems unwarranted to assume that the recipients believe, or are made to
believe, what they are being told. The new touch of the magic-ritual language
rather is that people don't believe it, or don't care, and yet act accordingly. 27

This passivity and indifference becomes a most disheartening aspect of
alienation. Baudrillard ascribes it to the abolition of referential systems,
including even the exchange value, which, he argues, has been replaced by
what he depicts as symbolic exchange, or a system of simulacra 28. This
system is based on mediated and manipulated reality, where media become the
means of control over human needs, opinions and ways of life.
In order to persuade the citizen that he controls his destiny, that
morality informs decisions, and that technology is the servant rather than
the driving force, it is necessary today to distort information. The ideal of
informing the public has given way to trying to convince the public that forced
actions are actually desirable actions. 29

The mediated reality, however, goes beyond information; it invades our experience and our affective reactions:
Tofeed ourselves we consume symbols, to love and reproduce we resort to
the advice of experts, to desire and dream we use the language provided by the

26
27
28

29

Marcuse. op-cit.: 11
ibid.: 103
The era of simulation is announced everywhere by the cornmutability of formerly
contradictory or dialecticauy opposed terms. Everywhere we see the same 'genesis
of simulacra': the commutability of the beautijid and the ugly in fashion, of the left
and the right in politics, of the true and thefalse in every media message, the useful
and the useless at the level of objects, nature and culture at every level of
sign~ficationAll the great humanist criteria of value, the whole civilisation of
moral, aesthetic and practical judgement are effaced in our system of images and
signs. Everything becomes undecidable, the characteristic effect of the domination
ofthe code, which everywhere rests on the principle of neutralisation, of
indifference. (Baudrillard,op.cit.: 8-9, emphasis mine)

Illich, 1973: 18

media. Even the threat of nuclear war, the very survival of our planet, hinges
uponthecontrol ofinformation. [ , . ] E ~ x Tbeannes
~ c ~ an artCOT IS^^&.^^
We are now living entirely within the 'aesthetic' hallucination of reality.

[. ..] Reality has passed completely into the game of reality. Radical

disaffection, the cml and cybernetic stage, replaces the hot, phantasmatic
phase. The consummate enjoyment of the signs of guilt, despair, violence and
death are replacing guilt, anxiety and even death in the total euphoria of
simulation. This euphoria aims to abolish cause and efect, origin and end,
and replace them with reduplication. 31

The current stage of alienation in the consumer culture is thus
characterized by virtual social reality which is achieved by disconnection from
or neutralization of our direct affective response and interaction with "real"
reality:
We are presently living with a minimum of real sociality and a maximum of simulation. [...I A televised event [...is]a cold event warmed up by a
cold mediumfor masses, themselves cold, who are going to experience only a
posthumous emotion, a tactile and dissuasive shudder that will enable them
to let the catastrophe slip into oblivion with a sort of aesthetic good conscience. I...] Immense energies [are] spent in maintaining this simulacrum at arm's
length, to avoid the brutal dis-simulation that would occur should the reality
of a radical loss of meaning become too evident. [...I The masses respond to the
simulation of meaning with a kind of reverse simulation; they respond to
dissuasion with disafection, and to illusions with an enigmatic beliej 32

In this way, alienation becomes a detachment from and loss of sensitivity
for the reality, for our social and natural environment 33.

Systemic Perspective of Alienation
Alienation emerges as an increasing rift between individuals and their
social environment. The systemic interrelatedness of individuals and their
environment (social and natural) is based on active interactions, on involvement
in the processes of exchange which constitute the systemic unity of individual-

30
31

32
33

Melucci, op.cit.: 1-2 (emphasis mine)
Baudrillard, op.cit.: 74-75 (emphasis mine). In this connection, the problem of
virtual violence which pervades the media and entertainment products is
particularly pertinent. This issue will be relevant in the chapter on domination.
Baudrillard, 1979: 155, 160- 16 1 , 163 (emphasis mine)
TOhave seen all there is to see is to have become totaUy desensitized and
habituated [...I As the pace quickens and the intensity escalates, have we lost the
capacity to notice what actually lies directly before us? (Melucci and Chorover,
1997: 82)

in-her/his-environment. This social environment has been transformed into
institutions which turned individual interactions into passive consumption.
The alienation effect of institutionalization is further intensified with the pervasive growth-orientation of the current economic and social system. Growth
extends to proliferation of ever bigger and larger economic, technological and
organizational structures and institutions - a tremendous increase in scale and
complexity. These large-scale organizational structures seem to operate by
themselves, by some unstoppable inertia, irrespective of particular cases and
individual needs. From the systemic perspective, there is no more possibility
for individual interaction with the social environment on such a scale, so the
basic systemic interrelatedness of individual-in-her/his-environmentis broken.
Systemic interrelatedness of individuals and their environment (social and
natural) does extend to very broad levels of complexity, but this extended
relation is manifested through nested levels of interaction. The social and
economic organization based on large-scale institutional structures annihilates
the immediate and intermediate levels of interaction. The pattern of
relationships is thus redbced to isolated individuals and large-scale structures
+which are practically inaccessible to individual interactions and insensitive to
individual needs.
We find highly mobile individuals (or nuclear families) within an almost
undifferentiated and unbounded mass extending to cover the globe. There is
no sense of scale, or intermediate levels of organization. 34

Vital human needs are satisfied in a centralized way - for their satisfaction.
individuals depend entirely on large-scale institutionalized structures. Because
of their disproportionate size, these structures operate practically independently
from the needs. The needs being so many, it seems they cannot any more be
satisfied without the large-scale systems, but, a t the same time, every individual
case has no influence on their functioning. There is a dehumanizing shift: humans
and their needs exist for the sake of maintaining and sustaining the functioning
of large-scale institutional structures with all the comprehensive gigantic

34

Booth, 1984: 74

technical and social machinery that serves them

35.

Thus people become

passive consumers without any control over the ways of satisfymg their own
needs

36.

Technology [can be perceived] as a self-enclosed, totalitarian system. In
this totalitarian system, true human values are lost and technology becomes
a n autonomous force guided by internal values that bear no necessary
relation to the needs of humanity. Means become ends, and every aspect of
society - the individual, the family, the state - becomes subservient to the
system 37

This kind of social organization disrupts the basic systemic quality - the
simultaneous integrity and identity of individual systems and their belonging to
broader levels of interaction and complexity. This disruption is the fundamental
characteristic of the current progressive stage of alienation. The social
environment has transmuted into impersonal bureaucracy, into a mechanism
devoid of any humaneness, insensitive to differences and uniqueness of each
particular expression of life 38.
It is not commonly realized that this dehumanizing effect occurs on both

sides. Those who are more directly involved in the operation of the large-scale
institutional systems, usually hold to the illusion that they are in control.
However, they are only in service of, and are just a s enslaved by the
institutional structures.
As re~fcation tends to become totalitarian by virtue of its technological form, the organizers and administrators themselves become
increasingly dependent on the machinery which they organize and
administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the dialectical
relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in the

Generally irresponsible, the individual becomes, whatever happens to him, a
pretext for bureaucratic structures I.. .I (Baudrillard, 1976: 170)
Ristic, 1989b
Teich, 1981: 3
A branch of industry does not impose a radical monopoly on a whole society
by the simplefact that it produces scarce products, or because it drives cornpetmg
the market, but rather by virtue of its acquired ability to create and
industries 08
shape the need which it alone can satisfy. I...] Each citizen of a motorized Utopia
would be deprived of the use of his feet and dra$ed into the servitude of
prolgerating networks of transportation. (Illich, 1974: 47-48)
The progressive stages of alienation (in Marcuse's terms) are emerging from domination of institutionalized systems over humans. Alienation and
institutionalization are, therefore, issues of domination and will be further
discussed in chapter 8.
Ristic, 1990a

struggle for mutual recognition, but rather a vicious circle which encbse both
the Master and the Servant. 39
Bigness encourages me (evenforces me) to treat you like a cipher, an
inconsequentialfraction of the masses I must deal with. It licenses me to
impose an abstract policy upon yourflesh-and-blood particularity, and then
to hidefrom the consequences behind a wall of red tape and procedural
protocol. So we become unreal to one another, mere phantoms moving
through a maze of impersonal rules and statistical formulas.40

The ways of satisfying basic human needs are less and less under the control of those who are directly, vitally and ardently interested, whose needs are
being satisfied, and more and more in the hands of professionally obligated workers or officials, who most often plod through tasks indifferently, unemotionally
and inefficiently. The loss of personal involvement in the ways of satisfying the
person's own needs - in processes of exchange and in direct interaction with
the immediate social and natural environment - that loss induces the passivity
and disinterestedness which are characteristic of the current consumer
culture. This aspect of alienation is manifested in increasing loss of meaning in
work. Lutz and Lux perceive in this context the importance of technologies for
satisfymg human needs that put directly involved people in control over the
entire ecology of the process:
Work occupies only a peripheral place in contemporary economics texts,
where it is ordinarily referred to as "labor"and analyzed as one of several
inputs (or 'yactors of production") in the making of consumable commodities
and services. I...I
Meaningful work is the primary avenue towards afully human economic
Any work that does not albw us to satish our social and moral
system. I...]
needs of self-esteemhas to be described as alienating. 41
In the current cultural and socio-economic context, work is alienating in its

increasing meaninglessness, rather than directly enslaving as it was in earlier
historical stages. The alienation of work is not direct any more, as it was in
strictly Marxist terms

42;

it is rather part of a virtual social reality and of the

fused production/consumption (as depicted by Baudrillard) of things no longer
connected to real human needs and to life processes.

39
40
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42

Marcuse, op.cit.: 33
Roszak, 1979: 310-311
Lutz and Lux, 1988: 153. 150
See text around footnote 26.

Labour power is no longer brutally bought and sold, it is designed,
marketed and turned into a commodity - production re-enters the sign system
of consumption. [...I Labour (even in the guise of leisure) [. ..] pervades every
aspect of life in the form of a control, a permanent occupation of spaces and
times regulated according to an omnipresent code. Wherever there are people,
they must be&ed, whether in schools, factories, on the beach, in front of the
TV,or being retrained. 43

The pervasive control over human lives, perpetuated by large-scale
institutional systems, results in loss of responsibility as the key aspect of

alienation. By loss of control over the ways of satisfymg their own needs.
humans are deprived of their responsibility for their own lives. The mode of
operation of large-scale institutional systems actually induces and stimulates
individual recklessness and irresponsibility

44. And

institutional systems seem

to take over the responsibility for all aspects of individual lives.

This rationalist culture sufiers, like no other, from a collective
paranoia. Something or someone must have been responsiblefor the least
accident, the slightest irregularity, the least catastrophe, an earth tremor, a
house in ruins, bad weather; everything is an assassination attempt. [...I The
new social contract: society as a whole, with its science and technology
becomes collectively responsible for the death of each individual.45
This obsession with institutional responsibility, which has become so
overwhelming, actually indicates the negative aspect of responsibility:
individual responsibility has mutated into institutional liability. If individuals are
deprived of responsibility, and the systemic interactions between individuals
and their social environment has been disrupted, there can be no genuine
responsibility at any level any more, a s responsibility is based on interactions
between individuals and their social and natural environment.
The erosion of trust in an economy leads to the development of ever
complicated and extensive legal procedures in which each party tries to
protect itself against being sold out or taken advantage o$ This multiplies the
red tape involved in economic transaction. Contract requirements
proliferate, and litigation over their interpretation correspondingly
increases. [. ..] Thus the "transactioncosts" of doing business increases and the
economic system becomes more cumbersome and infixible. 46
43
44

45
46

Baudrillard, 1976: 14
Here are some very simple examples (also illustrative of more complex situations):
at home you most probably turn off the light as you come out of the bathroom; at
work you tend to leave it on - the larger the company/institution you work in, the
more likely. Similarly, you are extremely unlikely to throw a candy wrap on your
floor, but not so unlikely to do it in the street.
ibid.: 161-162 (emphasis mine)
Lutzand Lux,op.cit.: 85

The lack of control over and responsibility for individual's own life - as well
as the incapacity to affect the operation of the large-scale institutional systems
- can create the feelings of futility of individual efforts and of helplessness,

passivity and apathy. These feelings can become a chronic disturbance of
behavior when individuals are repeatedly exposed to vital situations which
affect them adversely, but are entirely beyond their ability to exert any
influence upon. This chronic disturbance has been a subject of extended
research by psychologist Martin Seligman, and he described it as "learned
helplessness":
When experience with uncontrollable events gives rise to the expectation
that events in Urefuture will also elude control, disruptions in motivation.
emotion, and learning may ensue. "Learned helplessness" refers to the
problems that arise in the wake of uncontrollability. First described in the
1960's among laboratory animals, learned helplessness has since been
applied to a variety of human problems entailing inappropriate passivity and
demoralization. 47

Joanna Macy discusses apathy as a reaction to helplessness against the
overwhelming threat of environmental and military destructions

48,

but I

contend that the gist of the problem is the disruption of direct interaction
between individuals and their social environment and the resulting lack of
individual control and responsibility.
The feeling of futility and helplessness would probably be lessened if largescale institutional systems were entirely successful in fulfilling their apparent
role which seems to be a logical consequence of their takeover of responsibility
for human lives. However, they are typically dysfunctional and inefficient and
their failure results primarily from lack of responsibility and its transformation
into liability.
The inefficiencies and dysfunctions stemming from irresponsibility (or
fictitious, pseudo-responsibility) of large-scale 'institutional systems is most
obtrusive in organizational and administrative institutions.
The system of separation of powers [leads]to no one being exclusively
accountable, leaving plenty of room to pointmgers. Outcome is division and
deadlock. There are p o w e r - inducements for politicians to avoid dealing
47
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Peterson, Maier and Seligman, 1993: 7
Macy, 1983:4; Macy. 1995:248

with d ~ m u lproblems
t
[...which] lead to incoherent and inemiently targeted
policies. 49

Social problems tend, therefore, to be evaded and substituted by
technological issues:
Since technological problems are intrinsically easier to solve than
social problems, I...] we transform our social problems into technological
ones. For example,faced with a shortage offresh water, one can either try
social engineering - altering lge-styles and the ways people use water - or a
technological j?x, such as the provision of additional fresh water through
nuclear-powered desalting of sea water. 50

Consequently, "technological fixes" are given high societal priority and we end
up in a culture of domination by technology 51. The evasion of social problems
results in new social problems created by "technological fixes" 52.
Large-scale technological, economic and administrative institutional
systems present vast social and ecological problems. Scale is one of the central
issues of sustainability. It ensues from growth devoid of connectedness with
life and natural processes of renewal, growth a s occupying and colonizing ever
larger expanses of human and physical resources. Large-scale technological
and organizational structures, resulting from such growth orientation, present
managerial and decision-making problems, and produce huge operating costs,
apart from their harmful social and environmental impact. And the current
economic system is conceptualized to hide these costs.
There may be many situations where decentralized technologies are
substantially cheaper to the society than centralized ones, especially when
the full set of social costs is taken into account. 53

The unsustainable inefficiencies and dysfunctions of large-scale centralized
technological systems primarily result from the entropy of complex and oversize
infrastructures, and from the systemic irresponsibility (or elusive responsibility)
of their organizational and managerial structure. These deficiencies or
diseconomies of scale translate into excessive costs.

49

50
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Weaver and Rockman. 1993: 2
Teich, op-cit.:2
This issue will be discussed in chapter 8.
See quotes and text between footnotes 28 and 29 in chapter 3.
Craig and Levine, 1982: 7

Most of these enormous sums is going into building huge regional
systems of pipes and interconnectors with single large treatment plants.
Builders and bureaucrats seem tofavor these super sewers even though much
of the money is spent simply moving wastewater around, rather than treating
it. This means not only high construction costs but also high operating costs,
since water is heavy and it takes e n o m u s electrical energy to pump it. Single
large treatment plants also tend to put all the eggs into one basket. Plant
breakdowns can be disastrous; moreover, the movement of so much water
Jiom its natural course creates ecological imbalances. 54

Even apparently sustainable technologies can be dysfunctional and
inefficient if they are based on large-scale, centralized institutional mode of
organization 55. The key to sustainability are not only ecologically sound
technologies, but also the issues of control and responsibility.
Any waterless system represents a technical and psychological departure
Jiom the thinking and practice of many sanitarians. Their concern is to
minimize individual involvement and responsibility for waste management.
They tend tofavor the "out of sight, out of mind" approach to waste
management that centralizes the disposal of wastes infacilities run by public
agencies. Systems which require maintenance by individual householders are
discouraged because they create a control problem for local officials. 56

One of the human-ecologically most dysfunctional institutional systems one that went out of control and beyond responsibility - is the corporation.
Corporations present in a n overwhelming form the characteristics of
unsustainable growth. institutionalized domination and economic control over
increasing aspects of human lives.
Corporations are the dominant institutions of our time, exercising the
sort of power wielded by the church during the Middle Ages or by the
nation-state in more recent times. In fact, some corporations are actually
bigger than nations in terms of money. Mitsubishi is the 22nd largest
economy on earth, ranked ahead of Indonesia. 57

The development and operational features of corporations indicate that
technological, economic and organizational systems cannot be conceived a s
separate. Hawken correctly perceives the corporation a s a piece of technology
(although he doesn't explicitly discern its alienating aspect) - a s a large-scale.

-
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Van Der Ryn, 1980: 100
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Ristic. 1990a
Van Der Ryn, op-cit.:73
Hightower, 1997: 60
The one hundred largest corporations have more economic power than 80
percent of the world. (Hawken. 1993: 108)
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alienated institutional system which operates a s a mechanism served by its
human and infrastructural parts:
A corporation is a social machine with interchangeable parts and
processes that can be I...I bought and sold, broken up and reassembled. Because
managers manage corporations, it is dimcult to see that corporations also
run themselves. They have a powerful inertia toward given goals, and fi one
manager cannot accomplish those goals, he or she is very likely to be replaced
until one is found who can. [.. I A corporation, although created and peopled by
human beings, does not depend on any of them in order to exist. Founders die.
so do their families; directors and managers come and go; workers have
become essentially interchangeable components. 58

Money is also a piece of technology. The emergence of institutional
dysfunction, irresponsibility and detachment from social and ecological reality
is best exemplified by developmental evolution of money 59 from an exchange
tool and convenience, to a n entirely fictitious symbol in the current consumer
culture, dominated by what Baudrillard defines as simulacra (deceptive
substitutes) 60.
Today there is no longer any commitment by the banking system to
convert paper money into any unit of production, be it a commodity or a
service. As a result, there is no longer a n y basis for conflence that the
banking system is subjected to a n y checks and balances to maintain either its
stability or relevance in organizing society to produce and consume. 61

Money was initially a commodity (mostly gold, silver, etc.) commonly used
a s a reference unit, or measure of exchange value, and a convenience which
enabled the transactions of goods to be mediated and deferred. Banks first
appeared a s depositories of the commodity that served as money, and a s
places where its quality was checked and tested. Soon banks started issuing
deposit notes which were conveniently accepted a s substitute money, but they
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ibid.: 120 (emphasis mine). Corporations and their discomectedness from
human-ecological processes will be further discussed in the next chapter.
lucidly and succinctly presented by Shann Turnbull (Morehouse et al., 1989: 138145)
See footnote 28 above.
Morehouse et al., 1989: 138-139
To avofd declaring a country bankrupt,further loans are made to provide the
foreign exchange to allow interest payments to be met. In m a n y instances, the new
loans are made by multilateral governmental banking agencies, such as the World
Bank, or with the support of govenunent guarantees. In this way, the cancer of
compounding bad loans is spread throughout the national governments of the
world's strongest economies and their banking systems. (ibid.: 139)

also made it convenient for the banks to create money for their own profitmaking purposes

62.

In many cases, one customef s deposit of gold or tobacco would be used to
back a note issued to a new borrower without the consent or even knowledge of
the depositor. Unless you are a banker, such action is called embezzlement. [...I
The practice of a bank only holding afraction of the "hard"or reserve currency
for which it created paper claims became known as 'Ifractional banking." It
might also be viewed as duplicity, especially when carried out so excessively
as to provoke the failure of the bank. 63

The most important point here is the ensuing centralization of the banking
system and the emergence of large-scale institutional structures which led it
toward dysfunction and utter detachment from any tangible production
processes, or human-ecological processes of exchange of matter and energy
with the environment.
The issue of paper money became a monopoly of national governments
and their central bankers. I...I In 1971,the U.Sgovemment announced that its
ownpaper money would no longer be convertible to gold. Paper money throughout theurortd had now lost its one last contact with mdity. [.. .] It has now
t see how such
become undefinable and therefore unmeasurable. It is d ~ m u l to
a concept can have for long much relevance or use as the key mechanismfor
organizing economic activity in society. [ ...]
As money is nowadays nothing but ink marks on paper or patterns of
magnetism in a computer tape, the remittance of money no longer requires
the transfer of valuable commodities. When one country borrows money from
another, nothing is transferred. 64

Alienation in the current stage of the prevailing mode of cultural
development appears a s disconnectedness from real interactions with social
and natural environment and from human-ecological metabolic processes. It is
a consequence of the dysfunction of institutional structures that operate
beyond human scale - a result of unsustainable social organization.
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ibid.: 139-141
ibid.: 141- 142 (emphasis mine)
During the nineteenth century, [...I as it was a decentralized system, the failure
of even large banks did not endanger the whole system Failures were created o#en
through note holders demanding conversion of their paper claims to physical
delivery of reserve currency. This practice, however, resulted in checks and
balances on the creation of excessive and infitionmy note issues. Today there is
no longer any such discipline. (ibid.: 142-143)
ibid.: 143-145(emphasis mine); see also quote a t footnote 25 in the previous chapter.

Community
As many as 500,000 Cali$ornians are currently
living in walled-in communities, and fifty new
developments are under construction [...I The
growth in walled-in communities reflects both a
concern for personal safety and "a retreatfiom
civic responsibility." 1
A society made up of decentralized, self-sufficient
communities, in which people work near their
homes, have the responsibility of governing themselves, of running their schools, hospitals, and
welfare services, in fact of constituting real communities, should, we feel, be a much happier place. Its
members, in these conditions, would be likely to
develop an identity of their own, which many of us
have lost in the mass society we live in 2

The alienating disconnection of interactions between individuals and their
social environment, brought about by large-scale technological, economic and
administrative institutional systems, has had its manifestation of most farreaching consequences in the disruption of the local community. The local
community has been considerably destroyed

3

by the development of the

growth, profit-making, consumer economy which turned away fiom concrete
life processes into virtuality and apparent limitlessness of profits and money.

Community destruction has been identified a s the core of the social
1
2

3

Rifkin, 1995: 212
Goldsmith et al., 1972: 157
Berry, 1987: 183

disintegration in the current culture. Manifestations of this disintegration are
different social dysfunctions, from crime, to mental and physical illnesses. The
destruction of community is the consequence of removing economy and politics
from it, and reducing it to suburbia where people return after work 4.
The destruction of community is a crisis of historic momentum as
humankind in all races and cultures has chosen to live in these aggregates
throughout its evolution, right down to the current era. 5

In his comprehensive analysis of human social organization and the relevance
of its scale and size, Kirkpatrick Sale has distinguished
two basic kinds of community that humans have apparently found the most
useful and successful over their many millennia as social creatures. One is the
face-to-face community, or association group, with somewhere between 400
and 1,000 people I.. .I - what we might call the common neighborhood; the
other is the extended association, a wider alliance of some 5,000 to 10,000
people I...] - what we would think of as the standard community. 6

These units of social organization - the neighborhood and the community represent two of the basic nested levels of social interaction between humans
and their social (and natural) environment, and they have both been very much
destroyed in the process of alienating institutionalization that I discussed in the
previous chapter. A very important characteristic of both is that they make
sense only in relation to locale - to the local social and natural environment in
which humans live. When the destruction of community is discussed, it is both
the neighborhood and the local community that are referred to. I find it
important to emphasize that it is the local community which is considered in
this context (as the term is also often used to denote other groups with a
common denominator, like the business community, the academic community,
the international community, etc.). The destruction of the neighborhood and the
local community thus manifests the discomectedness of economic and social
organization in the consumer culture from life processes as natural cycles of
renewal.

4

5
6

ibid.: 184
Sale, 1980: 188
ibid.: 188 (emphasis mine); also: Dobriner, 1969

The revitalization of the local community is, therefore, a key process in dealienation, in undoing the social disintegration and (re)creating a sustainable
social organization a s part of a comprehensive economy of life processes

7. The

revival of the local community has been perceived by many analysts as the
prerequisite for establishing a sustainable economy; moreover, sustainability is
most often defined and identified with community development.
Development of sustainable community indicators can provide a
theoretical and practicalframework for defining the meaning of a
sustainable community and for measuring progress towards that goal. 8

Kline defines four indicators: Economic Security, Ecological Integrity. Quality of

Life and Empowerment with Responsibility

9.

Community development therefore

involves the decentralization and de-alienation of the economy and politics and
their re-connection to life processes.
Revitalization of the local community is a principal way out of the
progressive alienation which has been identified a s a characteristic of the
postmodern stage of consumer culture. The critics of the postmodemist social
theory explicate how it leaves no hope of a reconstruction of social interactions
which have been effectively disrupted, and how postmodernist analyses imply
a n inevitable conclusion that the community is not possible any more. In
previous chapters, I have presented to some extent Baudrillard's analysis of
disconnectedness from reality and of the virtuality of consumer culture based
on exchange of signs which have become progressively devoid of meaning
(simulacra). Bill Martin refutes the despair-provoking inevitability of such
conclusions and contends that
the community will be possible only aBer the impasse of postmodernity is
broken and aBer the notion and the reality of community is recreated. [...I The
new community will be the community of radical diversity - radical
conjluence. I...]Either this community will emerge and the impasse of
postmodernity will be broken or there will not be afuture for humanity. 10
-

7
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-

In chapter 4 (between footnotes 33 and 34) I have proposed that a sustainable,
ecological economy can be again defined a s household management, where this redefinition encompasses a nested range of interrelated levels of interaction with
the environment: household - neighborhood - community - bioregion, etc.
Kline, 1995: 1
ibid.:4-5
Martin, 1993: 189 (emphasis mine)

The Community Economy
The community economy - a s the basis of a sustainable economy - implies
primarily returning the economy to the community: re-connecting work,
management and control over the economic process and its effects. This means
a move toward repairing the impact of disconnection of the current economy
from locale and from natural cycles of renewal.
In the development of the current economy, this diconnection has taken
two principal forms: urbanization and the colonial/corporate economy. Both
phenomena have a long history, which now - with economic growth and
institutionalization - upsurgingly culminates in metastases of megalopolises and
multinational corporations.
Cities have become foci of ecological imbalance and dysfunction resulting
from unsustainable growth and disconnection from natural cycles of renewal:
Cities require concentrations of food, water, andfuel on a scale not found
in nature. Just as nature cannot concentrate the resources needed to support
urban lqe, neither can it disperse the waste produced in cities. The waste
output of even a small city can quickly overtax the absorptive capacity of
local terrestrial and aquatic eco s ys terns. 1 1

Modem urbanization has been dependent on industrial agriculture which
has enabled unprecedented growth of cities. Urban growth and proliferation

12

was primarily spurred by the development of industry which required a n influx
of work force into cities. This influx could only be achieved - in the
contemporary, a s well a s in historically earlier urban growth - to the extent
that the small number of people remaining in agricultural production could feed
the growing city population. Therefore, the recent expansive growth of cities
has been possible only with industrialization of agriculture

13.

The amount of energy it takes to satisb food needs increases in urban
settings. Not only are supply lines longer for cities, frequently extending
across national borders, but food shipped long distances needs more
11
12
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Brown and Jacobson, 1987: 34-35
The present wave of growth has started with the Industrial Revolution, but has now
reached the steepest escalation: ugrowthin the world's urban population from 600
million in 1950 to 2 billion in 1986." (ibid.: 45)
Schumacher, 1975

processing and packaging. Fresh fruits, vegetables, and livestock products
often require remerated transport. Of the total energy expended in the food
system of the United States, roughly one-thud is used in the production of
food; one-thud in transporting, processing, and distributing it; and one-thud
in preparing it. [ ...I
Petroleum has also enabled cities to lengthen their supply lines and draw
basic resources, such as food and raw materials,from distant points. Cheap
oil and economic policies encouraging rapid industrialization together led to
a phenomenal surge in urban growth that is still rippling through developing
countries. 14

Disconnectedness of the economy from the local community and inclusion
into world markets has had most disruptive impact in the Third World.
Degradation of life quality in the Third World urban agglomerations, and the
destruction of urban communities in general, is where the unsustainable
character of the current world economy is manifested in its extreme form.
Population growth in Third World cities is outpacing city and national
budgets and straining urban institutions. The result is a profusion of
sprawling, unplanned cities in which access to adequate housing,
transportation, water supplies, and education is severely limited. This
pattern of uncontrolled growth reduces urban productivity and efficiency.
anecting not only urban areas but entire national economies. 15

The economic disconnection from the local community thus entails an
economy of alienation and of dependence on and domination by
institutionalized, large-scale technological and organizational systems. This
characteristic is even more pronounced in the other manifestation of economic
disconnection from locale - the colonial economy which is now epitomized in
multinational corporations.
The relation between colonial economy and the destruction of the
community economy has its historic development and it is now manifest in the
inclusion of the Third World economies into world markets described above.
The historic perspective and its modem implications are clearly shown in
Wendell Berry's analysis:
The economy of a colony exports only "raw material" and imports only
_finished goods. It buys and sells on markets over which it has no control;
thus, both markets drain value from the colony. [...I
14
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Brown and Jacobson, op.cit.: 14- 15, 5
Major cities I...],
such as Leningrad. Moscow, Cairo, Lagos, Dacca,Hong Kong,
and Tokyo, depend heavily on grain produced in North America. [. ..I In Africa,
formerly a grain exporter, some of the world's fastest-growing cities are being fed
largely with imported grain. (ibid.:24-25)
ibid.: 11

7'he way that a national economy preys on its internal colonies is by the
destruction of community - that is, by the destruction of the principle of local
self-sumiency not only in the local economy but also in the local culture.
7'hus, local life becomes the dependent - indeed, the victim - notjust of thefood
industry, but the transportation industry, the power industry [...I and so o n 16

An essential component of the colonial "economy"is pillage of distant, alien

communities, and this mode of acquiring goods, or of wealth maximization,
originates quite some time back in history. The following example is related to
the third millennium B.C.:
When there was a shortage of necessary material, the response of
Sargonid Mesopotamia, as of Egypt, was not merchant venturing but the
mounting of a military expedition. Such were the Sargonid 'campaigns'
among the timber-yielding mountains of the Lebanon, and the Egyptian
excursions to the copper mines of Sinai 17

Corporations as a legal form are a product of the colonial economy - of
detachment from locale (social and natural) where economic activities are going
on, and, consequently, of irresponsibility for social and natural environment
and context of the economy.
7'he early state-chartered corporations of Europe and England were established to sponsor exploration of the New World. [. ..] If they did not sail under
the charter of a state corporation, they and their families could be ruined for
l$e if bad weather or piracy struck en route. By establishing the corporate
form, limiting shareholders to liabilities no greater than their investment,
Europeans were able to create a form of commerce that could absorb the hard
knocks of trading and exploring, encouraging both risk-taking and
speculative investment at the same time. [...I In the early years of the republic,
the citizens of the United States were keen to prevent a n y institution,foreign
or domestic, commercial or religious,from dominating or suppressing their
newly won rights. [...I Even then, citizens openly and presciently expressed
concern that corporations with specijk rights granted under charters would
nevertheless become so powerful that they could take over newspapers, public
opinion, elections, and thejudiciary. [...I Despite these efforts, legislatures
inevitably began to lose their control over big business, state by state. 18

The legal framework of corporation enabled that "ownershipof an enterprise was separatedfrom responsibility for the enterprise."Thus, corporation is a
"structurethat invites mischief" because it can relieve the owners or investors
from accountability even if the business "loots,pollutes, or otherwise behaves
illegally" 19. This was reinforced
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Berry,op.cit.: 186
McEvedy, 1975: 26
Hawken, 1993: 105- 107
Hightower, 1997: 59

in 1886, when the U.S. Supreme Court I...]
decreed I...]that a corporation is "a
person," with the same constitutional protections that you and I have. Dr.
Frankenstein could not have done better I...]In only a century, the
corporation was transformed into a superhuman creature of the law I...]
because it has civil rights without any civil responsibilities. It is legally
obligated to be selfih: it can not be thrown intojail; it can deductfrom its tax
bill a n y _tines it gets for wrongdoing; and it can live forever. 20

Currently, large-scale corporations, particularly multinationals, with their exterritoriality, exist primarily to avoid the responsibilities which are unavoidable
at the local community level and scale, in direct interactions and transactions.
The key to this irresponsibility is detachment from locale and the community in
the form of absentee ownership which is the inherent mode of property in the
corporate economy. Absentee ownership has the potential to emphasize the
irrelevance of any economic assets or resources other than money

21, thus

reinforcing the complete disconnection of such a n economy from the local
community, from any tangible production, from the natural cycles of renewal.
Absentee capital ownership I...]characterizes virtually all large
companies in the United States today, and is not likely to be changed until
workers, rather than investors, achieve not only ownership but also control
of the places where they work. 22

The community economy should involve a different distribution of wealth,
different shareholding patterns and it should do away with absentee interests
which are indifferent toward the community and careless with its environment:
The present approach to local economic development leads to solutions
dicerent from the orthodox ones which typically involve creating industrial
parks with tax breaks to lure outside businesses. Local resource optimization
leads naturally to such non-market mechanisms as barter, community development corporations, community investment funds, and cooperatives - all
of which combine an economic with a socialfunction. In the process, they
eliminate the need to pay tribute to large centralized government and business
systems. They are also consumer- and local producer-oriented and can be
community controlled. 23

The community economy and its broader framework of the sustainable or
ecological economy involves a questioning of the current notion of property
which is reduced to two aspects - property as a resource for extracting profits
and maximizing them; and property as commodities bought to be used u p and
20
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ibid.: 60; See also quote at footnote 18 in chapter 4.
See quotes at footnotes 25 and 64 in chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
Morehouse et al., 1989: 93
ibid.: 174

discarded. In both cases the relationship and the attitude to the inherent
metabolism of matter and energy are essentially that of absentee ownership:
the notion of property is fundamentally disconnected from any concern and
responsibility for the economy of life processes characterized by cycles of
renewal and exchange of energy and matter with the environment.
Most analysts of sustainability identlfjr responsibility for the land and the
environment a s the key issue of property and a n essential component of its
concept which can be traced back to the thinkers of the Enlightenment.
Each person should possess and control the means of his sustenance, a
principle which underlies the institution of privately ownedproperty. The ideal
Hamngtonian form of property is the selj=sufficientfreehold estate in land.
But "property,"in the Language of civic humanism, had a somewhat
d~serentmeaningfrom what the term implies today. To ~arring'ton,and to
Thomas Jeflerson after him, property had a moral connotation. It implied the
personal and moral supervision of a responsiblefreeholder. 24

Locke is often acknowledged a s a most influential source of both the current
misinterpretation of the property concept and its reinterpretation in the context
of sustainablity.
Lmke made property a natural right preceding civil society and not
created by it. By merely applying his labor to the g~ftsof nature man creates
property. Lmke limits the amount of property to which a man has a natural
right to -as much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use
the product of." 25

Probably the most controversial idea in this context is the "property right".
particularly when it is deemed "natural". When it is not questioned altogether,
efforts are put to distinguishing its current misinterpretation from a more
environmentalist notion of husbandry or stewardship of the land and its
resources. Robert Goodin's analysis of the logic of property right - which is
based on udecornposing[it] into basic: 1 right to use, 2 right to use exclusively, 3

right to transfer at will," - is primarily uconcerned to show that the right to
destroy is a separate right in no way derivabkfrorn any property rights" 26.
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Bryan and McClaughry, 1989: 20 (emphasis mine) - referring to -James
Harrington, whose masterpiece, The Commonwealth of Oceana, appeared in 1656
in England. " (ibid.: 20)
Locke, 1690: xiv - introduction by Thomas P. Peardon
Goodin. 1990: 401

Few analysts of the property issue, however, identifl clearly the connection of the current concept of property to economic and social structures which
have for a long time through history been based on domination over nature and
over people 27. This connection makes the current property concept rather
incompatible with notions of stewardship and husbandry, and essentially with
responsibility for the social and natural environment. The problem with the two
basic aspects of the current notion of property - profit resource and
commodity - is that consumer culture has effectively neutralized the
consciousness of the domination-oriented character of property 28.
The issue of the (at least implicit)interpretation of property right as a freedom
to destroy is very much relevant to the position of consumers in what I have
previously described as technological sequence 29. Disconnection from involvement in the process of production - the technological sequence - has reduced
people to consumers who have the illusion that, by buying matter and energy
in form of commodities, they have full liberty to do whatever they want with
them. And, by now, practically everything has been turned into commodities 30.
Consumers are in no position to have any responsibility (or to be aware
that it is necessary) for the metabolic process of matter and energy involved in
satisfymg their needs and for the impact of that process on the environment
(social and natural). The fragmentation of the process of technological sequence
into separate activities and concerns of production, consumption and waste
management hinders the possibility of anyone having a true responsibility for
the process in its integral impact. Once the products are sold as commodities,
the producers shed every responsibility (if they had any at all) for the further
flow of matter and energy incorporated in those products.
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the issues I will discuss in chapter 8
See Marcuse's quotation in the previous chapter at footnote 23.
See chapter 4, after footnote 108.
See quotes by Melucci at footnotes 59 in chapter 4, and 30 in the previous chapter.

There have been attempts to remedy this situation. Most of them effectively tackle the problem at the production end, but fail to address the passive and
irresponsible position of consumers:
What we want from these products is not ownership per se, but the service
the product provides: I...] Under the intelligent product system, these products
would not be sold, but would be licensed to the purchaser, with ownership
retained by the manufacturer. 31

A more comprehensive change of ownership pattern has been attempted

by the community land reform movement which seeks to alter the speculative
practices that tie up land of enormous ecological and community value because
its exchange value under current market conditions is prohibitive for purposes
like forest management or farming 32.
In the U.S.. a [...I community approach to land reform referred to as the
Community Land Trust has been gaining momentum in the face of public
apathy over land reform in general. Both the Community Land Trust
movement a n d the environmental movement have in common the notion of
trusteeship or stewardship of land rather than the traditional concept of
ownership. [...I What is d~perentabout the Community Land Trust is that the
ownership, and therefore the power to determine ultimately how the land is
used, is vested, through the Trust, in the community as a whole. 33

Connection to Local Processes
The key to a sustainable, community-based economy is the social and
economic organization which relies on decentralized initiatives. They entail
decentralized responsibility for social, biological and physical environment,
qualitatively different because of connectedness to locale. And this
connectedness is more than just an economic issue in a narrow sense:
Psychological health is essential for social harmony, and [...I the evidence is strong that the small, cohesive community is by far the most bene-
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Hawken, op.cit.: 68
When you buy a television today, you are purchasing some 4,000 chemicals, 10
to 20 grams of mercury, and a n explosive vacuum tube. There is no safe place to
dispose of a television. If you transport twenty televisions in a truck, you are
technically required to be licensed by the EPA as a toxic waste hauler. A television
is not toxic waste, however, fi you return it to Sony to be assembled into another
television. (ibid.: 68)
Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 22-24
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ibid.:20.33
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_ficial unit because it provides a spirit of belonging, of place I. ..] suggestmg the

inner well-being that comes with knowing a particular spot as your home. 34

A broader context of reconnection to locale can be found in bioregionalism

which presents itself as a most appropriate framework for the humanecological project of healing the conflicting conception of humanity and nature.
Bioregionalism perceives social structures in their natural, biological and
physical environment. It offers a n ecological, integrative perspective, where
geographical wholes, and consequently jurisdictions and responsibilities, are
not defined by distribution of economic and political power, but by ecological
commonality and interconnectedness.
Ifthere is any scale at which ecological conxiousnesscan be developed,
at which citizens can see themselves as being the cause for the environmental
efect, it is at the regional level; there all ecological questions I...] are dealt
with as immediate and personal. I...]
Bioregion [..Jis a n y part of the earth's surface whose rough boundaries are
determined by natural characteristics rather than human dictates, dis tinguishablefrom other areas by particular attributes of m r a , fauna, water, climate, soils, and Zandforms, and by the human settlements and cultures those
attributes have given rise to. The borders between such areas are usually not
rigid - nature works withflexibility andjuidity - but the general contours of
the regions I. ..]are generallyfelt, understood,or in some way sensed, by m a n y
of the inhabitants of the area. I.. I. There is an advantage in keeping borders
vague, even i f it goes against the scientistic love ofhedness, for it tends to
encourage a blend, a cross-fertilization of cultures at the bwregwnal edges. 35

Among different bioregional systems, watersheds are most significant, not
only because they are unique in having clearly definable boundaries:
A watershed is in many respects afundamental ecological unit we are
only beginning to appreciate. It is often d ~ m u l to
t accurately define the
boundarics of a n y ecosystem I.. ] But the path that water takesfrom the top of
a ridge downhiU to the sea is a definingfeature, because watermws in only
one direction, sustaining all forms of life on its way to the sea. 36

Water is a most essential substance, resource and medium for ecological and
metabolic processes, both living and non-living, on all levels from molecular
and cellular to planetary. Water is basis of life, but also a most wide-spread
medium to transfer pollution - linking other media a s it captures pollutants
from the air and conducts them into the soil. Watersheds offer a pertinently
34
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Sale, op.cit.:485 (emphasis mine)
Sale, 1991: 54-55, 59 (emphasis mine). A fundamental issue for the context of this
essay is presented in the quoted explication of the bioregional paradigm - the
sensitivity for natural processes which I will discuss in the last chapter as the
principal basis of my concept of ecological consciousness.
Conkling, 1995: 7

systemic, integrative perspective, not only because of the interconnecting
capacity of water, but also because they are interrelated a s nested systems of
progressively larger and inclusive bioregional wholes.
The continuous cyclical flow of water is a basic natural (physical and biological) given, and also a paradigm for a n awareness of and inclusion into natural
cycles of renewal. Throughout history, rivers used to divide people a s they
offered natural boundaries in confrontational human relationships. Conversely,
watersheds exemplify and emphasize both the integrativeness/interrelatedness
and the collaborative necessity dictated by the shared waterflow which
connects the entire ecology of a watershed into a common metabolic process.
The most important aspect of establishing the economy on a bioregional
basis is the re-connection to both the natural cycles of renewal and to the local
community. The community is conceived of as part of a bioregion, a s one of the
nested level of human-ecological interactions and integrity. As a re-connection
of currently disjointed and dualized humanity and nature, this concept emphasizes the interrelatedness and unity of the social and natural environment, and
thus essentially overcomes the traditional anthropocentrism of the economy.
A community economy involves a redefinition of how the economic effects
are measured and consequently valued. In chapter 4, I have already discussed
the reductionist concept of value in the current economics, limited to exchange
value which abolishes every difference in use value, and also ignores the social
and ecological context of economic processes.
Ten dollars' worth of coal equals ten dollars' worth of bread,
transportation, shoes, or education. The only criterion for determining the
relatiue ualue of these goods and services is their monetary market ualue; all
ualues are reduced to the single criterion of priuate projit making. 37

What is it that is valued in economic processes? According to conventional
economics, it is the willingness to pay - the expression of solely the utilitarian
(profit-maximizing)purpose of economic transactions 38. In the context of a n
ecological or sustainable economy - a n economy of eco-systemic exchange of
37
38

Capra, 1982: 225
See at footnote 5 in chapter 4.

energy and matter with the environment - it is this exchange of energy and
matter that has to be the measure of economic value.
Since the early 1970s economists have paid increasing attention to the
ecological analysis of economic processes [. ..I systematic examination of the
pattern o f m w s ofenergy and materials in the economy I...]Ecology studies
t h e m w ofenergy and the cycles of materials in ecosystems. 39

Energy has been often proposed a s an alternative to the present alienated
monetary system.
Nature has an economy of its very own. While we do our best to ignore or
disguise it, the main purpose of human society is to cope with the very real
demands of the natural world. The currency of this natural economy is not the
dollar. It is the simple calorie. If we don't eat, we die. 40

Such a way of assessing economic processes would be congruent with the energy/matter flow which I have proposed a s a basic principle for analyzing ecological processes.
The matrix (shown in chapter 4) represents a sequence which involves ener-

gy exchange with the environment (natural and social) at each of the four phases:
2
3
4
conversion
+ life function + conversion + output
into usable
into sustain- (energy/
form of intake
able output
matter)
(technological
(technological
process)
process)
The resources for all these exchange processes include energy from :
1

energy/matter
resource

+

the physical environment
the biological environment
the social environment (work, know-how, psycho-social conditions).
I include psycho-social conditions as a form of energy in the sense of life

energy involved in human interactions - a perspective I have adopted in this
essay

41.

Thus, a comprehensive analysis of economic processes in terms of

energy can include psycho-social as well as ecological disturbances which are
now the characteristically 'unrecognized" (or externalized) aspects of the
"output" stage in the sequence presented above. By perceiving these aspects of
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Martinez-Alier. 1987: viii, 1
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Burns, 1975: 71
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See the discussion and quotes between footnotes 97 and 104 in chapter 4.

comprehensive economic processes in terms of energy, "internalization" is also
avoided in its current form which typically entails their interpretation in terms
of money, and thus substantially distorts and c o m p t s their life-qualities 42. A
comprehensive analysis based on energy reveals a different picture of our
current economic processes: it exposes aspects which are obscured by the
existing monetary systems of valuationand measurement
In all western nations it is currently more costly (in energy terms) to producefood than to benefit by its consumption. In the United States the energy value offood is on average only one-tenth of the energy value of the inputs required
toproduce it I...] Nearly three quarters of the United States food energy budget is
consumed in of f - j i i distribution, storage,packaging, and retailing (including
the gasoline consumption of purchasers driving to and from the supermarkets).
By way of comparison, it has been estimated that cultures practising 'primitive' agriculture eyoy food energy efficiencies of unity or higher. 43

In his resourceful book Ecological Economics, Juan Martinez-Alier offers an
exhaustive analysis of the problems of introducing a method of measuring economic effects and processes in a way appropriate to a sustainable or ecological economic paradigm 44. The book presents a comprehensive history of arguments
which demonstrate the deficiencies of the mainstream economic methodology.
and of suggestions of alternative approaches which include the consideration of
both human and natural resources. Energy has been the most frequently proposed medium for exposing and assessing the flow of resources. Martinez-Alier emphasizes the arguments about counter-entropic (or ektropic) effect of life processes and its significance in the context of an ecological perspective of economics45.
42
43
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See text between footnotes 17 and 18 in chapter 4.
O'Riordan, 1976: 78
The typical American male devotes more than 1,600 hours ayear to his car. He
sits in it while it goes and while it stands idling. He parks it and searches for it. He
eams the money to put down on it and to meet the monthly instalments. He works
to pay for petrol, tolls, insurance, taxes and tickets. He spends four of his sixteen
waking hours on the road or gathering his resources for it. And thishure does not
take into account the time consumed by other activities dictated by transport: time
spent in hospitals, traffic courts and garages I...] The model American puts in 1,600
hours to get 7,500 miles: less thanJive miles per hour. In countries deprived of a
transportation industry, people manage to do the same, walking wherever they
want to go, and they allocate only three to eight per cent of their society's time
budget to traffic instead of 28per cent (Illich, 1974: 18-19)
Martinez-Alier. op.cit. See also at footnote 107 in chapter 4.
Human work, and the work of animals directed by humans, were able to
increase the energy budget on the surface of the earth by agricultural activity. I...]
Man has the capacity to transform one-fi$h of the energy gainedfrom food into
muscular work I...] Giving to this ratio I...] the name of 'economic coefficient',

However, the adoption of energy a s a criterion for assessing economic
processes does not resolve the problem of commensurability of economic
effects and transactions

46.

Energy rather presents a possibility of resurrecting

the referential value system a s the current monetary system has become
entirely fictitious. Money has lost its reference to any tangible values and has
become a value by itself. This metamorphosis has created the profound
alienation of economic and social processes which I discussed earlier

47.

Community-relevant Valuation System
The disappearance of a referential value system is actually one of the most
salient manifestations of the disconnection of economy from the community and
from local processes. Reconnecting the economy to the local community involves addressing the problem of currency and creating a community-based
banking system 48. The goal is to overcome the dependency of economy on
hierarchical institutional systems and on a currency system which no longer
has any relevance to the community economy. Thus, a systemic interdependence and web-like interactions would be achieved - community-based
economic units would have (or rather regain) their integrity, and a t the same
time be part of the broader interrelated economic system. This systemic
simultaneity of interdependence and integrity assures a much more viable and
stable economic functioning as it is not hierarchical, but horizontal and weblike, so that each unit retains its self-sustainability.

[Podolinsky remarked] that man was a more efficient transformer of energy than
a steam engine. I...I
[Serhii]Podolinsky [ 1850-18911 measured human (and animal)work, that is,
he counted the energy input as the equivalent to work done, and not as thefd
energy intake, which is the measure sometimes taken in contemporary studies in
ecological anthropology. I...] Energy accounting thus gave a scientii basis to the
labour theory of value, a point that neither Marx nor Engels appreciated. (ibid.: 4946
47

48

50)
ibid.: 232
See quote at footnote 64 in the previous chapter.
Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 153

The need to deJine a unit of economic value between communities
increases in proportion to their economic interdependence. As our current
highly centralized economic systems create community dependency, there is
a t present a strong need to deJine stable units of economic value. 49

In order to have a self-sustainable community-based banking system, the
currency has to be a commodity which is produced locally in the community
and a t the same time universal enough to be a referential unit of value

50.

As scarcity creates value and abundance reduces value, we need to select
a commodity, the availability of which remains relatively stable in relation
to all the other goods and services traded for money in the community. 51

Energy appears as the most adequate unit, but it can take different forms
-

including human work. Human labor (or work) in the form of senice

rendered has been considered a s a referential unit:
An individual could create a contract note to provide specified hours of a
spectfwd service. If these services were deliverable to the bearer of the note,
the note could be exchanged [sold) by the creator of the note for other goods
and services. This is the essence of the LETSs [Local Exchange and Trading
System) which have been established in British Columbia and are emerging in
other communities in North America. 52

Work has the same physical dimension a s energy. However, a s a referential
unit, human work (or labor - which typically connotes saleable, and also often
alienated work) is conventionally expressed by time (hours of work). This
already indicates a problem with human work a s a unit

53.

It does not only

ignore different energy levels needed for different types of work (let alone the
problem of measuring creativity and other psychological components of human
work), it presents a serious commensurability issue which has been the
stumbling block of socialist and communist economies 54.
Kilowatt-hour of electrical energy seems to be a more suitable unit a s
electricity is now a rather universal commodity and can be produced in
p
p
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ibid.: 159-160
ibid.: 154
ibid.: 153-154
ibid.: 155
A usual unit for energy or work is kwh, where kW is the unit for power, obviously
disregarded in this case.
Commensurability of human work is not at all an issue of the choice of the
monetary system, but a problem of cultural definition of value, as I discussed in
chapter 4. Therefore, no currency can resolve it.

practically every local community. Gold was the most universal referential
commodity for quite a long time 55, although other products and commodities
were also used (like tobacco in Virginia in the 17th century

56).

In our times,

electricity compares to gold much more favorably in terms of relevant criteria
for a community-based banking system:
Evaluation

Kwh Dollars

Unit of value
Quality testing
Intrinsic consumable value
Subjective value
Changes in consumption

Kwh
Not required
100%
Nil
Related to total economic
activity
Universal
Related to consumption

Global activity
Changes in production
Rate of change
Cost of production
Cost of s torage
Cost of insurance
Cost of distribution

Gold Dollars

Ounces/grams
Density
10%
90%
Little relation to economic actiu~ty
Haphazard
Little relation to
consumption
Relatively stable
Less stable in production
Relatively stable by region Fluctuates with region
and time
and in time
Not required
1% of value per annum
Not required
1% of value per annum
Increases with distance Changes little with
dist a m

The most important aspect of electricity a s a referential value system is
that it makes most sense if its production is decentralized and if 'renewable"
resources are used (or rather resources with a sustainable renewability rate 58).
This mode of production fosters the reconnection of the economy to the local
community and to natural cycles of renewal, and averts the large-scale,
centralized, institutionalized systems of domination, control and monopoly,
which, in the manner of 'the colonial economy", create dependent communities.
Modem technology, using renewable energy sources, has made the cost of
production relatively constant throughout the world. [...I The renewable
energy d o h would be far more democratic than gold dollars, as sun. wind,
and/or wave energy is available to all communities in the world, whereas gold
is not. It is also very democratic within communities since each individual

55

56

57
58

It is still believed to be the 'basis" of money, albeit it has lost this function both
practically and legally as money can no longer be converted to gold (see at footnote
64 in the previous chapter).
Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 139
ibid.: 157
See the paragraph after footnote 92 in chapter 4.

could own his own renewable electrical energy source to supply his own needs
and/or to supply to others. 59
A different monetary system and a different form of ownership (discussed

earlier) are two essential aspects of a n economy reconnected to the local community. They also entail a different pattern of management. The key approach
suggested by George Benello involves a reversal of the relationship between
capital and work:
Where the capitalistm is made up of workers who hire labor, the selfm a n a g e d m is made up of workers who hire capital. 60

This management pattern impedes the control over the firm which is typically
exerted from outside by absentee providers of capital. The control is retained
by those who are directly involved in the production process and in the interactions with the local environment (social and natural). It is not the abstract,
impersonal, uninvolved control led only by profit-maximizing interests, but a
management responsible to the local community a s a human-ecological system.
A major breakthrough has been occurring during the 1980s in the United
States with the adoption in several states of statutes embodying the principles
and characteristics of atruly democratic worker-owned and managed business.
Thefirst of these was enacted in Massachusetts in 1982 I...] A crucial d~fference
betweena general business corporation and a worker cooperative under Massachusetts law is that the latter must issue a class of voting stock to its members,
which are limited to persons employed by the corporation. The statute further
provides that membership shares be cast on a one-person/one-votebasis. 61

This approach to the economy (in its primary meaning of household
management - or management of human-ecological systems) presupposes a
form of democracy which is

59
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Morehouse et al.,op.cit.: 156-157
Non-renewable power sources are less suitable for defiing units of value as a
substantial proportion of their costs arefuel and labor the value of which, relative
to the original investment cost, may change over the life of the plant. Auther
technological advances could make small, decentralized, environmentally
compatible energy sources even more competitive. (ibid.: 158)
A new generation of technologies, including gas turbines, wind turbines,fuel
cells, and solar generators I.] is a small-scale, potentially mass-produced means of
generating power, with the capacity to create a less expensive and more decentralized electricity system I.] It will soon be common to generate power within individual buildings, reducing energy conversion and transmission losses, and increasing
the overall reliability of the entire power sys tern (Flavin and Lenssen, 19947)
Morehouse et al., op.cit.: 93
ibid.: 99- 100

people-based, not property-based or capital-based. Democracy is thus a
method for people to govern themselves, not a method for property owners to
govern their property. 62

Such a concept of democracy entails direct participation and involvement, and
consequently a de-institutionalized responsibility which is a n essential aspect of
de-alienation - of overcoming and casting off the dependence on inaccessible
and dehumanized social, technological and economic mechanisms. Direct
participation and responsibility are possible and make sense only in the context
of the local community, of connectedness to local processes of social
interactions and natural cycles of renewal. Such a responsibility is the core of a
sustainable social and economic organization.
Enhanced participation increases worker satisfaction and commitment
to thejob. This results in increased efectiveness, and allows workers tofeel
they have control over their working lives. I...] Successful participation and
seljhanagement requires changes in attitudes and behaviors, and the
development of an active rather than a passive orientation toward one's work
and its organizational context and goals. 63

Decentralizing the economy to the level of the local community entails a
smaller scale, which considerably reduces the entropy of large systems - waste
and pollution, a s well a s organizational inefficiencies.
It has become rather apparent [...I that the existing formalized
institutions and their accompanied bureaucratized arrangements have been
loosing ground in providing the necessary resources for the people and their
government to nourish life. Diierent people for d~ierentreasons are
beginning to connect the relevance of inforn-zal economy, unstructured labor
markets, and grass-root participation to their lives. 64

Reconnection of the community and the economy, a s well a s decentralization and small-scale of the local community, enable a closer relationship
between the working place and residence 65. Furthermore, these processes
result in a n integrated life, where working and living are not sharply segregated
a s they are now by the division between production and consumption. Another
outcome is less division of labor and more creative initiatives. Reconnection of
the community and the economy is also a move toward a n integration of life
--
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ibid.: 90
ibid.: 89.94
Danesh, 1991: 1
Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.: 62

and the economy - reaching closer to a n "oikonomia", a n integrated economy of
life processes pertinent to the emerging ecological culture.
A congruent integrative idea was put forth by Petr Kropotkin. He has been

perceived by a number of analysts in the general area of sustainablity, environmentalism and human ecology 66 a s a thinker whose work presents a n essential background to the current discussion of the issues of the community and
cooperation-based ethic 67. In addition to these more famous concepts, he has
developed a comprehensive vision of and a n argument for integration of the economy and life - established on the fundamental principle of integrated work:
Thegreatest sum total of well-being can be obtained when a variety of agricultural, industrial and intellectual pursuits are combined in each community;
and man shows his best when he is in a position to apply his usually-varied
capacities to several pursuits in the farm, the workshop, the factory, the study
or the studio, instead of being riveted for life to one of these pursuits only. 68

This is a holistic concept of life and of work

-

favoring a n integration of

manual and intellectual work in order to achieve a meaningfulness and
creativity which has, particularly recently, been increasingly waning.
When we [...I examine human life as a whole, we soon discover that, while
all the benefits of a temporary division of labour must be maintained, it is
high time to claim those of the integration of labour. Political economy has
hitherto insisted chiefly upon division. We proclaim integration, I...]a society
composed of men and women, each of whom is able to work with his or her
hands as well as with his or her brain, and to do so in more directions than
one. 69

This perspective offers a reversion of the profound alienation of work in the
current economy and social organization. This alienation is characterized by
disconnectedness from the local community and life cycles, and from direct
involvement of people in the processes of identifymg and satisfying their needs
in unmediated interaction with their social and natural environment. The
reconnection and integration of work is thus a part of the process of the local
community revitalization.

66
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e.g.:O'Riordan, op.cit: 7-8; Roszak, 1979: 120, 275
Kropotkin, 1902; Kropotkin, 1922
Kropotkin, 1899: iv-v
ibid.: 2-4, 182-183

Kropotkin's views were developed contemporaneously to one of the prominent concepts in the history of urban planning - the garden cities of Ebenezer
Howard 70. Howard's model may be the most appropriate starting point of a
new ecological urban planning because it is based on a balanced relationship
between work and dwelling, on cooperative economic organization, and on
combined local, small-scale industry and agriculture. As physical structure, the
model entails individual housing with gardens/farmsteads. During the first half
of this century several small towns were built in England according to this
model, applying, however, merely its physical structure aspect, and regrettably
failing to achieve the new paradigm of socio-economic organization, which
required a more profound change. Only the form, the physical appearance was
attained, and the essence remained unaccomplished 71.

Decentralization:
The Community and Sustainable Social Organization
To put future development on paths that are sustainable I...] is simply beyond the reach ofpresent
decision making structures and institutional
arrangements, both national and international. 72

Decentralization and reconnection to the local community, as a move toward
a sustainable social organization, can enable a more integrated economy of life
processes. By contrast, the current mode of social and economic organization
is characterized by fragmentation. Large-scale, centralized organizational
structures operate disjointedly, incapable, because of scale and organizational
complexity, to provide an interrelational and interconnected management of life
processes in their integrity.
Most of the institutions facing [environmental and economic] challenges
tend to be independent,fragmented, w o r k q to relatively narrow mandates
with closed dedsion processes. Those responsiblefor managing natural
resources and protecting the environment are institutionally separated from
those responsiblefor managing the economy. I...] The mandates of ministries
70
71
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Howard, 1902
Ristic, 1990b
World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: 22-23

of industry include production targets, while the accompanying pollution is
leji to ministries of environment. Electricity boards produce power, while the
acid pollution they also produce is leji to other bodies to clean up. I...]
Sectoral organizations tend topursue sectoral objectives a n d to treat their
impacts on other sectors as side e&cts. 1. ..I Many of the environment and
development problems that confront us have their roots in this sectoral
fragmentation of responsibiti@. Sustainabk development requires that such
fragmentation be overcome. 73

The key issue (asI pointed out in the previous chapter) is the intrinsic lack of
integrated responsibility. It is a consequence both of organizational inefficiency
and fragmentation,and of the disinterested attitude of employees who are in positions of cogs in unfathomable and elusive bureaucratic machines, and who lack
vital involvement necessary for an integrated sense of responsibility. Such an
alienating organizational pattern is inherently non-cooperative; it is rather based
on hierarchical, dominational relations which typically discourage responsibility.
Issues ofpolicy were enmeshed in issues of power! Theformulation of
questions became entangled in competition. To demonstrate and reinforce
their autonomy, units felt compelled to reject the suggestions of others,
hindering strategic thinking. 74

Institutional fragmentation is thus a form of disconnection from local community, from integrity of life processes and metabolic cycles of renewal. In the
context of social and environmental policy, the most exacerbating manifestation
of institutional fragmentation is the fundamental and apparently eternally irreconcilable fracture between community needs and market economy interests,
or between the public sector and the private sector (meaning private property
maximization). A s long as the problem of this fracture is addressed within the
institutionally fragmented political sphere, it remains unresolvable because, as
a consequence of the fragmented perspective, the two sectors are perceived as
conflicting and incompatible:
The administrator had to decide how important it was to protect various
kinds of sensitive persons from dzfferent nonpermanent decrements in lung
function I...] At the opposite end of the spectrum, OPM was impressed by the
high cost of achieving dubious gains for only a small minority of citizens. 75
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ibid.: 9-10. 63 (emphasis mine)
Landy. et al., 1990: 284 (emphasis mine); see also at footnote 49 in the previous
chapter.
ibid.: 63

When the regulation is institutionalized and centralized, the link is lost not
only between the two interests, but also among various aspects of communal
life. The result is inefficiency and deadlock:
Reducing pollutant emissions by 99 percent can cost ten or more times as
much as a 90% reduction. No political system will be able to ratchet down
more stringent regulatory requirements inde_finitely. As the goals of
regulations become increasingly divorced from the economically a n d
politically feasible means of attaining them, policy goals become npolicy
_fictionsnroutinely ignored both by the regulators and the regulated,
undermining the legitimacy of the regulations altogether. 76

Institutional regulation operates primarily a t the level of power negotiations
between the conflicting interests, detached from the reality of life a t the local
community level (or the level of individual human interactions, a s the local community has been already quite destroyed). And yet, this regulation indirectly
affects the everyday life in a way that leaves lay individuals helpless and
powerless to keep control over their own lives. This situation has led to a
profound loss of confidence

77,

to

erosion of public trust as lies build up into vast institutional practices I...]
From 1966-76the con$dence in people in charge of running major
institutions droppedfrom 73% to 42% for medicine; for major companies
from 55%to 16%;for law firmsfrom 24% to 12%; and for advertising
agencies from 2 1% to 7%. 78

The deep distrust is a result of both the feeling of exclusion from and
disillusion about the regulation of the vital matters of human lives. These
matters are perceived a s someone else's responsibility, under jurisdiction of
some impersonal officials with whom people have no direct contact

79.

At the

same time people have a gut feeling, if not always a clear awareness of the
inefficiency and irresponsibility of these officials - the feeling that responsibility
is only a pretence, a simulacrum, and a need for legitimacy:
Central to the [bureaucratic paradigm] was recruiting experts in
accountuzg, engineering and social work, not only to achieve results, but to
legitimate actions. 80
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Ringquist. 1993. 200
Ristic, 1982. Ringquist, op.cit.: 96
Bok, 1978: xiii, xviii
Ristic. 1990b
Banelay, 1992: 117; see also at footnote 46 in the previous chapter.

The helpless acceptance and the simultaneous distrust and disillusion
creates a schismatic attitude which can reinforce the cleavage between
individual and public interests. And it certainly strengthens the deadlock of
institutional regulation:
For thepast 15 years poll afer poll has recorded the American people's
desire for increased environmental protection, yet the majority of the
population participates in the industrialized worlds rnos t wasteful and rnos t
polluting style of lge. The values are there; the appropriate motivations and
institutions are patently inadequate or nonexistent. 81

Mark Sagoff perceives this incongruity a s a "schizophrenic" behavior:
The question arises whether what we want for ourselves individually as
consumers is consistent with the goals we would set for ourselves collectively
as citizens. Would I vote for the sort of things I shop for? Are my preferences as
a consumer consistent with my judgements as a citizen? They are not. I am a
schizophrenic. 82

This situation points to a fundamental incapability of the political sphere to
induce (from "above") any environmental/ecological consciousness. In the context of this essay, this is a key issue: sustainability can be attained only with a
conscious involvement of people at every level of social interactions. And consciousness cannot be built on mistrust and on lack of responsible involvement
in governing our lives.

Historian Bany D. Karl puts our condition in brilliant perspective: [. ..] -At
a moment in history when the technology of communications is improving by
quantum leaps, our suspicions of the truth of what we are told and what we
know are greater than they have ever been. These suspicions have their source
in our oldest and most profound need: our need to govern ourselves." 83

The "need to govern ourselves" is the crucial point of a sustainable social
organization. It involves decentralization of governance. Decentralization and
the revival of the community mean returning politics back to the local
community. This evokes the initial meaning of politics - the managing of the
polis. Polis was originally almost of a size that Sale establishes for local
communities 84,

SO

it is a scale appropriate to human and humane proportions

and to direct interactions with the local environment, both natural and social.
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Ruckelshaus, 1989: 35 1
Sagoff, 1981: 317
Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.:3
See at footnote 6 above.

That means the scale of direct, decentralized democracy 85,without the
alienated, impersonal bureaucratic apparatus and the fragmented and
disconnected institutional regulation. Above all, direct democracy entails direct,
immediate, decentralized responsibility - connected to life processes and to
their social, biological and physical environment.
While organization theory often argues that coercion is an essential
element in all formal, purposive-rational organizations, there is a strong
counter trend represented by people such as Bennis, Argyris, McGregor, Likert,
and others who argue that autonomous work groups and other nonbureaucraticforms are more effective and free of the rigidities and
dysfunctions of bureaucracy. 86

Sustainable social organization - (re)connectedto the local community and
based on direct, decentralized involvement and responsibility - presupposes
cooperative and collaborative relationships which draw on primordial human
inclinations:
The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and is so
deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human race, that it has
been maintained by mankind up to the present time, notwithstanding all
vicissitudes of history. 87

These collaborative inclinations traditionally entail spontaneous organization to
address problems of common or communal life processes. A colleague of mine
who worked in Africa in a newly established urban planning and regulation
agency, told me the story of a remote village under their jurisdiction where an
elementary calamity destroyed a number of houses. The experts went
immediately to the rescue in a jeep. However, when they arrived, the villagers
had already begun to mend the houses by themselves, spontaneously initiating
the traditional self-organization for mutual help. They did not even imagine, not
only to wait for help from experts, but to expect that any other people, outside
their local community, should take care of their problem.
However, soon (in the sense of cultural 'development") they will learn that

- in Kropotkin's terms - under the auspices of the state, one should not
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In the ancient polis, though, democracy was quite partial as only a rather limited
segment of the society was acknowledged and permitted to have any right to
participate in governance.
Morehouse et al., 1989:88
Kropotkin, 1902:223

meddle into the matters which officials are responsible for 88. Institutionalization has thoroughly discouraged and suppressed individual initiative and spontaneous organization

89.

I s it possible to regain it?

I consider ecological culture inseparable from the personal involvement of

people in the processes that are vitally important for their lives. In political
science this kind of involvement is termed participation, but it is perceived
almost exclusively within the political realm - a s getting citizens involved in the
decision making processes about common, political issues 90.
A reconnection of politics (and economy) to the local community - communi-

ty politics - would, therefore, involve direct participation in management of
economic and social processes in the local community, thus reviving the
involvement and responsibility which have been disrupted by the alienating and
disconnecting impact of institutionalization.
In architecture, participation gets a more everyday-life connotation - a s involving the users of buildings and of urban space in some phases of design and
construction processes 91. My own research in this field 92 has turned my attention to initiative of people, rather than participation, because participation typically means that the initial incentive for involving people in the decision making
processes comes from experts and institutions. This is evident even in the formulations which typically use passive voice, such a s "getting people involved".
Indeed, that reflects the basic problem of participation techniques, which
always dispense to people small doses of responsibility. That often turns out to
be a way of sharing the burden of responsibility for the decisions that are
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ibid.: 227

Community l$e is by definition a l$e of cooperation and responsibility. I...]
As our
communities have disintegrated from external predation a n d internal
disaffection, we have changedfrom a society whose ideal of justice was trust and
fairness among people who knew each other into a society whose ideal ofjustice is
public litigation, breeding distrust even among people who know each other.
(Berry, 1992: 121-122)
Ristic, 1989a: 167
Crowfoot and Wondolleck, 1990 - examine participation in environmental issues.
Habraken, 1972
Ristic, 1989a

initiated and conceived in domaines that have power. Also, the dispensing of
responsibility "from above" implicitly sustains the patronizing relationship
toward lay-people.
The term participation was actually introduced when people have long lost
the initiative and spontaneity of self-organization. It has been introduced not
only because of the awareness of the alienation of laymen, but also because it
has become intolerably complicated for experts and officials to handle the
matters and problems of complex social systems, so that the pride of
accomplishments has been almost completely overtaken by responsibility for
failures. Therefore, experts and officials are now often eager to get rid of part
of the responsibility

-

to have laymen participate. Having been deprived for too

long, laymen are not much capable to do it any more. But experts are ready to
teach them how to participate - and thus keep the power and a t the same time
get rid of too much responsibility

93.

As a n attempt from "above" to improve involvement of directly interested

people in decision making, participation retains the process within the scope of
the initiative of experts and officials. So, in a way it misses the initial goal fails to achieve direct responsibility if the initiative and inception come from
experts and officials. "Participants" accept the experts' model or plan, either
reluctantly, because they would rather have their own initiative, or "obediently",
and then there is little of their own initiative left.
In order to achieve truly de-alienating conditions, it would be necessary to
regard and practice participation processes in a way that would primarily enable
people to exert their own initiative, their control and responsibility for their own
lives. Initiative h a s to emerge from the people, those who are directly and
vitally involved. Only then they cease to be passive participants. It is actually
the question of: either participants or initiators - initiators a s people who can
identify and define their own needs, goals and priorities by themselves. Having
one's own initiative, control and responsibility changes substantially the attitude
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towards things, products and resources. People become more careful about their
immediate and wider environment.
In other words, initiative cannot be a n imposed procedure or attitude.
Therefore, conditions of truly direct democracy and responsibility do not
primarily involve participation of people, but rather initiative of people with
participation of experts 94.
A sustainable social organization has to be based on decentralized initiatives

which are inherently less entropic because they do not entail the huge, energy inefficient institutional apparatus (and energy inefficiency is here considered in a
broader sense which includes the human inefficiency). Decentralized initiatives
which are less entropic also because they benefit from the direct impact of individual interest of humans in their own lives, a s this interest and enthusiasm taps
the counter-entropic effect of life. It will be a process of some length to achieve
these degrees of initiative and involvement a t the local community level, but the
process seems to be ongoing. The following example indicates some initial
accomplishments in decentralization of control and responsibility:
The JECIO [Jay Environmental Control and Improvement Ordinance]
establishes local regulatory controls by the Town of Jay over air emissions,
waste water discharges and solid waste disposal.[...I to apply them better and
enforce them better via implementation at the local level. I...]The Ordinance
embraces the notion that people should haue some local control over the
condition of their own environment. Afer all it is us who breathe the air in
Jay.. . When one sees a problem, it is reassuring that one need only call the
Town O m e for immediate attention, rather than calling an agency in
Augustafor a response that might take days or weeks. 95

Decentralization is one of the key issues of sustainability and ecological culture. It is more complex than it might seem from the often unreserved fascination
with small-scale a s the only viable level of operation for a sustainable society 96.
Such a view is inclined to reverse uncritically the current situation perceived a s
oppressive and alienating. So anything centralized and largescale tends to be con94
95
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Ristic, 1989a: 24, 27-28
Dawson, 1994 (emphasis mine). (Jay is a small town in the state of Maine. It has
had some excessive pollution problems due to the local - but multinationally
owned - paper industry.)
Schumacher's 'cult-book" Small is Beautiful (Schumacher, 1974) could be
identified as primarily 'responsible" for this fascination, although he never
expressed his concept in so exclusive terms.

sidered bad, and everything small-scale and decentralized is seen a s good. Such
a perception posits centralization and decentralization a s a dualized pair

97.

Centralized policies and decisions - even when they do not completely
disregard the local community and environment by following the big-business
interests

-

have to be based on compromises, on averaging and levelling the

diversity and uniqueness of particular communities and locales. They,
therefore, usually result in solutions which suit no one adequately, and can
even do harm

98. On

the other hand, from the viewpoint of the local community

interest, more general impacts of some actions cannot be visible and
assessable, so a n exclusively decentralized perspective can easily miss the
integrative, holistic context.
Democracy is risky business. We would not dream of letting the towns
along the Connecticut River decide whether or not to allow chemical wastes to
be dumped into the water. This is not because the quality of the decisions made
I.. .I
by these towns [...I It is the range of impact of a decision that is of concen~
An entire river is at stake. 99

At the same time, the current centralized regulation with its fragmented
procedure, detached from the locale and life processes, does not quite assure
the integrative perspective either.
In approaching this problem, centralization and decentralization are usually
perceived a s confronting and competing with each other. This perception
unintentionally emerges in the previous quote with the undefined "we" who "let"
decentralized decision-making happen or not. The "we" could only indicate a
"higher", more centralized authority, which, in the current mode of social
organization, almost invariably has the upper hand.
In a systemic and holistic context, the dualized notion of centralization and decentralization is a misconception and it can be transcended by the perception of
97
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Uncritical reversal is what Val Plumwood denotes as one of the two basic reactions
to dualist constructs (see text at footnote 53 in chapter 2). It does not address the
dualistic framework, but only reverses the established dualist hierarchy - replaces
the dominant category by its polar opposite (Plumwood, 1993: 6 1-62, l26), and thus
leaves the dualistic mind set unchanged. I will further discuss the important issue
of dualism and of uncritical reversal in later chapters, in the context of postdomination and spirituality.
Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.: 99
ibid: 97

nested levels of interrelated and interdependent social and ecological (humanecological) interactions of different scale and complexity - the individual, the
household, the neighborhood, the local community, the bioregion, etc. Within
this whole range, I will differentiate two basic levels: local and general. They
are perceived a s necessary, but in a non-competitive relationship

-

as

coexisting, cooperating and complementary. In the systemic sense, this
perspective does not confront the two levels, it does not view them a s
contradictory, or conflicting; it presupposes the integrity of the unit and the
integrity of the whole at the same time.
In human ecology thefunctioning of a system in its environment is
frequently of concern to the researcher; therefore, the researcher needs first to
address the levels of system to be investigated [. ..I to assess the
interdependence between the micro- and macro-system levels. 100

The essential importance of this perspective is its emphasis on the
coexistence and cooperation, the non-power basis of the two levels of the
collective sphere - the local and the general. The local level is defined by the
immediacy of relevance, a s the individuals involved are vitally interested and
can directly experience the impacts of their actions. The general level serves
best a s general policy guidance and expert help, with capacity and capability of
a wider contextual overview.
In the domain of responsibility for the environment (natural and social), the
two levels can be perceived a s the political sphere (general level) and the life
sphere (local level) - the sphere of environmental policy (general level) and the
sphere of immediate vital interest and individual responsibility for the environment (local level). The integrative character of the systemic interrelatedness of
the two levels transcends the fragmentation of the current organizational mode
of the political sphere and its disconnection from life processes.
This integration also offers a possibility of overcoming the schism between
market economy interests and community needs, or between the institutional
and the local community spheres - a s the life sphere is a common factor for
the now confronted domains of the private and the public sector. The
100

Sontag, et al., 1993: 152

individuals, who are linked by their professional commitment to either of the
two sectors, all belong to the sphere of everyday life. The life sphere also gives
a different, non-dualized perception of impersonal and alienated officials of the
institutionalized bureaucracy: they are not some other people, on the other side
of a barrier; they belong to the same life sphere, but they are just in a role
imposed by the institutionalized systems, which equally alienates them.
Bureaucracies are not evil, but they are inhuman. They are fashioned
that way: they work because they are capable of inhumanity on a massive
scale. This is not to criticize bureaucrats. In fact the greatest complaints
bureaucrats have about being bureaucrats is that they are forced by routine to
treat people as numbers. 101

Nested Levels of Technology
Reconnection of the economy to the local community involves a n integrated
concept of economy which includes sustainable social organization and
sustainable technology. Reconnection of technology to the local community
means decentralization and smaller scale as a n alternative to inefficiency and
entropy of large-scale systems.
Large-scale systems entail substantial losses in distribution. I have already
presented examples of this problem when I discussed industrialized agriculture

102,

but it is, of course, more generally manifested:
According to engineers at the Pact@ Gas and Electric Company, it
sometimes costs the company twice as much to distribute power as it does to
generate it in the f i s t place. 103

Diseconomy of large-scale systems is more clearly disclosed with analysis of
comprehensive energy consumption across the entire technological process

104.

Such a n analysis is, however, still slow in becoming more widely applied. It
would shake the conventional assumption about the advantages of the large-
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Bryan and McClaughry, op.cit.:93. See also at footnotes 39 and 40 in the previous
chapter.
See at footnote 14.
Flavin and Lenssen, op.cit.:42; see also at footnote 54 in the previous chapter.
See at footnote 43 above.

scale and centralized technological and organizational mode. Hopefully, another
promising challenge to the confidence in the current centralized practices is
presented by the development of small-scale power-generating technologies like
photovoltaic solar cells, small gas, wind and hydro turbines:
Soon the traditional model may be obliterated entirely by fuel cells
mounted in basements, and rooftop solar systems that allow residential
customers to generate their own power and sell excess supplies to other users
through the grid. 105

Inefficiency of large-scale technologies is also manifested in loss of quality

106, again

apparent most obtrusively, but certainly not solely, in industriali-

zed food production. A relatively simple example is milk: After it is pumped out
of cows which are treated as machines, then processed mechanically and
chemically, and finally transported and stored for quite some time before it is
consumed - it can barely retain much of its biological quality.
The mechanization of the agricultural sector was heralded as a triumph
of industrial society. One leading agriculturalist of the day boasted. "Weno
longer raise wheat here, we manufacture it.... We are not husbandrymen, we
are not farmers. We are producing a product to sell." 107

A frightening scope of different forms of tampering with natural biological qua-

lity of food has most recently included genetic and other bio-engineering technologies. In the last decade or two, this development has induced a widening reaction in the form of the increasing popularity of "organicallyw-grownfood, which.
if genuine, cannot be produced by large-scale, industrialized methods

108.

In the case of decentralized energy-generating technologies, as well a s of decentralized food production, the essential importance is in the reconnection to locale and to the local community. It involves decentralized control over technological processes -a key issue of de-alienation of institutionalized largescale systems.
In the current centralized and institutionalized mode of operation and organization, control over and responsibility for the technological sequence are kagmen-

ibid.: 40; see also in footnote 59 above.
Ristic, 1990a;Turner, 1975
107 Rifkin, op.cit.: 109
108 It is, however, still kept price-uncompetitive by the current economic practice
which externalizes and disregards most of the social and environmental (and
health) costs - as I have demonstrated in chapter 4.

105
106

ted 109. Jurisdictions are divided into production, consumption and waste management, and production is further dispersed into separate enterprises without any
cooperation in terms of concern for the integral metabolic process of the technological sequence. The principal disconnection of the sequence is that production
and waste management are run by different a n uncoordinated institutions, and
lay people are competent only for the phase of use of final products. Lay people
have neither interest in, nor responsibility for the phases before or after the use
of final products. Even the use, which traditionally included maintenance (by
users themselves, and/or by neighborhood- or local community-based shops),
is now restricted solely to consumption

110.

The obsession to value only new

things and to keep buying and discarding the "old" ones has been induced by
the consumer culture propaganda, and thus maintenance has been reduced to
a negligible presence in the technological process, if not completely abolished.
Consequently, the process of use, or rather consumption, is regarded a s
destructive, a s a sharp and rapid loss of value. And technological processes in
general are perceived and practiced a s destruction of resources, rather than a s
a metabolic flow, a s part of natural cycles of renewal

111.

Fragmented responsibility (or rather irresponsibility) for the technological
sequence and its consequences is part of the disconnection of technology (and
of the economy) from the local community. Decentralization and reconnection
would instigate a different attitude toward consumption/use, and would establish a community responsibility for the environment based on awareness and in-

volvement in the technological sequence. This would mean primarily the return
of the production phase of the technological sequence to the local community.

109
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I have defined technological sequence as the 'path" that matter or material passes
in the process of use for human needs, and which includes the essential phases of:
(1) natural resource; (2) element or component (semi-final product); (3)commodity
(final product); (4) use (life function); and (5) recycling (returning the matter/material back to technological process, or to natural cycles of renewal). See text after
footnote 108 in chapter 4.
Ristic, 1989a: 16
Alexander and Jacobson, 1974: 45

Returning the production phase to the local community does not involve
just decentralizing the production and retaining the same economic structure.
There would be no substantial change if only the scale were reduced to local
facilities and s e ~ c e -s owned, managed and operated a t the community level.
but still used only to produce commodities for the consumer/market economy.
The alienated conditions of the consumer culture would thus be kept unchanged, and the position of the community would remain in the framework of the
colonial economy which exploits and depletes the community's natural and
human resources

112.

and which has led to its destruction.

If the community economy is to be sustainable, the community has to produce for its own needs, a t local scale for the local level of social and economic organizationlls. However, this cannot be realized by turning back to the pre-industrial
technological and economic mode. Sustainable, or ecological, alternative technolo-

gy has been a t some point contemplated in terms of autonomy from the current
largescale economic and technological structures, a s emancipation from dependency and alienation created by institutionalization of human needs. However, technological autonomy is impossible unless we revert to the most primitive technologies and most rudimentary needs - which means returning to very early stages
of cultural development. That is obviously unfeasible, and it is unnecessary.
It is unfeasible because in the current stage of cultural development
community cannot produce by itself everything that it needs. Furthermore,
autonomy implies a n isolation from the broader human-ecological milieu, a nonsystemic perspective which disregards the interrelated and interdependent
nested levels of social and natural environment - different in scale and
complexity. Technological processes too have to be perceived and organized in
terms of nested levels of interaction. The technological sequence with its
complex ramifications involves interconnected processes which constitute a n
integrated process of exchange of matter and energy with the environment.
112
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See at footnote 16.
It is the same argument as for establishing a community-based currency system see at footnotes 49, 50 and 51.

Autonomy is unnecessary because the return of production and of
responsibility for technological process to the local community can be
established within the system of the two basic levels of interaction and
organization (social, a s well a s economic and technological) - the local level, or
the level of immediate relevance for concrete life processes, and the general
level of the broader contextual framework.
In the sphere of technology, the two levels are clearly distinguishable in
the technological sequence matrix. A slightly expanded version is necessary
here (it still reduces complex technological processes to basic phases, omitting
often numerous intermediary stages; likewise, the given examples are very
simplified, in order to illustrate the basic concept) 114:
matter (or energy)
a s natural resource

examples:
forests
ore in Earth crust

+
+
+
logs
raw iron
+
+
+
cut lumber, steel beams, steel tubing,
component /element /part
plywood, etc. sheet metal, complex parts
+
+
+
final product
houses,
structures, vehicles,
(or directly usable form of energy)
furniture, etc.
appliances, etc.
+
+
+
use
+
+
+
recycling (returning the matter back to different phases of the sequence)
semi-raw material
(or applicable form of energy)

115

In the consumer culture, only the phase of use is performed on the local
level. All the production phases are now situated at the general level, in the
technological and economic mode of organization which is large-scale and
institutionalized. The phase of recycling has been only recently acknowledged,
and it is still malfunctioning in a confusion of jurisdictions.
In the early stages of historic development, in the pre-industrial, preinstitutionalizationperiod, most of the technological sequence was going on a t the
local community level. The general level differentiated when the initial phases
of production began to be performed independently from the concrete,
114
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Rstic, 1986: 25; Rstic, l986/ 1989: 16
See text around footnote 114 in chapter 4.

particular needs at the local level - like extracting the resources from nature
and converting them into the forms usable a s elements or components, or the
forms of energy, necessary for producing the final products. The phase of
making the final products remained for a very long time exclusively at the level
of the local community. Only with the onset of industrialization, the phase of
final products began to pass over to the general level, until the stage of total
industrialization and institutionalization was reached, when the concrete, local
needs became completely irrelevant for the process of industrial production,
and the community was reduced to a n agglomeration of consumers

116.

Reconnection of technology (and of the economy) to the community can be
best acomplished if the final phase of production, the making of final products,
is returned to the local level - the level of the local community
Ralph Borsodi, the [. ..Ieconomist and decentralis t philosopher who
championed self-reliant homes teading I...]proved by both theory and example
that breakingfree of marketplace dependence was a comparatively easy - not
to mention cheap and healthy - thing to do. A few years ago, in an interview in
Mother Earth News not long before his death at the age of 91,Borsodi said:
" Probably one half to two-thirds I...]of all the things we need for good
living can be produced most economically on a small scale ... either in your
own home or in the community where you live... You can't make electric wire
or light bulbs, for example, very satisfactorily on a limited scale. Still,
virtually two-thirds of all the things we consume are better off produced on a
community basis. " 117

The local level is defined by immediate relevance to concrete life
processes, so making final products in the local community means a
production appropriate to concrete needs. This can entail a de-alienation of the
consumer economy which manipulates human needs for profit-maximization
purposes. Such a development would also re-establish a community-based
responsibility for the ways of satisfying individuals' own needs and enable them
to regain control over their own lives.

116

Ristic, 1989a: 17-18
The bureaucratization and centralization of nation-states in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries reduced the amount of control that everyone had in their
lives at the local level. As the loci of power became more and more remotefrom the
community as a whole [...I
it eroded the community life on which home
manufacturing had previously depended. (Biehl, 1991: 54-55)
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Why do I have to give my child cereals with food coloring and preservatives? I can go to a health-food store and make myself a mix that I want, out of
pre-prepared ingredients. There are many other possible examples with
vehicles, houses, computers and other things which can be made from
components produced in previous phases of the technological sequence, and
finalized at the local level, in the local community.
The previous phases remain at the general level. The post-industrial
development - or, in Rfkin's tenns, the Third Industrial Revolution

1 18 -

involves an increasing automatization and computerization of production. The
phases of the technological sequence before the making of final products are
exactly where these new production methods are most beneficial:
Workers in clean, crisp unvonns program and monitor the computers
that oversee and control the production process. None of the men handle the
s teel directly. The process itself is nearly fully automated and produces cold
rolled s teel in less than one hour. The same process in an older integrated
steel mill used to take as much as twelve days. 119

Rfkin presents this image of advanced technological process of
production, not primarily to show a n obvious improvement of work comfort and
ease, but as part of his comprehensive argument that this kind of technological
innovation leads to enormous decrease in the role of humanpower in
production processes, and thus to imminent lay-offs of vast number of
industrial workers

120. However,

in the context of the two-level organization of

technology and the economy, instead of lay-offs, this development can be
perceived as liberation of people from the slavery to hardships and unhealthy
conditions of working in basic industries (or in the phases of the technological
sequence before the making of final products).

1 18
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See paragraph between footnotes 26 and 27 in chapter 3.
Riflrin, op.cit.: 133-134
The quickening pace of automation is fast moving the global economy to the day of
the workerless factory. Between 1981 and 1991, more than 1.8 million manufacturing jobs disappeared in the U.S. I.] In the 1950s, 33 percent of all U.S. workers
were employed in manufacturing. By the 1960s. the number of manufacturingjobs
had dropped to 30 percent, and by the 1980s to 20 percent. Today, less than 1 7
percent of the workforce is engaged in blue collar work. (ibid.: 7-8)

People will thus be liberated to have time and energy which they can employ to get more involved in control over and responsibility for their own lives by engaging directly or indirectly in making, a t the level of their local community, the final products that will satisfy their own concrete needs. This work will
be much more fulfilling a s it will have the relevance of concrete life processes
of the community. It will involve creativity in making almost each particular
final product. Creativity has by now become completely alienated from everyday work and limited to professional efforts which are mainly oriented toward
satisfying the consumerist and profit-maximizing criteria, rather than the

quality of concrete human needs. Furthermore, at the local level, the combination of manual and intellectual work would enable a more integrated life:
The worker whose task has been specialized by the permanent division
of labour has lost the intellectual interest in his labour, and it is especially so
in the great industries: he has lost his inventive powers. Formerly, he
invented very much. Manual workers - not men of science nor trained
engineers - have invented, or brought to perfection, the prime motors and all
that mass of machinery which has revolutionised industry for the last
hundred years. But since the great factory has been enthroned, the worker,
depressed by the monotony of his work, invents no more. 121

The two levels - the local and the general

-

can only function a s

interrelated, so technological organization has to enable their interaction. An
appropriate technological approach can be based on so-called "open
prefabrication"

122. It

means that production at the general level is primarily

aimed at supplying semi-final products - elements or components from which
the most diverse final products can be made a t the local community level,
according to specific and real needs. Open prefabrication is "open" because it
is independent of concrete final products. Prefabricated elements or
components are designed to enable maximum flexibility, combinability and
compatibility for the assembling of a greatest variety of products

123. Open

prefabrication is a horizontal, network system of technology, compatible with
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Kropotkin, 1899: 186; see also quotes at footnotes 4 1 and 43 in the previous
chapter.
Otto, 1975; Schulitz, 1975; Schulitz, 1977
Ristic, 1986: 27-28

the open systems of social and economic organization, and interrelated a s
nested levels of interaction.
This technological system practically exists already - it only h a s to be
further developed and rendered appropriate and convenient for the two-level
social and economic organization. A small producer of computers or audio
equipment, for instance, actually only assembles the ready made components
(chips, resistors, switches) into a specific design. It is only in the interest of big
businesses to hinder such a production pattern because they do not primarily
want to make good products, but to control the market, often by pushing out
better designs and by aggressively preventing any independence, openness
and creativity.
"Barriers" to energy conservation cue attitudes or institutions that
prevent or discourage investments which are economically optimal. 124
Small business is the seedbed for innovation and increased productivity.
Studies have shown that far more innovations are created by small
entrepreneurs than big corporate research departments. 125

This control by the competing big businesses is also achieved by avoiding
compatibility and standardization of components and parts, along with a
planned and imposed obsolescence and reduction of quality and durability by
design - all resulting in increased waste and entropy.
Consumption of material goods is driven by advertising, planned
obsolescence, technophilia, and a style-conscious culture. The amount of
physical material, energy expenditures, and costs to produce the packaging
"required"for marketing purposes oftenfar exceeds that needed for the
product itself. Packaging material has a short lifespan; after successfully
enticing the consumer to buy the product, it goes directly to the landfill. Often
the product is not far behind. Consumer products themselves cue often
intended to go out of style or fall apart rapidly, encouraging replacement
purchases. Material "newness"is worshipped. 126

A sensitive issue of open prefabrication (and prefabrication in general),

particularly in the context of social and technological sustainability, is the
problem of assembly and disassembly

124
125
126
127

127.

Open prefabrication systems have to

Craig and Levine, 1982: 6
Morehouse et al., op.cit: 14
Thayer, 1994: 254
I have already mentioned the problem in relation to the recycling phase of the
technological sequence - after footnote 114 in chapter 4.

include carefully designed joining and bonding devices, so that they enable
both assembly and disassembly which is operationally and ecologically
sustainable and appropriate to the two-level social, economic and technological
organization

128.

Now that the responsibility to reuse and reprocess materials is reverting
to the manufacturer, [...I companies are scrambling to redesign their products,
building in recycled materials, changing product and material composition,
and designing for disassembly. Matsushita's new washing machines can be
completely disassembled with a single screwdriver. 129

Decentralization of technology and the two-level organization are the basis
for a true sustainable community economy. The orientation of such an economy
toward making final products a t the local level induces social relationships
whereby control over the ways of satisfymg vital needs is no longer alienated
from people. These changed conditions would create a framework which
encourages and fosters a social and ecological responsibility based on direct
involvement in production processes. This responsibility has been identified by
the theorists and activists of the community-revival movement, known in
England in the 1970s a s "community action". It was noted that children
playgrounds which were built by direct involvement and initiative of the
residents of the local community - both children and their parents - suffered
no vandalisim a t all, in contrast to the council-built playgrounds which were
often completely vandalized

130.

Making final products a t the local level provokes a different attitude toward
the process of use. Such a n attitude involves more care and responsibility for
the commodities which satisfy human needs, a s well a s for the environmental
and social context of the whole process of production, use and renewal. This
responsibility is the key component of a n ecological culture.

Ristic, 1986: 28
129 Hawken, op.cit.: 73
130 These data were publicized in the locally distributed materials by the 'community
action"groups in London, in 1977.
128

Chapter

Household
It is increasingly evident that thefuture of the
species and of the ecosystem is a problem that
a.ects the lives of each and every one of us. Change
can therefore no longer be dissociatedfrom
individual responsibility. [. ..] Granting that the
ecological question signals these transformations,
it is also necessary to accept thefact that we cannot
address the problem of the planet without
addressing the problem of ourselves. 1
Ecology -from the Greek oikos ("household")- is
the study of the I...I relationships that interlink all
members of the Earth Household. 2

In discussing the issues of decentralization and de-alienation. I have
repeatedly mentioned the importance of control by people over the ways of
satisfjrlng their needs, individual interest in their own lives, their creative
initiatives within the community economy, and particularly their individual
responsibility. All this points to the individual a s the ultimate level of
decentralization and de-alienation.
However, in the eco-systemic context, individual cannot be viewed or examined in isolation, but as an integral unit of individual-in-her/his-environment.
Individual's immediate social, natural and built environment is the household.
It is the sphere of the most direct vital relevance for the individual's life,

a social unit that is closer to the ground, in which changes are comprehended
b y reference to the motives and actions of individual human beings. 3

Household is thus the basic unit of eco-systemic interrelatedness and
interaction between individuals and their environment, the fundamental unit in
the range of nested levels of complexity 4, which comprise the Earth household
depicted by Capra in the above quotation.
I have indicated in previous chapters that this interaction between

individuals and their social environment has been disrupted by the alienating
processes resulting from the institutionalization of social, economic and
technological structures. This disruption is most conspicuously manifested by
the sharp difference in individuals' attitude toward their own household and
toward the broader levels of their environment. For example, it is absolutely
and immediately clear to everyone who takes care of maintaining one's
apartment or house -just as well as to those who never think about it - that,
by pushing garbage under the carpet, one will very soon jeopardize both
physically and hygienically one's survival in that environment. By contrast,
people typically behave toward anythlng beyond their threshold as if it belongs
to someone else, because indeed - in the all-inclusive alienation of the
institutionalized world we live in - it is always someone else who is authorized
to be responsible. Thus, environmental and ecological problems are being
constantly pushed under the carpet

5.

Within these conditions of alienation in the current culture, household still
remains the basic unit where ecological consciousness is rooted in the
awareness of and the responsibility for the immediate life processes, and
wherefrom it can extend to broader levels of interaction with the social and
natural environment.
Household is the most appropriate unit of eco-systemic inquiry because it
includes both the social structure and the immediate physical environment.
-

3
4

5

Wilk. 1989: 7
encompassing, as I pointed out before, the household, neighborhood, community.
bioregion, etc.
Ristic, 1989c

Household usually incorporates the family a s the basic social structure (but it
is still a household, even if only one person lives in it), and it also means the
locus, the physical space, the house, a s well a s the everyday life functioning,
the process of satisfymg vital needs. It includes all the functions that notions of
home, house and dwelling signify and consist of, like shelter, living space,
relaxation and sleep, sexuality and reproduction, common meals, personal care
and waste management, a s well a s categories like love, creativity, sociability,
privacy, security.
The words family, household and home are three p o w e r - notions in
western culture which have also been used as conceptual tools in cross-cultural studies of domestic organization. [. ..] The three words have been used in
many, ofen overlapping ways, not only to describe socioeconomic or genealogical categories and units of residence but also as images, metaphors, and
symbols. 6

So household means the individual in her or his social, biological and physical
environment, which makes it the basic human-ecological unit.
The defintion of household established by the U S Bureau of Census (from
1990) is rather simplified a s
all persons who occupy a housing unit. A house, an apartment or other group
of rooms, or a single room is regarded as a housing unit when it is occupied or
intendedfor occupancy as separate living quarters; that is, when the
occupants do not live and eat with any otherpersons in the structure and there
is direct access from the outside or through a common hall. 7

But sharing the living space is the most basic definition:
By household I refer to a group of people coresiding in a dwelling or
residential compound, and who, to some degree, share householding activities
and decision making. 8

Analysis of activities is the ground for the definition of the household
purported by Wilk and Netting (two of the foremost anthropological authorities
on household issues). They group these activities into five categories which
characterize the household a s a social unit: production, distribution, transmission, reproduction and coresidence

9.

They refer to this approach a s functional

- distinguishing the household as a place of activities and tasks from the family
6

7
8
9

Lofgren, 1989:446
quoted in Magrabi et al., 199 1 : 6
Blanton. 1994: 5
Wilk and Netting, 1984: 5

which involves psychological, moral and symbolic aspects. Such a n approach
offers a possibility of differentiating the household from the family. This
differentiation has been identified by a number of anthropologists a s a major
problem of reaching an acceptable defmition of the household.
The dtference between our approach and that in the diverse literature of
family history and psychology was that we avoided the topic of the quality of
personal interaction and aflective behavior within the family I...]con.ning
ourselves to the observable and ofen quantitatively veniible behavior of
individuals in households. 10

Wilk and Netting establish their approach on "thecommon productive, con-

sumptive, and reproductive activities directed toward the satisfaction of needs," 11
which is obviously derived from Malinowski's functionalism

12,

although he did

not frame it in reductionist terms which exclude the psychological, moral and
symbolic side. The exclusion of psychological aspects - and primarily values follows the current paradigm of "value-free" economics, a s Wilk and Netting
explicitly ident@ their approach a s functional or economic

13.

Despite the purpose of making a clear distinction between the household
and the family, the task-oriented character of the former is not always
presented in sharp isolation from its other aspects. It is actually questionable
whether and how functional aspects, or tasks/activities, can be clearly
separated from the psychological, moral and symbolic aspects. Analysts with a
more feminist perspective, like Peggy Barlett, include both facets. She presents
a more comprehensive defmition of the household which consists of
personnel and household composition; production activities and the division
of labor; consumption activities and inter- and intra-household exchange;
and patterns of power and authority. 14

Another characteristic of the household that has been identified a s a
problem is its universality. It has two aspects: the fact that household is
ubiquitous, universally present in all cultures; and the perception of the
Western type of household a s a universal model for cultural development.
10
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ibid.: xx
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Notwithstanding the unquestionable fact it presents, even the first aspect has
been questioned as an inconsistent basis for statistical relevance

15 because

of

diversity of household forms in different cultures, and their fluidity in the
process of cultural change. However, the predominance of the Western
perspective, if not the Western household pattern, still induces, more or less
unconsciously, the adoption of some of its stereotypes as universal values, or
at least referential models in studying the households in other cultures. This
anthropological universalism has been identified as a bias which distorts
perception and research results, so the strategy of excluding the underlying
values from household inquiry may have seemed appropriate.
Yet, the changes and transformations in relationships within the household
are undeniably of paramount importance for its study, which, therefore, cannot
exclude the issue of values - of household's psychological, moral and symbolic
aspects. Particularly the gender roles, based on the deeply rooted patriarchal
structure and values - which have been almost universally present in human
cultures for quite a long period of civilizational development - have been of
central interest for researchers with feminist orientation.
The traditional position of women is most often revealed in economic
terms:
As unpaid labor carried out in near isolation, household work does not
share the formal characteristics of "real"work and thus has been
systematically excluded from the purview of most traditional organizational
research. 16

The economic position of women in general is established in the household
relationships, which are not merely economic. They are based on the
patriarchal structure which is one of the fundamental forms of social
relationships of domination. The household is thus the core unit of domination
- as Victoria Lockwood succinctly demonstrates:
Women's labor in reproduction and domestic activities is devalued and
unremunerated because, in capitalist systems, the concept of labor is reserved
for activity that produces surplus value ( i e . cash-earning activities). [...I A
critical facet of this pattern of intra-household gender strahiation is that
15
16

Hammel,1989:40
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d~Terentia1power (Le. decision-making and authority) in the household is
derivedfrom, and inextricably linked to, control of the means and rewards of
production (as in all capitalist systems). Thus, the material foundation of
male domination in commodity producing peasant households is male
control of capital. This foundation may be reinforced by social institutions,
religious beliefs, or ideolqies which socially just^& male pre-eminence. 17
I would put it less mildly: economic domination is invariably directly

interrelated to the cultural paradigm of domination over women in particular,
and over humans in general (as I will explicate in the next chapter).
These relationships are changing at an extremely slow pace:
As the United Nations State of the World'sWomen 1985 points out,
globally women are half the population, perform two thirds of the world's
work in terms of hours, earn one tenth as much as men e m and own one
hundredth the property that men own. 18

The most conspicuous change is caused by the infusion of market economy
and consumer culture into the traditional pattern of household economy:
In the commodity producing peasant household, a form generated by the
penetration of capitalist relations of production, men control major marketoriented economic activities and wealth producing resources, and women are
usually economically dependent and politically subordinate. 19

This change does not substantially alter the patriarchal structure, but it does
introduce an initial step to cultural transformation:
Women's economic power is also bolstered where women make major
labor contributions in the production of commodities and male household
heads are dependent on these contributions;wives may be able to make claims
to some portion of the product of their labor, although it is "owned"by men.
Because male economic control is not absolute, women may also be able, at
least on a situational basis, to chaUenge male authority when their own
interests dictate it. 20

All this points to close interrelatedness between household activities and
tasks, and inter-personal relationships that belong to the family sphere, with
the complex issues of gender, marriage, love, sexuality, reproduction, childrenrearing, education - which are all expressed and manifested through household
activities and functions. This interrelatedness exemplifies the comprehensive
systemic context of individuals-in-their-(immediate)environment.
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However, the distinction between the family and the household is necessary, not because of any advantage in reducing the household to quantifiable
economic/functional aspects in terms of activities and tasks, and excluding the
qualities of inter-personal relationships, values and psychological, moral and
symbolic aspects - a s Wilk and Netting contend

21

- but because the two units

do not overlap completely. All the members of a family rarely belong to the
same household throughout their lifetime, and, on the other hand, a household
can include persons who belong to different families (traditionally, the servants,
farmhands or other members of large households, and, nowadays, mixtures
and blends of different families due to divorces and other manifestations of
instability or transformation of the nuclear family).
The word family i s also ambiguous, since it refers to the extended kin
relations of a particular individual, or kinship as a network in itself, as well
as a coresident domestic group. 22

In strictly anthropological terms, family is a social group defined by
kinship relationships, whereas household is characterized by shared functions
and coresidence 23. This distinction, however, does not imply that there is no
overlap. The overlap is of key importance for the integrative systemic context
mentioned above.
Household types generally are d e f i e d in terms of the number of nuclear
families in a household, their completeness (whether they contain widowed or
divorced persons), the manner in which one nuclear family is connected to
another lfor example, by a sibling or a parent/child bond), and the degree to
which they are extended by having attached to them persons who currently
belong to no nuclear family. 24

The form of family overlapping with the household - i.e. living together in
the same household - has been in the state of intense change since the onset
of industrialization, urbanization and development of consumer culture. The
prevalent form in the industrial/consumer culture is the nuclear family, and it
21
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has likewise been in a process of transformation a s the patriarchal structures
are being shaken, but its instability is also a result of its isolation from immediate levels of social interaction - entailing from the destruction of the neighborhood and the local community which I described in the previous chapter.

Household as the Basic Unit of Cultural Change
Household includes the basic elements of family structures, and their
changes are certainly important for its development, but they cannot affect its
distinction a s a unit. In a way household has a broader meaning than family, a s
it integrates the individual's most immediate social environment (which in most
cases means the primary family), and the basic life functions. In the context of
my discussion in this essay of a n integrated economy of life processes,
household can be best defined a s the locus of the processes of s a t i s w g
individual's basic needs, the processes which imply the immediacy of
interactions with the social, natural and built environment.
In chapter 4, I have suggested the following categorization of the basic
human needs, or life functions:

breathing/drinking/eating/personal care
motility/relaxation/sleep

taking space (and time) - living space/environmental control and cornfort/
shelter/clothing/maintenance
sexuality/love/sociability/peace/privacy/security/comunication/coope-

ration
creativity/reproduction/education.

These are all processes of exchange of matter or energy with the social and
natural environment, and they amount to the fundamental metabolic flow of
intake + functioning + output. The functioning - or the satisfying of a need occurrs in all cases entirely, or a t least in its essential, rudimentary form, in

the household. That is to say, household is the focus and the center of the

basic life functions.
These life functions involve social, economic and technological interactions.
so household has to be comprehended as a technological, economic, social and
political unit - or, in integrative, systemic sense, as the basic human-

ecological unit.
Pooling and sharing of resources, food processing, cooking, eating, and
shelteringfrom the elements tend to take place in the household, which has
therefore become a standard unit of analysis for ecological and economic
purposes. 25
As the basic human-ecological unit, household is the most important

sphere of cultural change. Thus it has the potential to be the basic and
principal sphere of change toward an ecological culture - which is one of the
central arguments of this essay.
While social change viewedfrom the distance of history can be envisioned as abstract forces acting upon each other, change that is observable in
daily life is generated by patterns of individual and group decisions. The
household unit has become recognized as the most important and informative
level of analysis for understanding how individual and group action leads to
structural transformation on a larger scale. 26

The importance of the household as a sphere of cultural change is based
firstly on its universal presence in all societies and cultures 27. Furthermore,
as the locus of satisfying the basic human needs, household is the fundamental
cultural unit - and the principal sphere of cultural reproduction.
Culture is defined as the ways of satisfymg human needs - the cultural
interpretations of the primary biological needs and the secondary needs which
emerge from these interpretations

28.

This interaction between the biological

and cultural spheres (or between nature and humanity) is a dynamic process.
It represents a crucial aspect of the evolution of human species, which unfolds
25
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and basic socio-economic unit." (Netting, et al., op.cit.: xiii)
The problems set by man's nutritive, reproductive, and hygienic needs [. ..] are
solved by the construction of a new, secondary, or artificial environment. This
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as an interplay of its social (environmetallyinfluenced) and innate (biological,
genetic) facets 29.
The culturally defined ways of satisfymg human needs are reproduced
through education, primarily within the basic parental relationships which are
invariably situated in a household - "aprirnary arena for the expression of age
and sex roles, kinship, socialization, and economic cooperation where the very
s t u . o f culture is mediated and transformed into actionw 30. So the basic social,
economic and technological relations are culturally reproduced principally in
the household, in the educational process which is neither only rational nor
scholastic, nor specifically targeted at any of these relations as separate
disciplines or issues. It is an integrated learning of life processes, not only
because of the non-academic character of early education, but, most
importantly (for the issue I am discussing), because of the integrative character
of the household as a unit of basic life processes.
Household is thus the fundamental unit of cultural reproduction and
change, but it does not fulfill this role in isolation. The mechanism of cultural
reproduction and particularly of cultural change is manifested in interaction
between the household and its environment - the broader nested levels of
social, economic and technological organization.
These interactions, however, have been much disrupted, as I argued before, by the alienating processes of institutionalization and consumerism. The intermediary levels of interaction - which played a crucial role in the integrated
process of cultural reproduction - have been eradicated with the destruction of
the community and the neighborhood. The gap has been filled in by the invasion of media, which are an integral part of the consumer culture, and which
have become the overwhelmingly predominant vehicle of its reproduction.
This change of sphere of cultural reproduction is not just a matter of social
structure; it entails substantially and qualitatively different content and context
29
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-

the virtual reality of consumerism and detachment from concrete Life proces-

ses - which have been comprehensively addressed by Baudrillard's theory of
simulacra:
Under the sign of the commodity, culture is bought and sold - under the
sign of fashion, all cultures play like simulacra in total promiscuity. 31

What is particularly important in the context of household a s a unit of
integrative life processes, is that
information societies develop a cultural production not directly connected to
the needs for survival or for reproduction. 32

In this alienating disruption of the levels of social organization which involve direct interactions and connectedness to the integrity of human life processes, houshold has remained the last resort, the sanctum of individual identity:
Home became a n antipole to the growing anonymity, rationality, a n d efficiency of the outside world. In this dialectical process the sweetness of home
increased as the outside world became more complex and problematic. 33

The alienation of institutionalized consumer culture has also considerably
affected the household. The disruption of the relationship between work and
residence has reduced the household to a dormitory and tv-lounge (principal
meals, except in increasingly rare social occasions, are Linked to the tv-function
in form of unhealthy tv-dinners). In the Third World, the disintegration of the
household is even more intense a s migratory workforce typically lives in
disjointed conditions (which have been a continuous curse of the lowest class
of industrial proletariat since the beginning of industrialization). The basic
criterion of coresidency thus becomes almost unsubstantial in the "dormitory"
households of the "developed world" - or even hard to apply with certainty in
societies where there is much economic migration

34.

All in all, the role of the

household a s a unit of integrated life processes and direct involvement in and
31
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In many developing countries substantial numbers of households send one or
more members out in temporary emigration to urban areas a n d other employment
centers. [. ..I In a great many ethnographic settings it cannot be assumed therefore
that each residential unit corresponds to a n independent household or that a
household contains only those persons resident in its principal domicile a t any
particular moment. (Carter, op.cit.: 53)

control over the ways of satisfymg the individual's own vital needs has much
diminished. But, despite the extreme conditions just described, it is still not
entirely abolished.
Most theories of sustainability are mainly focused on the local decentralized community and perceive its revitalization a s both the prerequisite and the
goal of change toward a sustainable society. However, the local community has
been almost completely disintegrated, so its revitalization will be a n arduous
process. Household, on the other hand, has preserved enough of its integrity,
vitality and non-institutional position to remain the principal unit of cultural
change and a much more viable sphere of transformation toward a n ecological
culture. Furthermore, a revived household (as a more fundamental unit) will be
the germ and the basis for a renaissance of the local community.
If the primary sphere of a n emerging ecological culture is to be perceived
in the household, the diversity and fluidity of household forms imposes the
question of the type of household which can be identified a s the possible and
probable focus of such a process of cultural change. A tentative classification
appropriate to this context of inquiry should include the following types of
households:
typical Western middle-class consumer-culture household;

** urban/suburban subtype
** rural subtype;
low-class - poverty (urban slum);
third world transition;
third world slum.
It can be argued that, generally, all the later types aspire - mostly allured by
the intricate consumer-culture propaganda - to the "Western" type. Currently.
it is the predominant model, and it has become the most prevalent type for the
middle-class (in the most general terms) world-wide, not only in the 'West".
A very marginal number of households world-wide has, of course, a s yet

achieved to various extent a form of a n ecological household. For the rest.

although it is certain that, in some cases, the transition is conceivable from the
last three types, the consumer-culture household is the primary departure for
the change toward a n ecological household.
When I say departure, I have in mind primarily that a n ecological household, and a n ecological culture in general, present a n integrated alternative
(both practically and conceptually) to the currently prevailing comprehensively
unsustainable mode of household organization and operation, and to the related
cultural basis: the industrial, consumerist and profit-oriented economic and
social structure. Furthermore, it is important to note that the present condition, if not also the form, of the other types of household from the above
classification is substantially the result, or the underside, of the dominant
world economy. And the consumer-culture household is its expression and its
glossier side.
The contribution of the household in the economy a s it is currently
organized is reduced to consumption. Conventional household economics 35
identifies the household a s a consumption unit

36,

and its field of inquiry

amounts to the study of consumption behavior and is intended for market
analysts and policy makers 37.
This perspective reflects the framework of consumer culture and growthoriented economy, where perpetual and increasing consumption is the
prerequisite of expansion of production and profits

38.

What is particularly

implicative is that consumption is identified with use:
Consumption is the use of commodities b y households. 39

Or, rather, use is reduced to consumption. Use is equalled to using up,
exhausting and expending matter and energy. The role of the household in
economic processes thus emerges a s destructive.
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Buildings are either designed to last only a few years with the idea that
they can be tom down then; or they are designed to last forever, and made of
materials which never have to be repaired. I...]In both cases, living and
working in buildings are seen as destructive activities - buildings are only
thought good when they are new.40

This example demonstrates the consumptive role of the household in the
context of the building industry, but this condition extends practically to
everything else, a s almost all life functions have by now transmuted into
commodities.
In protoindus trial economies as well as in agrarian communities.
households generally function both as units of production and as units of
consumption, while in industrial economies households tend to lose their
role as productive units. 41

As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the consumer culture all the pro-

duction phases in the technological sequence are situated a t the general level of
social, economic and technological organization, while the local level is reduced
solely to consumption. The two levels present only the basic distinction within
the range of nested levels of interaction which includes the household, the
neighborhood, the local community, the bioregion, etc. When the technological
sequence is viewed in relation to this more discrete categorization of levels of
human-ecological organization, things take on a different aspect. The distinction
between production and consumption becomes less clear-cut a t the household
level. Even without that insight, Magrabi et al., observe from the standpoint of
conventional household economics that
the value of the household commodities consumed is likely to be greater than
the value of the market goods and services used to produce the commodities. 42

Here lies a n essential conceptual misunderstanding. If the life functioning
in the household is conceived of in terms of metabolism, of exchange of matter
and energy with the environment, as part of the comprehensive technological
sequence

- then

we cannot speak of consumption, but of the production of

final products and services in the process of satisflmg the vital needs of
household members.
40
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The producer produces for the household, the consumer produces within
the household. That is the real diserence between producer and consumer. 43

In this context, the technological sequence phase of use (or of life function) in
the household is no longer perceived of a s destroying, using up the material
and energy resources, but a s a process of transforming them within the
human-ecological cycles of renewal.
So household emerges a s the basic economic unit, which is actually a
tautology when the original meaning of economy is evoked - and I have defined
a n integrated, ecological (or sustainable) economy in these terms.

The Economy as Household Management
If the context of a n ecological culture implies a n integrated economy of life

processes, then the household is the basic unit a s it is the locus of production
processes which enable the satisfaction of vital needs and the fulfillment of life
functions. However, these productive or economic activities are unrecognized
a s such by conventional economics because they do not involve monetary
exchange 44.
Traditionally, household activities which were not aimed a t yielding
products to be sold outside, in the market, consisted of the sustenance of life
processes in the household and were almost exclusively performed by women.
This division of labor by gender has been a manifestation of the patriarchal
cultural pattern. Therefore, women's unpaid work in the household a s a form
of gender-based domination has been comprehensively analyzed, particularly
by feminist authors 45. The meaning of women's unpaid work is that they were
deprived of participating in economic activities which procured monetary gains,
and consequently excluded from the social position of power. However, the
ongoing change in these socio-economic relationships with the gradual
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dissolution of patriarchal structures, does not alter the essential placement of
household activities outside of the economy defined by monetary exchange.
When, with the slowly transforming gender relationships, household activities
have become more shared, they still remain unpaid, whether performed by
females or males.
The economy at the household level is distinctly characterized by direct
involvement of its members in the processes of satisfymg vital needs and
fulfilling life functions. This is the gist, the focal point of the economy of life
processes, of metabolic exchange of matter and energy between the basic
human-ecological unit and its natural and social environment. In this process,
household members are directly engaged in work for their vital purposes, a s
differentiated from professional service which involves primarily monetary
exchange. Bums describes the difference - and its manifestation in the current
economic perception - in the context of the traditional view of women's work in
the household:
The woman who decides to get ajob outside the home hires a maid to
clean her house. Both her income and that of her maid are then included in
GNP and national income accounts, because they involve the exchange of
money. In reality, the only real addition to the economic product is the job
outside the home. The work of the maid is included in the GNP not because it is
done but because if is paid for [...I ?he value offriend's services on her own car
is excludedfrom GNP. But the cost of her accident, ambulance ride, and the
hospital stay is not. Indeed, a multitude of entirely negative economic events the cost of police, prisons, pollution, accidents, etc. - are included in GNP,
while the value of home production, volunteer work, and the services of
consumer-owned capital are excluded. 46

Direct involvement can be exchanged between households without
monetary mediation. That is the friendly help mentioned in the previous
quotation and it extends the non-market form of economic activities to
neighborhood and local community levels - the local levels of social, economic
and technological organization characterized by direct interaction

47.

The activities which fall outside of perception of the current mainstream
economics are generally denoted a s the informal economy. The term covers a
46
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Burns,op.cit.:61-62
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130 in chapter 6.

broad and indeterminately defined range of economic processes which elude
the institutional control of monetary exchange for a variety of reasons. It also
indicates the inadequacy of the institutional sphere to respond to and resonate
with different aspects of life processes

48.

The household economy is typically

considered a n informal economy 49 because of its "invisibility" to GNP and other
formal indicators of economic activity. However, the "invisibility" of the household economy ensues from its essential inconsistency with any form of monetary exchange, while the other types of the informal economy imply unambiguous
orientation toward monetary gain and can involve informal markets. Direct
involvement in the process of satisfying vital needs characterizes both the
household economy and the essential purpose of the community economy,
although the later includes local markets and monetary exchange.
A lot of work has been done to translate housework into the market

economy terms

50

in order to demonstrate by mainstream indicators -

particularly for the purpose of feminist arguments against the "invisibility" of
women's housework - that 'the household economy is about one third the size of

the market economy."51. However, this quantitative evidence does not reflect
the non-market quality of the economy at the household level. The economy at
the household level cannot be included into the overall picture of the economy
by expressing its activities in terms of monetary exchange. Instead, a
comprehensive, integral economy has to be perceived a s consisting of what
Bums defined a s the basic triad of the household, the collective and the
market economy. He observed that
both the collective and the household economy are so structured that it is
impossible to disentangle the economic aspects of these organizations from
their social and biological functions. They are exceedingly natural
economies, evident in the operation of wolfpacks, bees, and porpoises as well
as of human societies. [. ..]
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Two hundred years ago, the market w a s of little importance to anyone.
Now the market is predominant, to the virtual exclusion of the original and
more natural economies. 52

Although the characterization of household and collective economies a s
natural in contrast to the market economy may be inappropriate and somewhat
dualistic, it indicates the current imbalance generated by the overwhelming
dominance of the market component

53,

which Bums believed would be

regulated by a natural tendency toward a balanced economy. If this prognosis
sounds too optimistic, it can certainly be argued that the current ill-balanced
economy is untenable and unsustainable.
This imbalance is manifested by increasing commodification of life
functions and the reduction of direct involvement of people in satisfying their
own needs. This is a key aspect of alienation in the consumer culture which I
discussed before. However, a s long a s the household exists, it will remain, in
whatever degree, the basic unit of economic processes demarcated by direct
involvement and vital purpose - by direct control over and responsibility for
individuals' needs and their own life. The household is, thus, the germ of a
process of de-alienation and emancipation from the consumer culture, and of
reestablishment of a balanced, sustainable economy in its integral scope.
It is necessary here to clarify the definition of the economy at the
household level. I have been consistently using the expression "the economy at
the household level" to emphasize that it is only one (the basic) of the nested
levels of eco-systemically interrelated economic processes which comprise the
integrated economy of life processes (which is the definition of a sustainable or
ecological economy I developed in chapters 3 and 4). The current perception
creates a confusion about what defines the economy at the household level
primarily because monetary exchange is the exclusive criterion for iden-g
economic activities. Therefore, household consumption which involves the purchase of commodities in the current market economy is identified as the household economy because it entails monetary exchange perceived to be performed
52
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by people in their position a s household members. However, it is the imrnediate satisfaction of vital needs and fulfilment of life functions - the economy a s
a metabolic process of exchange of matter and energy with the (natural and
social) environment - that defines the economy a t the household level. It presents some essential differences from the market economy. Firstly, life functions cannot be expressed in terms of market exchange value, despite the alienation and distortion of needs by the pressures of the consumer culture

54.

Bums explains the difference with a n example:
The man who operates a laundromat will likely see the regular
replacement of his machines as the most emient route to proJits. But he will
also resent the inevitable deterioration of the same machines used by his w$e
at home [...I A washing machine offers nothing but clean clothes in the here
and now. And the ultimate service of a car, whatever its psychic satisfactions,
is delivered in miles, not dollars. Household investments, by nature, are
discrete and real. They lack entirely the magic of capital. Their returns are
rigid, immediate, and non-transferable. The phenomenon of compound
growth does not exist in the household. 55

Consequently, the notion of economic growth, based on the primary economic
purpose of profit maximization, is also incompatible with the essential metabolic
processes of life functions. Likewise, competition a s the basic social interaction
of the market economy is not characteristic of economic processes at the household level.
The common denominator of these forms of economic activity, beyond
theirfailure to use money, is that they are organized around the idea of giving,
of mutual need, and of cooperation rather than competition ?hey assume
that productive activity is a social as well as an economicfunction and that
the competitive drive for individual gain is not necessary the best drive to harness in order to accomplish a given task. Perversely, o w system of economic
accounts excludes all motives but the competitive desire for money. 56

The issue of the purpose of economy, which I discussed in chapter 4,
becomes clear with this essential characteristic of the economy a t the
household level. The purpose of monetary gains and of profit maximization is
entirely incompatible with the economy of life processes, of which the
household is the focal point. The interactions of the economy at the household
level are based on mutuality and cooperation.They work on giving-and54

55
56

which I discussed in chapters 4 and 5
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taking, on common and mutual vital needs, on exchange of energy. Give-andtake is a truly metabolic process. It is the key to the eco-systemic definition of
sustainability: the exchange with the social and natural environment a s
interconnectedness, interrelatedness and interdependence means mutuality,
rather than a perception of the environment a s confrontational and competitive.
Mutuality and cooperation are the fundamental issue of the sustainable
economy and ecological culture. They are primarily manifested and evident a t
the household level, but they are the essential characteristic of the integrated
economy of life processes

57.

They involve giving and taking a s a two-way

relation, in contrast to confrontation of gain and loss - the competition for
profit gains a t the expense of recognized or unrecognized social and
environmental losses.
Currently, the consumer culture has reached the stage where the growth
paradigm and its public image of boundless consumerism has effectively
obliterated the awareness of losses. Consumer culture has become a happy-golucky trance of endless gains. However, metabolic processes are a n inevitable
ecological and bio-physical given. At the level and scale of direct interaction,
losses are conspicuous, so they cannot be entirely detached from gains, and
the interrelatedness of give-and-take stays much in evidence. The concealment
of the simultaneity of give-and-take, or gain-and-loss could have only been
achieved by the alienating detachment from life processes and from direct
interactions and involvement. In the course of this detachment, local
community has been disrupted and the household invaded by consumerism.
Mutuality and cooperation involve and require direct interaction. They
involve synergy of the group which works together toward a common purpose.
Moreover, mutuality and cooperation seem to be possible only a t the levels of
small-scale groups:

57

In his famous book Mutual Aid, Kropotkin (1902)argues that mutuality is
primordially a crucial characteristic of all social animals, and the fundamental
condition for the development of humanity as a basic system of social and
economic support. See quotation at footnote 87 in the previous chapter.

A sense of cooperation and mutuality arise among those who continually
rub shoulders - it is d~ficultto think of "cooperation"among millions, but
very easy to conceive of it among hundred. 58
The essence of social l$e is cooperation. People can only exchange
services, work together, and rely on supplementing each other as regards task
and ability, when they are within reach. And conversely, people who are close
neighbors must come to some agreement on a whole number of points.
Obviously the smallest neighborhood group is the household I...] Yet
invariably we have also some forms of organization which embrace a number
of families and other kinship units. The local group I. ..I territorial unit of
potential cooperation, exchange of services, and community of interest I...] 59

Cooperative and collaborative relations obviously work across the nested
levels of social and economic interactions - but within the scope of local direct
involvement. Martine Segalen perceives this systemic interrelatedness in terms
of networks:
Work cooperation was often based on neighbor networks. The
organization of work also associated richer and poorer domestic groups; the
small holder would come and help the larger farmer during the ploughing
period and the latter would lend his horse and plough implements to the
former to till his small plot of land. [...I The work force was formed inside the
household but at times required pooling between households, either kinfolk
or neighbors, according to the stages of the annual labor cycle. 60

However, she refers here to traditional social and economic relationships
which are now mostly a thing of the past. Collaboration and cooperation have
been very much reduced to smaller groups which externally seem to operate increasingly in competitive mode - a s collaboration for group gain against other
groups, or social/economic structures. This external confrontation is always easier if the other group is alien, or perceived a s such, either by sincerely accepted propaganda, or by the consensus of a game (typically in sports, which historically have had a social function of reproducing social conflicts in game form).
The prevalence of intergroup confrontation and competition indicates a lack
of awareness of eco-systemic interrelatedness of nested levels of social and
economic interaction. The intermediary levels of social organization - the local
community and the neighborhood - have been eradicated from the continuum
of nested levels of interaction (as I demonstrated in the previous chapter). The
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disrupted sense of interrelatedness makes space for the detachment necessary
for separation of gain and loss into gain versus loss. The dualistic and
hierarchical opposition between the units of social and economic organization is
thus emphasized, and they operate in a competitive, conflicting relationship.
The question is whether the awareness of eco-systemic interrelatedness
has historically been the factor that made the household the basic unit of
mutuality and cooperation.

Household as a Sphere of Change
Toward an Ecological Culture
An answer to this question can be found in the concept of the moral

economy which
was first introduced by the historian E. P. Thompson, in connection with his
studies of transitions ffom pre-capitalist to capitalist societies. In precapitalist societies, economic exchanges appear to be regulated by traditional
norms that define both an individual's social status, and the support to which
he or s h e is entitled in order to maintain a n appropriate level of subsistence.
[...I In economic anthropology, households have usually been understood as
intimate economies based on sharing, rather than on the economic exchange
that is found in more distant relationships. Rights to goods a n d services are
therefore thought to be defined by social obligations rather than by
calculations of retwns, a n d they are described as being patterned by the role
structure of the group. 61

Cheal's analysis of the social and economic relationships in the household
indicates that the organization of its economic activities around mutuality rather
than competition has been traditionally based on the compulsive morality of
domination over women (at the level of family relationships) and over servants
(as non-kinship members of a household). They were simply not in a position to
get involved in economic activities which would permit competition for
monetary gains 62.
Thus, the traditional role of the household a s a basic unit of mutuality and
cooperation is not established on any social and ecological consciousness, but
quite contrarily, on a n external, culturally imposed morality of domination. This
61
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See text around footnote 45 above.

historical background makes the household a basic unit of social and gender
domination, and thus the cradle of cultural reproduction of authoritarian
relationships. Moral values have been reproduced in the household through its
basic family relationships and through its life functions and activities.
This points to a rather controversial position of the household as a sphere
of change toward a culture based on a human-ecological consciousness.
However, moral economy has completely disappeared from the other nested
levels of direct social and economic interaction. The neighborhood and the local
community a s social and economic units have disintegrated and competition for
profit maximization and monetary exchange has become the pervasive and
almost exclusive form of economy.
I have discussed at length the negative impact of the destruction of the lo-

cal community and the neighborhood, and the socially and environmentally disruptive and alienating effect of the current economy and consumer culture. If,
however, these developments are perceived in the context of a moral economy.
they present another side of cultural evolution - a process of liberation from
the compulsive morality of domination which was a cohesive factor of the local
community, but also a stifling safeguard of its authoritarian social structure. In
that sense, detachment from direct interaction brought about by institutionalization and urbanization has also loosened up the social relationships based on
the compulsive morality of tight, small-scale groups. The large-scale market
economy has thus developed a s a detachment from direct social interactions.
This process of transformation from the moral to the market economy is
now affecting the last remnants of the traditional household:
A s more traditional communities are incorporated into market systems,
households are transformed into petty commodity producers for regional and
world markets. In many rural areas of the Third World these commodities are
agricultural products (e.g. coflee, copra, cocoa, etc.).The typical peasant
household economy is mixed and generalized, combining subsistenceoriented production of indigenous crops with the cultivation of cash crops. 63

A s I have pointed out above, the infusion of the market economy into the

gender division of labor in the household indicates a change in the economic
63

Lockwood, op.cit.: 199

position of women, but it does not substantially affect the relationships of
domination. It only extends them outside of the household. Generally, the
liberation from the moral economy has turned out to be just a change of scale.
Domination has not disintegrated, it is now enacted at a larger scale.
Domination is detached from direct interactions and has thus become even
more oppressive because of its alienating elusiveness.
There is a cleavage between the revival of economic and social relationships of direct interaction at the local community, neighborhood and household
levels, and the emancipation of women from their social and economic position
defined by the compulsive morality of domination in the household. This
emancipation means the empowerment of women to gain control over their
work and its products, and they seek it through a position in the market
economy. Bums perceives the cleavage when he contends that
women are abandoning the household at precisely the wrong time; they are
transferring from lgeboat to sinking ship. [...I Rather than fwhting for
position in a declining institution, women should be learning to extend the
household economy. 64

But he does not seem to understand that women can only return to a redefined
economy in the household from a post-emancipation status. At this stage of
their emancipation, women prefer to accept a n alienated, detached domination
in the institutionalized sphere instead of (and a s a step out of) the direct
interaction of domination within the household.
Of course, the household undergoes transformation along with this change
in the social and economic position of women. The initiation of the process of
dissolving the compulsive morality of gender domination sets the stage for the
next level of human-ecological emancipation: regaining the control over and
responsibility for the immediate life processes.
Rapid growth of countereconomies is a spontaneous devolution as
citizens bypass paralyzed institutions and their bottlenecks and simply begin
recalling the power they once delegated to the state and executives of giant
corporations. 65
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Recalling the control and responsibility is the reaction to the alienating institutionalization of social, economic and technological organization. Henderson
identifies this reaction with informal economies in general, but it is the household a s a unit of the integrated economy, or a s a human-ecological unit, that is
the basic locus of this next level of emancipation. It will be based on mutuality
and cooperation. They are not lost with the dissolution of compulsive morality
(or the moral economy) of the traditional household. Mutuality - a s the
simultaneity of giving and taking - is the economic expression of metabolic
processes that are basic to eco-systemic interrelatedness and interdependence.
Mutuality is the awareness, the sense of interrelatedness of individuals-intheir-environment, and thus it becomes the essential basis of responsibility for
immediate life functions a s processes of exchange of matter and energy within
the human-ecological systems.
In terms of a sustainable technology, this becomes a n awareness of and responsibility for the metabolic flow, the intake + functioning + output involved in
the life functions going on in the household. The household is the basic technological unit a s it entails immediate involvement with technologies a s technical solutions to the ways of satisfylng vital needs and fulfilling life functions. These technologies are culturally defined (as I pointed out in chapter 4). and the household is the basic unit of cultural reproduction, so the sustainable technology of
a n ecological culture is primarily established a t the level of the household.
For household members, such a cultural change would mean a de-alienation from the passive position of consumers who are manipulated by the enticements of consumerism, and who are only aware of matter or energy in the
form of commodities that are sold to them. They are therefore entirely unaware
and uninterested in the metabolic flow of intake + functioning + output involved in the process of satisfylng their needs in the household

66. Taking

into

consideration the intake + functioning + output process places the household
in a different position from merely a consumption unit that it has held in the

66

See text and quotation between footnotes 2 and 3 in chapter 5.

consumer culture. Household becomes the central and crucial point where the
two basic technological processes of production and waste management meet
and integrate into a n indivisible flow of matter and energy which is fully
conspicuous to the members of the household. Furthermore, the distinction
between production and consumption is a misconception in this context 67.
Metabolic flow - the exchange of matter and energy with the environment

-

is the basic principle of a sustainable or ecological technology of the household.
It necessitates the inclusion into natural cycles of renewal, which is applicable
to all the life functions that take place in the household.
The functions of dwelling, shelter, living space, relaxation and sleep,
common meals, personal care and waste management involve technological
solutions which include:
building and maintenance (space, personal care and dishwashing)
materials which are non-toxic and which involve ecologically sustainable
production and recycling processes

68;

environmental control (temperature and ventilation), primarily using
passive solar approach 69;
lighting and electrical appliances - using energy resources which are
decentralized and ecologically sustainable in conversion processes and in
renewal rate, including photovoltaic solar cells, small gas, wind and hydro
turbines, and fuel cells

70;

food production relying on organic and decentralized processes - a t the
level of the household, neighborhood and local community;
waste management which uses composting and full recycling of all
material output of the household;
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Audubon House (NationalAudubon Society, 1994) includes in appendix a
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See quotes by Flavin and Lenssen in the previous chapter: in footnote 59, and at
footnote 105.

water supply and waste management with water recycling systems that use
different levels of water purity for appropriate functions in the household71.
Most of the ecologically sustainable technologies operate much more
efficiently on a small scale because they do not require expensive and wasteful
infrastructures, nor complex structures which typically house or hold the
cumbersome large-scale systems 72. Centralized systems in general usually
necessitate a condensed structure to be efficient or viable a t all. In order to
generate energy from solar-based resources - by solar cells, for example - it
would be utterly impractical to concentrate all the cells in one place and then
distribute energy by infrastructure to each user. And that is entirely
unnecessary a s a t least some of the solar-based resources (sun, wind, hydropower) are readily available almost everywhere. Yet, conventional energetics
sticks to the concept of centralized systems, so condensed mega-power plants
are devised even for solar-based resources and they are huge and complex
structures with existing or new infrastructure networks 73.
It is, however, even more important that the immediate presence of technological processes a t the household level enables the awareness and responsibility for the metabolic flow which are impossible with the detachment and
remoteness of the centralized systems where individuals only know that they
pay for them and have no idea where from and how the resources like water,
food or energy come to them, and what happens to the waste. Centralized
systems are actually upheld (and claimed to be more efficient) primarily
because of the control which they'exert over economy and technology. It is the
issue of control and responsibility of people at the household or other local
level, against the monopoly and liability of institutionalized systems 74.
71
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Metabolic flow - matter and energy exchange with the social and natural
environment - is the essential manifestation of systemic interrelatedness
among nested levels of social, economic and technological interaction. Thus the
control over and responsibility for the metabolic flow in the household can only
be achieved if there is a continuous interaction across the nested levels of
social, economic and technological organization. Therefore, the household is not
viable a s a n isolated unit, although that is the prevailing traditional notion:
Managing one's own household, living on one's own, now stand as
important symbols of individual freedom in contemporary society. I...]
Setting up an independent household is in some ways a ritual statement of
independence. 75
The single house on a suburban lot allows more control over one's
temtory... The American Dream is notjust a box on a lawn. It's a chance for a
small portion of creative independence."
Collaboratiue communities require organization and interdependence
among households that does not need to be dealt with in the typical detached
home. Decisions that are generally made within the family or by the
individual now move into the sphere of the group. Residents in these
communities need d~fferentsocial and communication skills than
individuals living in a typical neighborhood. 7 6

A s a human-ecological, eco-systemic unit, the household cannot be conceived

of a s a n independent (and isolated), but a s a n interdependent unit. This
interdependency is expressed by mutuality and cooperation a s the basic
characteristics of social, economic and technological interactions a t the level of
the household, wherefrom they extend to the broader nested levels of social,
economic and technological organization.
The very idea of community comes from the sheltering of people
together, whether to provide maximum areas of shade and cooler air between
buildings or to reduce the external surface area of the community as it faced
the hostile weather. People constructed their buildings together because of the
mutual benefit to be obtained. A policy of cheap energy removed this generator
of traditional community as surely as did the automobile. 77

Mutuality and cooperation have been perceived in terms of pooling and sharing a s a distinctive attribute of households 78. Pooling and sharing, or mutuality
and cooperation, also define collaborative housing (or cohousing) which has gra-
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dually emerged in the sixties, seventies and eighties79, primarily in Holland and
Scandinavia, but also in other western-European countries and the U.S. Cohousing is a new form of collective living which attempts to balance the individual
integrity of households with their closer interaction a s a collective sphere:
In collaborative housing, each household has its own house or
apartment and one share in the commonfacilities, which typically include a
fully equipped kitchen, play areas, and meeting rooms. Residents share
cooking, cleaning, and gardening on a rotating basis. [...I It creates not only a
home but a small community as they actively participate in its development
and management. 80

Cohousing invariably involves full participation (or rather initiative) of codwellers in the planning, design and management of their living space

81. Thus,

cohousing presents a true opportunity for full commitment to, control over and
responsibility for the entire process of metabolic interaction between the
household and its social and natural environment in a close systemic
interrelatedness with a n immediate broader level of social organization.
Cohousing has definitely emerged from the movement of communes and
cooperatives of the sixties

82, but

it has not involved the comprehensive and

radical questioning of the conventional household and family structure which
characterized these other two alternative forms of living. Cohousing is only a
reaction to the isolation of the nuclear family and of the household, but it does
not imply any internal changes. So rather than a n extended household (which
would be a return to its traditional structure), cohousing is a tighter, more
cooperative neighborhood - a level of integrative social interaction between the
household and the local community.
Likewise, cohousing did not follow the strong intent of the communes and
cooperatives on integration of living and working. It remained restricted to
residential functions. The reason is partly the compliance with existing zoning
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regulations

83, a s

cohousing projects have not been the extreme counter-cultu-

re like the communes, but have developed within the existing social and economic relationships.
More recently, larger units of interdependent social, economic and technological interaction have emerged, and they include a rudimentary integration of
work and residence:
The urban neighborhood is away to tie cohousing to the larger community,
enhancing both. The idea is to integrate housing, businesses, and commercial
services in an old-fashioned market town. [...I The residents should have the
opportunity to open up shops in their homes and walk down the block to the
grocery store or hair dresser's. Child care should be a short walk away. 84

Cohousing projects- which were primarily created around the social, rather
than ecological issues of housing - have only recently started to apply a more
comprehensive implementation of ecological technologies 85. It is still, however,
limited by restrictions of urban setting where cohousing projects appear.
Eco-villages, on the other hand, are essentially developed with the purpose
of achieving a completely sustainable functioning, of integrating a community of
ecological households and their natural environment into a fully interdependent
and interconnected human-ecological system.
The community of Village Homes in Davis, California represents a convergence of several dimensions of sustainability in one 70-acre landscape [...]
a community of 220 clustered solar homes, naturally drained open space, community gardens, orchards, and vineyards. [. ..] Each group of eight households
owns a contrguous "commonarea" awayfrom the street, which might typically contain a small grassy area. fue pit, toddler's play area, vegetable gardens,
fruit trees, and percolation ponds for stonn runoff. A third category of land
ownership is the "greenbelt"-jointly owned by all 220 households, which
includes a solar community center building and swimming pool complex,
central play field,large orchards, vineyards, playground, garden center, and
many acres of community garden plots available to any resident 86
83
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Zoning often places limits on "mixed occupancy," such as combining living areas
with work spaces or a childcare center. [...I Exactly where certain types of
collaborative housing arrangements can be built is a matter of how the residential
zoning categories are interpreted. (ibid.: 190-192)
ibid.: 34, 36
ibid.: 95
Thayer, 1994: 287-289
Village Homes has a highly successful open or "natural"drainage system
Instead of buried storm drains,frequent curb cuts in the streets empty water into
common area swales interrupted by numerous check dams or weirs. This system
allows winter stormwater to collect and percolate into the local soil profile [...I
Combined with the general deemphasis on chemical herbicides and pesticides, the
open drainage system allows for a rich ecological diversity - there are toads, lady

The household has thus to be perceived a s the basic unit in the interrelated system of nested levels of interaction with the social and natural environment. If sustainability is defined a s life processes in their metabolic cycles of
renewal, and if it is identified with community development (or revival), a
process of change toward sustainability, or toward a n ecological culture, starts
a t the household as the basic unit of life processes. At the level of the
household, a s I have shown in this chapter, the key issues of sustainability
and ecological culture are manifested in modes relevant to individual's life.
This relevance entails the awareness of and the responsibility for the
process of metabolic interaction between the individual and her or his
environment. Awareness and responsibility are based on a n individual's
involvement in the processes of satisfymg vital needs - on the sense of control
over her or his own life. The involvement entails individuals' initiative,
enthusiasm, emotional engagement and vital interest.
It is argued that ifpeople are to grow intofull adulthood and become
responsible human beings, they must be able to make sign~ficantdecisions in
matters that aflect their Lives. 87

Individual responsibility is the key issue of a n ecological culture. It involves a n awareness of the ecological context of the individual's life process, the
awareness of the impact which the ways of satisfymg the individual's needs
have on the immediate, and also on the wider social, biological and physical
environment. Individual responsibility is thus the basis of a n ecological
consciousness. As a n eco-systemic unit of individual-in-her/his-environment,
household is the locus of individual responsibility and the basic sphere of a n
ecological consciousness.
The individual's life processes evolve in eco-systemic interrelatedness and
interdependence along the nested levels of complexity, interaction and responsibility. Responsibility is thus interrelated and interconnected with wider levels,
starting and emerging from the household as the level of vital and immediate
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beetles, owls, dows, mockingbirds, killdeer, cedar waxwings, crows, magpies,
owls, and numerous flocks of migratory birds I...I A large portion of the Village
Homes landscape is "edible."(ibid.: 290)
Morehouse et al.. 1989: 87

relevance. Individual responsibility therefore involves a n awareness of this
interconnectedness with nested levels of interaction.
Two essential levels of responsibility are individual responsibility for life
processes of immediate relevance a t the household level, and direct collective
responsibility at the level of the local community. They are interdependent: individual responsibility is the prerequisite for a true direct collective responsibility, but it only makes sense if there is a local level of direct interaction, a s I
have demonstrated in the context of alienation in the previous two chapters.
Responsibility cannot be further contemplated without addressing in more
depth the issues of domination - which have already imposed themselves once
the discussion came to the level of the household.
Are individuals in our present culture capable of achieving a n ecological
consciousness and responsibiliv Do they have the inner potential to perform
cultural transformation into a new ecological culture based on responsibility?
These questions lead to the next chapter - to the problems of domination and
post-domination.

Domination and Post-domination
Domination is one of our century's most fruitful
concepts for understanding human-human and
human-nature relationships. The theme of
domination and its reversal through liberation
unites critical theorists and environmental
philosophers whose work spans the twentieth
century. 1
We are nearing the possibility of a second social
transformation - this time a shij?ji-om a
dominator society to a more advanced version of a
partnership society. 2
Sociability and need of mutual aid and support are
inherent parts of human nature. 3

In this essay, I have decided to use the compound "post-domination" even
though it is not in common use, comparable to the widely accepted terms "sustainablity" and "spirituality". It seems there is no term in wide use that would
denote and connote the exact meaning directly and affirmatively, without
recourse to invertion of an opposite meaning. Yet, I have chosen the prefm
"post-", rather than "non-", thus indicating transition and cultural
transformation. There are some terms with affiiative meaning, but they seem
to describe only part of the issue: partnership, mutuality, coexistence,
cooperation, co-evolution. And they are not in wide use either.
The [model of society] in which social relations are primarily based on
may best be described as the
the principle of linking rather than ran-,
partnership model.
1
2
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Merchant, 1994: 1-2
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At a 1985 New Paradigm Symposium [. ..I new paradigm thinking was
spec~@allydescribed as "postpatriarchat," and the new episternology was
seen as representing a "shiftJiom domination and control of nature to
cooperation and non violence." 4
The reenchantment of nature called forth by the Frankfurt school's
analysis of domination implies a partnership with nonhuman nature. Nature
is an equal subject, not an object to be controlled. A partnership ethic means
that a human community is in a sustainable ecological relationship with its
surrounding natural community. 5

Another term, possibly closest to the connotational scope of post-domination, is anarchism. However, besides a similar inverse morphology (an-archy),
its meaning a s rejection of subordination and subjugation, has been blurred by
politicizing and has gained an ill reputation by connections to political nihilism
and terrorism, Links which are fundamentally inconsistent with its meaning 6.
The reason for a lack of a widely accepted term that would hit the right
comprehensive connotation, is that relationships of domination have prevailed
over human civilizations for a very extended period, spanning different patterns
in cultural evolution. We are facing the task of naming what for a long time has
been unnamed.
Domination has lasted so long that it is hard to describe any conditions
without it. Consequently, there are theories that, in various guises, claim
domination to be a natural relationship - biologically, and even "cosmically"
determined

7.

Most notorious of them is Social Darwinism 8. It is still present

in more or less mutated forms despite continuous refutations of its scientific
credibility ever since Herbert Spencer put forth the first statement of the
concept. In the latest revamping, this social theory is envisioned a s practice
through genetic engineering:
4
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Eisler, op.cit.: xvii, 169, emphasis mine
Merchant, op.cit.: 20, emphasis mine. Also, in the quote above, Merchant indicates
liberation a s "reversal" of domination.
Guerin, 1970; Bookchin, 1980. A similar situation occurred with communism
which turned into totalitarianism when put into practice. Yet one of the central
issues of sustainability is the community, but the concept is hardly associated
with communism.
Ken Wilber purports socio-biological stereotypes within a broader context of
cosmic determinism: &Inthe biosphere, might makes right. In the biosphere, big
fishes eat littlefishes. In the biosphere, muscle rules. And in the biosphere, men
dominate other men, and men dominate women" (Wilber, 1995: 382-383)
See text after footnote 37 in Chapter 1.

Molecular biologist Lee Silver of Princeton University looks forward to a
future in which I...] society will segregate into the "GenRich and the "Naturals"
I...I All aspects of the economy, the media, the entertainment industry, and the
knowledge industry are controlled by members of the GenRich class ...
Naturals work as low-paid service providers or as laborers ... [Eventually]the
GenRich class and the Natural class will become entirely separate species with
no ability to cross-breed. 9

Overcoming domination is the key issue for resolving the conflicting
relationship between humanity and nature (which I have emphasized as the
principal underlying theme of this essay lo). It is also the prerequisite for
achieving individual responsibility a s a basis of ecological consciousness.

Responsibility as an Issue of Empowerment
Even more efficiently than police force, it is
distrust of self that makes people vulnerable and
obedient. 1 1

Why should I listen to a Utopia? There is nothing
that can be done. I am, and I am going to remain,
the poor little man of the street, who has no
opinion of his own. Who am I anyhow... 12
Our revulsion does not do away with the question:
how can the people who have been the object of
eflective and productive domination by themselves
create the conditions of j?eedom? 13

The discussion of sustainability in the five previous chapters has yielded
two essential concluding points. The first is that ecological culture (and
sustainability a s its component) has to rely on individual responsibility. This
means responsibility for the processes of metabolic interaction between
individuals and their immediate environment - social, biological and physical.
Through systemic interdependency between the immediate environment and its
broader levels, the individual's responsibility extends to include more general
spheres of concern. The second concluding point is that the loss of almost
9
10
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Hayes, 2000: 6
It is also explicitly stated by Carolyn Merchant in the opening quote for this
chapter.
Roszak, 1979: 96-97
Reich. 1948/ 1979: 99- 100
Marcuse, 1964: 6

every form of individual responsibility has been the most distressing aspect of
comprehensive alienation in the current consumer culture. The lack of
individual responsibility is both caused by and expressed in domination
patterns. Therefore, without addressing the issues of domination, sustainability
and ecological culture cannot be fully understood. This chapter will revolve
around empowerment for responsibility and its obstacles.
In order to address the capability of individuals to reclaim their responsibility
as a key condition of change to a n ecological culture, it must be ascertained why
they have lost the responsibility in the first place. Why is it that individuals gave
up their control over and responsibility for their own lives, for the ways of satisfymg their vital needs, for their immediate and wider environment? Why have
they relegated their responsibility to others, to institutions that have power?
Power is obviously the key issue here. The increasing complexity of
managing the life processes in the new conditions of industrialization might
have necessitated a general level organization

14,

a n assistance to individuals

from a wider perspective. If that is so, why have individuals had to empower
that general level to have control over their lives, and disempower themselves
and lose a possible chance to share the responsibility315 Was this a matter of
conscious relegation of responsibility3
Evidently, it did not happen that way. The conditions of disempowerment already existed before industrialization and institutionalization. And the preexistence of these conditions made it possible for institutionalization to turn into power
and control over people's lives. Viewed from a different angle, power and control
over people's lives took the form of institutionalization and extended to control
over the ways of satisfymg all their needs, and to defining the needs themselves.
In the social reality, despite all change, the domination of man by man is
still the historical continuum that links pre-technological and technological
Reason 16
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in terms of what I have discussed in chapter 6, between footnotes 99 and 101, 115
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and 122; and between 129 and 130.
Ristic, 1986/1989: 167
Marcuse,op.cit.: 144

16

Therefore, to de-alienate from the conditions created by institutionalization, the
much older conditions of disempowerment have to be addressed.
Without empowerment to have and keep responsibility, individuals cannot
break the vicious circle of irresponsibility and disempowerment, which is
manifested in paternalistic attitudes and doubts about the viability of
responsibility at the level of community and household. Doubts are often
expressed that a decentralized community may easily drift into irresponsible
behavior, thus jeopardizing the wider social and physical environment.
Citizens will be required to do the work of gouenment as well as making
the decisions. An oficer like the environmental constable, a local citizen with
the power to poke around the shire and make sure laws designed to keep the countryside clean are being obeyed, is an example. I...I A whole range of administrative services now run by the state will become the work of local people. 17

Visions of decentralized local communities, like this one, can provoke
carping about the flip side: the misuse of power to "poke around", the social
environment of small, provincial communities that are stifling and rife with
intolerance and petty politics. Doubts about a smooth path to decentralization
can be quite justified:
Once big systems have been broken down into many small units [...I how
do we make certain that what we have will be beautiful small units, not ugly
onesflled with animosity, envy, and intrigue? 18

Roszak touches

- in

the specific context of community decentralization -

upon what less benevolent observers would phrase a s the old misgiving that
people, left to themselves, are prone to create chaos. Unless there is a "ruler",
or 'rulers" of some kind to control and check them, people will revert into
asocial behavior and violence. Regulation is supposed to have become

,

necessary because people are irresponsible.
This view denies the possibility of individual responsibility a s a n inherent
human trait, and it is essentially congruent with Social Darwinism. Peter
Kropotkin criticized most comprehensively such a view, and generally argued

17

Bryan and McClaughry, 1989: 94-95
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Roszak, op.cit.: 308

(primarily a s a response to Social-Darwinist statements and writings

19) against

domination a s a necessity because of "human nature".
There always were writers who took apessimistic view of mankind I...]alwctys watchful of wars, cruelty, andoppression. I...]and they concluded that mankind is nothing but aloose aggregation of beings, always ready to fight with each
other, andonly prevented from so doing by the intervention of some authority.
Hobbes took that position; and while some of his eighteenth-century followers endeavoured toprove that at no epoch of its existence I...]mankind lived
in astateof perpetual warfare [...I his idea was, on the contrary, that the so-called "stateof nature" was nothing but a permanentfight between individuals. 20

The reality, however, in most cases seems to support the more pessimistic view,
and ideas like Kropotkin's are often deemed utopian. Yet, Kropotkin, a s well a s
other anthropologists who have studied the problem

21, point

to examples of "pri-

mitive", or pre-institutionalized human groups where there has been no loss of responsibility. These findings indicate that we are endowed with a natural predisposition for responsibility which is somehow thwarted in our social development.
A developmental psychology experiment with babies a t crawling stage offers

a n interesting insight into a child's inborn ability to act responsibly. The experiment is known a s "Visual Cliff' because it uses a special surface, half of which
drops down with a sheer precipice. The deeper part is covered with thick
glass. The anthology of developmental psychology, which I used a s the source,
refers to this experiment a s an argument in the old educational dilemma:
Common sense might suggest that the child lean- to recognize fallingoflplaces by experience - that is, by falling and hurting itselj But is
experience really the teacher? Or is the ability to perceive and avoid a brink
part of the child's original endowment?
To investgate the question, Gibson and Walk developed a special
f
to its mother
experimental setup [...IAn infant on the visual c l ~ crawls
across the shallow side, but refuses to do so on the deep side, even though it has
tactual evidence that the cltpis solid. 22

However, this natural endowment is lost (or suppressed, numbed

23), and

a new endowment of institutional regulation has been imposed instead. It has

--
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See quotes related to footnotes 149 and 165
Kropotkin, op.cit.: 77
e.g. Bronislav Malinowski, Ashley Montagu
Liebert, Wicks, and Strauss, 1974: 182- 183 In the accompanying photographs, the
child is seen touching the glass with its finger, but still declining to cross over it.
This is related to the issue of sensitivity. which is central for my discussion in the
last chapter - between footnotes 25 and 29, and 141 and 153.

been fully adopted, and has become a superstructure without which people
cannot imagine their Lives any more:
The individuality that learned order and subordination in the subjection
of the world soon who& equated truth with the regulative thought without
whose fixed distinctions universal truth cannot exist. 24

People have become used to regulatory restrictions. These offer them a
possibility of revolt and defiance, which are often stimulants to action because
they enable irresponsibility. Altogether, the result is a n immoral attitude toward
the environment (social and natural) 25. Kropotkin, on the other hand, argued
that humans are naturally endowed with a n inclination to mutual help and care
(also amply evident in the non-human biosphere), and that authoritarian
relations often induce, provoke and sustain confrontation and aggressiveness,
rather than dissuade such behavior:
The absorption of all socialfunctions by the State necessarily favoured
the development of an unbridled, narrow-minded individualism I...] As the
obligations towards the State grew in numbers the citizens were evidently
relieved from their obligations towards each other [.. I In barbarian society, to
assist at afght between two men [.. I and not to prevent itfrom taking a fatal
issue, meant to be oneself treated as a murderer; but under [. ..] the allprotecting State the bystander need not intrude: it is the policeman's business
to interfere, or not. And while I.. ] among Hottentots, it would be scandalous to
eat without having loudly called out trice whether there is not somebody
wantug to share thefood, all that a respectable citizen has to do now is to pay
the tax and to let the starving starve. 26

The Visual Cliff experiment is also important because it draws attention to
parental practice which is the opposite of what the experiment teaches. The parents are, of course, by vast majority unacquainted with this proof that their overprotective concerns are unwarranted and that their typical constant cries - Don't
go there! Don't lean over! Careful! Don't run! You'll fall and hurt yourself! - have
actually a n opposite (and arguably undesirable) effect. By repeating persistently
such fear-inspiring alerts, parents discourage and deaden the child's instinctive
sense for assessment of reality and its natural predisposition to rely on its own
responsibility and initiative - and t h u s educate irresponsibility. I have argued.
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Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944: 48, emphasis mine
Ristic, 1989b
Kropotkin, op.cit.: 227. See also the African example in chapter 6, between
footnotes 87 and 89.

risking a simplification, that this educational prejudice is a fundamental germ
of disempowering people for initiative in and responsibility for their own lives 27.
I said that the effect of the prejudice is arguably undesirable, but many

parents would contend that it is advisable to discourage initiative - as they
have themselves so much internalized the unquestionable necessity of external
authority (as indicated by Horkheimer and Adonlo in the above quote), that
they cannot bear to have their own children free from it

28.

The term "paternalism"has two very d~ferentuses. One is to idenhh an
adult's sheltering relationship toward a child who could not survive without
such protection. The other is to characterize an adult's ostensibly sheltering
but actually stulti_fjlingrelationship toward another adult who probably muld
- and should be able to - survive without such protection. 29

Paternalistic attitude and practice extend beyond childhood. Adult
individuals are also typically given or denied the freedom to have their own
responsibility

- because

of professed fear that, without control, they might not

behave appropriately. Paternalism stems from the conditions of disempowerment, control and domination. Both the paternalistic education of children and
treatment of adults enhance what is known as learned helplessness

30.

The overwhelming presence of paternalism opens up the central question how to empower the irresponsible and helpless with responsibility3 How can
individual responsibility be achieved in a n authoritarian culture? If people are
treated as irresponsible and their lives are controlled, they cannot become
responsible. It is a vicious circle, a chicken-and-egg dilemma of whether to give
people responsibility first, or keep them under control until they become
"mature enough for it".
The fact that people cannot become responsible under external control has
been repeatedly proved in practice. For me, the first experiential proof was the
Community Action playgrounds (and other activities) in the 70s in Britain,
which clearly supported the Kropotkinian argument. It was shown that
27
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Ristic, 1989b. I have presented this a s a key issue of alienation in chapter 5.
This is the issue of authoritarianism which I will further discuss toward the end of
the chapter - see text between footnotes 258 and 262 below.
Szasz, 1996: 37-38, emphasis mine
See text and quote between footnotes 47 and 48 in chapter 5.

playgrounds built and maintained by users (children and their parents) were
never vandalized in neighborhoods where the City Council-provided facilities
were typically reduced to ruins.
Yet, the distinction of individual/institutionalized responsibility is not so
clear-cut. It is not a n either/or status. Individual responsibility or irresponsibility does not exist in a social/cultural vacuum. It is a systemic - relational situation. Very often a n individual can internalize a n external, institutionalized rule,
understand the circumstances in which it is necessary, and find the inner
sensitivity to respond to these circumstances in a way appropriate to the
external rule. A good example is the observance of queues referred to by Daniel
Bromley 31. Apart from the sensibility and flexibility of the rule, the decisive
difference in terms of individual responsibility is the awareness of the ability to
rely on one's own judgement, sense and responsibility, independent of
authoritarian pressure and imposition. On the other hand, inasmuch a s the
individual's authoritarian attitude is stronger, the fear of authority will impede
the sense of internal, individual responsibility. In other words, the difference is
between complying with a rule from a n inner sense of individual responsibility
(in its systemic meaning of interrelatedness of individual and common levels of
interaction); or from blind obedience to authority. From a behavioral point of
view, this distinction is immaterial - it doesn't seem to make any difference in
the outcome, in obeying the rule. And Bromley apparently assumes a
behavioral perspective a s he uses the queue example to illustrate compliance
with institutional regulation. But the distinction does make the essential
difference for exercising individual responsibility a s opposed to the
irresponsibility of disowning it and relegating it to external authority.
When systemic interrelatedness of individuals and institutions is recognized,
it follows that individual irresponsibility necessarily entails the irresponsibility of
institutions. Institutions are typically dysfunctional and inefficient because responsibility is transformed into liability. The dissolution of responsibility works
-

31

discussed in chapter 5, between footnotes 15 and 19

both ways. It does not only disempower the citizens, a s Kropotkin perceived in
his times, but it also essentially disables the institutions themselves.
The lack of a n interrelatedness perspective is also manifested in the
typical dualization of individual versus institutional irresponsibility. While
authoritarian institutional imposition ostensibly prevents people from killing
each other, in reality, institutions (state and religious) have enticed and
compelled people to mutual bloodshed throughout history in mass scale and to
a frightening extent. But the two forms of asocial behavior have been valued in
a n entirely different (and essentially dualistic) way: when someone kills by the
exercise of one's own responsibility, that person is presumed a criminal, a
murderer; when the responsibility and authority for the killing comes from the
state, king, army leader, fiihrer, then the person is a patriot (and can become a
hero), and is fully justified and absolved

32.

In the further development of the institutionalization of (ir)responsibility,
criminals have been turned into mental invalids:
Crime is no longer a problem of law and morals, but is instead a problem
of medicine and therapeutics. This transformation of the ethical into the
technical - of crime into illness, law into medicine, penology into psychiatry,
and punishment into therapy - is, moreover, enthusiastically embraced by
many physicians, social scientists, and lay persons. 33

The transformation of penology into psychiatry entails a n essential modification
of the offender's responsibility status:

32

33

A most pertinent reference for this issue is Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment
(Dostoyevsky, 1993).
When repression is organized and carried out by those who claim legitimate
authority, the activity may be labeled "peacekeeping" and o m l l y praised. As one
psychiatrist has noted, the uictims of o m a l violence outtmigh the victims of
interpersonal violence as the elephant outweighs the rat, yet the power of labeling
is so strong that o_ficial violence isfiequently redefined to make it appear correct.
necessary, andjust. I...]
But mental health professionals rarely apply their labels and propose their
treatments when the violence is committed by individuals acting in a n o
m
capacity; the high public o m i a l s who ordered the destruction of Indochina by
aerial and naval bombardment escape such diagnosis and treatment. The mental
health approach to violence is selective; it tends to be used by the agents of the
pwe@ to deal with the dissident behavior of the weak. (Chorover, 1979: 139-140,
emphasis mine)
Szasz, 1970: 8, emphasis mine

If the individual is driven to act by antisocial impulses arisingfrom a
deep-seated biological derangement or behavioral disorder, personal
responsibility is beside the point. 34

Individuals are thus entirely deprived of responsibility for their deeds. They are
pronounced ill, and subjected to behavior control (and custody) - through different forms of medical technology. Of course, in both cases, the definition of
what is criminal or insane is in institutional hands, and it is typically reductionist - disregarding the deeper social and economic causes of crime or mental/psychic disturbance, and defending the dominant political and economic
system. This means that the causes of asocial behavior (irresponsibility) are
outside the vision range of both psychiatry and jurisprudence. The basic goal is
behavior control, which only reinforces disempowerment. However, if disempowerment with responsibility is to be addressed, a social-psychological therapeutic approach is more appropriate. Individual responsibility makes sense
only if the offense is defined by inner ethical criteria, not by obligation to external interests of power structures. And psychological disturbances are often
caused by the individual's conflicts with institutional structure and norms.
The exemplars of this humanistic spirit in psychiatry are Sigmund
Freud, with his deep commitment to understanding "mentally disordered"
behavior and avoiding coercion, and Wilhelm Reich, with his passion to
liberate man from his fetters, whether these be forged by his upbringing or by
his political masters. The direction is [...I awayfrom medicine and toward
psychology; then, awayfrom psychology and toward a study of man in society
- that is to say, toward a study of the individual, with a past and afuture and
an inescapable moral commitment to himself and others. 35

The interrelatedness of individual and institutional irresponsibility is also
reflected in this disempowering punitive-to-psychiatric transformation. It is
manifested in detachment or disconnection, which I have repeatedly indicated
a s a distinct expression in various forms of disrupted interactivity and of
alienation. In the context of responsibility, it becomes a n issue of involvement
or commitment:
Whereas the so-called madman is one who characteristically commits
himself, the psychiatrist is one who characteristically remains uncommitted.
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Chorover, 1979: 188, emphasis mine
Szasz, 1970: 234, emphasis mine

Then, claiming a false neutrality toward the issues at hand, he excludes the
madman and his troublesome claims from society. 36

The institutional spheres of control are not only very oflen guilty of
inflicting much wider and large-scale damage to the social and physical
environment because of irresponsibility. In Baudrillard's view, at the current
stage of cultural development, institutional control and regulation also
necessarily operate on irresponsibility:
Whencapitalism rested on merit, initiative, individual enterprise andcompetition, it needed an ideal of responsibility, and therefore its repressive equivalent:for better or worse, everyone, whether entrepreneur or criminal, received his penalty or his credit. In a system that rests on bureaucratic programming and the execution of a plan, in-esponsible executants are required, and
so the entire system of values based on responsibility collapses into itself. 37

This pervasive irresponsibility certainly exacerbates the potential for
insanity, but also emerges as an essential problem of morality and ethics. The
relationship of institutional versus individual responsibility becomes an issue of
institutionalized morality versus an inner ethic.

Environmental Ethic and Responsibility
Defining individual responsibility as the central issue of sustainability and
ecological culture may tend to be regarded as an anthropocentric approach.
This problem pertains to environmental ethics. Anthropocentrism is considered
a position whereby the environment, the biosphere or ecosphere, are defined
from the point of view of human interests.
An environmental ethic is established as a departure from anthropocentric attitudes. This departure is often defined as extensionism- an attitude of extending
moral obligation to natural, biospheric, or eco-systemic entities. This typically
means acknowledgement of the inherent value of entities other than humans.
As I have pointed out in chapter 4, current economics is even more

extreme than anthropocentrism in failing to acknowledge inherent value. The
36
37

Szasz, 1970:9.See also the related problem discussed in chapter 5, between
footnotes 38 and 42.
Baudrillard, 1976: 170,emphasis mine

critique of anthropocentrism does not usually recognize that the current world
view is influenced by economic thinking which equates babies with consumer
commodities 38, and generally exemplifies a utilitarian perspective. In this view
everything is valued by money/market worth - even human lives 39. Therefore,
anthropocentrism can be taken a s a departure from current economics - a
departure from the disregard of inherent value.
However, once intrinsic or inherent value is recognized, the concept itself
comes under scrutiny.
Deep ecology proclaimed that other living beings had intrinsic value for
their own sake, independent of their practical utility to humans. The richness
of other l$e forms and ecosystems was to be considered a necessary
contributing inj2uence to the realization of self-as-part-of-nature.40

When humans are relieved of the current culture's obsession with utility, inherent or intrinsic, innate, natural value is typically understood a s value "by
itself' (an sich). However, from the systemic perspective, value "by itself' is a
reductionist concept. There are no isolated entities. Values and qualities are
determined by relation of entities to their environment, or to the context in
which they are observed 41.
Conversely, anthropocentrism and its critiques are typically presented in
these non-systemic terms, neglecting the inevitable interrelatedness of human
life processes to their eco-systemic levels of interaction - metabolic exchange
with the environment. Bioregionalism 42 implies a perception of humans and
their social structures a s integrated to their natural, biological and physical
environment

- and

thus reconnects the disjointed concept of humanity and

nature. The departure from anthropocentric attitudes has to be viewed from
this systemic viewpoint.
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See quote related to footnote 2 in chapter 4.
See quotes related to footnotes 20 and 21 in chapter 4.
Thayer, 1994: 183
If we have kept one hand in our pocket, and the other in the cold open air, then put
both in a bucket of water. water will be both cold and warm. (Naess. 1989: 54)
presented in chapter 6

This departure can be perceived a s stages on a path of emancipation from
egoistic positions 43. However, it is usually presented without much emphasis
on ethic a s individual sense of responsibility, but rather a s a moral prescript

-

a s moral extensionism towards natural entities. It sometimes extends only to
limited realms of nature, a s with the animal rights movement. Here,
anthropocentrism is denoted by a specific term:
A speciesist, Singer says, is a person who "allowsthe interests of his
species to override the greater interests of members of other species."44

In discussing the issues of the ethics of animal rights, Regan and Singer,
a s well a s Mary Midgley 45 devote much space to various arguments for
including or excluding animals when human moral obligations are considered.
Particularly Regan and Singer give a comprehensive historical overview of the
criteria for defining animals a s a delineated group with moral status. But they
all pay very little attention to the fact that, what they really are doing, is setting
up a threshold, a border-line a t some point down the species-evolution line,
above which the mord obligation can be defined. Does this mean that below
the threshold we have no moral obligations? Doesn't the term speciesist imply
moral disregard for all species other than humans? Or, to put it more simply:
why are the moral obligations extended only to animals?
This question may seem superfluous because, the way the concept of
moral obligations is defined in this context

-

i.e. not to cause pain, not to treat

cruelly - the concept can be applied only to some animals, and that delineates
them a s a group for different moral consideration. Yet, this should not imply a
reductionist negligence - an exclusion of other species, a s well a s the
inanimate nature, from moral extensionism.
We do not ordinarily think we have duties to such beings as clouds or rocks. 46

Of course, neither Regan and Singer, nor Midgley think that, by isolating
animals for moral consideration. other realms of nature are denied human
43
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Wenz, 1988
Regan and Singer, 1976: 13
Midgley, 1983
Regan and Singer, op.cit.: 8

obligations. Nevertheless they give little attention to the wider context of the
moral status of the whole biosphere, of the entire environment.
Obviously, partial extensionism

- to

limited realms of nature - is

problematic, not only because of the ambiguity of setting the threshold of moral
obligations 47, even as low on the evolutionary line as micro-organisms, but also
because it cannot be applied at all if the ecological interrelatedness of all living
beings is taken into consideration

48.

An eco-systemic perspective is not

compatible with the threshold concept.
The use of criteria like sensitivity to pain - and generally those,
established by seeking in animal species some form of consciousness akin to
human

- is in a way a n anthropocentric approach. It does not truly

acknowledge a n inherent entitlement to moral standing of a living organism in
its own right. In that sense, to identlfy the concept a s moral extension might be
appropriate because it contains a n element of paternalism. And such
paternalistic attitudes pertain to the domination paradigm.
If there are no limitations to extending moral obligations, the ultimate level
of emancipation from anthropocentrism is reached at ecocentrism. It is a moral
principle based on what is considered a holistic view: regarding inherent value
in interrelated and interdependent eco-systems. On this emancipating path,
Peter Wenz discerns several steps - based on regarding inherent value in
beings or systems other than oneself - from egoism, through ethnocentrism
and anthropocentrism (including Singer's speciesism), to animal rights
consideration, biocentric individualism, and finally ecocentric holism. Wenz
distinguishes bio-centrism from eco-centrism, and describes biocentric
individualism a s a moral concern extended equally to every single living being,
but failing to consider the interrelatedness and interdependency of biotic
communities, and of the entire eco-system:
The existence of diverse species and, more generally, the health of biotic
communities, should be of direct moral concern This does not imply that
individual living things should not also be of direct moral concern. [. ..] The
47
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Callicott, 1989: 19
ibid: 25

only implication of Ecocentric Holism is that we should try to avoid degrading
ecosystems and causing the extinction of species. 49

Although Wenz resolves the problems of partial extensionism, his ecocentric concern is still couched in the mode of moral obligations. He argues for
the relinquishing of individual rights for the sake of biotic processes in terms of
inherent value of biotic communities. However, the concept of moral obligation
poses some problems. They are already evident in Regan's and Singer's
difficulty (in the quote above) of establishing duties to clouds and rocks. It is
very problematic to establish eco-systemic concern based on moral obligation.
While arguments against domination over animals (and nature in a wider
perspective) are pretty much the central issue in most discussions of moral
extensionism, there does not seem to be any attempt to question the deeper
authoritarian core within which the concepts of moral obligations, duties and
rights are posited and contemplated. After one has read about all the different
criteria for establishing moral obligations toward animals or nature as a whole,
there emerges a crucial question: Who is to decide the right criterion? the
unnecessary pain? the necessary level of animal suffering? In the eco-centric
mode a s well, there is a failure to deliberate which institutional body would
have the authority to decide what are the interests of the eco-system
processes, and which individual interests have to be relinquished for their
sake. This approach does not only retain a patronizing (and therefore cryptoanthropocentric) attitude toward nature, it is also a n indication of an
undivulged authoritarian context.
Typically the terms obligations and duty are used interchangeably, a s if
they were synonyms. Who, then, imposes upon u s the duty toward animals?
Who do we owe it to? This legalistic approach leads into a maze of normative
(institutionalized) definitions of rights, duties, entitlements, claims. (It can
become quite a logical tangle if one tries to imagine animals stating their claims,

-
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Wenz. op-cit.:309

and the whole business necessarily emerges as a human judgement

50.)

What

is lost in the maze, is individual responsibility as a feeling and understanding as a complex and comprehensive ethical category. In the normative, legalistic

form, the responsibility for animals, biotic communities, or eco-systems is
defined by a n outside authority and it actually becomes the responsibility of an
institution - a n institutionalized morality. The individual is left only with the
duty to obey the rule. Thus this becomes a n issue of empowerment for
responsibility (discussed earlier).
Ecocentrism in general is not based on the social context of environmental
responsibility. Responsibility is actually seldom considered in connection with
the ethics of ecocentrism. Moreover, individual responsibility is put in a n
ambivalent and precarious position by the definition of ecocentric concern.
Ecocentrism demands that individual rights and interests - of any individual
organism, human or other - are relinquished for the sake of eco-systemic
processes

51.

Thus, in a way, the threshold is still there - as a dividing line

between individuals (humans - when we keep in mind the remark a t footnote
50) and the rest of the eco-sphere.

This approach creates a chasm between individualism and ecocentrism.
which is the crux of the controversy about anthropocentrism versus
ecocentrism that has bloated into a n ideological conflict between Social and
Deep Ecology

52.

However, the counter-posing of the individual and the eco-system is not
eco-systemic.
[Individual's] instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the
community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate. 53

50

There can be no value apartjiom an evaluator, all value is as it were in the eye of the
beholder. The value that is attributed to the ecosystem, therefore, is humanly
dependent. (Callicott, op.cit.: 26)
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Leopold, op.cit.: 219

53

As I have often repeated, eco-systemic perspective emphasizes the unity of

individual-in-her/his-environment,
a unity which presupposes the integrity of
the individual, not her/his dilution in the environment.
The unit of survival I...] is the organism-in-its-environment. An
organism that thinks only in terms of its own survival will invariably
destroy its environment and I.. .I thus destroy itselj 54

The chasm between individualism and ecocentrism emerges from the
pervasive dualistic paradigm and its basic human/nature split, a s well a s
either/or logic

55.

In her comprehensive discussion of dualism, Val Plumwood

analyzes the position of Deep Ecology from the perspective of deconstructing
its dualist underpinning, and, in particular, by indicating the problem of
dilution of individual identity in broader (eco-)systemic levels:
Theframework on which deep ecology draws represents a psychology of
incorporation I...] Deep ecology locates the key problem area in human-nature
relations in the separation of humans a n d nature, and it provides a solution
for this in terms of the 'identi.ationf of self with nature. 'Ident~fication'is
usually left deliberately vague [...] It is unclear how [...] obliterating any human/nature distinction and dissolving self boundaries is supposed to provide
the basis for a n environmental ethic. The analysis of humans as metaphysically un~fiedwith the cosmic whole will be equally true whatever relation
humans stand in with nature - the situation of exploitation of nature exemplifies such metaphysical unity equally as well as a conserver situation. 56

The inherent external authority of moral extensionism - and the entire institutional morality - is derived fi-om a dualized construct of individuals against
the social and (in the case of ecological ethics) natural environment 57. This
connection also points to the difference between a n institutional (authoritarian,
imposed) morality and an ethic based on individual responsibility. The
dualization of the individual versus the eco-system seems to indicate that the
abandoning of individuality is the condition of environmental morality. In view
of the precarious position of individual responsibility and the delicate issue of
empowering humans for it (discussed earlier), such a proposition can be
considered a counterproductive moral blackmail. The position of the individual
-

--

Capra, 1982: 289
See text at footnote 54, in chapter 2.
56 Plumwood, 1993: 175-177
57 The close connection between dualism and authoritarian structures will be
discussed later on in this chapter.
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toward nature would remain within the choices of the domination paradigm:
either patronizing or submissive.
The fundamental problem with the differentiation of anthropocentrism/ecocentrism is that it is conceived a s a n issue of interests. The ensuing ethic is
therefore based on negotiating the conflicting interests. Such a concept confuses ethics with the current form of economics and politics, where any issue
can be a matter of competing interests, of trade-offs, to be negotiated in the
stock market, or in the political arena. Such ethics is steeped in the relationships of competition and domination. A true ethic of an ecological culture.
however, can emerge only when the deep roots of domination are addressed.
In the ethic of conflicting interests (or of dualism of the individual versus
eco-sphere), the anthropocentrism/ecocentrism cleavage is interpreted a s
egoism versus altruism.
Economics considers egoism a fundamental psychological
characteristic, whereas biology shows that altruism makes a contribution to
the adaptation of species. 58

The Tragedy of the Commons issue has become paradigmatic for this perspective, and its argument is very much based on the economic way of thinking:
A s a rational being, every herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.

59

Hardin's classic article poses some essential socio-psychological questions
about everyman's attitudes toward ecological issues - although the choice of
herdsmen (as one of the first occupations humans have taken) is rather
inappropriate to illustrate a behavior that is characteristic of less ancient
cultural patterns, and particularly typical for the current economy of cut-throat
competition. Yet the way Hardin formulated these essential questions, and.
consequently, drawn his solutions, reflects a n authoritarian position that is
very much in tune with the Social-Darwinist ideological framework. Such a n
approach explains Hardin's choice of herdsmen to convey (consciously or not)
the idea that human behavior has always been basically selfish, that such is
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"human nature". Consequently, he can see a n environmental morality
achievable only through institutional coercion.
In [Hardin's]view a sense of mutual responsibility must be enforced for it
can never be achieved by voluntary means. The survival of the earth therefore
depends upon the emergence of an elitist managerial minority armed with
powers to regulate human behaviour in the collective interest. Freedom must
be tempered by necessity. 60

The other subliminal message of this parable (again it is possible that is
was not consciously intentional) is that it is up to the general public to observe
the imposed environmental morality. However, in reality, "herdsmen" behavior
is more typical for the leaders in the cut-throat economy - and with much
graver environmental consequences. The second part of Hardin's article
provides another metaphor that has become paradigmatic - the lifeboat, which
essentially restates the same tenet in a Malthusian context, perceiving the
demographic problem at the root of the sustainability issue 61.
In postulating that the rich nations (the occupants of the li$eboats) enjoy
unilateral power to determine the future of mankind, [the lifeboat metaphor]
does not faithfully reproduce the real world situation. In fact, the rich nations
are already subs tantially dependent on some resource-rich poor countries
whose political influence is already quite impressive and still growing. 62

The Social-Darwinist position which assumes innate human selfishness
can result only in a n environmental ethic which is conceived of a s an imposed
(authoritarian or institutionalized) morality. Furthermore, some formulations of
ecocentrism render it open to totalitarian interpretations 63, which can easily
gain ground in the culture based on deeply ingrained patterns of domination.
An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation onfreedom of action in the struggle
for existence. 64

With his austere attitude, Leopold might be more suitable a s a "father" of Deep
Ecology than Naess, who seems to have deserved this "position" by coining the
term, but who is otherwise, much less harsh in his Ecosophy. This is not so
60
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much because of all that Leopold has written, but rather because he failed to
warn against what some of it could imply:
A militant minority of wilderness-minded citizens must be on watch
throughout the nation and vigilantly available for action. 65

The Deep Ecology movement has already turned to some terrorist acts. It is
difficult to find anything in Leopold's writing that would directly approve such
interpretations, but neither he, nor Naess have paid attention to the deep
authoritarian context of morality and ethics.
There is an arrogance in failing to respect boundaries and to acknowledge d~zerencewhich can amount to an imposition of self. Deep ecologists see
themselves as 'empowered to act on behalfof other beings' by claims of
merging. [...I Such treatment is a standard part of subordination, for example,
of women, servants, the colonised, animals. Similarly, respecting the needs of
the other involves acknowledging the dtfference as well as the connection
between our needs. 66

Perceived in the context of the analysis of dualized constructs, ecocentrism
appears a s a n uncritical reversal of anthropocentrism (reversing the dualization
of humans versus nature, where human interests are considered superior) 67.
Uncritical reversal is rooted in unresolved issues of domination and
authoritarianism.
The lifeboat metaphor fails because of its own internal inconsistencies.
The care of the commons, by definition, requires a communal effort and the
mutual respect of all participating members. [. ..] The ethics of a lifeboat denies
the existence of a community and guarantees the persistence of
discrimination. 68

In one of the most comprehensive summaries of environmental issues, O'Riordan points a t the key issue of the cleavage between the individual and the ecosphere. Mutuality and community best epitomize the eco-systemic interrelatedness and interdependency of the individual and his or her social and natural
environment. In the previous chapter, I have already presented Kropotkin's
concept of mutual aid69, which emerges as a most pertinently systemic response
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to the dualistic deadlock of the chasm between individualism and ecocentrism70.
The crucial argument of Kropotkin's concept is the importance of solidarity,
considerateness and cooperation in evolution - a s instinctual endowments
common (in different forms) to all living beings. Solidarity, considerateness and
cooperation are based on a n individual's sensitivity towards others. And that is
a substantially different attitude from the legalistic regulation of moral matters
based on authoritarian relegation of responsibility to persons, institutions or
deities that are believed to have power. The paradigm change of rationalism
and the Enlightenment left the authoritarian basis untouched: the power of
deities and their spiritual representatives was only handed over to legalistic
institutions and their rational representatives. But the individual instinctual
sensitivity remained a neglected and disempowered tool in moral decisions.
The essence of a n ecological ethic is not external authority, but individual,
inner responsibility, based on a sense of belonging to nature, to the eco-system
a s a sphere of interrelatedness and interdependence. Mary Midgley points to
Hume's understanding of ethics which included a human sensitivity:
Morality was for [Hume] not primarily an affair of reasoning at all, but
of the feelings, especially the 'sentiment of humanity', which is a natural, not
an artificial virtue. 71

John Rodman's review of environmentalist positions is also presented in
what could be perceived a s stages of emancipation. He describes resource
conservation and wilderness preservation a s anthropocentric and utilitarian
views, and moral extensionism a s considering rights and duties of humans to
nonhuman natural entities. But he differs from Wenz in putting the last stage
of emancipation into a new paradigm:
When perception is sufficiently changed, respectful types of conduct seem
"natural",and one does not have to belabor them in the language of rights and
duties. HerefiaUy we reach the point of "paradigmchange". 72

70

71
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Mutual aid inclinations constitute so great a part of our daily intercourse that if a
stop to such actions could be put all further ethical progress would be stopped at
once. Human society itself could not be maintained for even so much as the
lifetime of one single generation. (Kropotkin, op.cit.: 229).
Midgley, op.cit.: 48
Rodman. 1983: 90

For Rodman, the essential feature of this new paradigm is ecological sensibility:
The term "sensibility" is chosen to suggest a complex pattern of
perceptions, attitudes, and judgements which $fully developed, would
constitute a disposition to appropriate conduct [. ..] Ecological Sensibility.
then is "holistic" in a sense beyond that usually thought o$ it grasps the
underlying principles that manqest themselves in what a r e ordinarily
perceived as separate "social" a n d "environmental" issues. 73

An ecological ethic can be defmed as a sense of inner individual responsi-

bility for individual's eco-systemic interaction with his or her (social and natural) environment. Inception of such a n ethic requires a reassertion of
individuality and individual responsibility. Individual responsibility is in
jeopardy with ecocentrism taken a s a moral precept based on denial of
individuality - or "selfhood", in Bookchin's terms:
We are already living in a period of massive de-individualization. Not
because deep ecology is making any serious inroads into our own cultural
ecology, but because the mass media, the commodity culture, and a market
society a r e 'reconnecting" us into a n increasingly depersonalized 'whole"
whose essence is passivity and a chronic vulnerability to economic and
political manipulation. It is not an excess of "se1flood"from which we a r e
suffering, but rather the surrender of personality to the security a n d control of
corporations, centralized government and the military. [...I It is not
deindividuation that the oppressed of the world require, but reindividuation
that will transform them into active agents in the task of remaking society
and arresting the growing totalitarianism 74

As the "father" of Social Ecology, Bookchin, of course, puts emphasis on

the social context, which is strikingly absent from Leopold's land ethic, and
generally from Deep Ecology. Social ecologists argue that ecocentrism is a
diversion from the acute social problems that are the actual cause of the
environmental ones. Steven Vogel contends that alienation from nature is only a
symptom of our social, economic and political alienation:
If w e j h d ourselves living in a n environment of ugly shopping malls and
endless superhighways, of dangerous nuclear power plants and toxic waste
dumps, of rotting slums and polluted rivers, it is not because we have violated
nature, but because our own ads remain powers over and against us: because
we have not yet exerted conscious social control over our own activity, and s o
that activity remains under the sway of alienation. 75

The terms humility and humbleness are often connected with ecocentrism
and with 'new age" spirituality, indicating the emancipation from egoistic
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positions. But real emancipation can only be achieved after passing through the
full empowerment of individuality. In this overwhelmingly authoritarian
civilization, the majority of humans is far from even recognizing the need for
emancipation into individuality, into individual responsibility, into having control
over their own lives. They remain comfortably (more or less) in the full
authoritarian position and, therefrom, it is easy to adopt humility a s a
fashionable attitude, without challenging the deeply ingrained and anxietydefended mechanisms of submission and domination.

Domination over Nature
We have, as a culture, been talked into the proposition that our security as a species depends upon our
power over nature; and, in turn,we have been persuaded that our power over nature requires us to
screen the personhood of nature out of our lives even as a professional torturer must begin by
denying the personhood of his victims in order to
gain total control over them.
But now, that proposition turns out to be exactly wrong, and blatantly so. The power upon which
it is predicated is rapidly proving to be illusory; the
environment deteriorates in its supposed master's
hand, and our promised security dwindles. 76
All things are bound together. All things connect.
What happens to the Earth happens to the children
of the Earth. Man has not woven the web oflve. He
is but one thread. Whatever he does to the web, he
does to himself. 77

Extreme anthropocentrism is manifested in the hyper-expansionist growth
of the current profit-oriented economy. It is based on regarding nature a s resources to be exploited for human use

78. The

underlying purpose can be defi-

ned a s a quest to conquer nature, to restrain it a s a force that can endanger
humans in various ways, from illnesses (which are perceived a s external
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attacks on human organism), to elemental calamities. This conquest would
enslave nature and make it work for human benefit. And this enslavement
would supposedly help humanity to develop toward a n independence from
unpredictable chaos and limitations imposed by nature. Nature is regarded a s a
stint to limitless growth and expansion of humanity. Perceived in this manner,
nature has to be conquered and exploited by humans. That is the external level
of the meaning and practice of domination over nature.
There are, therefore, two basic attitudes toward nature (which are intertwined and interconnected): one of use and exploitation, the other of
conquering and taming. The first has developed to a n overwhelming magnitude
in the capitalist economy; but the other attitude has existed long before. They
represent different perceptions of nature.
The attitude of use and exploitation reflects and requires human confidence that nature may be tampered with. It involves daring to question, intervene
in and probe into natural processes - and the conviction that any problems

arising from the interference can be solved by science and technology.
What has especially changed for the intellectual with the rise of
technology (especially weapons technology) since the twelfth century is not so
much the separateness and inferior moral status of nature, but the confidence
in controlling it. This s h ~ 3in perceived human power in relation to nature is
implicit in Descartes' images. I...]A role is envisaged for reason, the role of
exercising power over the natural world rather than escapingfrom it or rising
above it. 79

At the same time, this attitude has made possible the development of modem
technology, regardless of the negative consequences that it has brought about.
The present Westem ideology of dominating nonhuman nature has
distant roots in the history of humanity itsew Indeed, human beings of
whatever culture must use nonhuman nature instrumentally for their
survival to some extent or other. 80

Of course, it is not a revelation that humans have always utilized nature a s
a resource - like all other living organisms do, a s life is a process of metabolic
exchange of matter and energy with the environment. The difference is
obviously in the extent and impact - and in the related attitude.
-

-
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Classical Marxist critique of capitalist economy did not include concerns
about the negative consequences of the development of modem technology,
but, rather considered only its progressive role, and believed it a prerequisite
and empowerment for the emergence of a post-capitalist society. It was the
members of the "Frankfurt school" who offered
a fundamental challenge to the orthodox Marxist view concerning the progressive march of history, which had emphasized the libera tory po tentiat of the
increasing mastery of nature through the development of the productiveforces. Farfrom welcoming these developments as marking the "ascent of man
from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom offreedom" (to borrow Engels's
phrase), Horkheimer, Adomo, and Marcuse saw them in essentially negative
terns, as giving rise to the domination of both 'buter"and f'inner"nature. 81

The perception of the liberatory aspect of human interventions into natural
processes is a heritage of the Enlightenment which brought about the change
in human attitude to dare to interfere in what had before been considered the
province of deities, of powers beyond human reach

-

and to dare beyond

human capacity to grasp the consequences of their intrusion. This reverence
for superhuman realms was rife with fear, and, therefore, the license won by
the Enlightenment had a progressive significance of a liberation from fear.
The Enlightenment has always aimed a t liberatug menfrom fear and
establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates
disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the
disenchantment of the world, the dissolution of myths, and the substitution
of knowledgefor fancy. I...]
What men want to learnfrom nature is how to use it in order wholly to
dominate it and other men. 82

Horkheimer and Adomo point a t the two sides of this liberation process.
The freedom conceived a s license to interfere with nature and exploit it, also
had the meaning of a riddance of limitations that natural processes impose
upon human economic and other pursuits. In Magic Mount*.

Thomas Mann

depicts how Voltaire protested against earthquake a s a
scandalous dereliction of nature, to which were s a c n i e d thousands of
human lives [...I There you have the hostiltty the spirit feels against nature, its
proud mistrust, its high-hearted insistence upon the right to criticize her and
her evil, reason-denying power. Nature is force; and it is slavish to suffer
force, to abdicate before it. 83
-
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From the perspective of today's ecological crisis, Mam's somewhat ironic interpretation of Voltaire's position emphasizes its controversy: on one hand the rebellion from the medieval prohibition of rationality and scientific probing into
cosmic mysteries, and from the principle of the untouchability of god; on the
other hand, when rationality became a dominant ideology, it turned into a n an-ogance of self-delusive pretence of man's superiority over nature

84.

In light of

the long-term outcomes of this arrogance which brought the planet and the civilization to the verge of ecological peril, the medieval prohibition gains a meaning
of a (somewhat belated) warning. When this prohibition is unburdened of the
layers of mystification and intolerance, of institutional hatred toward any striving for liberty from sheer authoritarian power - it emerges a s a fundamental
awareness of a necessity to preserve the self-regulatory mechanisms of the
eco-system.
The emergence of confidence or license to interfere with natural processes
and to subordinate and exploit nature for human benefit, involved two developments: the renaissance of Platonic dualism, and the Enlightenment with its
new paradigm, which included rationalism, mechanism and utilitarianism. The
basic dualist split between humanity and nature is derived from Platonic
conceptual framework, and its historical development is succinctly outlined by
Val Plumwood:
The first step in the evolution of human/nature dualism, is the construction of the nonnative (the best or ideal) human identity as mind or reason,
excluding or inferiorising the whole rich range of other human and nonhuman characteristics or construing them as inessential. The construction of
mind or reason in terms exclusive of and oppositional to nature is the second
step. The construction of nature itself as mindless is the thud step, one which
both reinforces the opposition and constructs nature as ineluctably alien [...I
This last step is the one Descartes makes explicit I...]a major intens~fication
of hurnan/nature dualism a t this time. The first two steps are clear in Plato,
and the thud is implicit in his treatment of original matter as chaos, the
mindless material or primitive form of the world on which rational order
must be imposed. The Cartesian contribution builds on and presupposes the
earlier steps, and together they construct the great gulf between the human
and the natural which has become characteristic of the western tradition. 85

-
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The Enlightenment put Platonic superiority over nature into the practice of
human donlination in a utilitarian sense (a sense absent in Platonian outlook),
which required the liberation from scruples to intervene into natural processes.
To achieve this liberation, the conception of nature a s alive had to be superseded. This profound paradigm change was accomplished with the Cartesian mechanistic concept of nature- a s dead matter and living mechanisms without any
consciousness or sensitivity. Even living organisms came to be perceived a s merely mechanic systems which operated according to physical laws observable
by science. Consciousness was not only ascribed to humans exclusively, but it
was also conceived of a s detached, separate from the merely biological mechanism - the body. This detachment from nature, already inaugurated in Platonic
dualism, was then intensified, and has since been a crucial aspect of the world
view which developed into a profound rift between humanity and nature.
Detachment from direct involvement in and responsibility for nature has
evolved over time. Pagan worshiping of animals a s atonement for killing turned
into Christian absolution by defining animals a s soulless and subordinated.
This was a n e c c e s s q relaxation of the pagan inner spirituality and sensitivity
into godly (external authority) justification for using animals in the advance of
technology. The Cartesian paradigm enabled the transition from godly to
scientific authority, and to the authority of institutions that regulate and control
the technologies for satisfyrng vital human needs.
Domination over nature was the principal purpose underlying this world
view of humanity/nature dualism:
It was Sir Rancis Bacon who in the early seventeenth century most
clearly put forward a new agenda for human domination through science and
technology, emphasizing the need for organized empirical research Through
probing Nature's secret places, as he put it, man couldfind out her secrets so
that he could more efectively bind her into servitude and have dominion and
power over her. 86

Science became the institutionalized practice of domination over nature a s envisioned by Francis Bacon's treatment of nature a s an object,
manipulating and modiijmg it to suit human purposes:
86
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[Bacon]transfom~edthe magus from nature's servant to its exploiter,
and naturefrom a teacher to a slave. Bacon argued that it was the magician's
error to consider art [technology)a mere "assistant to nature having the power
t o f i i s h what nature has begun" and therefore to despair of ever "changing,
transmuting, or fundamentally altering nature." 87
Bacon's attitude of extremely arrogant subordination of nature was
consequent to his authoritarian views on social and political issues:
In contrast to the organic egalitarian societies of Campanella and
Andrea, in which women and men were to receive much the same education
and honor, the social structure of Bacon's Bensalem was hierarchical and
patriarchal, modeled on the early modem patriarchal family. I...]Bacon's
utopia, the New Atlantis illustrated a patriarchal family structure in which
the "Father"exercised authority over the kin and the role of the woman had
been reduced to near invisibility. 88

This comprehensive social, technological, economic and ecological paradigm
was the necessary basis for the emerging social-economic system:
Capitalism needed to turn nature into a market commodity and resource
without signijkant moral or social constraint on availability. [...I The view of
nature as terra nullius available for annexation, as empty, passive and
without a value or direction of its own, often underlies and is implicit in early
liberal arguments for the legitimacy of private property. 89

Of the two attitudes toward nature described above, the older one is

related to Platonic dualism - the conquering and taming of nature which is still
considered alive. The other, newer attitude of use and exploitation is the
outcome of the Enlightenment, and it presents what Carolyn Merchant
describes a s death of nature:
The removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos
constituted the death of nature - the most far-reaching eflect of the scientijk
Revolution Because nature was now viewed as a system of dead, inert particles
moved by external. rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework
itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature. Moreover, as a conceptual
framework, the mechanical order had associated with it aframework of
values based on power, fully compatible with the directions taken by
commercial capitalism. 90

The essential aspect of this paradigm change is that detachment from nature is
instrumental to domination over it. A nature with no sensitivity, consciousness,
or inherent spirituality permits interference of any kind which cannot hurt or
disturb nature, other than causing mechanical impacts that can be controlled
87
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by technology. The consequent relief from moral scruples for humans when
interfering with natural processes is the situation which a n ecocentric ethic is
attempting to rectifj.. However, this reductionist, mechanistic paradigm has
been compatible with the underlying economic system:
Living animate nature died, while dead inanimate money was endowed
with life. Increasingly capital and the market would assume the organic attributes of growth, strength, activity, pregnancy, weakness, decay and collapse,
obscuring and mystifying the new underlying social relations of production
and reproduction that make economic growth and progress possible. 91

The older attitude of conquering and taming nature, however, involves a
perception of nature a s something alive, with a will of its own, so that it has to
be fought, conquered and, ultimately, tamed. Yet, despite of the pervasive
diffusion of the new paradigm of "dead nature", the old one is still present. In
fact, the shift was neither so abrupt, nor complete. It was rather a
development within the dualistic construct of humanity and nature toward
greater detachment and rift. Thus, the notion that non-human beings are
insentient has developed from the Christian dogma which declared that they
had no soul, and therefore could not be hurt in the same way a s humans.
As a mater of fact, both views are simultaneously in use, and they make

up a somewhat "schizophrenic" attitude toward nature - a s a dead, or
insensitive mechanism, but, a t the same time, as a lively force to be tamed and
restrained. This vacillation is of crucial importance for understanding the
deeper origin of domination over nature, and of domination in general. From
conquering and taming to predicting, controlling and exploiting, there is a
transition: a passage from force - distinctively male, warrior - to reason, order.
Reason and rationality have been long considered (in dualistic tradition) a n
eminently masculine faculty, and a token of superiority over nature, which is
perceived a s mindless, irrational, chaotic, and therefore inferior. There is
manifested a "schizophrenic" situation again: it is against the honor of the
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masculine, warrior morality to attack the inferiors, and yet this male world view
takes pride in the conquest over nature.
The whole issue pivots around rationality, so it may seem a s if this
domination pattern is a rational concept. There are two basic misleading points
about that rationality. Firstly, the domination relationship is neither exclusively,
nor primarily based on reasoning. It has deep psychological roots, complex
motivational structure, and the cerebral, intellective part is mostly a n ex-post
rationalization and justification. Likewise, a s I explained above, the Cartesian
rationalistic warrant for the exploitation of nature is a rationalization of older
irrational (or non-rational) attitudes toward it.
The other problem is that this rationality, a s the criterion for superiority, is
a dualized concept of reason

-

postulated in opposition to and in exclusion of

the natural and the feminine, a s well as intuition, impulse, emotionality and
sensuality. Such dualized, exclusive rationality is not only reductionist, it is
actually quite irrational.
However, this reductionist rationality has had a clear raison &&re in the
utilitarian world view of economics. When the point of view is moved out of that
perspective, such rationality does not appear reasonable a t all:
In the common usage of the tenn rational one would not think of
describing the robbing of a bank as a rational or reasonable act. However, we
f i d out that for economics this is quite possible [not because economics
supports crime).Robbing a bank can be described in economics as rational,
because for the economist the word rational strictly means the logical
application of means to attain particular ends, regardless of what these ends
are. For economics, therefore, a bank robber is behaving rationally fi he goes
about his work in an egicient and efective manner. 92

Contemporary economics is predicated on a "value-free" approach

93,

which basically excludes ethical considerations. Consequently, the issue is
addressed by Mary Midgley in the context of moral extensionism:
Another misleading idea which distorts both the charge of emotion and
that of emotiveness, namely, an impression that strong feeling is in itself
more objectionable than calm feeling, and that states of ind~ference,
involving no feeling, would really be the best of aU. 94
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The essential meaning of this reductionist perspective is again detachment
from natural processes - in this instance, in ourselves. A s this reductionist
rationality is dualized with (i.e. superior to) nature, everyttllng non-rational (or
other-than-rational) pertains to the sphere of (inferior)nature - as I enumerated
above: intuition, impulse, emotionality, sensuality. This detachment, or
disconnectedness is the prerequisite of domination - subordination of nature.
Man is emphatically not part of the nature he objectively describes; he
dominates i t j v m the outside. 95

In the case of the nature within (our other-than-rational modes of impression
and expression), subordination takes the form of suppression, or denial. When
suppressed, the contact with nature perverts into combat against it.
Nature is traditionally conceived a s feminine, it is always a female
grammatical gender (the cultural pattern manifests its linguistic reflection 96).
and it is always represented as a female. Carolyn Merchant does not address
the dualistic background of this convention, but her book gives an excellent
insight into the evolution of the mechanistic paradigm and detachment from
and domination over nature.
In his "Experimental Essays" (1661). Boyle distinguished between merely
knowing as opposed to dominating nature in thinly veiled sexual metaphor: "I
shall here briejZy represent to you ... that there are two very distinct ends that
men may propound to themselves in studying natural philosophy. For some
men care only to know nature, others desire to command her'' and "to bring
nature to be serviceable to their particular ends, whether of health, or riches,
or sensual delight." 97

This psychological and conceptual basis of domination over nature
presents a link to domination over women, which is an important issue for
understanding the essence of domination. Feminist and ecoferninist theory has
argued that the subordination of women and nature is based on common
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attitudes. The commonality is in the mind frame which justifies and maintains
both domination patterns:
a masculine perception of nature as a mother and bride whose primary
function was to comfort, nurture, and provide for the weUbeing of the male. 98

Connection between domination over nature and domination over women is
the basic starting point of ecoferninism. Karen Warren finds that the
connection is manifested in the
oppressive conceptual framework [...I that explains,just~fies,and maintains
relationships of domination and subordination. 99

The key conceptual background is, of course, dualism. Women are
considered less rational because they are considered closer to nature. Reason
is posited as the criterion of human superiority over nature, and of male
superiority over women. The crucial point of this mind frame is that

subordination is justified by inferiority.
One of the main objections to some ecofeminist writings is that they buy
into the identification of women and nature, and thus unintentionally endorse
the dualization of humanity and nature and of the masculine and the feminine.
Such a view obscures rather than clarifies the issue of domination over nature
and women. It supports the misconception that men and women are substantially different in their relation and belonging to nature, and it overlooks the
fact that both men and women have become alienated from nature and the
natural processes in the course of the cultural evolution which is now culminating in social and economic conditions of unsustainable and unecological
ways of life.
It is true that, despite the obvious privileges that male domination gives
men, gender roles also confine males to stereotypical roles of their own, and
this keeps them from exercising the full range of their human capacities for
love, cooperativeness, trust, and a nurturing emotional life in general. In
these senses, feminism promises liberationfor men as well as women. 100

There is a n important fact for the issue of domination which is concealed
by the feminist insistence on identifymg domination over nature primarily with
98
99
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ibid.: 9
Warren, 1990: 268
Biehl, op.cit.: 50
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domination over women. Domination over nature in ourselves affects both
genders. In the process of cultural evolution, humans - both women and men have become thoroughly alienated from a n indigenous sensitivity for the nature

in themselves. This points to the deeper origins of domination as well a s of the
loss of connectedness to nature and its processes.

Domination over Humans
Domination over nature, therefore, has two aspects: domination over
nature outside and in humans themselves, in ourselves a s well as in others over nature within and without. These two aspects are interrelated from a n
(eco-)systemic point of view. And they indicate the connection between
domination over nature and over humans.
The deeper origins of domination over humans are related to domination
over nature within and without. They have been manifested in human
relationships which are characterized by demonizing, denial and repression of
sensuality and sexuality. The denial of sensuality and sexuality has had a
fundamental impact on the epistemological framework of our culture

101.

On

the other hand, the repression of sexuality has been one of the primal vehicles
of institutional coercion and domination over humans, a s well as a source of
violence and aggressiveness derived from perverting suppressed sexuality.
Issues of patriarchal power required the control of women, turning
woman into enemy in a man's house [...I By creating an enemy in his home,
man has also created an enemy within his heart: his sexual feelings. 102

In the outward mode, a s domination over other humans, these attitudes
are primarily exemplified in sexual inferiorizing and subordination of women,
or, seen from another viewpoint, attitudes toward sensuality and sexuality
underlie the relationships of domination over women. A fact of crucial
importance for understanding both domination patterns and the current
-
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which will be discussed in the following chapter
Goodison, 1992: 177,350

alienation of sexuality and sensuality, is that sexuality in this context is not
primarily a matter of love and eroticism, but of power and domination. Love
and eroticism have in these conditions undergone a substantial change which
has profoundly affected human relationships in general.
The key issue is how and why sexuality has became the innermost psychological vehicle of male power and domination- not only over women, but generally over others, over nature, and ultimately over man's own primordial, natural
self, sexuality and sensitivity. What many feminist writers overlook is that males are also crippled by power and domination patterns that have become their
role model

103.

This is a n important connection and makes domination a much

more complex issue, than just a political one in the narrow sense of the word.
The root of the problem lies in a social system in which [...I both men and
women are taught to equate true masculinity with violence and dominance and
to see men who do not conform to this ideal as "too s o p or "effeminate."104

The complex, deeper origins of domination over humans are linked to
violence and aggressiveness - primarily to aggressive attitudes toward
sensuality, sexuality and nature in humans themselves, particularly in women.
These attitudes link sexuality with the dualized notion of male power and
female weakness. Sexuality assumes the symbolic meaning of male power and
dominance and female submissiveness (and the power/submissiveness
relationship is the basic domination pattern in general). This idea has been for
a very long time ingrained in cultural models, so that the conditions it infers
are widely accepted a s a natural and innate endowment. Therefore, it is hardly
noticed a s obtrusive in its countless manifestations - in the warrior mentality,

in the mass-culture, in the enticements for consumer behavior. This attitude of
power and dominance is expressed toward nature a s the notion that humans
103

Theweleit, 1987.
Male liberation will constitute the next important chapter in the awakening
of women's consciousness,for men too have been victimized by the system that
exploits Mother Earth, women, and children. [...I At the level ofpatriarchal values,
if appears that they are not victims at all but the successful ones in that system [.. I
And this awareness represents a new kind of masculinity, one that is both
sensitive and strong. [...I 'Strength must be redefined not as power-over but as
power-with (Fox. 1988: 174-175)
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have the undoubted right to own, take and use nature for their own interest
and pleasure. That is comparable, and can be perceived a s related to the
attitude toward women, whom men presume to have the right to possess and
use for their pleasure - without asking for women's consent, without thinking
of it a s a relation of mutuality

105.

When the evidence did not seem to support the conclusion of female
dominance, many scholars returned to the more conventionally accepted
view. Ifthere never was a matriarchate, they reasoned, male-dominance must,
a t e r all, always have been the human norm. The evidence, however, supports
neither one of these conclusions. 106

Although there are theories that claim domination generally, and over
women specifically, to be an inherent characteristic of "human nature", a
"natural law"lo7, - there has also been, particularly recently, abundant
anthropological evidence that the domination model has been only a phase
(albeit a prolonged one) in human development. The key anthropological
question - most profoundly argued on the issue of sexuality - is whether a nondominational model is only post-dominational or was also pre-dominationalwhether it existed before. Both Riane Eisler and Lucy Goodison base their
analyses on the more recent work of the anthropologist Maria Gimbutas, but in
the first half of the 20th century, Malinowski did extensive research and
analysis which point to the same essential conclusions

108.

The archaeological data we now have indicate that in its general
structure prepatriarchal society was, by any contemporary standard,
remarkably equalitarian. [...I For a time span of overfiteen hundred years
the archaeological evidence indicates that male dominance was not the norm.
"A division of labor between the sexes is indicated, but not a superiority of
either. " writes Girnbutas. 109

It is important for the connection between domination and attitudes toward
sexuality that, in this pre-patriarchal cultural mode, gender equality was
consequent to mutuality as basis of love and sexuality.
105
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Such attitudes make rape possible. What is weird and amazing is that some men
can derive pleasure out of forcing or intimidating women into giving it. See also at
footnotes 114 and 116.
Eisler, op-cit.:24
as I have indicated in the beginning of the chapter between footnotes 6 and 9
Malinowski. l929/ 1987
Eisler. op.cit.:24. 13-14

The evidence which has suruivedfrom the communities living on Greek
islands in the third and early second millennia BC [depicts] men who look
tender, calm and peaceful, but who are by no means castrated; their genitals
are strong, emphasised and sometimes erect I...] and yet who appear gentle and
sometimes even meditative. I...] In a prepatriarchal society the phallus could
have been seen not as I...] a symbol of masculine supremacy, of male violence
against women, of misused political and military power, it could be celebrated
for its part as the fertilising agent in the procreative process. I...] The genitals
of both sexes were respected for the power and pleasure they carried. 110

This important anthropological evidence of tenderness between genders is also
supported by the analysis of the radical theologian Mathew Fox:
In the Song of Songs there is no male dominance, nofemale
subordination, and no stereotypes of either sex. Throughout the Song she is
independent, fully the equal of man. Truly there is a recovery of mutuality in
the garden of eroticism. [...I
His love is not rapacious and possessive, not demanding and controlling.
I...] He is more given to ecstacy than control and can confess that in her
presence "I did not know myser' I.. .] This man and woman are mature lovers
seeking one another's pleasure as well as their own 1 1 1

Another very important connection is the absence of violence in these
cultures which valued equality and tenderness between genders:
The Cretans' more natural attitudes toward sex would also have had
other consequences equally d~mcultto perceive under the prevailing
paradigm wherein religious dogma ofen views sex as more sinful than
violence. I.. .I These liberated attitudes toward sex seem to have contributed to
the generally peaceful and harmonious spirit predominant in Cretan life. 1 1 2

Such a conclusion is also supported by Malinowski's findings. He compared
tribes with different attitudes towards sexuality and discovered an
interdependence between sexually repressive cultures on one hand, and
aggressiveness, violence and relationships of domination on the other

113.

This

concurrence has been pertinent to the present day:
A cross-cultural study conducted by Shirley and John McConahay found
a sign~ficantcorrelation between the rigid sexual stereotypes required to
maintain male dominance and the incidence of not only warfare, but wiJe
beating, child beating, and rape. 114

With the emergence of patriarchy, sexuality become a symbol of
dominance and violence. Patriarchal societies typically idolize war and
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combative competitiveness

-

a s the domain of males, and the sphere where

superiority and supremacy is determined over the weaker: women in general
and the weaker, i.e. defeated men. Thus emerged the essential mechanism of
domination - justifymg subordination by inferiority
Warfare was an essential instrument for replacing the partnership
model with the dominator model. [...I The gloriiation of the lethal power of
the sharp blade accompanied a way of life in which the organized slaughter of
other human beings, along with the destruction and looting of their property
and the subjugation and exploitation of their persons, appears to have been
normal. 1 15

The connection between sexuality and power is of vast importance for
understanding the deep roots of authoritarianism and domination. This form of
sexual identification has thoroughly infused all aspects of our culture and life.
The prevailing imaginative model of sexuality is of aggression, domination, imperialism. I...I Fictional heroes, from James Bond to Rambo, are
involved with sexual conquest rather than the erotic I...]When the adolescent
youths I teach draw very large erect penises on the blackboard to greet me as I
come into the classroom, they are saying that though I am a teacher, they are
members of a more powerful class. It is not sex which is at issue but power. 116

The pivotal change in sexual attitudes, motivations and behavior was the
perverting of tenderness into conquest. It also meant the forsaking of any
mutuality in sexual relationships and the shift to a n antagonistic, combative
and competitive basis of human relationships in general. There is a wide range
of theoretical work which has been deconstructing this psychological core of
violence and domination: from Freud to Wilhelm Reich, humanistic psychology,
antipsychiatry and feminism. Reich's work offers a most profound analysis of
the psychological and psychosomatic mechanisms of sexual repression and
inhibition (which he metaphorically termed "annoring"), clearly revealing the
process of distortion of tenderness into violence:
The armored organism is essentially d~fferentfrom the unarmored one
in that a rigid wall is erected between its biological core, from which all
natural impulses stem, and the world in which it lives and works. As a result
every natural impulse, particularly the naturalfunction of and capacity for
love, is impeded. The living core of the armored organism has retained its
impulses, but they can no longerfindfree expression In the desperate attempt
"to express itself," every natural impulse is forced to penetrate or break
through the wall of the armoring. The impulse must use force to reach the
surface and the goal. While the impulse is trying to overcome the armoring by
115
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force, it is transformed into a destructive rage, regardless of its original
nature. [...I The core of the process is the transformation of all love impulses
into destructiveness. 117

The renunciation of mutuality and the support of antagonistic relationships
have their conceptual core in dualization. Dualism is one of the fundamental
elements of the Western mind frame. It perceives the basic concepts, relationships and entities in opposed pairs: male-female, human-nature, mind-body,
matter-spirit, reason-emotion, self-other, etc. These polarities are deeply
imbedded in our culture. Although I have already mentioned dualism
throughout the text, I have left a more detailed discussion for this chapter,
where it is most relevant because domination is based on dualism. Its two
essential routines are inferiorization and exclusion of mutuality. Particularly
important in the dualistic mind-set is its negative impact on mutuality or any
related attitudes of empathy and harmony, which are prerequisites for a
positive relation with the environment (social and natural):
The qualities (actual or supposed), the culture, the values and the areas of
life associated with the dualised other are systematically and pervasively
constructed and depicted as inferior [...I so as to make equality a n d mutuality
literally unthinkable. Dualism is a relation of separation and domination
inscribed and naturalized in culture and characterised by radical exclusion,
distancing and opposition between orders constructed as systematically
higher and lower, as inferior and superior, as ruler and ruled. 118

The sexual inferiorization and domination of women is connected to the
dualization of body and mind, of nature and spirit - and of sexuality and love,
which are defined as the dualized notion of male power and female weakness.
Examining in depth the structure of the dualized perception of femininity and
nature, Val Plumwood discerns a set of its principal mechanisms, some of
which are: backgrounding (or denial), radical exclusion (or hyperseparation),
instrumentalism (or objectification) and homogenization (or stereotyping).
Backgrounding is related to detachment, which I have been mentioning a s a n
important aspect of alienation in systemic terms
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Reich, l949/ 1973: 64-65, emphasis mine
Plumwood, op.cit.: 47-48
in this chapter, between footnotes 35 and 36, 85 and 86.90 and 91, and 94 and 95;
in chapter 3 between 70 and 7 1, and 83 and 85.

One of the most common forms of denial of women and nature is [...I
their treatment as providing the background to a dominant, foreground
sphere of recognised achievement or causation. [It involves] the denial of
dependence on biospheric processes, and a view of humans as apart, outside of
nature, which is treated as a limitless provider without needs of its own.
Dominant western culture has systematically inferiorised, backgrounded and
denied dependency on the whole sphere of reproduction and subsistence. 120

Radical exclusion or hyperseparation is related to what I have termed
disconnectedness from natural processes:
Dualism denies continuity, treating its pairs as comprising two worlds
between which there is nothing in common I...] Thus men are defined as
active, intellectual, egoistic, competitive a n d dominant, while women I...] as
passive, intuitive, altruistic, nurturant and submissive. Each has
characteristics which exclude but logically require a corresponding a n d
complementary set in the other. Because of the polarisation a n d elimination
of overlap, dualistic pairs present a false dichotomy. 121

Instrumentalism (or objectification) is a typical mechanism of domination,
and it is exemplified in the attitude of use and exploitation of nature which I
described in the previous subsection. Instrumentalism is also the
dualizing/dorninational mechanism which most clearly manifests the connection
between domination over nature and over women:
Those on the lower side of the dualisms are obliged to put aside their
interests for those of the master or centre [...I they are conceived of as his
instruments, a means to his ends. 122

It is important also to point to stereotyping (or homogenization) a s a salient link
between dualization and domination:
More than polarisation is needed fi a relationship is to be a n appropriate
one for domination. The dominated class must appear suitably homogeneous
fi it is to be able to conform to and confirm its 'nature'. In homogenisation,
diserences among the inferiorised group are disregarded. 123

Plumwood's deconstructivist analysis of dualism has exposed uncritical reactions which do not address the dualistic framework, but only create a reactive construct, leaving the basic dualistic mindset unchanged

- the

dualistic

structure remains unrecognized and unresolved. There are two types of
uncritical reaction strategies: the reversal and the unification (equalization) of
dualized polarities.
120
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Uncritical reversal keeps the established dualized relationship but shifts
the position of the dualized pair

124.

In the text so far, I have pointed out seve-

ral examples: ecocentrism a s a n uncritical reversal of anthropocentrism

125;

decentralization when it is conceived a s a dualized pair to centralization

126;

and others. Likewise, the feminist deconstruction of dualism demonstrates how
some ecofeminist positions reverse the dualistic notion of femininity versus
masculinity by asserting the feminine a s superior to the masculine because of
women's alleged closeness to nature.
The diverse manifestations of uncritical reversal indicate that it expresses
a n emergent awareness of the current oppressive conditions which result from
the inferiorization of one dualized polarity. On the other hand, uncritical
reversal also reflects the lack of awareness of the dualistic basis of the
accepted mode of thinking, and the incapability to comprehend it. Dualist mind
set is too deeply ingrained in psychological structure, and it therefore presents
too much of a challenge and threat if one has to question it.
The extreme manifestation of this misunderstanding of dualist structures related to both uncritical reactions - is the identification with the oppressor. It
presents the issue of domination defended by the subordinated (and I will
return to it a t the end of the chapter):
The reclamation and a m a t i o n of subordinated identity is one of the
key problems for the colonised, especially in race, class and ethnic cobnization. [...I The colonised is not free to proceed independently, but a
m
uncritically whatever the coloniser has made of him or her, or embraces
whatever the coloniser despised and excluded. 127

The uncritical reaction of equalization (unification) is also characterized by
the deeply ingrained dualistic mindset, which is manifested (in this case more
clearly than in uncritical reversal) in the inability to assert individual identity:
There is a strong temptation, once the role of dualism in creating
exaggerated separation is perceived, to conclude that the resolution of a
dualism requires merger, the elimination of the problematic boundary
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between the one and the other, the coloniser and the colonised, tacking the
m_Edence to a
t a distinct identity. 1%

In systemic terms, this is an inability to comprehend and sense the identity of
the self in relation to the (social and natural) environment - and to understand
that the integrity of the individual is not precluded by interdependence and
ecosystemic belonging

129:

Psychological and sociological research confirms that individual
iden ti ty develops in a circular relationship with a system of constraints.
Individuals are able to identih themselves when they have acquired the
ability to distinguish betuseen themselves and the environment. 130

In the context of this chapter, (eco-)systemicidentity and integrity present a
key issue of empowerment for individual responsibility, and thus of the
transition to post-domination (and ecological culture).
The essential misunderstanding of dualistic constructs expressed by uncritical equalization (unification)is the misinterpretation of differences. Instead
of perceiving the problem in the dualistic counterposition of different
characteristics - as a basis for superiority/inferiority and consequently
subordination - the differences themselves are taken for the cause of
antagonism. Uncritical unification attempts to eradicate the dualistic polarities
by levelling the differences on which dualization has been based.
A dualism is not same as a dichotomy, and we do not have to, and should
not, abandon either dichotomy or d~fferencein order to avoid dualism I...]A
merger strategy is neither necessary nor desirable, because, while dualism
makes d~fferencethe vehicle for hierarchy, it usually does so by distorting
d~fference.The attempt to eliminate distinction along with dualism is
misconceived on both political and philosophical counts. 131

The salient point is the distortion of differences, both by the basic dualistic
constructs and by their uncritical reaction

132.

This attitude to dualism has also been manifested in some ecocentrist and
feminist concepts and strategies. Some feminists seek to resolve the oppres128
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sion of women by denying gender differences, and thus can end up abandoning their femininity. Ecocentrism is occasionally interpreted as an undifferentiated unity or continuity of humans and nature. According to this interpretation, such unity is a prerequisite for changing the practice of anthropocentric
imposition of human interests.
The loss of the essential tension between drfferent and alike is
characteristic of domination and instrumentalisation, which involves the
erasure of the other as an external limit and its reappearance as a projection
of self. In the domination framework, the entire dynamic of interaction takes
place within the self, rather than between the selfand the external other. 133

The eco-systemic or holistic perspective has to subsume differences and
tensions, rather than equalize the opposites - it has to include a dialectical
outlook as a non-dualistic acknowledgement of differences. Actually, dialectics
is by definition opposed to dualism as it means the coexistence of differences,
opposites, tensions, while the essence of dualism is to shut out the possibility
of coexistence and mutuality as differences are the basis for confrontation and
subjugation 134. An eco-systernic/holistic dialectic is therefore non-dominational
and non-hierarchical.
A non-dualist dialectics acknowledges inherent tensions. Tensions and

relaxations are manifested in vibrations, pulsations, and in the thermodynamic
non-equilibrium - which constitute the basis of life and metabolic processes.
One of the essential dialectic antipodes, in eco-systemic terms, is the relation
between integrity (identity of individual entity) and integration (its belonging to
broader levels of eco-systemic interactions)

135. This

tension is also related to

the essential antagonism of life and death.
The classical concept of dialectics has not addressed the issues of
domination, and has often been depicted in terms of verticality, if not of explicit
hierarchy. The political practice which emerged from classical Marxism has
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I have pointed out in chapter 2 that dualistic logic is exclusive ('either/or") because
differences are construed as mutually exclusive, while systemic/holistic
perspective presupposes an inclusive ('both/and") logic.
I have discussed this issue in connection with the basic concepts of systems theory
in chapter 2.

interpreted dialectics within the domination paradigm - a s the basis for class
struggle. It was in a way a strategy of a reversal of the current domination
patterns. If the domination basis is not deconstructed, dialectics remains

within the dualist mind frame.
Dialectical tensions and oppositions have substantially weakened in the
totalitarian unification of the institutionalized and consumerist culture. This has
been pointed out by neo-Marxist and postmodernist theorists a s a n aspect of
alienation. Marcuse is most elaborate in his critique of the levelling and
neutralizing effect of the current "one-dimensional" culture, and he argues for
conflicting realities, for dialectics.
The new totalitarianism rnanifests itself precisely in a harmonizing
pluralism, where the mos t contradictory works and truths peacefully coexist
in ind~fference.136

The most important aspect (in the context of this chapter) of this alienating
one-dimensional reality of the institutionalized world, is that the sides of
domination are no longer clear-cut. The perpetuators of oppression are
oppressed a s well (though not a s much)

137.

The loss of dialectic/oppositional

tensions in dominational relationships reflects the conditions of internalized
domination, which is a further stage of alienation

138.

The totalitarian tendencies of the one dimensional society render the
traditional ways and means of protest ineffective - perhaps even dangerous
because they preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty. This illusion
contains some truth: "the people", previously the ferment of social change,
have "moved up" to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than in
the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the new
stratrfication characteristic of advanced industrial society. 1 39

This argument is reiterated and further reinforced by Baudrillard, who
contends that dialectic of class tensions cease to exist when the exploited class
has been effectively assimilated into the process of reproducing the symbolic
reality of the consumer culture
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These social-psychological aspects of domination and dualism point to a
fact which is important to emphasize: neither domination, nor dualism are primarily, or exclusively rooted in the rational sphere. Domination is only rationalized by dualized constructs. Dualism is not the cause of domination. It is only
its conceptual underpinning - a s the basis for the relationships of competition,
confrontation and subjugation, relationships which exclude any equality, closeness, unity, mutuality and coexistence. These attitudes define the social, economic and ecological relations in the current culture. The negative impact on
mutuality, or any akin attitudes of care, empathy and harmony, is particularly
important for the relations toward the social and natural environment.
Racism, colonialism and sexism have drawn their conceptual strength
from casting sexual, racial and ethnic dtfference as closer to the animal and
the body construed as a sphere of inferiority, as a lesser fornl of humanity
lacking the full measure of rationality or culture. 141

Domination over women has been institutionalized into patriarchy, which
became the sprout for disseminating the pattems of domination in human
relationships. Patriarchy is based on sexual oppression and on the oppression
of sexuality. Oppression is generated by the attitudes of inferiorizing and
dominating women a s sexual objects. In the process of the institutionalization
of patriarchy, these attitudes were linked to private ownership pattems and to
economic and political domination by males.
The origin of patriarchy has been the subject of some controversy, which
essentially stems from the provocative aspect of any issues related to sexuality.
Janet Biehl assumes the role of a somewhat dogmatic defender of the socialecology position, which postulates the theory that gerontocracy is the primal
form of domination, and, consequently, the origin of patriarchal culture.
Ynestra King, for example, with her background in social ecology agrees
that hierarchy developedfrom within, but she d~fferswith social ecology in
arguing that the subordination of women, not gerontocracy, was the earliest
form of domination. 142

The scope of this essay does not include nor necessitate a n in-depth inquiry
into this issue - beyond the salient connection between domination, sexuality
-
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and dualism, which I have discussed above. Perceived from the viewpoint of
these connections, the origin of patriarchy primarily from sexual and gender
oppression is much more consequential than the dubious gerontocratic theory.
After all, why were they always male geronts who assumed this kind of
supremacy3
One reason why this issue is open to debate is certainly the current blurring of sharp overt forms of domination (as I pointed out above). However, it is
also due to a shunning away from issues of sexuality. The critical link between
sexuality and patriarchy is the perversion of tendenless into conquest, and the
entire interrelatedness of sexuality, violence and subordination. It is manifested
in domestic violence, in more intense presence of patriarchal traits in warrior
cultures, etc. This crucial connection is not evaded solely by "orthodox" social
ecology; it is typically overlooked by most anthropologists and other thinkers
who tackle the controversial issue of patriarchy. Without considering the indispensable sexuality component of patriarchy, the picture remains incomplete,
and from there ensue many sterile elaborations of the topic.
One such effort is Rosalind Coward's detailed study of Patriarchal
Precedents, which is promisingly subtitled Sexuality and Social Relations

143.

However, although she starts from a feminist perspective, she disappointingly
fails to offer significant insights about sexuality. She reduces the notion of
sexuality to kinship and lineage patterns, which impoverishes her argument.
She also neglects to address even the authoritarian context of patriarchy,
which is one of its key issues. The sole (but comprehensively documented)
argument of Coward's book is that patriarchy has not been the universal and
eternal form of social organization.
In his book The Invasion of Compulsory Sex-Morality,Wilhelm Reich
addresses the problem of the emergence of patriarchy a s a social relation
based on sexual subordination
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Grounded on the anthropological findings of

Bronislav Malinowski, the essence of his detailed analysis is that patriarchy
arose a s power based on property and sexual oppression.
Evasion of issues related to sexuality reflects the attitudes of the dualistic
mind set which I discussed above. Fear of sexuality is, furthermore, one of the
essential buttresses of authoritarian education.
Patriarchy has been the institution whereby these attitudes are reproduced. Oppressed women, in their child rearing and educating role, have been
the perpetuators of the domination patterns

145, which

are based on the

relationships of power and submissiveness, not only between males and
females, but among humans in general. In that sense, patriarchy is the cradle
of other social relations of domination - of family structures, class structures,
of domination structures in economy, politics and technology.
This early conditioning for authoritarian and dominational relationships makes it difficult to discern and accept that they are not innate, biological, natural
or god-given. Therefore, a great deal of scientific effort is devoted to arguments
against such prejudices. Likewise, the above-mentioned book by Rosalind
Coward is almost entirely committed to proving that patriarchy has not been
the universal and eternal form of social organization, but only a long-lasting
cultural pattern.
Attitudes of domination permeate, affect and change all human relationships, which all became steeped in power. And it has been that way for rnillennia now. Throughout all this time, power and its intricacies have been preoccupying human minds, and diverse theories of domination, power and authoritarianism, and approaches to understanding and treating them have emerged.
There are two basic types of these theories and approaches: those which
perceive domination, authoritarianism and power in social and economic
context, and therefrom seek their origin; and the others which are
characterized by oversight, denial or disregard of such context. These two
viewpoints coincide with - or, rather, are consequent to - the related concepts
145

This is the mechanism of oppression of the oppressed - see quote and text related to
footnote 127.

of the origin of domination. Domination is regarded - implicitly or explicitly - as
innate, or genetically determined, by "context-free"approaches, and.
alternatively, as a phase in cultural evolution by theories which perceive it as
rooted in social and economic structures.
A "context-free"approach is exemplified by behavioral psychology, which

considers only the overt (and measurable) manifestations of human behavior as
scientifically valid subjects of inquiry: only what a person does is important,
not why; social background of behavior is irrelevant. Economic utilitarianism is
based on the behavioral approach (or, rather, the two viewpoints support each
other). Accordingly, behaviorism regards the individual as a utility maximizing
entity

146,

driven by his or her own, "value-free" interest (i.e. irrespective of

social context), and therefore inclined to employ power over others and over
nature.
An innate. "natural" dominational predisposition is implicitly assumed, and

also necessary as a ground for the underlying concept of human relationships
characterized by "cut-throat" competition. These notions are derived from Social
Darwinism and sociobiology (both based on the much older dualist mind
frame), which explicitly posit domination as an inherent human trait:
The notion of struggle among individuals in the midst of scarcity was a
familiar social doctrine long before Darwin and Wallace used it as a basis for
the theory of natural selection. I...]The arguments in favor [of "struggle for
existence"] were developed mostfully, or at least with the greatest rigor, by
Herbert Spencer. To Spencer is owed the grisly conception that nature as a
whole is "red in tooth and claw." His book "Social Statics" [was]intended to
show that the predations of Victorian society were merely the natural and
inevitable social expression of the vast and incessant strugglefor existence
which all living species waged in order to survive. [...I
The gist of Spencer's argument was that the misery of the lower classes
was coupled to certain inherent defects in their moral character and that
these defects were ultimately due to their innate biological inferiority. 147

It is actually a disservice to Darwin to connect this doctrine with his name,
as he never related his theory of natural selection to social standing of humans.
Neither did he perceive the "struggle for existence" as a continuous fierce and
-

146
147

-

-

I examined this concept in chapter 4 - see text and quotes between footnotes 5 and
8, and between 38 and 4 1.
Chorover, 1979: 89, emphasis mine

ruthless competition among the members of the same species

148.

It would,

therefore, be more appropriate to call the doctrine Spencerism, the more so
because it has been repeatedly refuted exactly on Darwinist grounds - initially
by Kropotkin:
The numberless followers of Darwin reduced the notion of struggle for
existence to its narrowest limits. They came to conceive the animal world as a
world of perpetual struggle among half-s tarued individuals, thirsting for one
another's blood. 149

It is true, however, that Darwin did frame his theory in the language of antagonism between species and nature, which certainly reflects the dualistic
paradigm, but, a t the time, dualism was hardly recognized a s a perspective to
be challenged. On the contrary, the constructs in terms of inferiority and
superiority, domination and violence, were uncritically accepted. Within such a
conceptual framework, Social Darwinism evolved into a broader approach
termed sociobiology.
In its applied form, sociobiology started with attempts to measure human
characteristics and traits, and to infer from these measurables innate social
and psychological predispositions. This correlation, however, has never been
tenable:
The origins of the present controversy are traceable to the work of a
Victorian Englishman, Sir Francis Galton, who published a book about the
inheritance of mental ability [. ...] The presupposition that reputation, success,
and social standing are correlated positively with intelligence not only yields
a n absurdly circular definition of mental capacrly in which intelligence
equals eminence and eminence equals intelligence, it reJlects a bias in favor
of the prevailing social order. 150

Nevertheless, this approach has never lost its proponents. It has mutated from
speculations like phrenology (which proposed that human scull - and brain
underneath - is divided into zones responsible for every moral and physical
aspect of behavior), whose absurdity is now widely obvious, to assumptions

149

What Darwin did not mean to imply was that the struggle for existence consists
solely or even mainly of a competition within speciesfor scarce resources. He was
emphatic in using the metaphor more broadly, to include the struggle all species
and members of species must wage tofiurish in the face of inclement natural
circumstances. (ibid.: 82-83)
Kropotkin, op.cit.: 4. See also quote at footnote 165.
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Chorover, 1979: 33, emphasis mine
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which disguise the sociobiological underpinning within sophisticated scientific
fields of inquiry:
Genes "$or'' particular characteris tics are subject to selection pressure;
genes are in competition, and some genes are more successful than others in
terms of the number of copies that are propagated. I...I The leading proponent
ofsociobiology, E. 0.Wilson, has [assumed]that there are genes, subject to
natural selection, 'ybr"traits such as homosexuality, xenophobia, and

attruism

151

The most salient context of sociobiological theory and practice is its
function as basis for behavior control

152.

Various reiterations of the concept

serve primarily to provide support and theoretical background for devising
methods of controlling those human actions which deviate from institutionalized
norms, and can question, challenge, threaten, or expose the undersides of the
social and political status quo.
The causes of social or antisocial behavior cannot be traced to inherent
attributes or genetic predispositions, and when d~gerentsocieties and
d~fferenteras cannot even agree on a defiition of antisocial behavior, the
search for criminal chromosomes is scientijkally meaningless [. ..] So long as
people can be persuaded to accept spwious defiitions of crime, absurd
attempts to locate the root causes ofsocial conflict within defective
individuals or stigmatized groups may continue to pass unchallenged. 153

Behavior control represents institutional domination on mass scale. As a
form of domination it is removed and abstracted from direct interpersonal
interactions of competition, inferiorization and subordination, and elevated to
an impersonalized, institutionalized level, where domination is no longer overt,
but becomes implied and surreptitious. In his comprehensive analysis of
behavior control as exertion of institutional power over people, Stephan
Chorover reveals appalling practices:
The "improvement" [from prefrontal lobectomy or lobotomy] often
consisted ofan increase in docility and obedience which made thepatients
tamer and easierfor hospital o m a l s to control or rnanqe. [.. I bbotomized
people were liable to be rendered apathetic, irresponsible, and asocial, their
inteUects were blunted, and they were likely to suffer from a drastic
impairment of memory and creativlty.154
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Sheldrake. 1988: 83-84. emphasis mine. See also quote at footnote 9.
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Throughout its history the measurement of human diversity has been linked to
claims ofhuman superiority and iqferiority and has thereby been used tojusw
prevailing patterns of behavior control. (Chorover. 1979: 34, emphasis mine)
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ibid.: 181-182
ibid.: 154-155, emphasis mine
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The notion of innate or genetically determined violent behavior is consequent to the use of extremely aggressive forms of psychiatric treatment. Both
at the level of medical behavior control, and on broader societal level, the
conviction that power and dominational relationships are innate, leads to
solutions (of eminently dualistic derivation) which are based upon taming or
curbing "natural" impulses. Such solutions require the eternal presence of
institutional bodies that perform this controlling and restraining function. The
essential point is that individual power or violence is curbed by institutional
power and violence. Power problems are allegedly cured by power, violence
healed by violence. Furthermore, such a n approach justifies the institutions
that inevitably enable misuse and distortion of power.
In behavior control violence is transformed into cruel medical procedures.
But the strategy of distancing from direct expression of violence, and even
immediate interaction, is consequently carried out

155.

Psychosurgeons may now implant electrodes in the brain, allow the
subject or patient to recover from the surgery, and then connect the electrode
to a portable transmitter/receiver. In this way, it is possible to monitor or
manipulate the behavior and brain activity of the unrestrained (and perhaps
unsuspecting) subject. I...] A system [. ..I for =mote monitoring and brain
stimulation I...] could blockfurther action by the subject by causing him to
forget or abandon his pro_jsct." 1%

This utterly Orwellian project

157 on

devising domination technology which

turns people into robots is not merely spooky; it is ho-g

because it not

only discourages, but effectively abolishes individual responsibility.
Of course, the concept of sociobiology and its associated practices are
predicated on depreciating individual responsibility:
Edward Thorndike, chairman of the psychology department at Columbia
University, stated, [in 1939 that] our superiors in ability are on the average
our benefactors, and it is
safer to trust o w interests to them than to
ourselves. 158

-
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See also text and quote between footnotes 35 and 36.
Chorover, 1979:160-161;196-197,emphasis mine
Orwell, 1976;a more tragicomical association would be Charlie Chaplin's feeding
machine in Modem Times.
Chorover, 1979:46,emphasis mine

As domination becomes covert with institutionalization into behavior control, it

gains a function of reinforcement and reproduction of authoritarian structures.
In this context, authoritarian structures are conceived of a s societally (and even
naturally) given. However, discouragement and inhibition of individual responsibility and empowerment, for the most part, is not consciously intended

159.

Consequently, behavior control methods are extended to children, with obvious
assumption that the importance of the desired goals overweighs the unfortunate side effects:
[In]the seemingly endless searchfor the biological roots of social
problems I . . .I highly potent drugs that act directly upon the brain [...I are being
used on a large scale in order to bring under control the behavior of children
who have no demonstrable biological disease. I...I
"Minimal brain dysfimction," states a recent text, "is probably the single
most common disorder seen by child psychiatrists." Yet, before the 1960s the
disorder hardly seemed to exist [...I Adults since time immemorial have been
alanned by, and ofen impatient with, the altogether "impossible"child. [...I
The signs by which MBD is recognized are purely behavioral [...I About half of
the preadolescent children 'yell into the MBD category."[The]"correct
treatment," [is]the use of stimulant drugs; principally, d-amphetamine I...]
Like all drugs, amphetamine has side effects, I...] such symptoms as
headaches, stomachaches, tremor, tension, nail biting, sallowness, loss of
appetite, and insomnia [. ..I Same children receiving amphetannine
medication may sufler a reduction in growth rate. [. ..] The main point is that
when children are treated with amphetamine they become quieter, more
attentive, more respectful of authority. lm

The first comprehensive theory of domination and its complex social, economic and political context was offered by Marxism. It situated the problem primarily in the class relations of economic exploitation, but did not reach beneath
the external manifestations of domination, neglecting to ponder the more basic
issues of power and authority. Even contemporaneously, Marxist postulates
were criticized by anarchists mainly because of the germ of domination
retained in the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat

161,

which did

eventually turn all practical applications into totalitarian rules. Developed
simultaneously, anarchism has been devoted to more radical insights into
mechanisms of power and authority, and it has envisioned a society based on

-
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See text between footnotes 25 and 26.
Chorover, 1979: 128-131, emphasis mine
Bakunin. 1973

individuals empowered with responsibility, and therefore capable of managing
their lives without oppression by any form of dominant institutions.
Neo-Marxists, primarily the Frankfurt School, included a comprehensive
critique of institutionalization and its dominational and oppressive character. It
was principally Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adomo who extended the Marxist
concept of alienation into a broader issue of individual freedom in institutionalized society

162.

Much earlier, the most prominent theorist of anarchism, Peter Kropotkin,
formulated a vision of de-alienation in his cooperative concepts

163, and

primarily in his theory of mutual aid a s a basic human trait, inherent in the
biosphere. He derived it from a n in-depth biological and anthropological
analysis based on Darwinism.
We may safely say that mutual aid is as much a law of animal life as
mutual struggle, but that, as afactor of evolution, it most probably has afar
greater importance. 164

The theory was presented a s a response to Social Darwinism and it offered a
comprehensive counter-argument to the assumption of innate human
competitiveness:
If the evolution I...I were based exclusively, or even chieJy, upon the
survival of the fittest during periods of calamities. [. ..] retrogression would be
the rule in the animal world. Those who survive I...] are neither the strongest,
nor the healthiest, nor the most intelligent. No progress could be based on
those survivals - fhe less so as all survivors usually come out of the ordeal
with an impaired health [...I
Happily enough, competition is not the rule either in animal world or in
mankind. It is limited among animals to exceptional periods, and natural
selection finds betterfleds for its activity. Better conditions are created by
the elimination of competition by means of mutual aid and mutual support.
In the great struggle for life -for the greatest possiblefullness and intensity of
life with the least waste of energy - natural selection continually seeks out the
ways precisely for avoiding competition as much as possible. 165

The theory of mutual aid, a s well a s other anarchist visions have seen little
practical application because of deeply ingrained authoritarianism in the course
I have referred to their texts in several instances: see particularly in chapter 5,
quotes related to footnotes 20 and 26, and in this chapter, footnotes 24 and 136.
163 Kropotkin, 1899
164 Kropotkin, 1902: 6
165 Kropotkin, 1902: 73-74, bolded emphasis mine. It is evident how dominational
relationships waste enormous energy when just the devastations of war through
history are taken into account - see quotes at footnotes 191 and 192 below.
162

of the long history of dominational relationships. However, mutual aid - a s
individual responsibility in systemic interrelatedness

-

gains enormous

importance in the context of a n ecological culture. Hence, the related issues
are discussed by Arne Naess a s part of his ecosophy:
The violence found within modem industrial societies is more
malignant and self-destructive than that found in almost any other
mammalian society. The methods other mammals use to avoid and reduce
violence appear to be more eflective and less brutal than our own. I...I
Members of Homo Sapiens are not genetically or in any other way bound to
torture, torment and exploit one another for all eternity. 166

Individual responsibility emerges again as the key issue of a transition to
post-dominational human relationships. The emphasis on individual
responsibility is also pertinent to antipsychiatry, which applied in theory and
practice a contextual approach to mental illness

167.

Furthermore, it points to

social roots of psychological disturbances (where it has common outlook with
humanistic psychology, and particularly with Wilhelm Reich). By considering
conventional psychiatric practice as a form of domination over (mentally
disturbed) humans, the antipsychiatric approach

168

points to denial of

individual responsibility.
The contextual approach of antipsychiatry also indicates the systemic
perspective a s the appropriate framework for understanding domination. From
such a viewpoint, the individual should be regarded as a systemic unit in
interaction with its social (and natural) environment, but also a s a subsystem
with its inner interactions (somatic and psychic)

169.

Consequently, the

psychological basis of domination has to be perceived as a complex
interrelatedness of systems.
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Naess, 1989: 170, 169
Laing, l959/ 1974
See Chorover and Szasz, quoted earlier, particularly excerpts at footnotes 33, 34,
154 and 156.
Bateson, 1980: 147

Practice of Domination
The analysis of dualism, as the essential basis for understanding domination, has identified two essential routines: inferiorization and exclusion of

mutuality. Stemming from there are the fundamental elements of domination:
hierarchy, competition and power. Inferiorizing others is the way of establishing hierarchy, the relation of superiority and inferiority as the basis of every
interaction. This process requires competition as a vehicle for defining the superior, the winner, the higher, the bigger, the wealthier and the more powerful
- among the parties where mutuality is excluded. In this world of confronta-

tion, competition, clash, cut-throat combat and conquest, the primary and only
principle is power.
In their book American Government: Freedom and Power, Lowi and
Ginsberg define government a s having
two basic components: means of coercion and of collecting revenue

170.

Therefore domination and power (coercion) are basic elements of the present
form of governance - and have been for a long period of development of human
society. During this evolution, the notion of power as a social phenomenon has
existed in two major paradigms. The paramount change occurred when the concept of power a s a god-given leave to rule others turned into the concept of power given by people. This transformation was contemporaneous with and related to the emergence of confidence to interfere with natural processes, formerly the province of god's jurisdictionl71. Both changes enabled the development
of the scientific, industrial and technological breakthrough of the modem era.
On the governance side, one could take the work of Niccolo Machiavelli as
a turning point in this respect - as a very early hint at the paradigm shift from

170
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Lowi and Ginsberg, 1992: 8
See text and quotes between footnotes 83 and 86 above.
In [Bacon's] New Atlantis, politics w a s replaced by scienttfic administration.
[...I Decisions were made for the good of the whole by the scientists, whose
judgment w a s to be trusted implicitly, for they alone possessed the secrets of
nature. (Merchant, 1980: 180)

God-given to people-given power. His most famous work, The Prince 172, has
provoked a standing controversy about its intended purpose - whether he
meant it to be a cookbook or a satire (a it was probably both.) But it definitely
turned attention to the possibility of regarding power a s a n abuse.
Power is understood a s the ability to dominate and to impose one's will and
interests on those of others. Power is the central issue in politics and policy
making, which is evident by the recurrent use of the word arena to describe
the process. Power has been present in politics almost a s if immanent to it.
Politics has for a long time been the means by which people have wrangled
power exerted over them by one person or a group. However, the initial
meaning of politics was local community management.
The American democratic theory and the practice of separation of the
legislative and regulative aspects of governance has been developed (and
became internationally pursued) a s a n attempt to resolve the problem of power
imposition and usurpation. But instead of steadfastly addressing deeply rooted
and ingrained psychological and social aspects of power and domination - the
authoritarian attitudes and expressions - democratic theory and practice (not
only in America) has assumed that ruling and administrating are rational
matters. So administration has turned into bureaucracy, and the unresolved
issues of power and domination have been just pushed under the carpet of the
pretence of administrative rationality.
The democratic process is based upon what a majority is assumed to
want. However, the proponents of this approach typically fail to acknowledge
that what a majority upholds does not necessarily represent its genuine needs.
In authoritarian and domination-based societies, the majority is easily
manipulated by the few who pursue power and domination goals. Furthermore
- or because of that - politics has become a negotiation of ideas, issues and

attitudes, regardless of their value. Such value is determined in the political
market, where all values become malleable by political advertising and

172

Machiavelli, 15 l3/ 194 1

duplicity. In this way, democracy has remained deeply stuck in the domination
and competition mode despite the good intentions to liberate it. Politics has
become -just like the economy - a negotiation of competing interests, based
on confrontation, contest and power in the political arena.
The competition mode, and its rationalization into negotiation of competing
interests, is derived from the profit-oriented economy. Indeed, the Weberian
reform of administration looked up - and still does

173 - to

business and

industrial management a s a model for organizing administration a s an efficient,
orderly mechanism. Such a management model is based on exact norms, strict
hierarchies, and division and automatization of tasks

174. Max

Weber

established his theory of bureaucracy on the idea that autocracy as the
arbitrary rule of a single sovereign should be changed into the rule of the office
(bureau-cracy) 175. This idea obviously did not touch the issues of domination
and authoritarianism. Consequently, bureaucracy shifted into a state of
administrative dysfunction and alienating institutionalization

176.

Politics and administration are not only organized by models taken from
economics, they are fundamentally determined by the profit-oriented economy.
and thus dependent on the prevailing structures of economic power. This
dependence makes it extremely hard to reconcile the economic demands put
on politics with social and community needs. That is why policy making and
regulation, particularly in the social and environmental domains, are perceived
a s constantly tom between the private and the public sector. The way policy
making and regulation deals with this conflicting situation, is to treat the two
sectors as competing interests, fighting for upper hand in the political arena. It
is not difficult to guess which side wins most of the time: the side which has
power, and which has therefore imposed this power-based competitive and
confrontational approach.
Barzelay, 1992, 115
174 Taylor, 1912
175 Weber, 1922
176 See text and quotes between footnotes 48 and 49 in chapter 5, and between 72 and
74 in chapter 6.
173

Political and economic practice merge increasingly into the same type of
discourse;propaganda and publicity were fused, marketing and
merchandising both objects and powerful ideas. 177

The political practice of negotiating the competing interests that are not
defined by any value judgements is termed pluralism. Thus pluralism connotes
multiplicity, diversity and fluidity of issues to be negotiated. And they are
negotiated under pretence that they have equal, unbiased political weight.
Like economists, pluralists treat individual desires asfiued, and the
state is but a handy organizing device, a t r a m cop, helpingfree market to
function efficiently. [...I This view privatizes all political action, reducing it to
the uninhibited pursuit of selfish objectives. All motives and goals are
equally legitimate or illegitimate. The public sector is merely an arena in
which various interests are forged into winning or loosing coalitions. [...I In
the pluralistic world it is hard to make sense of the idea of the merits of an
argument. Exaggerated claims and one-sided advocacy are merely defensible
tactics. This optimistic irresponsibility presupposes that political and
economic resources are unlimited. 178

The pluralistic mode of operation of the current politics creates an overwhelming oppressiveness and alienation, a feeling of helplessness against the
intangible webs of power, no longer traceable to concrete people and groups 179,
and, most of all, completely detached from the local community. It all irnpresses and oppresses humans a s a virtual reality of ethical weightlessness and a s

an environment of undefined and irrelevant responsibilities.
With the growth in size of social and economic structures, the administrative structure that used to be appropriate to the management of the local community, now expanded beyond this human scale. Consequently, the connection
with local communities was lost, or - in terms of the systemic perspective

- the

continuum of nested levels of interaction became disrupted 180. Representative
democracy is no longer supplementary to direct democracy as representatives
increasingly lose direct contact with their constituency.
Representative government may be a desirable expedient in a
government of great sue, but as we have clearly seen it has nothing to do with
citizen participation, popular decision-making, or democracy. 181
177
178
179
180
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Baudrillard, 1976: 64-65, emphasis mine
Landy, et al., 1990: 12-13, emphasis mine
Hawley and Wirt, 1974
See paragraph after footnote 33 in chapter 5, and between footnotes 2 and 3 in
chapter 6.
Sale, 1980: 493

So, the paradigm change to power given by people (instead of god-given)
has had the consequence, if not the intended meaning, of the relegation of
responsibility. Without empowerment for individual responsibility (as a key
issue of the transition to post-domination and ecological culture), the current
political sphere is incapable of inducing a n ecological consciousness. It only
deepens the alienating domination. Domination becomes more alienated with
depersonalization of oppression

182;

it becomes a domination mediated through

administrative, economic and technological institutions.
As one of the principal manifestations of unsustainable economy, economic

growth is an expression of competition and power-thirst, a compulsion to
overrun, exceed and outpace all participants in the economy. The battle and
race for growth becomes a self-perpetuating rule of the game. It pushes the
growth of profit-making beyond all limits, and generates social and
environmental deterioration.
You can be sure a cornpetitor will put in new machines before you do and
will ruthlessly eat away at your share of the market. So you have to get ahead
of him Your p r o m must always be at least as large as your competitors' [...I
More, bigger, faster. 183

Growth becomes the symbol of power and aggressiveness in the market.
In order to speed up consumption, advertising impresses upon buyers the imagery of aggression, violence, war and horror, particularly with products for children, like toys, food packaging, clothing iconography. Growth thus becomes a
cultural symbol of aggressive power, speed and competition, and it pervades all
aspects of life by inescapable pressure to rush, grab and get more and morel84.
There are two important outcomes of the growth-frenzied economy: one
has to do with the size of businesses and their connectedness to local cornrnunity; the other has to do with the quality and duration of industrial products.
182
183
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See text between footnotes 136 and 138, and between 153 and 154.
Gem. 1980: 80-81
One among the overwhelming abundance of examples, is the cover design for
"Freehand", the designing software, showing a muscular male (built-up by weightlifting machines, presumably), but rather looking like a robot, holding a huge
"rapidograph" (the pre-CAD professional drafting pen) like a spear, which he is
just about to hurl and to pierce you (?) with. Why a computer drawing program has
to be enfolded in such aggressive context is beyond comprehension.

Power in the modern economy lies increasingly with the great organizations and increasingly tess with the supposedly sovereign consumer and
citizen, 185

Galbraith perceives the increasing control over human lives by big
corporations and institutions, but not at all as a negative phenomenon; he is
actually quite thrilled with it:
An increasingly large and complex organization [has to] control or seek
to control the social environment in which itfunctions - or any part which
impinges upon it. It must plan not only its own operations; it must atso, to the
extent possible,plan the behavior of people and the state as these a@ct it
This is a matter not of ambition but of necessity. [...I In the small,
uncomplicated enterprise authority derives from the ownership of capital - of
the means of production In the large and highly organizedJirmauthority
passes to organization itself- to the technostructure of the copration [. ..I
Not surprisingly the growth of t h e m is a dominant tendency of advanced
economic development. 186

The crucial change in connection with the size of business has been identified
a s bifurcation into small and big business. Apart from the great differences in
operation and management, the essential contrast is in responsibility - social
and environmental, just a s well a s commercial. Responsibility becomes more
easily avoidable with the enormous increase of power of big corporations

187.

However. Galbraith perceives this as an advantage:
The market system mani$ests the same desire [. ..I to exercise control over
its economic environment [...I, is much more visible in its effort and is much
less successful. The one system dominates its environment; the other remains
generally subordinate to it. I...]No one will be in doubt as to the source of these
attitudes. It Lies with the technosbucture and the planning system and with
their ability to impose their values on the society and the state. 188

The direction of his analysis indicates that he supports the emergence of a
totalitarian domination by corporate economic structures.
Although these corporate giants are ofen close to bankruptcy, they still
have the political power to persuade government to bail them out with
taxpayer's money. 189

This ethical mind frame of profit-oriented economy is consequent to its
historical origin. Large-scale trade has often been linked with plundering raids
-
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Galbraith, 1973:385,emphasis mine
ibid.: 389-390,emphasis mine. (This reads like an economic couterpart of
Machiavelli's Prince.)
See also text and quotes between footnotes 17 and 21 in chapter 6.
Galbraith. op.cit.: 404.emphasis mine
Capra, 1982:223

and wars in the early historic periods, and later on, wars have been almost
invariably connected to economic issues, to colonization and imperialistic
expansion, and to contests for spheres of interest

190. These

facts reinforce the

link between economic activities and power exertion.
The New Deal was at best only a partial success. In 1 940 [. ..] the economy
continued in a depression [...I It was only global war that saved the American
economy. Within a year afer the United States entered World War 11,
government expenditures climbed from $1 6.9 billion to more than $51.9
billion. I...] The war economy continued afer VJ day in the form of a vast
military industrial complex, a labyrinth of Pentagon-Bnanced endeavors
that came to dominate the American economy. [...I In the 1980s the United
States spent more than $2.3 trillion on military security. Nearly $46 out of
every $100 of new capital went to the military economy. 191
The U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. spent over $10 trillion on the Cold War,
enough money to replace the entire infastructure of the world, every school.
every hospital, every roadway, building and farm. 192

In the prevailing competition mode, trade and business typically establish
the relationships of domination by inferiorizing the other side in the transaction
-

either openly or inconspicuously. That is necessary in order to impose the

terms of transaction. The more formalized the negotiations, the more hidden
and implicit are the power relations that the transaction is based upon. So the
"freedom" of entrepreneurship is there only for those who have a power
position in the transaction. A peculiarity of market economics, stemming from
its domination basis, is that it limits the perception solely to the powerful
actors in the market, those who maximize wealth. The other side, those at
whose expense the wealth is maximized, who are exploited, who lose in the
transaction

- they

are excluded from the picture, they are in the blind spot.

The institutionalization of the market has developed to obscure the
relationship in which there is also a side that loses, a side that is compelled to
acquiesce to the terms of transaction. These participants in the transaction
either have to concede to the price because they need to buy, or have to sell at
the price because they need money to satisfy some other need.

See text and quotes between footnotes 15 and 17 in chapter 6.
191 Rifkin, 1995:31-33
192 Hawken. 1993:58

190

Those who are trading to meet their basic needs - that is, they trade in
order not to be worse off - cannot be said to have a trulyfree choice. They are
compelled to trade by the pressure of their needs even fi they do not like the
terms or conditions of trade. Literally, they must either trade or die. This
means that their choices in the market are coerced. 193

The profit making and wealth maximization purpose of economic activities
is often justified by claiming that private wealth is the condition of public

welfare, the source of job creation and community development. But the big
businesses, with their exterritoriality and disconnectednes from community
and with their absentee shareholding, only drain the wealth and welfare away
from the community. They deplete the social and natural resources without
renewal. What is maybe even more important, the uncritical acceptance of this
altruistic claim reflects the irrational reverence for power and domination. I t
reinforces the patronizing attitude of the wealthy toward the community and
toward "everyday" people who are not so successful in maximizing their wealth.
This patronizing attitude puts wealth into the position of power over individuals
who are given salaries and work under market conditions where the wealthier
party always has an advantage over the poorer.
Work is something you have to go looking for out there, in the world. You
apply for it and competefor it. Other people haw it to give. They are called
bosses and they give you work as a rewardfor being the right kind of person.
I...] People who don't work are either very poor or very rich. Poor people who
don't work are lazy and contemptible. They are failures and freeloaders. You
should despise them On the other hand, rich people who don't work are
"lucky."[.. I They deserve not to have to work because they are successfuL
Smart guys grow up to be like them 194

This patronization takes away from people the control over their lives. The
patronizing conditions originate from the times when feudal lords owned local
communities, and from even earlier stages of the history of domination and
class rule:
All this becomes clear in the genealogy of the slave. First, the prisoner of

war is purely and simply put to death (one does him an honour in this way).
Then he is 'spared' [epargnej and conserved [conserve](=servus),under the
category of spoils of war and a prestige good: he becomes a slave and passes
into sumptuary domestidy. It is only later that he passes into servite labour.
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However, he is I.. .]finally relieved of the mortgage of being put to death. Why is
hefreed? Precisely in order to work. 195

This remarkable genealogy of labour brings up the issue of give-and-take
relationship, which I have mentioned in the previous chapter in connection

with a n economy of mutuality and cooperation. Baudrillard does not put his
observations in that context, but he offers another innovative insight:
Contrary to aU appearances and experience I.. ] it is the capitalist who
gives, who has the initiative of the g~ft,which secures him, as in every social
order, a preeminence and a power fat beyond the economic.1%

A non-dominational (or post-dominational) relationship of giving and taking

is not based on the dualized notion of either/or, but on a simultaneous
process, a two-way unity of mutual give-and-take, pertinent to metabolic
exchange. Such economic relations are possible only a s decentralized, direct
interactions - and they require a revitalized community 197.
Adam Smith himself emphasized in his Theory of Moral Sentiments
that the market is a system so dangerous that it presupposes the moral force of
shared community values as its necessary restraining context. The market
does not economize on moral capital, it depletes it. The moral capital must be
renewed by the community. 198

The disconnectedness of big business from the community, from locale,
and from natural processes of renewal creates specific ethical conditions for
economic processes. As I indicated before, detachment is the essential
mechanism and prerequisite of domination. Big business is detached from
social and ecological connection and conscience

199.

The market economy

creates a n ethical framework in which the limitations of social and ecological
reality are removed from the p u ~ e w
of entrepreneurs seeking to increase
profit. Market is typically perceived a s the means of liberation from limits, a
liberation which enables unrestrained growth and free entrepreneurship.
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fieedomfiom external interference. (Galbraith,op.cit.: 389-390, emphasis mine)
See also the issue of absentee ownership discussed in chapter 6, between footnotes
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The uniqueness of the market economy lies in its having no natural
boundaries, no biological or natural constraints. It is a Faustian instrument,
divorced from nature, with no inherent capacity for recognizing self-limiting
factors. It is 1.. .I often proclaimed as the ins tnunent for abolishing limits. The
market offers freedom 200

However, Bums is mistaken in equating freedom with the ethical mind frame of
the market economy. It merely provides a n absolution from observing the
limitations of the social and ecological consequences of profit-making. That is
license, not freedom. But it reinforces the ethical environment of unrestricted
power a s fearlessness and unscrupulousness to use any means in the fierce
competition for profits.
The market is often identified a s a n institution which regulates
negotiations. It introduces money as a n intennediary which becomes a measure
of conscience in transactions and a screen from direct (emotional) involvement.
Thus money can buy out ethical scruples and responsibilities.
ZfI no longer must bribe my neighbor to keep her shade trees pruned low,
but can instead rely on a zoning rule that protects my interest in solar rays.
then our behaviors have been shifted from a "market" to a "non-market"
basis. The neighbor can always offer to pay me not to invoke the new zoning
rule, in which case a different "market" will emerge under quite different
institutional arrangements. 201

In direct, traditional market transactions, in direct interactions, this trading-off
is all visible and someone might still blush for it. The institutionalization of the
market economy does away with such direct transactions, puts them on a n abstract level, and thus alleviates direct responsibility and scruples. Scruples and
responsibility, embarrassment and ethical considerations - all that is translated
into money, into transaction costs and externalities, and, consequently. it all becomes negotiable. The responsibility for social, biological and physical environment thus becomes blurred, and practically annulled. Money also screens
power and domination. I t conceals that those who have power simply claim the
right to be arrogant and inequitable in economic and social transactions.
The bigger the institution, the enterprise, the movement, the greater the
opportunityfor people to mystii one another and themselves. [...I As those
who m r k in the system are screened off'om the msu1t.s of their action, their
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human sympathy and ethical sensitivity are deadened;their sense of p e r s o ~ l
responsibility fades into an in$inite regression of delegated authority. 202

The domination-based (and profit-oriented) economy creates the conditions
of ethical weightlessness, a virtual reality of fictitious, monetary-defined values.
It is a world detached from the reality of life and from the natural processes of
renewal. And it is often mistaken for a world of freedom. Freedom is thus
identified with irresponsibility; it is equated with the quantity of money
possessed, and therefore with the ability to act in the market without
respecting any limits. But freedom is first and foremost responsibility

203.

The current technology is rife with irresponsibility for the social and
natural environment. In other words, technology is now determined by the
patterns of domination, competition and power. This is inevitable and
understandable if technology is perceived as socially, politically, economically
and culturally defined 204.
The technological society is a system of domination which operates
already in the concept and construction of techniques. 205

Currently, technology is regarded as "context-free" and, consequently.
"value-free".This is consistent with the dominant economic paradigm

206,

which actually presents the context and value-system framework for
technology, notwithstanding the related perspective that ignores contexts and
values. This disregard is rationalized as neutrality of technology. However, it is
only a self-deception.
Technologies are never neutral. They are forms of life. In this sense they
are also political insofar as they legislate and govern thefundamental patterns which much of modem li$e assumes. Indeed, in our ordinary understanding we make an uncritical distinction between "technology"on the one hand
and "society"on the other. In some ways that distinction is still useful. But in
other ways it is not. Is a factory a technological institution or a social one? Is

-

Roszak. op.cit.: 3 10-3 1 1. emphasis mine
Because denial or loss of freedom primarily entails denial or loss of right to be
responsible. See also quote and text between footnotes 28 and 30 above.
204 I have discussed this issue in chapter 4, as a connection between cultrural
definition of human needs and technology - see text after footnote 87.
205 Marcuse, 1964:xvi
206 See text before footnote 146 above.
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a mass transit system a social or technological phenomenon in the main? Is
television a system of apparatus or a mode of social relationships? 207

Dorninational determination of technology is manifested in various forms
and aspects. I will differentiate them by the following expressions of
domination practice: growth obsession; aggressiveness and violence; absence
of mutuality; monopolization/dornineering the market and institutional
domination; and alienation engendered by mediated domination.
Growth obsession entails the pressure for constant increase in turnover.
Technology is geared to support this requirement by several methods of decreasing the life-span of products. Maintenance is discouraged by design - in addition to dissuasive organization of servicing and higher prices of parts which
make mending more expensive than buying a new product. This is supplemented by shortening the durability of products, so that the consumer is compelled
to purchase new. Shorter life-span of products is secured by poor quality by
design. However, deliberate reduction of quality is a limited possibility and a
double-edged policy in the competitive market. Therefore, built-in obsolescence
is devised a s a much subtler and more diversified way of inducing the quicker
turnover of production. It involves manipulation by imposed fashion changes
and by advertising pressures and enticements, but also by deliberate
incompatibilities of newer components and products with the existing ones.
Thefist_fluorescent lights put out in 1938 by Philips (Holland)had a
lifetime of 10,000 hours. They could "bum" continuously for 14 months. Bad
business, decided the Philips management, who, before putting the tubes on
the market, carefully reduced the lifetime to 1000 hours (42 days). [...I Maximum pro_fit is not made by economizing the factors ofproduction, but by
means of waste and deterioration that guarantee an appropriate capital
turnover. 208

Such a n approach qualifies most of the current technologies a s utterly
unsustainable, careless about the rate of resources depletion, and mindless
about the pollution and other environmental impacts. An overwhelming amount
of waste and pollution is created for the purposes of merely intenslfymg the
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turnover and alluring consumers to more consumption. One example is packaging which often has more bulk and toxic chemicals than its contents.
Silk blouses and ties are impregnated with zinc and tin to give them their
"hand," the heavy draping that gives people the impression they are getting a
more valuable fabric. Shoe leather is tanned with chromium and contains
toxic dyestugs. Although shoes are technically a toxic waste as presently
manufactured, there is no reason that they and other apparel could not be
made so that when they are ultimately discarded, they could break down into
food for other organisms. 209

All these technological efforts are demanded and determined by the
competition- and profit-oriented economy. Such a n orientation fundamentally
changes the definition of technological efficiency, which is now measured by
the rate of capital turnover. The consequence is the increasing rate of resource
depletion and of pollution and waste buildup. The efficiency of technology by
sustainability criteria would be defined by characteristics which are avoided in
the domination-based technology: quality, maintainability, durability, flexibility,
appropriateness to needs. The assessment of the rate of resource renewal and
of the environmental impact would be particularly critical. Such a n assessment
pertains to the technological sequence analysis, which I presented earlier

210.

Aggressiveness and violence are primarily manifested in the current
technologies of energy harnessing and usage. They epitomize a n obsession with
power and control on one hand, and on the other present a recklessness
toward humans and nature which most of the time verges on abuse and a
serious threat of peril. All these aspects are most prominently and horrifiedly
exemplified in the persistent use of nuclear technologies

211.

The pretence of

justification is provided by conscious or unconscious falsification of data about
the economic efficiency of nuclear power. These data conceal that nuclear
technologies are subsidized by the current political and economic system. But
even without that, their apparent economic efficiency emerges from disregard
of enormous social, political and environmental costs.

209
210
211

Hawken, op.cit.: 68
after footnote 107 in chapter 4,and at footnote 114 in chapter 6.
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In the 1971 the estimated cost of building a typical nuclear plant was
$345 million, but in 1980 t h e h u r e had climbed to 3.2 billion. The federal
government has spent nearly $18 billion in subsidizing the commercial
development of nuclear power by 1980. 212

Obsession with power and control in the context of domination results in
obstinate claims that alternative sources of energy are not viable, although for
decades their economic and ecological advantages have been proven, and the
perils of nuclear technologies demonstrated

213.

Having obtained heavy subsidies for conventional energy technology
through their political power, the utility companies then I...]declared that
solar energy was ineflcient because it could not compete with other sources in
the mj?ee"market. 214
Geothermal, wind, and solar energy produce limited if any air pollution,
and could one day provide most fi not all of the world's electricity. 215

The clandestine, unspoken justification for the obsession with nuclear
power can be found more in its connection to military systems and armament
industry. But even such a rationalization cannot explain the irrationality of
insisting upon the use of something that can be lethally dangerous for the next
hundreds of thousands of years (as the half-lives of radioactive atoms involved
in nuclear technologies are of that order of magnitude

216).

Even if technologies

for a n absolutely safe storage of nuclear waste were devised (which is not the
case), and could be devised with a certainty that they would function for
hundred thousand years

- even then it would be a lunacy to rely calmly and

confidently on them. It would be a lunacy because application and functioning
of technology is socially and politically determined, and it is impossible to
guarantee safety from even accidental human mistakes, let alone from planned
terrorism and other abuse.
Nuclear energy is costly in both an economic and social sense given the
danger of accident and sabotage and the need for strict security and perhaps a
garrison state. 217
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Technologies effective at removing pollutants are susceptible to
tampering and failure, which can release enormous quantities of pollutants
into the biosphere. 218

Nuclear technology is just the most notorious, and very likely the most
dangerous of hazardous technologies, the proliferation of which creates
ternfylng problems of pollution in all the phases of the technological sequence production, use and after use. There is either no possibility at all of recycling,
or detoxifymg the hazardous waste, or it i s not given attention because of
prohibiting costs.
Technologies for safely controlling and disposing of certain highly toxic
pollutants are simply not available! 219

These approaches in current technology present the absence of mutuality
as a key characteristic of domination paradigm. Technology is in senrice of
competitive interests. Consequently, care for human and natural environment,
and sense of ecological interrelatedness are neglected, if not altogether
nonexistent issues.
Monopolization as a method of dominating the market requires centralized
and large-scale organization. Monopoly is technologically achieved by avoiding
standardizationand by closed prefabrication. However, the efficiency of
technology depends too much on standardization, so that it cannot be
completely avoided. But it could be systematically developed to much broader
levels of application, had it not been inherently dissuaded by the monopolyoriented economy of competition and domination.
Closed prefabrication technology is an attempt to enable that a s much as
possible of the technological process is specific to products of one company220.
Thus the maintenance and repair of these products depend on parts made by
the same company. This is further enhanced by reducing repair and
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as opposed to open prefabrication technology, which is based on components that
can be used by different manufacturers and for different designs of products. I have
presented it in more detail in chapter 6. after footnote 122.

maintenance to replacement of parts. And even that is discouraged by fostering
the purchase of new products, as I mentioned above.
Monopolized and centralized technological organization abolishes every
possibility of involving the consumers (or the users of products) in technological
processes across the nested levels of interaction and along the stages of
technological sequence 221.
A pertinent aspect of alienating technology is what Robert Thayer has

addressed as transparency issue in the context of a perception of technology
as an interface between humans and their environment 222.
Technology has placed so many layers between our perceptions and the
core realities of landscapes that surface and core no longer relate: what we
oJten see is the opposite of what we get. Beautrful landscapes may threaten our
health; apparently "natural"landscapes may be ecologically impoverished.
The movement toward a sustainable world must include the peeling away of
intervening images between landscape function and landscape experience [. ..
making] responsible artrJiactual connections to the ecosystems we touch and
occupy, and [connecting] these ecosystems directly to our eqerience in a
transparent,congruent, and las ting manner. 223

Alienation generated by the present form of technology is its most depressing effect. It implies a complete lack of control over the ways of satisfymg human needs. In the present conditions, humans are not only compelled to acquiesce to hazardous technologies around them, but they are forced to use and
adopt as indispensable technologies like automobile, airplane, computer, the
Internet. The adoption of technologies most of the time is not determined by
real needs, but by competitiveness, growth and power which permeate our
lives. And the more mass-used such technologies are, the less efficient, cornfortable and useful they become, to the point of dysfunction and oppression.
Instead of serving as a tool, technology becomes a vehicle of domination over
humans.
Technology in general manifests its dominational impact in an indirect way.
This mediated domination is alienating and, therefore, it increases the extensive
221
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alienation in the present institutionalized society. Furthermore, there are specific technologies which engender alienation by themselves - because of their intrinsic properties, or because they are geared to applications with such effects.
It is not easy to be aware of all these oppressive conditions because
technology has been increasingly creating a world of virtual reality, where
artii3ciality and illusion is valued and revered. We live serviced (and dominated)
by technologies which are less and less intelligible and more and more
mystified and opaque (non-transparent in Thayer's terms). The sense of the
natural and the tangible has been lost and forgotten. It is particularly the massmedia that create and foster the world of deception and unreality or hyperreality. Technology and media have become the prevalent sphere of cultural
reproduction and of the promulgation of domination patterns - in addition to
the patriarchal family, which has thus been relieved of its exclusive role in
sustaining domination. In this world of illusions and hyper-reality, the
borderline between technology, economy and ideology becomes blurred, and it
is hard to pinpoint what generates what. The technologies of mass media and
the virtual reality they create, pervert art and creativity into commodities and
businesses. At the same time, the commercialization of all forms of human
activities and life functions in the profit-oriented economy, perpetuates the
technology which expresses these social and economic conditions.
Media are the foremost form of technology that performs this indirect, mediated domination, as well as the function of its cultural reproduction. Baudrillard perceives this social condition a s beyond alienation 224; rather as a consumerist stupor resulting from seduction, which he considers the essential strategy in the current cultural mode, and the new way of maintaining domination:
The masses will be psychologized in order to be seduced: they will be
rigged up with desires in order to be distracted. Yesterday they had a
(rnystiJkd!) consciousness and were alienated - today they have an
m n s c i o u s and (repressed and wrmpted) desires and are seduced. Yesterday
they were divertedfrorn the (revolutionary) truth of history - today they are
divertedfrorn the truth of their own desires. The poor, seduced and
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See the quote in footnote 28 in chapter 5.

manipulated masses! Where once they had to endure domination under the
threat of violence, now they must accept it by dint of seduction. 225

The central concept of Baudrillard's work is simulation and hyperreality, or
simulacra - the essential forms of mediated domination. He contends that reality
(or rather mediated reality, or hyperreality) is defined by symbols, signs, or
codes

226.

He formed this basic framework of his critique of postmodem cultu-

re in the early seventies, much before computers emerged a s mass media

227.

However, he predicted the whole world of computer-generated symbols, codes
and models a s a n extensive basis of the cultural images that now surround us.
Reality is increasingly defined by pre-determined patterns, models and
signs, like graphic design, fashion and pervasively more and more aspects of
consumer culture. Models and simulations of reality were initiated by film
industry, but they are now taken over to a much more overwhelming degree by
computers. The symbolic, virtual reality thus becomes potentially (and
practically) a powerful medium of indirect (mediated) domination. Of course,
computer simulations (as well a s ready-made graphic patterns) are enormously
helpful in design and education - but only a s long a s those who use them keep
clearly in mind that they are only simulations. This means that they are
limited and predetermined representations of selected and reduced aspects of
reality. Predetermination here implies that there is no place for the
unpredictable evolutionary process of emerging probabilities which is the
paramount characteristic of natural reality.
In some biological environments, the variables that are given great
weight by the designer of a simulation may not infact be those that link with
key d~serencesin reality. The ways in which variables interact may also be
art$cially limited by the computer-based environment. A further property of
simulations is that there is usually a defied conclusion of some sort. 228

With the overwhelming escalation of use and fascination with the possibilities of virtual reality, there is a serious danger of forgetting increasingly often
Baudrillard, 1979: 174-175
See text between footnotes 24 and 25 and quote at footnote 31 in chapter 5.
227 One of the most essential works is The Symbolic Exchange and Death (Baudrillard,
1976),but its precursors appeared earlier, like For a Critique of the Political
Economy of the Sign, in 1972.
228 Kerr. 1996:22
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that it is only a simulation, a representation of reality. However "life-like" it can
get by sophistication of software, simulation will always lack the full experiential scope of natural sensations. Furthermore, with a n increased forgetfulness of
this kind, there is a n even more alarming danger that simulations would take
over, and that "dolled-up" representations would be taken for more acceptable
forms of reality

229.

Information, the central resource of our society, disrupts spatial
relationships - above all the relationship between space and its dimensions.
[...I The concepts of large and small, near and far, thereby cease to relate solely
to measurable quantities. They are now symbolic indicators, cultural
artefacts organizing a space which is no less real than the physical space. [...I
Multidimensional experience devoid of B e d spatial referents creates
bewilderment and rootlessness. 230

Mediation (in most contexts) involves detachment. Therefore, mediated
domination, particularly through technologies of symbolic and virtual reality.
entails a n essential detachment and disconnection, not only from real human
(and human-ecological) interactions, but also from the social and natural
context of technology. The essential paradigm of this disconnected/detached
perception of reality is information.Therefore we live in the information age,
and we are - in Baudrillard's terms - thoroughly seduced into believing in the
world of information a s a new dream world of possibilities, a new virtual,
weightless (and responsibility-free) reality.
Information, a s well a s media, are conceived of a s entities by themselves.
Information is frequently referred to a s a n entirely new ontological category,
one that is considered to have no physical dimensions or properties, and which
thus becomes metaphysical. Rupert Sheldrake criticizes this perception and
offers a concept of information related to his theory of morphic fields 231:
Duality of matter and nonmaterial organizing principles I...]is inherent
in all traditional philosophies of form In the modem context, it is usually
conceived of in terms of the duality of matter and information. Information
is what informs; it plays an informative role, as Norbert Weiner, the founder
-

That is what Aldous Huxley foresaw as 'feelies" in Brave New World (Huxley. 1973).
However, from the vantage point of the world in which domination sides were still
more clearly defined (the novel was first published in 1946), this virtual reality
was envisioned as a 'dazzler" for keeping only the 'proles" in subordination.
230 Melucci, op.cit.: 17- 18
231 See between footnotes 59 and 61 in the following chapter.
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of cybernetics, emphasized in his concept of the primacy of informatwn over
matter and energy. I.. ] In f a t ever since the seventeenth century, the survival
of materialism h a s depended on its combination with the Platonic notion of
nonmaterial organizing principles. I.. .] Is the information Platonic, somehow transcending time and space? Or is it immanent within organisms? [...]
Morphicfields play a role comparable to information and programs in
conventional biological thought, and they can indeed be regarded asfields of
information, Thinking of information as contained in rnorphic_fields helps
to demysti& this concept, which otherwise seems to be refemng to something
that is essentially abstract, mental, or mathematical, or a t any rate nonphysical in nature. 232

McLuhanian theory of media and information is based on this metaphysical
(and dualistic) concept. They are presented a s isolated entities which have impact on civilization by themselves. Media and information are therefore perceived a s non-relational in a systemic sense 233. Although it is seemingly otherwise because of the very term media - although media appear to be regarded
a s relational (this appearance is part of the pervasive culture of simulacra) the concept is essentially based on disregarding relations, context, and even
content:
Media content questions alone, while important, do not foster much understanding of the underlying changes in social structures that new forms of
communication may be encouraging or enabling. I.. .] Electronic technologies
may have many consequences unintended by those who shape media
messages.
Marshall McLuhan has been one of a relatively small group of scholars
I...] who have tried to call attention to the potential injZuences of communication technologies in addition to and apartftom the content they convey. 234

Media and information a s concepts emerge when mediation, interaction
and interrelatedness are abolished by media themselves - when media
become content- and context-free (as the current economy is value-free, and
the current technology context-free). However, Meyrowitz's McLuhanesque
analysis needs socio-cultural determinants. Media and information cannot have
any impact without the social, political and economic conditions of human
relations which are mediated by some technology. It is absurd to perceive this
(or any) technology a s isolated from these determinants, but such is the context
of the current context-free paradigm.
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In his perception of the current cultural reality a s devoid of interrelatedness and disconnected from "real" reality, Baudrillard falls in the trap of
adopting such non-relational viewpoint for his own analysis. Therefore he fully
endorses the MacLuhanian perspective of media

235, and

thus supports his

own view of the current reality a s characterized by loss of meaning.
Information carries meaning, and meaning is relational - it emerges in
human interaction. However, current media technology detaches meaning from
direct human interactions and thus meaning becomes isolated infonnation. It
becomes a code - in Baudrillardian broader cultural sense, a s well a s in
technical, software sense. Detachment and disconnection are the essential

means of domination 236. Thus media and infonnation technology become
vehicles of mediated domination.
One aspect of this domination is social stratification and control through
technically restricted access to meaning

-

through technology which is now

needed to decode it:
Control over production, accumulation, and circulation of information
depends on code which organize information and make it understandable.
I...]In its operational logic, information is not a shared resource accessible to
everybody, but merely an empty sign, the key to which is controlled by few
people only. Access to meaning becomes thefield of a new kind of power and

conBict. 237
The sheer abundance of information is naively equated not only with
equal access to it but also with the advance of both genuine knowledge and
genuine democracy.238

The fascination with quantitative abundance of information often leads to
forgetting the integration into coherent, meaningful wholes. The integrative learning processes, multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, cannot be determined
by technology - although there is some potential of computer media to enable
them. At the same time, the Internet, a s it is structured now, seems to have an
inherent inclination toward disparate, dissipated information and thus the
medium can reinforce fragmentation, instead of fostering integrative learning.
235
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In educational, as well as everyday uses, information technology has been
promoted into communication technology. What has thus been achieved, is a
more effective mediated domination because - without direct interaction domination is not tangible, not easily perceptible, and therefore much safer
from challenges and attempts at overcoming it.
The essence of communication is human exchange of energy. If a supplemental technical aid (however spectacularly it can enhance the process) is
turned into a substitute, then not only a technical means is mistaken for a
human process, but communication is rather thwarted than improved. Computer media inherently lack and hinder true interaction - even when it is attempted by an artificial "interactive"communication with the machine/software. The
impersonality of the electronic medium adds to the increasingly alienating patterns of communication in our "hi-tech" culture. Furthermore, the alienation
from immediate, natural and tangible reality has been presented as an achievement of computer technology: "virtual reality" is accepted as a whole new, fascinating and even superior realm. Virtuality is taken for an advanced feature.
It is important to perceive the problem of simulacra and virtual reality in
the context of control and domination. Then it emerges as a relationship which
has existed throughout the history of institutionalized religion, which has been
using simulacra as a vehicle of power. The same pattern was utilized by
communist totalitarianism, where the communist future became a simulacrum.
a code. Seen in this light, the alienation and institutionalization of information
technology becomes a continuum of the domination paradigm.
I am inclined to believe, however, that these conditions are not
unchangeable. Technology is socially, politically. economically and culturally
determined and defined, and a different cultural pattern can bring about a
transformation of the use and functioning patterns, and the meanings of some,
if not all of technologies which are now oppressive and alienated.

An ecological culture would, therefore, entail pertinent technologies - some

of the existing technologies, modified in the new, different (culturally detenni-

ned) context, a s well as some new approaches. This cultural change would also
entail different criteria of assessment

239.

Post-domination technology would be

necessarily sustainable and vice versa - sustainable economy, technology and
social organization should be requisitely non-dominational.
An example of an emergent sustainable technology is industrial ecology,

which involves a collaborative, rather than competitive approach. Industrial
ecology arised out of an acknowledged necessity of interrelatedness of
technological and economic processes:
The term ["industrialecology"]was @st coined by Robert Frosch and
Nicholas Gallopoulos in 1989 [...I Recognizing that industrial processes that
harm and waste are, by definition, less economic and therefore more costly in
the long run, companies and industries are trying to dovetail their material
and waste _flows,attempting to eliminate pollution by tailoring
manufacturing by-products so that they become the raw materials of
subsequent processes. 240

In the context of a comprehensive ecological (post-consumerist)culture, this
excellent practice would gain a much broader interconnectedness not only with
technological, but also with social and economic aspects of sustainability 241.
The far largest quantity of energy (or money) is, and has throughout history
been increasingly wasted on power and domination. A post-domination culture
might well disengage a vast amount of these resources.
Lewis Mumford has likened rocket ships to the pyramids of ancient
Egypt: both are enormously expensive devices built by the sacriies of the
many for the purpose of carrying an elite few into heaven. 242
239
240

See text between footnotes 86 and 87, around 105 and between 107 and 1 10 in
chapter 4.
Hawken, op.cit.: 62.

A prototype of industrial ecology and cooperation is in place I...] in
Kalundborg, Denmark. [...I a coal-fled power plant, an oil refinery, a
pharmaceutical company specializing in biotechnology, a sheetrock plant,
concrete producers, a producer of sulfuric acid, the municipal heating authority, a
_fishfarm, some greenhouses, local farms, and other enterprises work
cooperatively together. 1.. .I
This synergy is remarkable because it happened "spontaneously," without
governmental regulation or law as the prime motivating factor [...I
The Environmental Protection Encouragement Agency (EPEA) in Hamburg,
Germany [promotes the] concept of a completely cyclical economy [which]goes
further than industrial ecology in that it eliminates waste altogether. [...I In order
for a product to qualrji~as a consumptive product, its waste must be wholly
biodegradable, capable of transforming itself into food for another organism with
no toxic residue that would cause harm or be accumulative. (ibid.: 62-68)
241
242

See text around footnote 114 in chapter 4, and 117 in chapter 6.
Daly, 1977: 1 12

Transition and Barriers to Post-domination
What is particularly fascinating and frighteqing, is that humans still so
confidently rely on technologies which are based on reductionist, narrowrationalist and mechanical concepts and notions, notwithstanding that these
notions have for quite some time been thoroughly questioned and challenged.
Such reliance can be perceived as irrational, and the following quotes illustrate
some of the many-faceted manifestations of irrational technologies:
The mutual vulnerability in the US.-Soviet relationship that stems
from the existence of capabilities for Mutual Assured Destruction - MAD threatens to make the actual execution of nuclear threats quite mad. 243
The use of psychasur~eryas a means of controlling violence [considers
that] the proper way to bring such behavior under control is by selectively
destroyingWjicparts of the brain 24.4

By granting broad patent protection over genetically engineered lge
forn-~s,the govenunent is giving its imprimatur to the idea that living creatunes are reducible to the status of mamfactured inventions,subject to the same
engineering standards and commercial exploitation as inanimate objects. 245

The issue is not just the unreliability of current scientific and technological
approach, as argued by conclusions from the Chaos Theory. What is involved
is not only the unpredictability at the level of physical processes, but a broader
social and psychological context of domination-based technology, economy and
social organization.
The work of postmodern scientists on unpredictability implies that
human beings must give up the possibility of totally dominating and controlling nature. Because ecological and social systems are open, interacting,
and unpredictable, we must allow for the possibility of surprise. 246

All this might be more understandable, though not justifiable, if it is perceived as a result of institutionalization and alienation of technology and the eco--
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244
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246

Rhodes, 1989: 1. The cold war between these two sides seems over now, but the
armament goes on, so the basic concept is still around. For "peacetime"version of
the madness, see text between footnotes 2 15 and 2 17.
Chorover, 1979: 136-137, emphasis mine
Rifkin,op.cit.: 119, emphasis mine. Frankenstein comes true1 See also the quote at
footnote 9.
Merchant, 1994: 19-20,emphasis mine

nomy - the alienation where individuals feel utterly hopeless and powerless to
oppose the developments which appear to be unstoppable and self-perpetuating. The feeling of disempowerment, a s well a s the process of institutionalization originate from the deep psychological and social roots of domination.
There is an undeniable cleavage between power and rationality. Chorover
frames it a s an interplay of meaning and power

247:

To promote their own survival, hierarchs reward the conformity of
thought and action of their subordinates and punish deviance or dissentfrom
organizationally required beliefs and behavior. Thus, they are inclined to put
their power behind meanings mainly on the basis of their correspondence to
organizational interests and not necessarily on the basis of their
correspondence tofacts. I...]Questions about the truth or falsity of ideas are
different from questions about the relations between the meaning of ideas and
the power of organizations. 248

Although it is clear that such an approach to meaning is not rational (unless the
current economic criterion of rationality is assumed

249),

Chorover insists on a

perspective which does not hide the irresponsibility of antisocial deeds behind
psychiatric diagnoses 250. This argument is drawn from the antipsychiatric
perspective

251

which also, and even more importantly, brings to attention the

irresponsibility of institutions that usurp power over other people on grounds
of their mental or other inferiority. Chorover consistently applies this approach
to analyzing different manifestations of institutional domination and violence
(primarily in the realm of psychiatry), including the Nazi genocide, which he
demonstrates not a s a deed of lunatics (the popular notion), but a rational
project initially devised by highest academic and medical institutions:
Nazi genocide was not an aberrant symptom of national psychosis but a
wldly calculated exercise in behavior control. I...]Considered in these terms,
it becomes possible to understand how in_fluentialsocial forces were able to
use the symbolic power of allegedly objective sociobiological science tofoster,
promote, defend, and justiJy the radical extermination of "biologically
inferior" elements of thepopulation.252

Chorover, 1979: xi-xii
ibid.: 16-17, emphasis mine
See quote at footnote 92 above.
See quote at footnote 34.
See text between footnotes 167 and 169.
Chorover, 1979: 9- 10, emphasis mine

The apparent rationality of institutional structure and particularly the use
of scientific justifications, does indeed hide the deeply irrational background of
institutional domination. The brutal means of Nazi genocide (or other atrocities)
may well have been devised and executed in cold-blood, but the sadistic
monstrosity certainly (and possibly even more with the associated withdrawal
of affect) indicates deeply disturbed psyches that were involved in them.
It is important to point to the difference between the institutional label of
lunacy - for the purpose of behavior control and institutionalized domination and psychological disturbances which are the background of pervasive social
disruptions conspicuous both at the individual and the institutional level. I use
a seemingly contradictory phrase "irrational rationality" to connote the deeper
irrationality of institutional domination despite its appearance of being
organized on rational grounds 253.
The (more or less) rational approach of those who usurp power cannot explain the authoritarian structure of people who succumb to it and perpetuate it.
Today the proletarian is a 'normal' being, the worker has been promised
the dignity of afull 'human being', and, moreover, in accordance with this
category, he seizes onto every dominant discrimination: he is racist, sexist
and repressive. I...] Thefundamental law of this society is not the law of
exploitation, but the code of normality. 254

Baudrillard demonstrates how domination has been internalized in the current
culture 255. Consumerism a s a pervasive cultural model of the hyperreality of
symbols - where the principal symbols are power and domination - has bribed
people to buy into the system of domination, and thus reproduce it willingly
and at the same time mostly unconsciously. However, authoritarian structures
have been reproduced in different ways throughout the history of the
domination paradigm. This cultural reproduction of domination is based on a
deeper psychological core of authoritarianism.

253
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255

'Irrationality of rationality" also indicates the reductionist and dualist concept of
reason which will be addressed as an epistemological issue in the following
chapter.
Baudrillard. 1976:28-29,emphasis mine
See also the quote at footnote 43 in chapter 5.

Directly, through personal coercion, and indirectly, through
intermittent social shows of force such as public inquisitions and executions,
behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions that did not conform to dominator
nonns were systematically discouraged. Thisfear conditioning became part
of all aspects of daily lge, penneating child rearing, laws, schools. And
through these and all the other instruments of socialization, the kind of
replicative information required to establish and maintain a dominator
society was distributed throughout the social system 256

Social pressure has been a crucial means of maintaining domination, but
there are also deeper psychological roots that make human insensitivity and
cruelty possible. Wilhelm Reich's comprehensive analysis offers avenues for
understanding the deeper causes and origins of authoritarianism. His findings
also identlfy fear a s the essential emotion that maintains authoritarian
structures - the fear of authority, impressed upon the individual in childhood,
through the education and socialization processes. Fear is sealed into the
bodily pattern and psychosomatic reactions a s emotional blockages which
Reich termed "character armor" 257. It is a cumbersome hamper of a n
individual's inner freedom, but at the same time it is indispensable to prepare
the individual for survival in the culture thoroughly imbued by domination and
authoritarian patterns and structures. The deeply ingrained fear thus
represents the psychological mechanism which fervently defends authoritarian
structures, power and domination patterns.
The armored organism perceives the self as consisting of isolated parts.
Every impulse must penetrate the armor. From this, the feeling of "you
should" or "youmust" arises, as well as the idea that the organism has a
higher center that gives "orders"to the executive organs. [...I From here to the
political concept of human society or, conversely,from the concept of the
absolute state to the mechanistic concept of the organism is only one step. 258

"Character armor" is also the basis for mystification of power and authority
- the process of "irrational rationalization" in order to just@ power and to

endure or maintain it. Of crucial importance here is the two way process: the
mechanism by which power is defended both by those who exert it, and by
those who are subjected to it, who are dominated, oppressed, coerced. This
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Eisler, op.cit.: 82-83, emphasis mine
See quote at footnote 1 17 above.
Reich, 1949/ 1973: 1 17-1 18, emphasis mine

two-way process explains how domination patterns have been maintained and
reproduced during such a long period of cultural evolution.
Power, ultimately, is the result of the helplessness of the people. Power
over men is either grabbed by leaders by force or leaders are pushed into power
over people by the people themselves. [...I This type ojpower is taken because
people let it happen, do not object to it, or even admire it. 259

Reich followed the development of human irrationality from the level of individual "character armor", that is perpetuated through education and socialization, to the social level, where it sprawls into what he termed "emotional
plague". It is the psychological essence of human evil, aggressiveness, violence
and cruelty, a s well a s of domination patterns, and it is manifested in both the
readiness to succumb to power, and the lust to exert it over others:
We can dejke the emotional plague as human behavior that, on the basis
of a biopathic character structure, operates in a n organized or typical way in
interpersonal, i.e., social, relations and in social institutions [. .. manifested
as] passive and active thirst for authority; moralism; [. ..] sadistic methods of
education; masochistic toleration of such methods or criminal rebellion
against them: gossip and defamation; authoritarian bureaucracy I...] antisocial criminality; pornography; racial hatred. [...I The compass of the emo tional plague coincides approximately with the broad compass of social abuse.260

The connection between irrationality, domination and sexuality 261 is
manifested in authoritarian mentality and in the support of oppression by the
oppressed:
John Doe, a mental patient a t Michigan's Ionia State Hospital [. ..I was
invited to participate in an experimentfunded by the state whose goal was to
compare the "violence control" efects of limbic system psychosurgery a n d the
drug cyproterone acetate, a n antiandrogen supposed to produce a "chemical
castration"characterized by impotence,lass of sex drive, and docility. Ram
information provided by the director, I...] Doe consented to participate in the
psychosurgery treatment group; his parents also consented. 262

This connection reiterates the relationship between domination over nature and
over humansas a repression and oppression of nature within and without
ourselves

259
260
261

262
263

263:

Reich, 195 1/ 1980: 64,emphasis mine
Reich, l933/ 1980: 508, emphasis mine
which I pointed out between footnotes 1 13 and 1 17 above
Chorover, 1979: 198- 199, emphasis mine
See text between footnotes 100 and 101 above.

The domination of internal nature makes possible the domination of
external nature, which in turn leads to the domination of human beings. 264

Authoritarian attitudes toward domination and power present a specific terminological issue. In physics power is defined a s ability to do work, or energy
The departure from this neutral meaning is manifested in the connotational
shift from power a s means to power a s goal in itself. A non-dominational
meaning of power would be related to empowerment for responsibility, which is
the key issue of transition to a post-domination (and ecological) culture.
In contrast to the still prevailing view of power as [...I the power to take
away or to dominate - a very d~fferentview of power seems to have been the
norm in Neolithic I.. .I societies [...I a power that was more equated with
responsibility and bue thanwith oppression, privilege, and fear. I.. .This]
view of power [...I -for which I propose the term actualization power as
distinguished from domination power - obviously reflects a very d~zerent
type of social organizationfrom the one we are accustomed to. 265

Joanna Macy refers to such a new definition a s power with instead of power

over 266.
The deep psychological basis of the barriers to post-domination surface as
fear of freedom and disempowerment for responsibility. Loss of responsibility
is a crucial aspect of alienation:
Alienation is not I...] an estrangement merely from the means and fruits
of production. It is also estrangement from the activity itself which allows us
to deny our responsibility for what we do. 267

I have already argued that freedom can be identified with responsibility

-

a s freedom from any external authority to which we relegate the responsibility
to determine the conditions of our lives. That does not mean freedom from the
responsibility for the external conditions of our lives. These two situations are
often confused. The confusion emerges because authoritarianism is deeply ingrained. It is deeply implanted by fear, a s described above. Fear is reproduced
a s fear of freedom - or fear of responsibility, fear of becoming liberated from
the false security that the reliance on external authority seems to provide.

Merchant, 1994: 5
Eisler. op.cit.: 28,emphasis mine
266 Macy, 1995:256-257.The same wording is used by Mathew Fox - see footnote 103
above.
267 Roszak. op.cit.: 2 14-216
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Fear and its deeper psychosomatic basis of "character armor" are essential
causes of disempowerment for responsibility and freedom. They produce a
numbness for freedom, a detachment which is a consequence of disconnection
between the biological core, the natural impulses of the "armored" individual,
and his or her affective expressions

268.

De-alienation and empowerment would

thus involve a liberation from authoritarian structures, a s well a s an
overconling of disconnectedness and detachment, which are essential
mechanisms and prerequisites of domination.
The attempt to create afree society of autonomous individuals via the
domination of outer nature was self-vitiating because this very process also
distorted the subjective conditions necessary for the realization of that
freedom [...I What was needed [...I was a new harmonization of o w rational
faculties and our sensuous nature. 269

The emancipation into individuality and into a n individual's responsibility
for her or his environment is based on this psychological framework. When the
domination patterns and authoritarian structures are deconstructed, what ensues is a n individual responsibility no longer derived from reliance on outside
authorities, on prescribed compulsive morality. This post-dominational individual responsibility is based on sensitivity, a n inner sense of regard for the individual's own self and for the immediate and wider social, biological and physical environment - a senuous faculty which is numbed by fear and detachment.
To bring nature into existence and to encounter it with respect would
mean today that ourfild of experience be expanded to include awareness of
our biological rhythms and thefundamental cycles within and without us.
These rhythms, however, wiU not operate as the 'pure', natural forces they
once were; they may still turn against us if ignored or violated, but they will
become part of our everyday experience of time to the extent that we are able to
consciously accept their presence. 270

This inner sense consists of rational, but also emotional, intuitive and spiritual components. It also presents the connection between sustainability and spirituality, or an inner ecology of the individual. Addressing the deeper aspects
of eco-systemic connectedness involves insights into issues of spirituality.
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See quote at footnote 117 and the first sentence of the quote at footnote 258.
Eckersley, op.cit.: 70-71, emphasis mine
Melucci, op.cit.: 22, emphasis mine

Chapter

Ecological Culture and Spirituality
I stand for the touch of bodily awareness between
human beings and the touch of tenderness. I.. .I And
it is a battle against the money, and the machine
and the insentient ideal monkeyishness of the

world. 1

Terminological and Connotational Issues
I have again chosen to use a currently very popular word, in order to

denote - in this case - a range of notions and concepts which span a wider
connotational scope than what is commonly meant by spirituality. The notions
now associated with spirituality are even more unclear and also much more
controversial than is the case with the term sustainability.
I am going to discuss only those aspects of spirituality which I consider re-

lated to the conceptual framework of ecological culture. Therefore, a s an inquiry into spirituality, this essay is unquestionably limited 2 . Furthermore, some of
the issues that I find pertinent to spirituality will certainly be considered debatable and even objectionable by a more orthodox approach to the field.
The controversy about spirituality arises primarily because the recent,
enormous interest in it has been mostly expressed as a return to pre-rationalist
views and concepts, which have for several centuries been considered unscien1
2

Lawrence, 1928/1977:292
See also the last paragraph of chapter 1.

tific and superseded by modem rationalist, objectivist and materialist science.
The revival of interest in spirituality has indeed been manifested primarily and
initially in non-scientific spheres. It is only most recently that spiritual topics
have slowly begun to enter the scientific domain. But these attempts have been
confronted with much caution and even animosity from the scientific cornrnunity, because it is still largely steeped in the paradigm which deems spiritual
issues unscientific and a province of other, primarily religious domains.
In addition to these more recent contributions to the topic, throughout the
reign of the rationalist and materialist/mechanistic paradigm, there have been
thinkers and scientists who addressed spiritual issues

3,

and who were

preoccupied by problems which could not fit into the context of the prevailing
paradigm. These more encompassing views have been upstaged and mostly
forgotten by mainstream. However, these views, particularly the more recent
ones, have mostly been addressed by rigorous scientific methodology.
Nevertheless, they have been ignored or rejected, often exactly on methodological grounds - because the conclusions did not fit the current paradigm. Thus
methodology has often been used a s a n excuse for conservatism, or has been
confused with the conceptual framework 4.
The recent revival of spirituality has its most wide-spread manifestation in
the "new age" movement. It has addressed spiritual issues in popular ways, a s
well a s in approaches which have scientific ambitions. The borderline between
these forms often is not sharp because of the innovative character of their
expressions which challenge the current paradigm.
It can be expected, particularly in the case of scientific endeavors, that the
renewed consideration of spiritual issues will be approached from a new
perspective, from a different context defined by the new developmental stage
in cultural evolution. Such an approach has to include the cultural experience
3

4

i.e. Kepler, Newton, Leibniz, Schrtidinger - to name randomly just a few among the
well-known.
For Leibniz. 'yorce"was the foundation for an understanding of both the
phenomenal and spiritual universes. (Merchant, 1980: 279)
See quote at footnote 62 in chapter 2.

which has been built-in in the meanwhile. This means that the heritage of the
rationalistic paradigm and all its ramifications have to be critically included,
and the new conceptual framework has to be established as post-rationalist.
However, many of the "new age" preoccupations with spirituality return to prerationalist positions. Such approaches are often justified by proclaiming that all
knowledge within the rationalist, mechanistic and materialist paradigm is a
mistake and a developmental blind alley.
For mos t of the recent modem era 1.. .I the reductionist stance toward spirituality has prevailed - all spiritual experiences, no matter how highly developed they might in fact be, were simply interpreted as regressions to primitive and infantile modes of thought. However, as fi in overreaction to all that,
we are now, and have been since the sixties, in the throes of variousforms of
elevationism (exernpl~fiedby, but by no means con$ned to, the New Age movement). [. ..] Anything rational is wrong; anything nonrational is spiritual. [. ..]
While we eventually want to move beyond rationality (and its own inherent limitations and grave problems), it is crucial to acknowledge what it did
manage to accomplish, and what its evolutionarily phase specific task was. 5

This condemnation of anythmg rational a s "non-spiritual" is often rendered
with more mystification so it does not appear a s simple a s Wilber presents it. It
is a peculiar manifestation of uncritical reversal of a dualistic pair 6 - one that
has been newly established. Namely, spirituality was not traditionally counterposed to rationality; on the contrary, they were initially construed at the same
side of the duality between reason and nature, or spirituality and nature. The
recent revival of spirituality emerges a s a n opposition to the dominant status of
rationality, and - following the habituated dualistic approach - it perceives spirituality as inferiorized by the dominant paradigm, and, therefore, recourses to
dualistic reversal a s a known strategy. Thus, spirituality is now treated a s a
dualized pair with rationality 7,and the whole rationalist heritage is uncritically
discarded.
The consequence of this reversal is a return to mystification, which is confused with experiences that are described a s mystical. The majority of "new
age" preoccupations thus renounce all the present achievements in and further
5
6

7

Wilber, 1995: 206-207,375
See text between footnotes 123 and 126 in the previous chapter.
This issue will be discussed again later on - see between footnotes 55 and 58, and
after 9 4 below.

possibilities of addressing and resolving the domination and authoritarian
issues. Actually, authoritarian patterns are largely preserved in most manifestations of the "new age" movement. "New age" is a very diverse mixture of all
sorts of mystical pursuits, joining aspects of some new liberative developments
with old mystical traditions, particularly Eastern and Native American. These
interests are basically a somewhat groping quest for a new understanding of
essential problems of our being. But, a s it usually happens with massmovements, the majority of "new-agers" is fascinated with the mystical aspects
and perceives them a s a goal in itself, rather than a vehicle to understanding
more about humans and the context of their being. Consequently, most of the
"new age" preoccupations establish authoritarian patterns by perceiving
external spiritual entities as decisive determinants of human life. This is
not only a dualist concept of spirituality, it also defies the possibility of dealienation from the constraints of domination patterns, which I elaborated in
the previous chapter - a de-alienation which would be based on responsibility
a s an inner spiritual and rational sense.
There are many strands within the [New Age] movement, but broadly
speaking it offers a view of the world apparently less rigid than either religion
or science: a view where the role of spirit is recognized without the dogmatic
framework of traditional religions, [...I It might seem that this movement
could offer us new guidelinesfor lwing that can bridge the great divides
patriarchy and capitalism have created. But can it? [...I The recognition that
each person has enormous Latent power is sometimes used to ingate the same
selfish ambitions that capitalism has always encouraged into an ego-oriented
vision of 'unlimited potential'. 8

This misunderstanding of spirituality by some "new age" concepts and practices does not entail that spirituality should be rejected altogether. Some critiques, however, fall into that trap and "throw away the child together with the dirty water". Bookchin is often undiscriminatingly adverse to most of the "spiritual"
or "new age" attitudes, which reflects his generally justified concern that they
are a mystification of nature, a step backward to religious authoritarianism.
One wonders how notions of spirituality can be given priority over the
need for a critical evaluation of social structures. [. ..] Taoist and Buddhist
-

8

Goodison, 19922W241. This perspective is, of course, consequent to the current
consumerist and economist paradigm of limitlessness -see around footnote 199 in
the previous chapter.

pieties replace the need for social and economic analysis, and self-indulgent
encounter groups replace the need for political organization and action. [. ..]
Social ecology I...]does not fall back on incantations, sutras I...] or spiritual
vagaries. It is avowedly rational. 9

Social context is typically absent from "new age" spirituality, and that is
another manifestation of its regressive stance:
What some in the new movement ignore is the fact that physical and
spiritual health cannot be bought but must be lived, and are inseparable from
the social conditions which are the contextfor that living. [.. I The 'new age'
spirituality is in many cases merely dispensing traditional religious values in
'new age' bottles more appropriate to the conditions of twentieth century
laissez-faire capitalism. 10

All these problems indicate how important it is to deconstruct domination
before embarking upon a spirituality quest.
Another salient aspect of "new age" spirituality is its significance as a
reaction to "postmodern" loss of meaning

11, and

a potential for a new

integration (despite the majority that regresses into mystifications).
The postmodern collapse of meaning has been countered by an emerging
awareness of the individual's self-responsibility and capacity for creative
innovation and self transformation in his or her existential and spiritual
response to l$e. 12

The discussion of the domination and alienation patterns in the previous
chapter follows to some extent the postmodern deconstructivist strategy.
primarily of Jean Baudrillard. However, like most postmodernist writers, he
often appears a s if he actually accepts the social conditions which he
poignantly criticizes.
Postmodernists emphasize thefiagmentaty cutd discontinuous nature of
reality. Denying the accessibility of any objective truth, postmodernists have
come to reject any sense of the individual subject as the locus of "truth,"
relying instead on a decentered concept of the individual as the intersection of
power-desire relations. 1 3

Postmodernism depicts reality a s disconnected and dissipated, and such a
perception is to some extent determined by the postmodernist method of
deconstruction. Notwithstanding the sagacious insights into patterns of

9
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Bookchin, 1988: 23 1-236
Goodison. op.cit.:244-245. emphasis mine
See Baudrillard's quotes at footnotes 32, 3 1 and 28, in chapter 5.
Tarnas, 1991:404
Gold. 1993: xv, emphasis mine

alienation, deconstruction typically leaves a rather pessimistic aftertaste. There
emerges a sort of a vicious circle: the reality is characterized by loss of
meaning, absence of dialectic and real conflict, and by pervasive impact of
deceptive simulations - and in such a reality, every attempt at suggesting a
different way is also deemed meaningless and doomed to be perceived as
anything but another simulacrum. By denying any purposefulness, this
inherent cynicism hinders the possibility of de-alienating visions and creates a
hopeless impasse 14. Does this attitude have to remain an eternal reality, or is
it just a phase, a reaction to the current stage of cultural development?
I f the postmodem mind has sometimes been prone to a dogmatic relativism and a compulsively Jiagmenting skepticism, and fi the cultural ethos
that has accompanied it has sometimes deteriorated into cynical detachment
and spiritless pastiche, it is evident that the most sign~jkantcharacteristics
of the larger postmodem intellectual situation - its pluralism, complexity,
and ambiguity - are precisely the characteristics necessary for the potential
emergence of a fundamentally new form of intellectual vision, one that might
both preserve and transcend the current state of extraordinary
differentiation. 15

Deconstruction makes more (if not the only) sense when it opens possibilities for reconstruction, toward a new integration. After the deconstruction of
domination patterns, authoritarianism and dualism, we are left with a shattered
foundation of our present culture. So we need reconstruction, coming up with
a new foundation - for an emerging ecological culture 16. The processes of
deconstruction and reconstruction have to be taken as consecutive.
Two antithetical impulses can be discerned in the contemporary
intellectual situation, one pressing for a radical deconstruction and
unmasking - of knowledge, beliefs, world views - and the otherfor a radical
integration and reconciliation. In obvious ways the two impulses work
against each other, yet more subtly they can also be seen as working together
as polarized, but compkmentaty tendencies. 17

14

15
16
17

There is no utopianism, no consolation, no telos to history, society, human lge.
I...] The movement is beyond optimism and pessimism,ideology and utopia.
(Hollinger, 1993: 169-170, emphasis mine) See also quote at footnote 2 1 1 .
Tarnas, op.cit.: 402
See also the quote at footnote 10 in chapter 6.
Tarnas, op.cit.: 407, emphasis mine

The reconstruction emerging out of deconstructed domination paradigm
offers a possibility of a new integration in the revisited sphere of spirituality

18.

This reconsidered spirituality can be denoted a s integrative spirituality, and the
two principal aspects of integration are immanence (re-connection of spirituality
and nature), and integrative epistemology (inclusion of other-than-rational
modes of [comlprehension 19 and communication

20).

These two aspects will be

discussed under the next two subtitles, respectively
The essential characteristic of this integration is re-connection - surpassing the disconnectedness and detachment (from nature within and without,
and consequently from direct interaction with social and natural environment),
which are the crucial manifestations of alienation in the current culture, and of
the domination paradigm that pervades it. The vehicle of connectivity in this reconnection is integrative spirituality. It is connoted a s a n intrinsic, individual
spirituality which enables the connections with spheres of non-rational (or notonly-rational) consciousness. In some of the renewed approaches to spirituality,
these connections are conceived of a s mediated by subtle life energies which
permeate us.
The factor so oJen r e e d as 'spirituality' can be understood as a quality
o f f i e energy present in all lge's activities. I...]We all have the ability to act
intuitively, to be in tune with the essence of our own energy and the energy of
others, to heal ourselves and others through acting in harmony with forces
present in the universe. 21

Moreover, intrinsic spirituality (Goodison refers to it as immanent spirituality) consists of this very connection and connectedness, the subtle energy. It
makes non-verbal and non-material links to other humans and to the environ18

19

20
21

The modern searchfor a lost ancient spirituality can be seen in a new I...]light I...]
the search for the kind of spirituality characteristic of a partnership rather than a
dominator society. I...]Increasingly, the work of modern ecologists indicates that
this earlier quality of mind, in our time ofen associated with some types of
Eastern spirituality, was far advanced beyond today's environmentally
destructive ideology. (Eisler, 1987: 75)
Prehension is defined in Oxford Dictionary as "apprehensionof something
perceived that may or may not involve cognition; the interaction that exists
between a subject and an entity or event". This meaning of the term is associated
with A. N. Whitehead.
Communication in this context is conceived of as a two-way epistemological mode
- see text between footnotes 1 16 and 117 below.
Goodison, op.cit.: 255-256, 284). See also quote at footnote 99 in chapter 4.

ment - social, biological and physical. Therefore, intrinsic, inner, or immanent
spirituality creates a sense of belonging, an ecospheric, or cosmic belonging 22.
Immanence means the re-connection of this sense to the body. It is a
sensitivity that we can feel in our bodies as connectivity and interrelatedness to
our natural and social environment. Thus, eco-systemic inter-connectedness is
not just an abstract notion, but it emerges as a tangible, "sensible" faculty. It is
the sensitivity for subtle life energies, for nature within and without - as both
the inner and the outer nature (the organism and the eco-system, a s well a s
the entire cosmos) function on the same energy-based principle. This sensitivity
can be experienced (under favorable circumstances) as streaming and vibrations
of natural processes, of energies within and around us. Sensitivity thus
enables us to feel our metabolic interaction with our environment. I have
described energy exchange as the essential characteristic and criterion of
sustainability. Inner sensitivity is what links our own life processes to the life

processes around us. It lets us feel that we are part of the natural processes
of renewal and energy exchange. It is a spiritual basis of sustainability.
In this way, sensitivity is perceived a s an ability and alertness, and can be
considered a s a manifestation of liveliness, vigor and health. Alternative health
concepts and healing practices are based on the conception of the organism as
a self-regulatory life process which has inherent tendency to heal itself. To heal
means to make whole, to return to the state of integrity. In that sense, health
is not primarily the treating of illness, but the sense of wellness, of wholeness.
So sensitivity is the awareness, the feeling of the self-regulatory life processes,
the energy exchange, the pulsation and streaming of life energy. Sensitivity is
based on the flow of life energy itself - the energy that permeates us, that is
within and without. So health is a sense of undisturbed flow of life processes,
of life energy. It is the sensitivity for self-regulating, sustainable processes of
natural renewal in ourselves and around us. In that way, inherent sensitivity is

22

See quote at footnote 51 in chapter 1.

the tangible basis for our relation to nature, to the ecospheric processes and
intercomectedness, to the social, biological and physical environment.
A whole new field has emerged under the name of ecopsychology. It is an

extension, or a developmental transformation of psychology, or its broadening
into the field of human ecology.
There is only one core issuefor all psychology. Where is the 'me"? Where
does the 'me" begin? Where does the 'me" stop? Where does the bther" begin?
[...I The human subject has all along been implicated in the wider world of
nature. How could it be otherwise, since the human subject is composed of the
same nature as the world? Yet psychological practice tends to bypass the
consequences of such facts. I...I An individual's harmony with his or her b w n
deep self' requires not merely a jounzey to the interior but a harmonizing
with the environmental world. 23

Ecopsychology questions the current psychological paradigm which is
established upon a rigid boundary between the self and the social environment
(natural environment has hardly come within the purview of psychology). Such
a concept of boundary perpetuates the mind set of disconnectedness.
Conventional developmental theories have lent support to the illusion
that we live wholly within this slender envelope o f f i s h that encloses the soft.
vulnerable organs - that we are irrevocably cut offfiom everyone and
everything else. 24

Ecopsychology puts the inquiry about human psyche into (eco-)systemic
context, where the issue of boundaries emerges in a n entirely different
framework: they become the interface, the medium of connectivity between the
self and the environment, both social and natural. This marks the transition
from separated self to self-in-relation.
Such a sensitivity or spirituality is the basis for individual responsibility,
liberated from domination patterns - a responsibility which is no longer a
matter of reliance on external authority and imposed morality of prescribed
rights and duties. Responsibility becomes a n individual's inner ethic, a n inner
sense for the individual-in-her/his-environment.
The sensitivity for selfregulatory life processes becomes a self-regulated ethic:
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The term "sensibility"is chosen to suggest a complex pattern of
perceptions, attitudes, and judgements which, $fully developed, would
constitute a disposition to appropriate conduct. 25

Inherent spirituality and sensitivity as the basis for a n ecological responsibility present one of the central issues of the concept of ecological culture.
In the process of the alienating, domination-pervaded cultural development, humans have become numbed for this sensitivity, for a n awareness
about the streaming and vibrations of natural processes which permeate them.
Consequently, they have undergone a process of alienation from natural, innate
frankness and openness to sensuality and sexuality 26.
Our inability to stop our suicidal and ecocidal I...]behavior that continues in spite of the individual knowing that it is destructive to self, family,
work, and social relationships [. .. indicates that] we as a species are suflering
from a kind of collective amnesia. We have forgotten something our ancestors
once knew and practiced - certain attitudes and kinds of perception, an ability to empathize and identih with nonhuman l$e [...I We notice the emergence
of an amnesia that is really a double forgetting, wherein a cultureforgets, and
then forgets that it has forgotten how to live in harmony with the planet. [...I
The amnesia metaphor is more hopeful than some of the other models,
since it is easier to remember something that we once knew than it is to
develop an entirely new adaptation. 27
Yet, the sensitivity is not all lost, some of it is still there, some of it we still use

without being aware of it - because we have not relied on it for so long in the
culture which conditions u s to rely on external authorities and on rational
mechanisms.
Another way of describing the loss of sensitivity is desensitization, which is
the result of overexposure to stimuli that are mostly simulations of reality

28.

Thus, numbness appears as a more appropriate definition than amnesia which
is rather a metaphor (as Metzner himself puts it), than a n accurate depiction of

the actual condition 29.
This numbness is a t the same time a manifestation and the consequence of
detachment and disconnection which are essential characteristics of the current culture of alienation and domination. An immanent spirituality, with re-con25
26
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nection to bodily sensitivity, would imply a non-dualized concept of spirituality
- a deconstruction and surpassing of the dualism of spirituality and nature.

Spirituality and Nature
NOW, as the gods have indisputably and$nally lefl

the stage and history no longer can promise any
insured outcome as its conclusion, we are prepared
to comprehend the nature that is ourselves. The
renewed interest in the body expresses this new
awareness of our belongingness to nature and of
the fact that it is in nature that our roots and
dignity lie. 30

Spirituality has been initially dualized from the bodily, from the sensual
and the natural, and in that polarization identified with reason. The current
paradigm still essentially accepts and endorses the basic dualistic split of
body/soul. Platonism was established a s a conceptual system based on these
dualistic notions.
One basic symbol, which can be traced back to Plato and the Greek tradition, represents the body as a dark container imprisoning the divine light of
the soul. I...] In Christian language sins are 'of thefish'. The body torments
the soul with sexual desires whosefilfillment is forbidden. Its separate parts.
when they are not evil, are sinister,frightening or disgusting. 31

The basic dualistic pairs of body/soul and nature/spirit were developed in
Platonism to their ultimate consequences - dualized cleavages between spirit,
reason, masculinity, power and intelligence on one side, and nature, body,
intuition, emotionality and femininity on the other. In the context of this essay.
the detachment of spirituality from nature is the most significant of these
developments. Spirituality has been posited a s a sphere of the mind, of supreme rationality, superior and dominant over nature within and without humans.
Plato separates world-body and world-soul and insists on the worldsoul's priority [...] 'the domination and controlling partner'. I...] The Timaeus
explains the principle and process involved in the imposition of form on
indeterminate and formless matter as the imposition of rational order (Zogos)
on the female 'receptacle'. I...] The feminine is explicitly and repeatedly
associated in Plato with the lower order of nature as opposed to reason,
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associated with formless, undisciplined matter or primeval chaos; with
disorder and ungoverned emotion. 32

The dualism of body and soul has been particularly implicative. It has entailed and further fortified a whole range of dualistic constructs: spirit a s pure
and divine - nature and body a s impure, dirty and despicable; the realm of
spirit a s superior because it is eternal - the sphere of life and nature a s inferior because it is ephemeral; the realm of spirit a s salvation - the sphere of life
a s suffering, and body a s prison of the soul. These basic dualist notions have
undergone some transformations in the course of cultural development through
the Enlightenment and Modernity, but the fundamental dualistic mind frame
has persevered a s the cultural pattern based on domination, on unsustainable
economy and on disconnectedness from the natural processes of renewal.
Particularly severe implications have, throughout the development of
western civilization, resulted from debasement and depreciation of everything
bodily, sensual and sexual - and consequently of everyday life processes.
The culture that we comefrom was suspicious of anything that had to do
with the level of instincts, urges, or deep-seated needs. In its religious version
of spirit possession and of sin, or in its secular-puritan version of bourgeois
morality, the principle persisted that the impulses of the body were
fundamentally evil in their origin and intuence, and thus to be considered
injurious to proper conduct of life if not adequately contained. 33

Debasement of everything related to body and nature has entailed the dualized
constructs of irnpure/pure and obscene/divine, which have established a
notion of spirituality as entirely devoid of any tangible and "sensible" reality the basic dualism of sensitivity-sensuality versus spirituality.
One of the most damaging myths we have inherited is that 'spirit' is pure
while 'matter' is impure [...I The subordination of women and the denial of the
body in early Greek patriarchy were paralleled by a growing emphasis on
abstract, sky-dwelling divinities. The philosophy of Plato crystallises the
elevation of the pure 'Idea' over the world of matter. As man became more
alienatedfrom his own nature, so he became more alienatedfrom the world of
nature in general. [...I The dualistic traditions of Platonism prevailed, via
Neoplatonism and Christianity, to institutionalise a contict between the
reasonable and the sensual. 34
32
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These attitudes have had the meaning of detachment and disconnection
from life and natural processes, and they have also been inducive and
conducive to the numbing of sensitivity for life strearnings and for nature
within and without. Moreover, they have engendered the further dualized pairs
of lewd/elevated, or simply low/high and down/up, which, however, do not
denote the simple spatial relationships, but are assigned a moral value. They
are connoted hierarchically, thus establishing the inferiorization essential to the
basic dualism of spirituality versus nature, and all its derived polarities.
The dualistic concept of spirituality posited a s a sphere of supreme rationality - superior and dominant over nature within and without humans - has been
the foundation of transcendentalism, the idea that the meaning and purpose of
existence are not life and natural reality, but the realm of pure spirit. The realm
of pure spirit is thereby considered beyond material and bodily existence.
In her comprehensive analysis, Val Plumwood demonstrates the Platonic
derivation of the basic concepts of dualistic transcendentalism:
There are important and obvious ways in which Plato is hostile to life: in
the establishment of an otherworldly identity beyond the earth which is the
real source of meaning and the corresponding treatment of the individual's
life on earth as a prison; in the conception of the biological world of change
and decay as inferior and corrupt; in the conception of the female giving of life
as debased; and in the imposition of lifeless, abstract 'rational' patterns I...]on
the supposedly 'disorderly' world of life. 35

Dualistic transcendentalism posits spirituality and everything essential a s
beyond the present reality, as "other-worldly". The consequent dualist pairs are
life/eternity, ephemeral/eternal, life/pure spirit, life/"after-life". By conceiving
of spirituality a s external to life, dualistic transcendentalism reproduces alienation in the form of presenting life a s inferior and illusory. Detachment and
disconnectedness are very effectively the vehicles of this form of alienation.
For both Platonic and Christian systems, the meaning of death is that

the meaning of human life is elsewhere, I...]in a separate realm accessible
only to humans (and only to certain chosen of these), the world of the Forms
and the world of heaven The salvation awaiting them beyond and above the

world of nature, a fate marked out for humans alone, confirms their
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diflerence and separationfrom the world of nature, and their destiny as one
apartfrom that of other species. 36

The essential meaning of transcendentalism is the perception of external
spiritual entities a s decisive determinants of human lives. Ken Wilber shapes
his theory of holism in order to establish and prove that a transcendentalist
position is pertinent to ecology. He contends that noosphere includes biosphere, but not the other way around, thus positing a hierarchical and dualist concept of holism, rather than a systemic perspective of interrelated, but non-dualized levels of complexity. His approach to holism is cast a s a n all-encompassing system of holons which he claims to be the ultimate reality. He states a t
the beginning of his theoretic elaboration that "theuniverse is not what it appears" 37. His consequently argued ultimate tenet is that pure spirit is higher

and a more desirable state of being than life. He perceives spirituality a s salvzition from the constraints of the lower holon of bios, a s freedom from the cumbersome embodiment of life processes. He returns u s to the cave of shadows.
The Platonic theory appears to represent an extraordinary inversion of
intuitive thinking: the lgeless world of the Forms gives eternal lqe, the living
world of nature is called a tomb. 38

Wilber analyses the etymology of the word hierarchy and concludes that it
means -sacred governance", or "governingone's life b y spiritual powers" 39.
What else is that than domination of external spiritual entities over humans?
This shows that Wilber retains some deeply ingrained authoritarian attitudes.
They are consequent to his dualized concept of spirituality and nature.
Because of its orientation toward "othenvorldliness" and its perception of
external spiritual entities a s decisive determinants of human life, dualistic transcendentalism is incompatible with a n ethic focused on nature, ecological systems
and living processes - and generally incongruous with any ecological perspec-

-
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tive 40. Detachment of spirituality from body and nature is an essential conceptual obstacle to a comprehensive paradigm change toward a different culture.
An overcoming of dualistic transcendentalism is offered by the concept of

immanent spirituality - a spirituality conceived of as a unity of consciousness
and sensitivity. The concept of immanent spirituality does away with the dualist
idea that embodiment is an inferior state of being, and that pure spirit is what
we have to aspire to (with different prognoses for attaining it, dependent on the
different religious contexts). Immanent spirituality also entails a different
attitude toward the body, toward sensuality and sexuality, toward nature in
ourselves and around us. Such an attitude has profound consequences for the
idea of sensitivity as the basis of responsibility for the social, biological and
physical environment 41. Immanent spirituality is therefore essential for the
concept of ecological culture that I am presenting in this essay.
Some non-dualistic theories of spirituality point out that the perception of
embodiment in terms of in/out, makes much more sense that down/up, or
descent/ascent. It implies that spirit is both within and without:
The mos t appropriate symbol or picture of divine omnipresence is that of
a circle of water withfish in it. We are thefih; God is the water. We breathe
God in and out all day long. We are in God and God is in us. I...] The circular
dynamic I.. ] corresponds to the in/out energies of pantheism while the ladder
motif I.. .I corresponds to the God-distinct-jirom-usmotif of theism. I.. .I We
need not climb up and up, merely wake fuller and fuller to what is already
present and pulsating in ow midst. 42

Matthew Fox is a foremost contemporary theologian who demystifies spirituality
and purges it of the long-lasting perversions of the domination paradigm. Thus
it becomes a n immanent spirituality no longer disconnected from life and
everyday reality.
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Considered as an environmental model, the platonic vision of the world-soul
yields not a spiritualisation of nature but rather a colonisation model which
points not to leaving things be in nature but to imposing human 'rational' design
on them (Plumwood,op.cit.: 86)
These consequences will be discussed in the last subsection of this chapter.
FOX,1979: 50-51, emphasis mine.

It is important to note, however, that transcendentalization of spirituality
has had its role in human development:
By separating Yahwehfrom nature, the Hebrews also separated the
Thus, the abolition of the immanence
divine from the human social order. I...]
of the divine was in fact afirst step in the secularization of society. 43

Yet, in tenns of domination, this historic change actually achieved much less
than Janet Biehl implies. But it had a meaning congruent to separation of
intellect from intuition, which Bergson perceived a s an important step in the
development of human consciousness, despite its negative consequences in the
form of detachment, disconnection and dualization

44.

Dualistic transcendentalism is indeed eminently dominational. It implies a
mediated domination 45 - via a system of simulacra: transcendental, i.e.
elusive, virtual entities as external determinants of our lives 46.
The issue of determinants emerges a s essential in this connection. Determinism is actually an aspect of transcendentalism. In the current paradigm (and
stage of cultural development) it appears as a problem of the conceptual and
methodological framework of science:
Any science that conceives of the world as being governed according to a
universal theoretical plan that reduces its various riches to the drab applications of general laws thereby becomes an instrument of domination. 47

Rupert Sheldrake has comprehensively examined and questioned the deterministic aspect of the current scientific paradigm, and identified its origin in
the transcendentalist world view:
-
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Science depends on a rigid. limited, and restrictive structural reality. This
limited view of reality is nevertheless very powerful, inasmuch as it allows for the
possibility of control whenever phenomena are predictable, regular, and subject to
rules and laws. The assumption of order is thus fundamental to the concept of
power, and both are integral to the modern scienhfic world view. (Merchant, 1980:
230)Of course, Merchant's observation is applicable to institutionalized science which, after all, seems to be almost the only form of science we have nowadays.

The orthodox assumption is that everything about a new kind of
molecule could in principle be calculated in advance before the molecule is
synthesized I...] determined by transcendent principles of order that exist
prior to its material existence. I...]It is not infact possible to predict in any
detail the structures and properties of molecules [...I on the basis of quantum
mechanics and the other theories of present-day physics. [...I But in so far as
this assumption is still taken for granted, chemistry, biochemistry, and
molecular biology continue to operate within a Platonic paradigm. 48

Once he has spotted this anomaly of the present paradigm (in Kuhnian tenns

49),

Sheldrake has gone ab ovo with his inquiry, and initiated a discussion which
indicates the onset of a profound paradigm change - one which has not yet manifested the immense ripple effect of its consequences. He has posed the fundamental question about natural (physical) laws - about their origin - and observed that, since the establishment of Darwinist evolutionary paradigm, science
has led a sort of a schizophrenic existence where "evolution w a s kept down to
earth, whereas the heavens were eternal."

50.

Sheldrake has identified this in-

consistence as "dual vision of the world" that perceives the continuously changing and evolving biosphere within a physical universe which is assumed to be
fmed for ever in its mechanical timelessness

51.

However, he considers that the

Big Bang theory has put the final touch on a process of conceptual change in
physics

52

- a process which (together with theories of irreversibility 53) has

moved physics into the evolutionary paradigm.
Starting from this fundamentally changed viewpoint, Sheldrake poses the
crucial question:
Do the laws of nature evolve? Or does physical reality evolve while the
laws of nature stay the same? In any case, what do we mean by the "lawsof
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nature"? I...] Laws that are invisible and intangible, but are nevertheless
present everywhere and always.
The nothingness "before"the creation of the universe is the most complete void that we can imagine - no space, time, or matter existed. I.. ] Yet this
unthinkable void converts itself into a plenum of existence - a necessary
ansequence of physical laws. Where are these laws written into that mid?
What "tells"the void that it is pregnant with a possible universe? It would
seem that even the void is subject to law, a logic that exists prior to time and
space. I. .] Orperhaps the laws of natum have actually arotved along with
nature itself: and perhaps they are still evolving. [...I Maybe the very idea of
"laws" is inappropriate. 54

The evolutionary paradigm has a profound significance. It offers the
possibility of integration of the "dual vision of the world", and, generally, it is a
non-dualist, or post-dualist perspective.
"Dual vision of the world" is also related to the new dualization of rationality and spirituality 55. Since the Enlightenment, rationality was identified with
science, and the emerging rationalist, materialist/mechanist scientific paradigm
blurred the perception of spirituality a s a sphere of the mind and reason

56

-

the supreme godly reason which governs the world. The Enlightenment was a
process of secularization of reason. With its strict rationalist and positivist
orientation, science has excluded the spiritual issues from its scope of vision
and left them to the domain of religion. Thus, it has prepared the possibility for
the new dualization. Most of the "new age" revival of spirituality has emerged a s
a reaction to the dry, soulless rationality of the modem science

57,

and has

therefore created a newly dualized antagonism of spirituality versus rationality
On the other hand, dualistic construct of spirituality versus scientific
rationality reflects the deeply ingrained authoritarianism which needs a sphere
of elusive and external spiritual entities to govern our lives 58. The overcoming
of the dual vision of the world offers a n integration of the transcendental
54
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sphere of the godly "laws of nature" with the evolutionary processes within
nature. And the overcoming of dualism entails the deconstruction of domination
and authoritarianism. Once the authoritarian need for external seats of
domination is surpassed, transcendental laws of nature loose their function.
And Sheldrake questions the appropriateness of "the very idea" of natural laws:
The concept of laws of nature is metaphorical. It is based on an analogy
with human laws, which are binding rules of conduct prescribed by authority
I...] Laws imply lawgivers, and they are maintained by the power of authority.
If we drop the idea that the laws of nature areframed and maintained by God,
then we must ask: what makes them u p and how are they sustained? I...]
What is the basis of the regularities of nature? They cannot depend on
natural laws $these laws are only in human minds. 59

Disposing of natural laws is a fundamentally post-dominational proposition
emerging from Sheldrake's theory of formative causation. It suggests habits a s an evolutionary category - which develop interactively with natural
processes, instead of natural laws, a s a deterministic category. Sheldrake
posits fields which he terms morphic and which function a s depositories of the
habits of nature. He denotes a s "morphic resonance" the process of
communication - of transfer of habits a s information.
I f the evolving regularities of nature are not governed by transcendent
laws, then could they not be more like habits? Habits develop over time [...I
They are not all given in advance by eternal laws which are quite independent
of anything that actually happens - and even independent of the existence of
the universe. Habits develop within nature; they are not imposed on the world
ready-made. 1.. .1 Not only does the world evolve in space and time,but these
immanent organizing principles themselves euolve. According to the
hypothesis of formative causation, these organizing principles are morphic
fields, which contain an inherent memory. 60

The essential aspect of the concept of formative causation is self-organization of
natural processes, and it entails immanence rather than the transcendental character of natural laws a s external determinants of natural processes. Formative
causation dispels the determinism implicit in the notion of natural laws, and offers a basis a t cosmogenic level for a post-dominational world view. Furthermore, the immanence of morphic fields is conceived of a s immanent spirituality:

-
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In general tenns, _fields have inherited many of the properties
traditionally ascribed to souls in the pre-mechanistic philosophies of nature,
and the growth offild theories can be regarded as another of the ways in
which nature has been coming back to lge I. .] In this process the idea of souls
as purposive organizing principles has been replaced by concepts of
organizing fields, organizing relations, principles of self-organization, mind
in nature, patterns that connect, the implicate order, information, and
organizing principles under yet other names. 61

Sheldrake's theory presents a n evolutionary concept of cosmos which overcomes the "dual vision of the world". The evolutionary and self-organizational aspect
are congruent with Bergson's principle of becoming

62. Becoming

is consequent-

ly immanent, and its immanence, furthermore, entails a parallelism of the evolution of (human) consciousness and of natural processes within and without.
Evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, it creates, as it goes on, not
only thefonns of lge, but the ideas that will enable the intellect to understand
it, the terms which will serve to express it. I.. I.
Life in its entirety, regarded as a creative evolution, is something
analogous; it transcends _finality,if we understand by _finality the realization
of an idea conceived or conceivable in advance. 63

Bergson identified these complementary self-organizing processes a s the
essential creative thrust of evolution or development at all levels and scale. He
termed the thrust elan vital (life impetus):
An original impetus of life I...] sustained right along the lines of evolution
I...] is thefundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly
passed on, that accumulate and create new species. I...]Life is tendency, and
the essence of a tendency is to develop in theform of a sheaf, creating, by its
very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided. I...] The
essence of lge is in the movement by which life is transmitted. 64

The self-organizing principles and the implied fields of interrelatedness and
connectivity have been discerned a t the molecular level, primarily through the
research of Nobel-prizewinner Ilya Prigogine. Examining the far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics, he observed that particles in these conditions behave
interactively - that they practically communicate
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ibid.: 313-314,emphasis mine.
Reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes
itself, but it is never something made. [. .I The universe is not made, but is being
made continually. (Bergson, 191 1 / 1983:272,241)
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process occurring in high thermodynamic non-equilibrium which explains its
self-organizing character 66.
Self-organization, becoming and non-deterministic immanence present the
essential conceptual basis for a n ecological culture. The implicit overcoming of
the "dual vision of the world" entails the human-ecological perspective of
integration of the social and natural spheres. The social sphere itself has been
regarded - in the dualist paradigm - a s having the natural and the spiritual
aspect. The post-dualist mode of non-deterministic immanence opens the door
to a n integration or re-connection of spirituality and nature.
The concept of fields (morphic, or self-organizingl is of crucial importance
for this integrative perspective. Fields are the appropriate physical entities to
manifest (eco-)systemic interrelatedness and interconnectivity. This interconnective aspect of fields has fundamentally changed the perception of matter
and energy. Sheldrake maintains that "matteris explained in terms of energy

within_fields."67For such a perspective, physicist David Bohm has devised the
term "unbroken wholeness":
Instead of having separate little particles as the constituents of matter, Einstein thought of afield spread through all space, which would have strong and
weak regions. Some sbpng ~ g i o n swhich
,
ane stable,=present particles I...] just
as the vortex or whirlpool is a temporarily stable form I...] We speak of a whirlpod but one does not exist In the same way, we can speak of a particle, but
one does not exist: "parficle" is a namefor a certainform in the_field of mouement I...] a view which I call "unbrokenwholeness orflowing wholeness" I...]
All the forms we see in it are abstracted by our way of looking and thinking. 68

This altered perception entails a fundamental questioning of the sharp
differentiation between energy and matter. The recent developn~entsin
quantum physics have demonstrated that, at the subatomic levels, there is
absolutely no tangible matter to be delineated; there are only vibrations, or
66

See quote at footnote 69 in chapter 3.
Only eten~allaws were seen to express scientific rationality. Temporality was
looked down upon as an illusion This is no longer true today. We have discovered
that farfiom being an illusion, irreversibility plays an essential role in nature
and lies at the origin of most processes of self-organization (Prigogine and
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energy fields 69. A physical meaning of (eco-)systemic interconnectedness is
thus established, and it re-defines the notion of boundaries of physical entities,
a s well a s of living beings. Instead of separation, which the mechanist scientific
paradigm has imprinted on our gestalt, boundaries appear a s interface of
connectivity (and of metabolic exchange of energy with the environment) - a s
suggested by eco-psychological perspective

70.

Weare dealing with contact phenomena, with excitations of the orgonefield. 71

- or subtle energy field, a s Goodison has depicted it

72.

Wilhelm Reich developed a fundamental theory (as well a s practical
demonstrations and use) of life energy - which he named "orgone energy". His
concept is, unfortunately, still widely misunderstood and considered
controversial because of its radical implications. A life energy has so far
remained unidentified by mainstream primarily because of the viewpoint of
detachment which characterizes the current scientific paradigm

73.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to supply any extensive review of the
literature that supports the concept of a life energy 74. Such a concept has

Now atoms are known to be complex structures of activity composed of subatomic
particles, themselves patterns of vibration withinfitds. (Sheldrake, 1995: 4,
emphasis mine)
Our notions of separateness are challenged: the distinction between a person and
the air around, or between one person and another, s o apparently self-evident to
us, can be seenfrom this perspective as a [. ..I series of energy movements.
(Goodison,op.cit.: 232). See also text and quotes around footnotes 23 and 24 above.
Reich, 1949/ 1973: 71, emphasis mine
See quote at footnote 99 in chapter 4, and at footnote 21 in this chapter.
See in the previous chapter: quote at footnote 95; quote at and text before footnote
36; and text after footnote 85.
Notwithstanding that life energy is now so widely implied and applied, the
mainstream still arbitrates that it is unscientific to assume the existence of such a
phenomenon. (But, after all, if it were otherwise, there would be no reason for
writing about it in this essay.)

been present throughout the history of Western thought

75, in

addition to

Eastern philosophies and practices which are famed for the various forms of
vital energy that they are based upon.
Reich discovered that the waves of orgone energy merge in a spiral
movement, and this merger, which he called superimposition, can create
matter, or initial life forms:
Inert mass emerges from the slowed-down motion of two or more
superimposed orgone energy units. I...I The basic point is the emergence of
inert mass from [...I kinetic energy. 76

This essential aspect of the orgone energy theory implies a genetic unity of
matter and energy (which was initiated by Einstein's theory of relativity, but
became a more extensive field of inquiry in physics after Reich's lifetime).
Fields are inherently holistic. They cannot be sliced up into bits, or
reduced to some kind of atomistic unit; rather.fundamenta1 particles are now
believed to arisefromfields. 77

Consequently there is also a genetic unity of energy and organisms. Reich
perceived organisms a s enclosed energy systems - self-contained, with their
own integrity, and yet interconnected and interdependent to their environment:
the pervasive orgone energy (or life energy) "ocean" 78, or field

79, which

permeates all matter and living beings.

The more renowned names include Paracelsus ( 1493- 154 1), Van Helmont ( 15771644), Leibniz ( 1646- 1716), Galvani ( 1737- 1798), Mesmer ( 1734-1815). Reichenbach
(1788- 1869), and, of course, Wilhelm Reich (1897- 1957). Probably the most critical
and meticulously compiled resource is Dr. W. E. Mann's Vital E n e r a and Health
(Mann, 1989). Carolyn Merchant's The Death of Nature also has extensive coverage
of the history of vitalism.
A reassessment of the values and constraints historically associated with the
organic world view may be essentialfor a viablefuture. (Merchant, 1980: 288-289)
Reich, 1951/ 1973: 185-186
Sheldrake, 1995: 80-82, emphasis mine. See also quote by Bohm at footnote 68
above.
Sheldrake uses the same metaphor a s Riech. (See Reich's quotes at footnotes 133
and 190 below):
Ilhe vacuum has ceased to be an empty mid; it has become a seething ocean of
energy, producing countless vibrating particles all the time and taking them back
again. "A vacuum is not inert and featureless, but alive with throbbing energy and
vitality " (Sheldrake, 1988: 4-5, emphasis mine)

Others may prefer to propose d~fferentnames for thesefilds, which could in
general be called biologicalfilds or Zife_fields.(Sheldrake, 1995: 94-96, emphasis
mine)

Orgone energy is present "everywhere,"and it forms an uninterrupted
continuum. This continuum varies in d~fferentplaces with regard to its
"denseness"or "concentration." 80

The enclosed energy systems were termed by Reich "closed orgonomes" 81,
denoting both the primal, primordial form of life, of organism - the protoorganism - and every developed organism (including human). (This concept
presents a biological interpretation of embodiment - where the spiritual aspect
is part of immanent nature or cosmos - and it thus surpasses the dualist
transcendentalism and offers a re-connection of spirituality and nature.)
"Closed orgonomes" are systemic units in the sense of nested levels of
complexity, as every cell in a multi-cell organism is a closed orgonome by itself,
and a t the same time a part of more complex units. The whole organism is also
one closed orgonome and it belongs to larger systems. Life energy, or orgone
energy permeates all the levels. In that way bodies, or closed orgonomes, are
within the all-pervading orgone energy.
Orgonomes a s life (or orgone) energy systems are characterized by pulsation. It is a manifestation of the frequency of orgone energy - its long wavelength (compared to the much shorter wave-length of sound energy, or the still
shorter one of light and further high-energy forms). Pulsation also manifests
the life processes of metabolic exchange of energy with the environment - all
vital functions, from the simplest monocellulars to humans are primarily
manifested by pulses:
IOrgone energy] current does not_flow continuously but in rhythmic
thrusts. Hence w e speak of PULSATION. The pulsation can be plainly observed in
the blood circulation of all metazoa. The pulsatory current of body _fluids is the
work of the organismic orgone, a direct expression of its form of movement. 82
Pulsation reflects the essential alteration of tension and relaxation, the
throbbing of life processes. I t also expresses the fundamental dialectic
80

81

82

Reich, 1949/ 1973: 145-146, emphasis mine. The variable density of orgone field is
congruent with Bohm's theory of unbroken wholeness and his comparison with
vortices - see at footnote 68 above.
Energy is traqfonned into matter. ?his matter is alive. [...I We shall call the
spectjk basic form of living matter the orgonome. (Reich, 195 1/ 1973: 195, 204,
emphasis mine)
ibid.: 204

antipodes of integrity (enclosed energy system, "closed orgonome") and integration (belonging and interconnectedness to larger systems of life energy functioning, to the open "orgone ocean"). This dialectic often appears as a feeling or
sense of the tendency to burst the enclosure and reach beyond the
boundaries. Freedom and creativity - a s well as biological growth - are closely
related to this dialectic condition.
Mass-free orgone always strives to break beyond the enclosure of the
membrane. The bio-energetic orgonome is extended and open; the material
orgonome is closed. I. ..I The function of growth corresponds to the expansion
of the membranes of the closed orgonome. 83

On the other hand, from his extensive experience of psychotherapeutic
practice, Reich concludes that "armored" character types

84

are inclined to

interpret this longing to burst the bodily boundaries in a mystified
transcendentalist mode. (Such a n interpretation emerges a s a n "orgonomic"
basis of dualist transcendentalism

85).

Pulsation t h u s signifies the basic dialectic of open/closed, or in/out. In the
context of the notion of embodiment, this means the life energy within and without, or the dialectic of life and death. At broader levels, pulsation is the basic
phenomenon of the (evolutionary) cosmos. It occurs at various strata of
complexity and at different scale - u p to the ultimate cosmic pulse
Bang and the Big Crunch

87. Pulsation

86, the

Big

t h u s emerges a s a manifestation of

natural cycles of renewal at all levels, including life and death of biological
organisms and eco-systems 88.

83
84
85

86

87
88

ibid.: 2 14
See quotes at footnotes 1 17 and 258 in the previous chapter.
In dying, too, the biological energy reaches beyond the confmes of the physical sac
in which it is imprisoned. Thus the irrational religious concept of "liberating
death," of "salvationin the hereafter" [. ..] appears in the arnwred organism (Reich,
1951/ 1973: 222-223)
Pulsation as the basic characteristic of orgone energy [...I can be divided into two
antithetical part-functions - expansion and contraction (Reich, l949/ 1973: 100102, emphasis mine)
See quote at footnote 92 in chapter 4; and also Reich's quote at footnote 190 below.
See also the second paragraph after footnote 87 in chapter 4.

The essential conclusion from the discussion of the concept of life energy
fields for the re-connection of spirituality and nature is that the energy within
and without is the same energy - therefore the basis of interrelatedness and
interconnectivity. Fields of orgone (or subtle) energy are thus the vehicle, the
physical medium of sensitivity - the medium of the sense of interrelatedness
between humans and their natural, social and spiritual environment.

Integrated Epistemology: Sensitivity to Natural
Processes
So powerful is the mystique of reason as
instrument in the control of nature and human
bodies that it banishes other modes of
participating in the world to the periphery of
society. 89
A client is to me a mere unit, Sherlock Holmes
said, a factor in a problem. The emotional
qualities are antagonistic to clear reasoning. [...I 1
am a brain, Watson The rest of me is a mere
appendix. 90

Think feelingly.

91

Immanent spirituality has emerged a s the basis of individual responsibility
for the multifaceted environment, and as the central issue of post-dominational
reconstruction. Such a view entails a different concept of knowledge and awareness, a different epistemology 92, congruent with a non-dualistic immanence a n integrated (holistic)epistemology. It primarily means a non-reductionist way
of (com)prehension 93, one which includes other-than-rational components of
knowledge: emotional/affective, sensual/sensitive, intuition and parapsychologi-

We must lean1 to cultivate and employ qualities of mind that go beyond
its mere cognitive operations [...I Changing our ways of seeing and doing
89
90
91
92
93

Merchant. 1994: 4
Arthur Conan Doyle, The Penguin Complete Sherlock Holmes: 96. 1014
Plant, 1990:82
Oxford Dictionary defines epistemology a s 'the theory or science of the method or
grounds of knowledge".
See footnote 19 above.

involves leaming to I...]trust our emotions, leaming to listen to what we are
told by our intuitive faculties. 94

The crucial prerequisite for such an integrated epistemology is the (re-)integration of the dualistic concept of reason. Such a re-integration would unite the
formerly dualized antipodes of reason and emotionality, mind and spirit, intelligence and intuition, thus establishing a way of knowledge - an integral humaneness - that would not rely exclusively on either rational or sensual experiences.
The basic dualist split between rationality and nature was derived from
Platonism and furthered by Cartesian mechanist/reductionist paradigm 95.
Reason/nature dualism sfill casts its shadow across the projects of modernity. The greatest of its philosophical a n d scientrjk projects has been materialis t reductionism [. ..] which resolves the dilemma presented by human/
nature dualism through conceiving not only nature a n d animals but also the
human itselfin the mechanistic and reductionistic terms inspired by Cartesianism Empiricism [. ..] has also become part of this thrust. Its main import
has not been to reinstate the senses a n d the body, much maligned by rationalism, as sources of knowledge a n d identity, but to validate a 'scientr_fic', stripped-down, impoverished a n d subordinated conception of the object of knowedge through observational restrictions on what can count as a knowledge. 96

The consequence of the dualization of reason and nature (withinand without
humans), has been that all the aspects of knowledge which are associated with
the body and with nature - emotions, sensitivity, intuition, instinct

- all the

sensual components of awareness have been deemed inferior to reason. They
have been rejected as sources of knowledge, which has consequently been
identified exclusively with rationality. Dualism is the conceptual underpinning
of domination, so the dualized notion of knowledge has been posited a s rational
control and order over the chaos of nature. Knowledge is considered a tool for
control, colonization and exploitation of nature

97.

Reason is, consequently,

perceived as detached from the sphere of nature (within and without) 98.

94

95
96
97
98

Melucci and Chorover, 1997: 79
See quote at footnote 85 in the previous chapter.
Plumwood, op.cit.: 120-121
See also quote in footnote 56 above.
I have repeatedly pointed out in the previous chapter that domination is based on
detachment from nature - see text and quote between footnotes 94 and 96 in
chapter 8.

It is important to reiterate that the deconstruction of the dualistic concept
of rationality does not imply its rejection - which is a typical "new age" reaction

99,

and presents an uncritical reversal of the dualized construct.
Since defenders of the western tradition persistently and voci$erously
portray criticism of the dominant f o m of reason as the rejection of all reason and the embrace of irrationality, it is still necessary to stress that critiquing the dominant fonns of reason which embody the master identity and
oppose themselves to the sphere of nature does not imply abandoning all
f o m of reason, science and individuality. Rather, it involves their redefinition or reconstruction in less oppositional and hierarchical ways. 100

It is actually equally irrational to dismiss rationality a s to stick to its
dualized construct

101.

Therefore, a non-dualist, integrated epistemological

framework retains the heritage of rationalism and includes and transcends it
by complementing it with other-than-rational aspects of knowledge and
awareness (or com-prehension).
The mainstream, of course, still embraces the current dominant

epistemological paradigm - the reductionist scientific rationality. It is further
reproduced primarily in the thrust of (and the trust in) the cybernetic concept
of intelligence and brain functioning, which leads to a frighteningly
impoverished notion of human consciousness.
Computer scientists contributed significantly to t h e m establishment
of the information-processing dogma by using expressions such as
"intelligence,""memory,"and "language"to describe computers, which led
most people - including the scientists themselves - to think that these terms
refer to the well-known human phenomena. This,however, is a grave
misunderstanding, which has helped to perpetuate, and even reirlforce, the
Cartesian image of human beings as machines. [. ..I Recent developments in
cognitive science have made it clear that human intelligence is utterly
diferent from machine, or "art~ficial,
" intelligence. The human nervous
system does not process any information [...I but interacts with the
environment by continually modulating its structure. 102

An essential epistemological aspect of scientific rationality is the notion of

objectivity, which is one of the pillars of the current scientific paradigm.

99
100
101

102

See text between footnotes 4 and 7. and between 56 and 57 above.
Plumwood, op.cit.: 4, emphasis mine
The notion that thinking is opposed to feeling is a product of our culture, with its
restricted and distorted demition of 'rationalism' - which is itselfa disguised
irrationality. (Goodison,op.cit.: 107) See also the two paragraphs before and the
quote at footnote 92 in the previous chapter.
Capra, 1996: 66-68, emphasis mine. See in this connection also Sheldrake's theory
of morphic resonance - between footnotes 59 and 61 above, and at 134 below.

Objectivity assumes the meaning of a supreme authority, of absolute truth
which reigns above human judgement.
A belief in the objectivity of science is a matter of faith for many modem
people. [. ..] This image of science I...]tends to be absorbed implicitly and taken
for granted. [...I Most simply assume that by means of "the scientijii method."
theories can be tested objectively by experiment in a way that is uncontaminated by the scientists' own hopes, ideas, and beliefs. 103

This retraction of human interference is, of course, only a consensual rule of
the game as part of the accepted scientific paradigm, but it also expresses the
fundamental reductionism, the inherent characteristic of scientific objectivity.
This reductionism has several aspects. The most basic is the narrowing down
of the scope and choice of infornlation to be included in the definition and
analysis of a scientific inquiry. It is a necessary limitation of the research
process, but it is in conflict with the belief in absolute objectivity:
Probably the commonest kind of deception - and of self-deception depends on the selective use of data 104

Even if conscious, or subconscious (self-deceptive) selection of data were
strictly avoided, it would still be impossible to evaluate and include all relevant
data which would determine a comprehensive truth assumed by objectivity.
The theories of chaos and of uncertainty in physics have clearly indicated that
any scientific interpretation is only a partial and incomplete view of a problem,
which cannot imply the pretence of any absolute validity, either in temporal or
spatial sense.
The idea of changeless laws and constants is the last survivorfrom the
era of classical physics in which a regular and (inprinciple) totally
predictable mathematical order was supposed to prevail at all times and in all
places. In reality, w e m nothing of the kind in the course of human affairs,

103
104

Sheldrake, 1995: 165
ibid.: 169.
For example,from 1910 to 1913, the American physicist Robert Millikan was
engaged in a dispute with an Austrian rival, Felix Ehrenfeld, about the charge on
the electron. [...I A historian of science has recently examined Millikan's
laboratory notebooks I...]The raw data were individually annotated with
comments such as "very low, something wrong" and "beauty.publish this." The 58
observations published in his article were selectedfrom 140. EhrenfeZd meanwhile
went on publishing all his observations, which continued to show a far greater
variability than Millikan's selected data. EhrenfeZd was disregarded while
Millikan won the Nobel Prize. (ibid.: 169- 171)

in the biological realm, in the weather, or even in the heavens. The chaos
revolution has revealed that this perfect order was a beguiling illusion 105

Furthermore, according to Bergson, reduction is inherent to rational
analysis. In his examination of duration and time, he showed that, by turning
reality into a thought process, intellect is geared to split it into descrete bits of
information. He likened this procedure to cinematographic representation of
continuum by a series of static images:
Science proceeds according to the cinematographical method. It cannot
do otherwise. [...I For it is of the essence of science to handle signs, which it
substitutesfor the objects themselves. [. ..I Signs are made to dispense us with
this effort by substituting, for the moving continuity of things, an artificial
reconstruction which is its equivalent in practice and has the advantage of
being easily handled. 106

This means that reductionism happens only when we think that our partial
evidence, and necessarilly the partial generalizations, are all there is to reality because we think that we think only "rationally" and "objectively". Objectivism,
thus, has a dualistic origin; it is based on dualized notion of subject and object,
and hence of subjective and objective truth, evidence, knowledge, where the
objective is superior and excludes the subjective.
Subject/object dualism is another legacy of the Cartesian denial of
mindlike features to the world which underlies western scientific accounts of
objectivity I.. .I as a mode of attention to the world which denies dependency
and kinship between observer and the observed. 107

Methodologically, the dualistic construct is primarily manifested in the sharp
separation of the observer from the object of observation - the detachment
which is the essential characteristic of dualism, and the instrument of its
dominational meaning and effect.
The -cogito"set I...] 'man' ontologically and epistemologically upcut
fmm (and aboue) 'natum*and "teason*epistemologically, and axiologdcally
apartfmm (and aboue) 'experience.' [. ..I This detached disembodied,
Archimedean conception of mind I...] offers the only available support to an
otherwise patently unsupportable 'specular ideal' of scientific 'detachment'
according to which a human observer, supposedly having succeeded in
detaching him/herselffom things and events observed, is in a position to
observe and describe them 'objectively.' 108

ibid.: 203-204
106 Bergson. op.cit.: 329
107 Plumwood, op.cit.: 123. See also quote at footnote 118 in the previous chapter.
108 Chorover, 1990: 94-95, emphasis mine. See also the quote in footnote 47 above.
105

The dominational aspect of objectivism is revealed in its detachment from
nature within and without humans - the detachment which gives it the
meaning of supreme rule, the absolute truth that governs human lives and
natural processes. Moreover, epistemologically it is manifested a s denial of
subjective (com-)prehension. Scientists typically withdraw or even deny their
subjective viewpoint, their own personality. It is tacitly agreed, under the rule
of the game of the scientific paradigm, that they are humble servants of the
"objective truth", which they strive to achieve in their research.
Duality and detachment between the objective and the subjective
necessarily defines rationalist scientific objectivity a s transcendentalist. The
power of determining the scientific truth is ascribed to (Platonic) metaphysical
abstractions - by substituting the reality for mathematical representations (a
procedure depicted by Bergson's cinematographic metaphor):
Galileo made a clear distinction between that which is absolute,
objective, immutable, and mathematical and that which is relatiue,
subjective, andfluctuating. [...I 7he objects we know by means of our senses
are not the real or mathematical objects; nevertheless they have certain
qualities which handled by mathematical rules, lead to a bue knowledge. [.
This distinction was of great importance in the subsequent development of
science and was a major step towards banishing direct human experience
Jiom the realm of nature. 109

Reality is thus encoded in the cryptic language of mathematics which can be
accessible only to the ordained. The further step are computerized
representations of reality - the step which turns reductionism and assumed
objectivity into virtual reality (or, in Baudrillarian terms, into a digitalized
simulacrum). Via the 'cinematographic procedure", reduction is succeeded by
artificial synthesis of disintegrated pieces

110

(a rather Frankensteinian

undertaking) - cut and then rejoined into a substitute reality.
The computerfetishist endows the computer model with a validity and
an independent power which altogether transcends the mental models which
are its essential basis. I...]This inevitably means that the rnodellers are
required to make assumptions [...I to omit what they consider to be irrelevant.
These decisions are matters ofjudgement, not of fact or mathematics [...I an

109
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Sheldrake. 1988: 24-25, emphasis mine.
See the quote at and the paragraph after footnote 34 in chapter 2.

attempt to substitute mathematics for knowledge and computation for
understanding. 1 1 1

Subject/object dualism and detachment are inherently non-systemic. They
reflect a n attitude of diconnectedness between the individual and her/his
environment - the environment which, in scientific research context, becomes
the object, in most general terms, of his/her observation, inquiry, or
manipulation. However, from the systemic perspective, subject and object are
interrelated

112.

And quite tangibly so in all contexts, a s well a s in scientific

research. The impact of the observer/researcher on the "object" of his or her
research has for some time become a salient issue. This impact is a n
interactive relationship which can be a s simple (or a s complicated) a s the joy or
sorrow of the researcher/exarniner, or just the individual presence

-

having a

decisive effect on the result of the examination.
As investigators, we interact with the systems we observe. [...I It is [...I an
irreducibly composite instance of participation/observation, in which the
observer's intervention affects the system being observed. 113

The interactions that are tangible by mainstream criteria are, now, largely
acknowledged. However, the more evasive forms of interrelatedness include
expectations which can have a s simple impact a s the selective reduction
described before, but also the "paranormal" or "parapsychological" effects thus named because (if a t all admitted) they are considered beyond the
approved purview of scientific physiology, or psychology.
The tendency t o m what is being looked for is deep-seated. It has a basis
in the very nature of attention. [...I Most people 'are well aware that other
people's attitudes affect the way they interact with the world around them [...I
But the 'ScientiJic method" is generally supposed to rise above cultural and
personal biases, dealing only in the currency of objective facts and universal
principles. [. ..]
First, expectations affect the kinds of questions that are asked in
experiments. And these questions in t u r r ~shape what kinds of answers will be
found. [...I Second, experimenters' expectations affect what they observe,
gwing a tendency to see what they want to see and to ignore what they do not
111

Freeman, 1973: 220-221, 227. See also text and quote between footnotes 225 and
229 in the previous chapter.

112

We accept the time-hallowed discrimination between subject and object. [...I
Subject and object are only one. The banier between them cannot be said to have
broken down as a result of recent experience in the physical sciences,for this
banier does not exist. (Schrtjdinger, 1956: 50-51)
Chorover, 1990: 96

1 13

want to see. [...I Third, and more mysteriously, experimenters' expectations
may # i t what actual@happens. 114

However, if (or when) the viewpoint is changed, and the interaction is
perceived a s mediated by fields of connectivity (morphic, subtle energy,
orgone), the influence of one energy system on another ceases to be anything
abnormal, miraculous, or even unexpectable. It is simply inevitable from the
systemic viewpoint which perceives the boundaries between entities and their
environment, not a s delineations of total separation, but a s interfaces of
interaction and energy exchange. In other words, human energy vibrations
necessarily interact with the vibrations of the object of scientific examination,
and it happens with any other interaction too.
There is actual experimental evidence for the effects of experimenters'
expectations on the behavior of animals. But in most areas of biology, the
possibility of such effects is usually ignored. I...] In psychology and medicine,
experimenter effects are generally explained in terms of inJluences
transmitted by "subtlecues." Butjust how subtle these cues may be is another
question. [...I The possibility that they include 'paranormal' influences such
as telepathy and psychokinesis is not discussed in polite scientific society. I
believe that it is better to face this possibility than to ignore it. [...I Tension.
fear, and hostility tend not only to inhibit psi effects, but Qlso to influence
e x p e r i m e n t s i n t h e ~ a l l e d h a r d ~ t a115
o.

Wilhelm Reich did not only emphasize the existence of the interaction
between the scientist and the object of his/her experiments. He furthermore
insisted on the critical importance of its quality because, in dealing with life
energy phenomena, the attitudes of the persons involved are manifested in
their energy metabolism, and, therefore, in the impact on the surrounding
energy systems (as the same energy within and without functions a s t h e
medium of connectivity and interactivity) .
The structure ofthe observer is of importance since it is the organismic
orgime energy in his sense organs that reacts to the extema2 otgone
phenomena. The inclusion of the structure of the observer in thejudgment of
natural phenomena is a very important, if not decisive, step fonoard toward
the integration of the subjective and the objective, the psyche and the
physical. [...I Natural-scientijk research is an activity that rests on the
interaction between observer and nature, or, expressed differently, between
or~noticfunctionsinside and the samefunctions outside the observer. 116

1 14
115
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Sheldrake, 1995: 167, 209-2 10, emphasis mine.
ibid.: 2 12-213, 224, emphasis mine.
Reich, 1949/ 1973: 156-157, emphasis mine.

Dualist and non-systemic perspectives entail an essentially reductionist definition of epistemology - consequent to the notion of detached, objective and
passive acquiring of information without involvement in the (life) process. A redefinition is therefore necessary: a non-dualist, systemic and integrative
(holistic)epistemology as interrelational - a two-way process. It involves both
the receiving and the conveying of knowledge, both the impression and the
expression in all its cognitive, intuitive, emotional and sensual aspects - the
(com-)prehensionand communication. It is a metabolism, an exchange of
energy with the environment. In other words, epistemology should not be only
about getting the knowledge, but a give-and-take process - an expression of
mutuality as an essential non-dualist attitude.
The hypothesis of formative causationpostulates a two wayflow of
influence:fromfields to organisms and from organisms tofields. 1 17

Emotionality is the most overt, or the least objectionable of the
epistemological components which have been excluded within the paradigm of
reductionist rationality

118. This

obviousness is probably the chief reason why

the lack of emotionality is the most implicative aspect of epistemological
reductionism. Humans have decreasingly relied on the emotional means of
knowledge and awareness, because emotions have been considered part of the
inferior realm of the irrational. This attitude is reflected in the complete denial
of emotionality by the dominant scientific paradigm of objective rationality.
However, it is impossible to exclude emotions; only a suppression might be
achieved, which nevertheless does not preclude their influence in interactions
of scientific experimentation,just as in everyday life situations.
Our capacity to create and to communicate passes through aflective and
emotional channels as importantly as it does through the cognitive circuits
exclusively privileged in the modem notion of rationality. [...I Affect no less
than cognition provides us with consensually valid and trustworthy ways and
means of addressing reality; openness tofeeling affords insightful access to
dimensions of experience that cannot be reached otherwise. 119
1 17
118

119

Sheldrake, 1988: 1 10, emphasis mine.
At the beginning of this subsection, I have identified the other epistemological
components as sensual/sensitive, intuition, parapsychological/"psychic"/spiritual.
Melucci and Chorover, op.cit.:8 1

The current science does not only deny emotions a s an allegedly unreliable
epistemological component. In its mechanist approach, it is also incapable of
truly accounting for the substance of the sensual and emotional qualities.
Science only describes the physical properties or mechanisms that are
associated or observed as coinciding with such qualities. The chemical or
physiological processes cannot depict the feelings of joy or sorrow, or the
sensation of yellow

120, or

of a piano cord sound, or the sense of beauty. The

current science only accounts for the indirect, "tangible" (behavioral) and
measurable phenomena:
Nowhere along [the] wayfiom the eye through the central organ to the
arm muscles and the tear glands - nowhere, you may be sure, howeverfar physiology advances, will you ever meet the personality, will you ever meet the
dire pain, the bewildered wony within this soul, though their reality is to you
so certain as though you suflered them yourself- as in actual fact you do! [...I
I have tried by simple examples [...I to contrast the two general facts (a)
that all scienttjk knowledge is based on sense perception, and (b) that none
the less the scientific views of natural processes formed in this way lack all
sensual qualities and therefore cannot account for the latter. 121

A significant consequence of these attitudes toward emotionality in general

is that humans have learned to suppress and deny their feelings. This suppression of emotionality has added to the development of the numbed sensitivity for
natural processes within and without. This numbed sensitivity includes also
the other means of (com-)prehension: the sensual, instinctual, intuitive and the
sphere of the parapsychological ("psychic", or spiritual) ways of learning.
Bergson defines intuition a s a contact with "thevery inwardness of Zi$en, or

'the key to vital operations" 122. Every human regularly uses intuitively
obtained information, but is not aware of it because of predominance and high
120 Ifyou ask a physicist what is his idea of yellow light, he will tell you that it is

transversal electromagnetic waves of wavelength in the neighbourhood of 590
millimicrons. I f you ask him: But where does yellow come in? he wiU say: In my
picture not at all, but these kinds of vibrations, when they hit the retina of a
healthy eye, give the person whose eye it is the sensation of yellow. I...I We may
further ask: Is radiation in the neighbourM of wavelength 590pp the only one to
produce the sensation of yellow? The answer is: Not at all. I f waves of 760pp, which
by themselves produce the sensation of red, are mixed in a demite proportion with
waves of 535pp, which by themselves produce the sensation of green, this mixture
produces a yellow that is indisturguishablefiom the one produced by 590pp.
121
122

(Schr6dinger, 1956: 88-90)
ibid: 45-47. 101-103
Bergson, op.cit.: 176

esteem that rational avenues to knowledge have had for such a long period of
human development, and because of the related dualistic inferiorization of
intuition as a sphere of the non-rational. Parapsychological avenues, on the
other hand, attract exceptional attention because they are associated with
much more spectacular effects than the everyday use of intuition. They are
therefore assumed to be endowed upon rarely gifted individuals. Yet
parapsychological phenomena are the same connectivity to "vital operations" as
intuition, but the term parapsychology denotes that these phenomena are
beyond the recognition of the mainstream.

If we are inJuenced by morphic resonance fi-om particular individuals to
whom we are in some way linked or connected, then it is conceivable that we
might pick up images, thoughts, impressions, or feelings fi-om them I...]Such
resonant connections would be possible even fi the people involved were
thousands of miles apart. I.. .I The occurrence of telepathy, many people claim
to have experienced themselves, and it has been detected in many parapsychological experiments. This evidence is,of course, much disputed, largely
because fi-om the conventional scient$c point of view telepathy, like the
other alleged phenomena of parapsychology, is theoretically impossible. By
oontrast, in the context of morphic resonance, it i s theoretically possibk. 123
Specific parapsychological phenomena have been applied as practical
techniques - most of them from immemorial times, like dowsing, which has
recently been revived and given serious consideration by scientists

124.

It has

developed into a research of energies radiated from the Earth - geo-pathological and geo-positive - and, further, of human ability to receive information
about their environment through energy connectivity. The tools, such as
dowsing rods and pendulums (used traditionally in water-search) can actually
confuse the understanding of the energy basis of dowsing (their function is just
to amplify the energy transmission). The recent popularity of this
parapsychological technique has given an important indication that such an
ability to establish the energy connectivity with the environment might well be
dormant in all humans.
-

123
124

-

Sheldrake, 1988: 220-221, emphasis mine.
For example: Yves-Andre Rocard (1903-1 992),French mathematician and
physicist who contributed to the understanding of such diversefields of research
as semiconductors, seismolwy, and radio astronomy; was head of the physics
department at h o l e Normale Superieure in Paris; in later years he concentrated
on the scienhjk study of biomagnetism and dowsing. (Encyclopaedia Britannica)

Kinesiology is another "technique" which achieves the same connectivity
with vital processes - but without any intermediaries, so that the energy basis
is clearly indicated. It utilizes "the innate intelligence of the bodyw 125:

Through the use of muscle testing, the Kinesiologist can gain
information about almost any part of the body, and about the body's response
to any stimulus [. ..I, sensitivities to [. ..] foods, liquids and airborne and tactile
allergens [. ..I metal toxicity (e.g. mercury), environmental and geopathic
stress, alcohol, tobacco, and food supplements. 126

These "parapsychological techniques" are significant in epistemological context because they become pertinent in the search for the answer to a key
question: How has some primeval intuitive knowledge been absorbed? How
have humans come to "know", for example, which mushrooms are poisonous?
By trial and error? By witnessing deaths and painstakingly learning from the

fear of getting poisoned? This is the same epistemological issue a s the child's
innate endowment to avoid a precipice

127. YOU can

get a book about

mushrooms (and still be quite uncertain whether your rational understanding of
the written explanation will be reliable enough), or you can keep screaming at
your child not to lean over. But the child's "knowledge", demonstrated by the
Visual Cliff experiment - like the "knowledge" animals possess about
mushrooms and myriad of such things - that knowledge is pre-rational:
intuitive, instinctual, parapsychological.
Rupert Sheldrake has devoted extensive research to issues of instinctive
and other non-rational avenues of knowledge, both human and animal. One of

La Tourelle and Courtenay, 1997: 9, emphasis mine
ibid: 41, 44, emphasis mine.
The Indicator Muscle Test involves using one muscle only as a biofeedback
tool to gain information I...] it will weaken under light pressure when the stimulus
is causing disorganization or imbalance in the client's system [...I It is thought
that the reasonfor this is that, fi the muscle is strong and there is no stress, the
brain can cope simultaneously with the muscle test and the additional, nonstressful stimulus. I f , however, the stimulus causes some stress. [...I the brain
prioritizes the stress and as a result, the indicator muscle instantly weakens. [. ..]
This is sometimes referred to as 'asking the body' or 'intuitive muscle testing'. [...I
Testug in the mouth, before the substance is digested, can provide an accurate
result. [...I 50 per cent of the sensory and motor brain ceUs are devoted to thejaw
area, ie. 50 per cent of the brain's messagesfilter through this area. (ibid: 50, 61)
127 discussed in connection with the Visual Cliff experiment which I mentioned in the
previous chapter - see between footnotes 21 and 23, and 26 and 27 in chapter 8
125

126

the spectacular examples he discusses is the movement coordination
performed by schools of fish,
the "jZash expansion," so called because o n f l m it looks like a bomb bursting

as eachJish Simultaneously darts awayfrom the centre of the school as the
group is attacked. The entire expansion may occur in as little as one-fiftieth of
a second, and theJish may accelerate to a speed of ten to twenty body lengths
per second within that time. Yet theJish do not collide. Not only does eachJish
know in advance where it will swim ifattacked, but it must also know where
each of its neighbours will swim 128

Such extraordinary capabilities - which make human "high-tech" attempts at
similar control pitiful in comparison - seem utterly inexplicable from the
current computational approach to intelligence. (Sheldrake indicates this
approach in the quote above by presenting the circumstances intentionally and ironically - in terms of the rationalist paradigm: fish "know in advance",
etc.) His morphic resonance offers a different perspective:
Ij however, the school is organized by a morphicfwld that embraces all
the fish within it, the properties of this field could underlie the behaviour of
the school as a whole and help account for the co-ordinated behaviour of the
individualJish. I...]Flocks of birds, like schools of_tish, show such a
remarkable coordination of their individual members that they too have
been ompared to a single organism. 129

This field interconnectivity is based on self-organization, or spontaneous
order at the molecular level in conditions of high thermodynamic nonequilibrium, characteristic of life processes

130:

Such a degree of order stemmingfrom the activity of billions of molecules seems incredible, and indeed. if chemical clocks had not been observed, no
one would believe that such a process is possible. To change color all at once,
molecules must haue a wag to "wmmunicate."Thesystem has to act as a
whole [...I which is of obvious importance in so many fields, from chemistry
to neurophysiology. [...I
The sensitivity of far-from-equilibrium states to externalfluctuations is
another example of a system's spontaneous "adaptativeorganization" to its

environment. 131

Instinctual/intuitive/parapsychological modes of comprehension and
communication are based on this essential sensitivity - which is a molecular
property of matter in high non-equilibrium, or a quality of subtle energy:

Sheldrake, 1988: 232
ibid.: 233, emphasis mine
130 See between footnotes 64 and 67 above.
131 Prigogine and Stengers, op.cit: 147-148, 165, emphasis mine

128
129

'Subtle energy*,refers to systems of energy within and around the body.
[It] is synonymous with the Qi (pronounced chi) of Chinese acupuncture, and
with the prana of traditional Indian medicine and philosophy; through the
ages many other terms have been given to this universal li$e-$orce, the
harmonious flow of which is vital to the health of mind and body.
Although it has long been disregarded by modem medicine and science,
the existence of subtle energy is coming to be much more widely accepted [. ..]
partly due to the Western culture's acceptance of acupuncture. 132

This sensitivity is the bodily knowledge about the individual's environment, and
it is mediated through subtle (or orgone) energy. It is based in the organism, in
bodily functions - the energy metabolism of the organism. And the primary
sphere, the organ of sensitivity is the b o u n d q , the interface of eco-systemic
connectivity and interactivity :
Sensation is afunction - thefunction of a limiting membrane that
separates the living systemjkom the surrounding orgone ocean.IThrough this
membrane the orgonotic living body communicates with all other orgone
systems. 133

In other words, the contact surface between the inner and outer energy processes - or between nature within and without - is the "instrument" of sensitivity.
This essential characteristic is also confinned in tenns of Sheldrake's morphic
resonance:
According to the hypothesis of formative causation, the morphic fields
that organize our behaviour are not confined to the brain, or even to the body,
but extend bepnd it into theenvironment, linking the bodg bo the sunoundings
in which it acts. 134

From epistemological viewpoint, the most salient aspect of the concept of
subtle (or orgone) energy is that it can be sensed within and without our bodies
- because

it is the same energy within and without

135. Sensitivity

is thus the

same for the processes in our body and in the surrounding eco-system. Sensitivity, therefore, establishes a tangible realization of the eco-systemic intercon132

133
134
135

La Tourelle and Courtenay, op.cit.: 5-6, emphasis mine.
In all these teachings [ancient Eastern alternative traditions] 'spiritual'
energy is not separatefrom the body but immanent throughout it. [... It] is thought
to run through the body along certain paths; and also to radiate out from the body
into a wide energy field or 'aura' surrounding the body, This 'aura' I...I can connect
us to other people and things [...I The structure which these traditions propose for
energy movement in the body corresponds closely to that which Wilhelm Reich
arrived at from a very d~fferentstarting point in his psychotherapeutic work.
(Goodison, op.cit.: 145. emphasis mine)
Reich, 1949/ 1973: 80-81, emphasis mine
Sheldrake, 1988: 197-198, emphasis mine
See quote a t footnote 116 above.

nectedness

- of

our eco-systemic belonging and our interrelatedness with the

social and natural environment. It is the crux of a different, integrated (or
holistic), but also essentially post-objectivist epistemology 136 - one which
includes both rational and other-than-rational modes of comprehension and
communication.
Sensitivity is one of the central concepts of this essay. As a substantial
component of immanent spirituality, sensitivity is the key to a n ecological
consciousness. Ecological consciousness implies and presupposes a n inner
awareness, a sense that we are part of nature, that we breathe and pulsate
together. Within the self-regulatory mechanisms, this sense operates without
rational mediation - it is part of a biological process. Consequently, sensitivity
is the crucial epistemological basis of individual responsibility for the social,
biological and physical environment, and thus of a n ecological culture.
Humanists for thousands of years have attempted to construct a
naturalistic, psychological value system that could be derivedfrom man's
own nature, without the necessity of recourse to authority outside the human
being himself. 137

These attempts could be actually perceived a s a quest to recover a lost
ability- or a numbed faculty: the sensitivity for life processes within and
without ourselves.
There can be little doubt that animals have developed or not allowed to
atrophy powers of identification and sensitivity that we humans have almost
totallyforgotten. 138
The entire antipersonalist critique is grounded in a tragically bifurcated
psychology that persists in pitting the ratwnal against the emotional, the
intellectual against the instinctive, the analytical against the inspirational an age-old warfare of the self against the self which remains the prime
symptom of Western society's dissociation of the sensibilities. 139

Roszak characterizes this loss of sensitivity a s a consequence of the dualist
construct of avenues to comprehension, which has had a prolonged impact on
human development. He contends that this kind of world view is reproduced
through the way we educate our children:
136
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See quotes at footnotes 107 and 108 above.
Maslow. 1968: 149
Fox, 1979: 166, emphasis mine
Roszak, 1979: 74, emphasis mine

The role Freud assigned to psychotherapy, that of patrolling the "boundary lines between the ego and the external world," remained unquestioned in
the psychiatric mainstream until the last generation. Moreover, his conviction that the "external world" begins at the surface of the skin continues to
pass as common sense in every major school of modern psychology. The "procedure" we teach childrenfor seeing the world this way is the pennissible repms&n of cosmic empathy, a psychic numbing we have labeled "normal-"140

These statements indicate that humans most probably have not entirely
lost this sensitivity - which Reich, in the quote above, defines a s a n inherent
function of organisms. Yet, the developmental distance might be too big
between organisms in their "natural" state and humans that have undergone a
lengthy process of alienation from their natural endowments (most of which are
looked upon a s atavisms - in the depreciative spirit of the dualist paradigm
indicated by Roszak). The distance might imply that the "forgotten" ability is
buried in the unfathomable depths of some primordial phases of anthropological evolution, and, therefore, hardly imaginable a s retrieved for use by modem
humans. The following account (which I will reproduce here at some length)
documents, however, a n actual experience of regaining such "powers", and

-

what is equally important - the process of losing them again in uncongenial
environment and mode of life:
My exposure to traditional magicians and seers was gradually sh~fting
my senses; I became increasingly susceptible to the solicitations of non human things.[..]Animals began to intercept me in my wanderings, as if some
quality in my posture or the rhythmofmy breathing had disarmed their wariness; I w o u l d w myself face toface with monkeys, and with large lizards
that did not slither away when I spoke, but leaned forward in apparent curiosity. In rural Java I ofen noticed monkeys accompanying me in the branches
overhead, and ravens walked toward me on the road, croaking. [.. I I found
myself caught in a nonverbal conversation with this Other, a gestural duet
with which my reflective awareness had very little to do. It was as if my body
were suddenly being motivated by a wisdom older than my thinking mind [.. I
I returned to North America excited by the new sensibilities that had
stirred in me - my newfound awareness of a more-than-humanworld, of the
great potency of the land, and particularly of the keen intelligence of other
animals, large and small, whose lives and cultures interpenetrate our own. I
startled neighbors by chattering with squirrels, who swifly climbed down the
bunks of trees to banter with me, or by gazing for hours on end at a heron
_fishing in a nearby estuary [. ..]
Yet very gradually, I began to lose my sense of the animals' own awareness.
[...I I found myself now observing the heronfrom outside its world, [. ..] no longer feeling its tensed yet poised alertness with my own muscles. And, strangely,
the suburban squirrels no longer responded to my chittering calls. Although I
wished to. I could no longer engage in their world as I had so easily done a few
weeks earlier.for my attention was quickly deflected by internal wrbat deti140

Roszak, 1995: 10-11, emphasis mine

berations of one sort or another, by a conversation I now seemed to cany on
entirely within myself. The squirrels had no part in this conversation. [...I
As the expressive and sentient landscape slowly faded behind my more
exclusively human concerns, threatening to become little more than a n
illusion or fantasy, I began to feel -particularly in my chest and my abdomen
- as though I were being cut offfrom vital sources of nourishment. 1 4 1

Of course, the extent of sensitivity that Abram attained (and lost again)
might seem too extravagant to be considered a common goal for a n ecologically
conscious humankind. Nevertheless, his example indicates that humans are
capable of regaining the sensitivity for their eco-systemic environment (and use
it in more "everyday" expressions) - when they get immersed in a congenial
morphic field, to put it in Sheldrake's terms. Sheldrake has shown (on animal
and human examples) that learning is also manifested a s exposure to
influences of increasing number of individuals who have already adopted or
attained certain skills or behavior. He denotes these spheres of influence a s
behavioral and social morphic fields.
Behavioural j k l d s I...]co-ordinate the movements of animals primarily
through imposing rhythmic patterns of order on the probabilistic activities of
the nervous system I...] Even when animals learn new patterns of activity,
they do so within a n inherited framework of potentialities, and there is no
sharp dividing line between instincts and learned behaviour, which depends
on inherited capacities. I...]
If the hypothesis of formative causation is correct, then it should be
possible for the habit memories of one organism to influence another by
morphic resonance, facilitatuzg the acquisition of the same habits. [. ..I Our
learning of language and of physical and mental skills isfacilitated by
morphic resonancefrom many other people who have already learned them
Several experiments have been carried out to test for this efect, with results
that are consistent with the hypothesis of formative causation. [...I
The morphic_fieldsof societies and cultures, like morphic_fields of other
kinds, are stabilized by morphic resonance from previous similar systems.
This principle sheds new light on the inheritance of social and cultural
patterns, which is still very poorly understood. 142

The current predominant cultural pattern (or social morphic field) is characterized by detachment from sensitivity. It is important to identify and examine
the associated mechanisms that have initiated and perpetuated this detachment.
In other words - how have we lost the natural sensitivity? I have already mentioned Ralph Metmer's suggestion that it has been a kind of amnesia 143. His
analysis explains it in terms of dissociation - which is a psychological concept
141

142
143

Abrarn, 1995: 3 12-314, emphasis mine
Sheldrake, 1988: 149-150, 168, 196, 240-241, emphasis mine
at footnote 27 above

related to the more general notions of detachment and discomectedness that I
have been indicating a s a salient aspect of alienation in eco-systemic sense.
The concept of dissociation [...I involves a "vertical"separation of
strands of consciousness that may be equally well organized, rational, and in
touch with reality. For example, the mental and emotional components of a
painful experience may be dissociated, so that we remember what we saw and
thought, but not what we (appropriately)felt; or conversely, a certain stimulus
may trigger a feeling state of panic, but the cognitive memory of what
happened remains dissociated. I...] I believe that this concept of dissociation
or splitting provides a more accurate and more useful understanding of the
collective human pathology vis-a-vis the environment than the notion of a
repressed and primitive "ecological unconscious." 144

However, he posits this explanation a s contrasted to Freudian and post-Freudian
concepts of the subconscious and of repression 145. I find it unnecessary to perceive the two mental processes a s mutually exclusive. Metzner does not mention concrete post-Freudian names, but the concept of repression is primarily
associated with the work of Wilhelm Riech, who gave it a profound psychosomatic understanding, and - what is particularly important

- exposed

its social

context in authoritarian and dorninational aspects of our culture. Reich developed a comprehensive theory of repression manifested in bodily expressions
which he termed "armoring"

146.

But he did discuss it in terms of dissociation:

Contactlessness, it tunzed out, is as general a phenomenon of neurosis as
is the change of function of the instinct. I...] When an instinct is taken over by
the egofor the purpose of gratijkation and it meets with a frustration, it can,
as we pointed out, split up or dissociate. One part of it turns against itself
(reactionformation); another part continues in the original direction toward
the outer world. When this happens, however, the dynamic relations have
changed. At the point where the [orgone energy] current directed toward the
outer world and the current turned toward one's own ego diverge, a condition
of paralysis or rigidity arises. 147

Metzner seems to neglect the unavoidable social component in his discussion, and he ends up accounting for the dissociative processes without looking
into any social causes. Presumably, he expects that a dissociation from
sensitivity to nature can only be explained by traumatic experiences related to
nature, so he seeks the causes exclusively in cosmic or earthly natural

144
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Metzner. op.cit.: 64. emphasis mine
ibid.: 63
See quote at footnote 117 in the previous chapter.
Reich, 1933/ 1980: 3 12-313, emphasis mine

334

cataclysms (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, Atlantis etc. 148), which
is a n unconvincing hypothesis. On the other hand, Reich offers a clear
demonstration of the mechanism of dissociation a s a consequence of
"arrnoring". Such an etiology would go much further in explaining Metzner's
own example of Nazi officials - or other individuals in their positions, that
history, unfortunately and indicatively has had in abundance - who were able
to accept the situation in which they would listen to Beethoven and play with
children after the day's work of killing and torturing

149.

But "arrnoring" a s a

dissociative mechanism also elucidates the more everyday and the less overtly
vicious manifestations of human disconnections and detachment from natural
processes within and around their organisms.
Metzner's rejection of repressive aspects of dissociation reflects the typical
avoidance and denial of the social context

150.

Thus he misses the entire

essential connection between the dorninational culture and its dualistic
underpinning on one hand, and on the other the multifarious alienation
manifested also in the loss of sensitivity. I have elaborated upon these
connections in the previous chapter referring also to the complex relationship
between the repression and alienation of sexuality and sensuality, and dornination over nature within and without humans

151.

All this etiology points to what I think is best described a s "numbing" of human sensitivity for natural strearnings, for pulsations of life energy within and
without. The notion of numbness indicates that it is not an irretrievable loss. It
Metzner, op.cit.: 62
ibid.: 64
See text and quotes between footnotes 8 and 11 above, and text before footnote 146
in the previous chapter.
[The human] must have felt rightfrom the beginning that his genital drive made
him "lose control"and reduced him to a bit of streaming, convulsing protoplasm
Here, the now well-knownhuman orgasm anxiety may w e l l have originated. [...I In
this manner, man "lost his paradise" (orgastic root in nature) and fell prey to "sin"
(sexual perversion). He lost contact with one of his most m i d roots in nature and
thus with nature itself, not only in the sensory and emotional but also in the
intellectual realm He could neither be in contact with nor understand nature,
except in devious. mystical ways or by abstract reasoning. (Reich, 1951/ 1973: 284285, emphasis mine). See also text and quotes between footnotes 102 and 104. and
259 and 263 in chapter 8.

is a dullness which is the basis of estrangement from humans' natural being,
the being rooted in nature. This stiffness and inhibition might well be the
sensuous core from which originate most forms of alienation and constraint
that have developed and diversified as civilization evolved. This basic alienation
is manifested essentially as derangement of natural self-regulatory
mechanisms, and, consequently of individual responsibility and initiative. Reich
puts the emergence of this numbing into developmental perspective:
The witMrawa1 of sexual interest or the inhibition of an outwardly
striving impulse is directly experienced as a growing feeling of "coldness,"
"numbness,""hardness,""deadness."I...I At an early age not every feeling and
desire can be expressed and articulated. The child m u s t m some other way to
appeal for understanding of the inexpressible psychic condition. But parents
and teachers, being what they are, are seldom capable of divining what is
going on in the child. In vain the child makes his appeal, until jinally he gives
up the strugglefor understanding and grows numb: "It's utterly useless." 152

This apathy becomes a pervasive cultural trait which is one of the origins
of authoritarianism and domination patterns in human relationships

153.

It can

also lead to mass-depression and helplessness which, according to Joanna
Macy, defines the typical response (or lack thereof) to environmental problems:
This state of absence or at best dulled human response to our world is
called psychic numbing. [... It] produces self-doubt and cuts us o m o m our
deep subconscious sources of creativity. Separatedfiom our inner authority,
we become more susceptible to panic and mob hysteria 154

Psychic numbing is culturally supported - at the level of consumerism.
which, in Melucci's brilliant insight, reveals the reproduction of disempowerment for individual responsibility (and sensitivity is essentially significant
as an epistemological basis for individual responsibility 155 and, consequently,
ecological consciousness):
In modenz society, the consumption of painkillers, tranquilizers,
sedatives, and stimulants has reached astounding levels, accounting for the
largest portion of the pharmaceutical industry's market share. [. ..]
Pharmaceuticals [...I erase the existence of the ailmentfrom o w minds.
152
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Reich, 1933/ 1980: 320-32 1, emphasis mine
See also quote at footnote 259 in the previous chapter.
Macy. 1983: 13. See also (Macy, 1995),and the related issue of learned helplessness
- in chapter 5, between footnotes 46 and 48.
The body annor makes inaccessible the basic organ sensations, and with them the
genuine feeling of well-being. The feeling of one's own body is lost and natural selfconwence with it. They are regularly replaced by fake, show-offappearances and
false pride. (Reich, 1949/ 1973: 125)

Wherepreviously there was a presence, we create, mentaUy and aflectively, an
empty space. This is the most important eflect of the pharmaceuticals, and it
explains their massive, indiscriminate, and uncontrolled use. I...] The silence
of the body thus represents the everyday counterpoint to its inordinate
display in public. While body-related images and signs assail us from all
directions, the only body that counts - ours - is consigned to silence. 156

Yet, this prevailing presence of psychic numbing suggests that it is necessary
on a mass-psychological level - that it fulfills a certain cultural role. I have
already pointed out that "annoring" has been a necessary function developed in
cultural evolution 157. That is the context in which evolved the anxiety because
of the loss of control that Reich presented in the quote above. Furthermore, he
suggested that the anxiety was engendered with the emergent consciousness in
the context of dominational relationships:
Reasoned thinking [...I slowly developedfrom the exact, sure contact
between nature within and nature outside the orgonotic system. [...I Man
slowly began to reason bgpnd his &ng orgonotic contact and harmony
h
mabout his own being andfunctioning, man turned
with nature [...I In t
involuntarily against himself, not in a destructive fashion, but in a manner
that may well have been the point of origin of his annoring, [.. I Just as in the
well knownfable, the miUipede could not move a leg and became paralyzed
when asked and started thinking about which leg he puts 3rs t and which
second, it is quite possible that the turning of reasoning toward itself induced
the _first emotional blocking in man. [...I In attempting to understand himself
and the s trearning of his own energy, man integered with it, and in doing so,
began to armor and thus to deviatefiom nature. 1%

This view is congruent with Bergson's concept of the (dialectic) divide

between the two essential epistemological components - intuition and intellect.
He argued that in the course of cultural evolution, the intellect emerged and
developed "at the expense", so to speak, of the neglect of intuitive faculties.
Intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itsew the intellect
has been cut out of it by aprocess resembling that which has generated matter.

[...I Consciousness, in shaping itself into intelligence, that is to say in

concentrating itself at _first on matter, seems to externalize itself in relation
to itselj [...I
If consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence, it is
because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to
follow the stream of life. 159

This divide has thus had its evolutionary function. But now that the negative

aspects of rationalist reduction have become a n impediment to further cultural
156
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Melucci, op.cit.: 77-78,emphasis mine
between footnotes 257 and 259 in the previous chapter.
Reich, 1951/ 1973:291-294,
emphasis mine
Bergson, op.cit.: 181. 178

development, there must emerge, what Bergson suggested as a reunion of
intellect and intuition - an integrated (holistic) epistemology:
By developing also the otherfaculty, complementary to the intellect, we
may open a perspective on the other half of the real. For, as soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it means creation [...]To intellect, in
short, there will be added intuition. [. ..] A complete and perfect humanity
would be that in which these twoforms of conscious activity should attain
theirfull development. I...]Thus [would be] revealed the unity of the spiritual
lije. 160

This integrated consciousness is the appropriate basis for an ethics pertinent
to ecological culture

161.

Ethical Issues: Eco-Systemic Responsibility and Joy
An ethic pertinent to an ecological culture has to be defined - in consequen-

ce to the discussion above - as an immanent ethic. Such a definition primarily
entails a distinction between morality and ethic. Morality, or "moral dictum",
connotes an external authority, while ethic is based on a n internal sense, or
consciousness. Etymologically, morality is derived from mores - habits of
conduct - and ethic from ethos which means personal disposition. Thus, the
delineation between morality and ethic is not so clear-cut

162

because a person

can and often does internalize external moral directions (the habits of conduct).
but the determinative criterion is individual responsibility, a reliance on personal judgement and consciousness, independent of authoritarian imposition.
Immanent ethics is based on immanent spirituality which is not grounded in
authoritarian and dominational relationships.
A major consequence of the idea of an immanent spirituality is that the
notion of 'superior beings' comes severely into question. [...I A spirituality
whose activity centres on a tree rather than a cathedral allows afreer access
to the partxipants to establish their own connection with what they

160
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ibid.: 342-3,267,181
Virtue-based concepts such as care, respect, gratitude, sensitiv*, reverence and
friendship seem more applicable. [...I They are moral Ifeelings' but they involve
both cognitive elements, ethical elements and emotion in ways that do not seem
separable. (Plumwood, op.cit.: 183)
See the paragraphs around footnote 3 1.

experience as a source of strength, without it being diverted through an authority structure. It also allows greater equality among the participants. 163

Immanent ethic and its immanent spiritual basis emerge from the deconstruction of domination and its dualist underpinning, and, therefore, do not
imply external physical or metaphysical entities a s determinants of human life.
Immanent ethic is not based on dualistic transcendentalism, and is not defined
by institutionalized spirituality or institutionalized (authoritarian, imposed)
morality - a "higher" sphere of supreme, eternal consciousness. It is defined by
a n ecological consciousness which implies individual responsibility based on
sensitivity for the individual's environment (natural, social and spiritual).
With nature, as with the human sphere, the capacity to care, to experience sympathy, understanding and sensitivity to the situation and fate of
particular others is an index of our moral being. 164

The immanent spiritual basis of ethic ensues from the integrated
epistemology - from united (non-dualized)cogmtive and sensual, emotional and
intuitive components of comprehension and expression.
Throughout most of the development of civilization, truth has been a
"loaded" concept. It has two basic connotations - a s a moral category (in the
sense of external moral dictum), and a s a category of scientific objectivity

165.

As a judicial category, truth is, in the current cultural pattern, essentially

defined by the previous two meanings. All of these approaches to determining
truth bypass individual responsibility - which is an entirely consequent
situation in the dominational and authoritarian culture. However, in a postdominational and post-objectivist context, truth becomes a category of
immanent ethic - based on immanent spirituality and integrated epistemology.
Truth is a naturalfinction in the interplay between the Living and that
which is lived. I...] It develops as long as the organism maintains its unitary
functioning, which meansfill orgonotic sensing. I.. .]
Truth, basically, is not, as many believe, an ethical ideal. It became an
ethical ideal when it was lost with the loss of [.. .I the full functioning of the Living in Man. Then truth was suppressed and the ideal mirror image of truth
seekmg appeared. Neither is truth something to be striven for. You do not strip

p
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Goodison, op.cit.: 248
Plumwood, op.cit.: 185
I have presented a deconstruction of scientific objectivity between footnotes 102
and 116 above.

ve to make your heart beat or your legs move, and you do not, by the same token, "strive"for or seek truth.Truth is in you and works in you just as your
heart or your eyes work, weU or badly, according to the condition of your
organism. 166

Truth is often described a s a "gut feeling" 167. Thus defined, it presents a
ground for individual responsibility - because with this meaning of truth, there
is no lying, only suppression or selfdeception. One cannot lie to one's own body:
Some branches of Kinesiology use an Indicator Muscle Test to assess
emotional factors. When a person says, truthfully, ' M y name is so-and-so', the
muscle will remain strong; fi a false name is given, it will weaken. [...I This
principle can be used to access informationfrom the unconscious mind. [...I
For example, the practitioner or client might make the statement, 'Thefear of
water started between the years 20-15 ... 15-10 ... 10-5 ...' and so on, until the
exact age is identijkd by a change in the muscle response. 168

It is necessary to reiterate that, of course, in the context of the integrated
epistemology, the inclusion of the "gut feeling", or intuitive "hunch", does not
exclude the rational sources of information which complement the integral
sense of truth. Furthennore, this means that truth is related to sensitivity for
natural processes within and without, to the sense of eco-systemic comectedness and belonging. Therefore it is a ground for the individual's responsibility
for her/his social and natural environment. It is a basis for a n immanent ethic:
Truth means full contact with oneself as well as with the environment.
[... It] is inextricably bound up with Life's energy economy. 169

The comotational framework of such a n eco-systemic consciousness
involves a deconstruction of all the dualized notions related to the categories of
morality and ethic. Thus, eco-systemic consciousness or ethic is beyond the
duality of anthropocentric or ecocentric definitions

170. From

a post-dualist

viewpoint, the current preference for remote, global issues a s objects of
environmental concern by ecologically conscious (and ecocentrically-minded)

166
167

168

169
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Reich, 1951/ 1980: 167-168, emphasis mine
7 h t h comesfrom the guts,from our viscera and not exclusivelyfrom the head.
Descartes' defiition of truth as "clear and distinct ideas" does violence to our
intuitions and deepfeelings which are equally important avenues of insight and
awcveness.(Fox, 1979: 97-98, emphasis mine)
La Tourelle and Courtenay,op.cit.:65. For the kinesiological background see a t
footnotes 124 and 125 above. Also. see in this light the paragraph about health
before footnote 23 in this chapter.
Reich, l%l/ 1980: 169-170
discussed in the previous chapter between footnotes 41 and 43, and between 50and 54

citizens reads as one of the consequences of the misinterpreted conception, or
dualized construct of the antropocentrism/ecocentrism divergence. Typically
people are more readily womed about spotted owls, or penguins, or famine in
Africa because of the imposed monoculture economy, or about other problems
distant from their own back (and front) yard

- than

about the consumption

patterns and waste management of their own life processes (in the integral
sense - both within and without), their own internal and external metabolism of
matter and energy, and its inclusion in natural cycles or renewal

171.

Again, when a situation is presented which typically tends to be interpreted from a n either/or (dualist) mind-frame, it is necessary to emphasize that
these noble (and absolutely vital) concerns are not devaluated if a n (eco-)systernic approach is suggested. This approach starts with the basic level of interaction between the individual and her/his immediate social and natural environment, and from there it inevitably implies the interrelatedness with broader levels of eco-systemic complexity. In other words, the best (and the most active)
way of exerting the care for species (human and animal) endangered by unsustainable practices is to apply sustainability in one's own interaction with the
environment

172.

Unfortunately, the profound alienation of the current institutionalized culture, and the resulting disempowerrnent and helplessness, induce wide-spread
discouragement of such "think globally, act locallyw-approach.Consequently, it
is most often deemed futile.
The essential basis of this cultural pattern is the dualized construct of
individuality versus commonality. It entails a n interest-based morality: the
individual against communal interest, the self against the common. An ethical
position is established by negotiation of conflicting and competing interests,

171
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Many people interested in thefuture of our nation and our planet may have only a
"headline news" awareness of environmental problems. (Switzer, 1994, vii) See
also the quote at footnote 82 in chapter 6.
I have elaborated this approach in the earlier chapters of this essay.

which is consequent to the underlying dominational patterns of human
relationships

173.

The current definition of self-interest is based on "rational economic man",
and the "rationality" is supposedly determined regardless of common (social
or/and environmental) interests. Thus, self-interest is identified with
selfishness and greed.
In such a perspective any ethical issue based on the fact that the selfinterested person is sel@sh becomes immaterial, and the word "selfinterested"is seen as equivalent to the words 'rational"or "purposeful."[...]
We do not know what he wants. But we do know that, whatever it is, he will
maximize ruthlessly to get it. 174

This relation between self-interest and selfishness presents a major
conflict. It is commonly understood in the dualist either/or mode that two
ethical alternatives offer themselves: utilitarianism or deontology. That is to
say, one will either accept to be selfish and greedy because it is a n inevitable
consequence of pursuing and maximizing one's utility, or will adopt a
"disinterested moral obligation" regardless of self-interest (which is the
definition of deontology). Deontology is typically interpreted a s a dualist
category. A s it is usually related to environmental ethics, environmental
interests are posited a s exclusive of any individual, or self-interest.
Consequently, it always appears that a safer moral attitude is to manifest one's
environmental concerns toward the issues which present no suspicion of
possible self-interest. From there stems the preference for remote and
personally unrelated environmental problems, like endangered species and
threatened Third-World populations.
Furthermore, deontology is invariably beyond the individual's own "gut-felt"
sense of ethos, because it is by definition a n external moral dictum, a duty
which implies a transcendental imperative. The deontological opposite to selfinterest is often belabored in the language of higher, nobler, elevated purposes:

173 I have
174

discussed the related pluralist/behaviorist approach in connection with
domination-based politics - in chapter 8, between footnotes 177 and 180.
Lutz and Lux, 1988: 94-95. See also quote at footnote 92 in chapter 8, and text and
quotes between footnotes 3 and 5 in chapter 4.

Deontology [...I sees human beings as subject to "binding duties" [deon in
Greek). The result is a continuous sbuggle between a nobler and a more
debased self;between moral commitments and urges. Kant is the leading
deontologist; we draw here on some of his positions to indicate the ethical
basis for a new economics and, more generally, a new social science. 175
Rationality, whether sel@sh or not, is about a single-se& the interests
and purposes of that self. As long as we do not admit another and higher phase
of our self there cannot be a higher purpose, a higherforce, and a higher-order
preference ordering [...I what economic orthodoxy ends up denying: the
possibility of an inner conJict I...] between two incommensurable interests,
one of the ego-se& the other of the higher [and more idea0 se& 176

This counter-position of self- versus common-interest presents a dialectic
tension, related to the (eco-)systemic contrast between the integrity of the individual system and its belonging and interrelatedness to more inclusive systems,
to broader levels of complexity and interaction

177.

From the systemic view-

point, however, this dialectic tension does not imply a mutual exclusion (characteristic for dualist positions) of individual and common (or communal) interests.
Rather, the systemic interrelations entail a n interconnectedness of interests.
Lutz and Lux cannot perceive this issue in such a non-dualist frameworkl78.
Thus they subscribe to the principal cleavage of dualistic morality: selfishness

versus altruism.
Altruism denotes "devotion to welfare of others",and the term is derived
fi-om alter (the other). This terminological and etymological definition lends itself
to the typical dualist interpretation - the dualized otherness

179.

Thus,

emerging from the dualist world view, altruism is identified with self-

sacrifice and self-denial.
Dualism is a process in which power forms identity, one which distorts
both sides of what is split apart, the master and the slave, the colonizer and
the colonized, the sadist and the masochist, the egoist and the self-abnegating
altruist [...I 180

-
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Etzioni, 1990: 221, emphasis mine. This reflects a typical dualist mind-frame - see
text and quotes between footnotes 30 and 32, and between 33 and 34 above.
Lutz and Lux, op.cit.: 96, emphasis mine
See text between footnotes 82 and 83 above, and footnotes 18 and 19 in chapter 2.
See also text and quotes between footnotes 67-72 in chapter 4.
Val Plumwood defines dualism a s 'the construction of a devalued and sharply
demarcated sphere of otherness." (Plumwood, op.cit.: 41)
ibid.: 32

The "self-abnegating" altruist is a product of the characteristic dualist strategy
of reversal. The inherent contemptuous construction of the other a s the
inferiorized, devaluated and, consequently, subordinated sphere, is thereby
perceived as a morally unacceptable position, so the only available procedure
within the dualist paradigm is the reversal: (an often hypocritical) "devotion to
welfare of others" by self-sacrifice and self-denial.
Altruism has come to mean in common usage the love of another at the

expense of onesew Instead of loving others as we love ourselves, the
degenerated use of the term "altruism"implies that we love others instead of
loving ourselves. If this be the operative meaning of altruism today, then
compassion is surely not altruistic. [...I In loving others I am loving myself
and indeed involved in my own best and biggest andfullest self-interest. 181

Self-sacrifice and denial (dualistic altruism) has been uncritically adopted for
the basis of environmental morality, where it is manifested as a recommended
resolution of the conflict between consumption and environmental concern. Frugality (or self-sacrifice/denial) is thus perceived a s a (dualized) opposite of consumption. The typical expression of such moral precept is the diet-metaphor:
One of the most prevalent views is that we must dramatically change our
consumption patterns - the so called conservation alternative - simply to go
on energy diet.182

A sustainable society is also likely to require a return to many Puritan
virtues such as simplicity of living styles and conservation practices. 183
There are also some ethical _firstprinciples indicating the desirability of
a steady state. Nearly all traditional religions teach man to conform his soul
to realm by knowledge, selfdiscipline, and restraint on the multiplication of
desires, as well as on the lengths to which one will go to satisfy a desire. 184

This approach proposes a (dualistic) remedy within the consumer culture,
without seeking a n alternative. Earlier, I presented a departure from the
passive position of consumers as the transition to full awareness of,
involvement in and responsibility for the technological sequence - the exchange
of matter and energy with the environment and the inclusion into natural cycles
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Fox. 1979: 33-34, emphasis mine
Switzer, op.cit. : 146, emphasis mine
Platt, 1977: 277, emphasis mine. Again, the preference for sensitivity-based
responsibility over imposed morality does not imply that the present consumer
culture, particularly in the regions most wasteful of matter and energy resources
like North America, should not adopt comprehensive conservation programs.
Daly, 1977: 113, emphasis mine

of renewal

185. Furthermore,

the diet metaphor offers a negative motivation.

The alternative is to turn towards wholesome and full richness of life in all of
its aspects - material and spiritual fulfillment, the bodily and the mind,
freedom and love. All that is feast, not diet in comparison with the miserable
life of dependency upon institutionalized irresponsibility, of slaving to
competitive, exhaustive, greedy, empty, never satisfymg devouring of material
commodities, and of constant fear of ecological and human destruction

186.

Self-sacrifice and denial, and dualist altruism have to be perceived as a
give-and-take issue

187. Throughout

the evolution of dualism-based cultures,

unconditional giving, a s an expression of self-sacrifice, has been praised a s a
model of morality. On the other hand, in the current consumer culture, taking
disproportionately exceeds giving, so there is more and more squandering.
dissipating, devouring, and less and less creativity - far more entropy, than
ektropy

188. AS

a result, many people are inclined to think, more than ever,

that only a dualized opposite to consumption would be an ethical ideal.
Dualized concept of give-versus-take - a s an expression of the related
either/or logic - is deconstructed when the (eco)-systemic perspective is
applied

189. Giving

and taking can be conceived of only as complementary

processes - a dialectical simultaneity of ektropy and entropy, an eco-systemic

185 See text in chapter 6 between footnotes 30 and 3 1, and between 109 and 1 13, and in

chapter 7 between 42 and 44, and between 65 and 67.
You devour your happiness. [...I You can only ladle in and only take, and cannot
create and cannot give, because your basic bodily attitude is that of holding back
and of spite; because panic strikes you when the primordial movement of LOVE and
of GMNG stirs in you. This is why you are afraid of giving. (Reich, 1948/ 1979: 45)
187 I have already discussed it in chapter 7 - between footnotes 56 and 58.
188 The issue of entropy and ektropy issue is elaborated in chapter 3 - see between
footnotes 37 and 38,40 and 41, 52 and 54,and between 66 and 67.
189 The mechanist cannot reconcile "society"and "individual,"[...I He will gSe
priority to the interests of society or to those of the individual. While he knows
that the interests of society are conditioned by gratiAing the interests of the
individuals, and vice versa, his thinking and acting are invariably a question of
either/or. This produces the sharp contrast between state and individual, which in
this form is insolvable and irreconcilable. (Reich, l949/ 1973: 105-106, emphasis
mine). See in this context the Tragedy of the Commons issue - between footnotes 60
and 62 in the previous chapter.
186

interaction of the individual with her or his environment, the exchange of
energy. Giving and taking, or gain and loss, are the essence of creativity.
Ihe whole universe is ruled by this cycle of give and take,absorb and reflect,gmu and die, wncentrate cosmicpower and dissipate it again into the
great cosmic ocean [. ..I
In this manner Life reproduces, maintains itself and grows endlessly.
Not so, armored man He became a one-waydeadend-mad. 190

Give-and-take metabolism is impaired by "armoring" 191. Therefore
"armored" humans produce an imbalance of entropy. Unsustainable processes
stem from self-interest a s one-way taking.
On the other side, the giving-only is a dualized mirror image of selfinterest. It is the expression of self-sacrifice and self-denial, which have a
deeply authoritarian basis. They manifest a passive exertion of power by moral
blackmail - inducing the feeling of guilt and sinfulness a s a principal ground
for power over people. The self-abnegating mechanism and its authoritarian
underpinning are culturally reproduced, primarily by mothers who - as a
consequence of their position in the patriarchal/dominational culture

192 -

are

the main purveyors or self-sacrifice and self-denial.
Lucy Goodison suggests the alternative view of systemic interdependence
of giving and taking:
Any mother who has spent hours and days taking care of her children
knows that fi she does not have time to withdraw, to take care of herselfand
enrich her sense of self, she will eventually have nothing left to give. 193

However, the overwhelming majority of mothers is utterly unaware of this
perspective, and is immersed in dualistic culture which glorifies sacrifice and
suffering for others' sakes.
This authoritarian underpinning points at another immensely consequential
dualistic construct, resulting from imposed morality - the split of freedom and
(ecological)responsibility into competing opposites. The essential cleavage
where this split is manifested is the confrontation of individuality and
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Reich, 1951/ 1980: 39-40, emphasis mine.
also indicated by the quote in footnote 185 above
See between footnotes 144 and 145 in chapter 8.
Goodison, op.cit: 256

commonality - the dualization in which interest-based morality is grounded (as
pointed out above). Morality is thus identified with self-sacrifice, or denial of
individuality - with restriction of individual freedom, which is perceived as
incompatible with, or as a dualized opposite of common interest.
It is indicative of the dualist attitude to freedom that prison is used as a
pertinent metaphor. An essentially life-negative situation is evoked to illustrate
conditions which should clarrfy the key issues of freedom in the context of
morality: the explication of the conflict between individuality and communality,
between the self-interest and the common interest:

If there is an agreement to team up with each other, each prisoner has to
choose to either cooperate and do his proper share, or else gain at the expense
of the other - to get something (instantfreedom)for nothing (no penalties for
his cheating). m i s selJish desire to gain while letting the other(s)foot the bill
goes by the name of being a 'Pee rider." In contrast, the choice not to exploit
the opportunity, the refusal tofree ride, is what cooperation is aU about. It is
intrinsically linked to setf-denial, not self-interest. I...]Only ij men were
actuated by moral s e t f m , could they serve the interest of the whole
human race. 194
This is known as the "prisoner's dilemma" parable, and it presents cooperation
as identified with self-denial or self-sacrifice, and freedom as a dualized
opposite of responsibility.
If the dualist (and consequently dorninational) conceptual framework is not
deconstructed, the only possible resolution of the confrontation between
individuality and commonality is perceived as recourse to curbing and
restricting the sphere of individuality and the individual's freedom. I have
discussed before Kropotkin's argument against the common assumption that
people are inherently inclined to asocial behavior unless an authoritarian
structure is instituted to control them

195.

Kropotkin's concept of mutual aid,

and the anthropological and zoological evidence he provided about its evolutionary signikance, indicate that cooperation is a natural, or instinctual faculty
- akin to sensitivity for eco-systemic interrelatedness between individuals and

their social and natural environment. In other words, responsibility is a sense,
like the "gut-feeling"of truth, and it can be perceived in the same way as
194
195

Lutz and Lux, op-cit.:8 1. emphasis mine.
See text and quote between footnotes 18 and 21 in the previous chapter.

inherent in a n undisturbed functioning of life processes in the organism

196 -

a n expression of the individual's freedom in the most basic sense.
Freedom, therefore, cannot be an opposite to responsibility. Freedom
means having responsibility.
When a person unjustly deprived of responsibility - by being declared incompetent to manage his fiances or stand trial- is restored to responsibility, we do not say that he has been "responsibilitated,"because there is no such
word. Instead, we think of such a person also as having been liberated, which
is true, since depriving a person of responsibility is one of the most effective
ways of depriving him of liberty as well. I...I Modem psychiaby dehumanizes
man by denying - on the basis of spurious scientiJc reasoning - the existence,
or even the possibility, of personal responsibility. But the concept of personal
responsibility is central to the concept of man as moral agent. 197

The connection between denial of responsibility and freedom points to Kropotkin's argument that authoritarian regulation results in reproduction of
irresponsibility and asocial behavior, rather than promotion of individual
responsibility 198.
A monk named Pelagius I.. ] believed that I.. .I denial of free will only served to just[& and reinforce the predatory and licentious behavior of people
and that insistence upon the innate impotence of human nature was an unconscionable attempt to evade social responsibility. [...I Obviously, by asserting
the possibility of individual responsibility, Pelagian doctrine threatened the
survival of a church predicated upon the need for institutionally authorized
condemned as a heretic [. ..I 199
redemption. I.. .I Pelagius was o-ly

In the context of conventional'enwonrnental morality, responsibility (if it is
a t all brought to attention a s a salient issue) is considered achievable only by
restriction of individual freedom. And freedom is perceived in the dualist mode
- as

pursuit of self-interest. Moral obligation (environmental or other) is thus

posited a s oppositional to freedom. Freedom is interpreted - consequently to
the current culture dominated by the profit/utility-maximizing economy - a s
economic irresponsibility (disregard of social and enwonmental consequences).
This dualist position is maintained to keep unresolved the present disharmony
between economy and ecology 200, and to retain the domination paradigm
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See Reich's quote at footnote 165 above.
Szasz, 1970: 44,11, emphasis mine.
See text and quote between footnotes 24 and 26 in chapter 8.
Chorover, 1979: 18-19, emphasis mine.
See text and quotes between footnotes 30 and 34 in chapter 4.

within which the discord is continuously addressed (but never resolved) by

litigation, i.e. institutionally enforced morality.
Some seem to believe that, fi we relaxed and werefreefrom moral
pressure, we would not care. I...]A relied morality would be unnecessary ifwe
were still in touch with the sense of belonging and of self-regulation which are
possible, but neglected,faculties in our organisms. 201

Goodison indicates the sensual aspect of an ecological ethic (that I
presented above) within her concept of immanent spirituality. On the other
hand, dualistic ground for morality and ethic is constructed on a concept of
spirituality a s an external, transcendental sphere of moral power over humans
in their "earthly state of being" (or embodiment). Alternatively, an ethic pertinent to the concept of immanent spirituality is based on immanent, i.e. internal
sense of the individual's interrelatedness to her/his social, natural (and cosmic)
environment - on a n eco-systemic consciousness. Such a n understanding
presents a liberation from the domination of external transcendental spheres or
entities. And, most importantly, it also entails a re-connection of freedom and
responsibility, and empowers us to have both in our own lives.
However, the pervasive human disempowerment to take responsibility has
been a long-lasting historical burden (as I have pointed out in the previous
chapter). It is continuously manifested in authoritarian dependence on imposed
morality, and in defending such dependence:
The armored person perceives himself and the world as complicated
because he has no immediate contact, no straightforward relationship to the
world around him The secondary result is that over the years this world
becomes actually complicated. Since these complications make an ordered
existence impossible, artificial rules in "human intercourse" emerge: rigid
mores, customs, rules of etiquette, diplomatic maneuvers.
No unarmored person would have the impulse to vomit or pass wind in the
presence of others. Hence it would never occur to him to advise or demand
obedience to the rules of society that one must not vomit in the presence of
others or yield toflatulence. The armored person, however, is full of such
impulses. It i s m m his own sowce of secondary driues that he derives the
rules and ethical customs against them 202
Reich's analysis (based on his therapeutic experience) shows the dependence

on external authority a s a result of dissociation - the disruption of sensitivity to
life processes within and without. From there stems the rampant fear of free201
202

Goodison, op.cit.: 269
Reich, l949/ 1973: 72-73, emphasis mine.

dom (and of responsibility) which presents a n impasse - a principal obstacle to
a n ecological ethic based on identity between freedom and responsibility.
A demandingfreedom does not lead everyone toward autonomous selfrealization. There are those for whom the experience ends in willing
submission to some form of spiritual or therapeutic fascism [...I Where
human identity is thrown into radical doubt, we walk the razor's edge between
thefullfreedom of realized personhood and the treacherous security of a new
collective enslavement. 203

Self-sacrifice and denial are essentially manifestations of the fear of
freedom, and it is expressed a s denial of the bodily, the sensual, the emotional,
the intuitive, and particularly the sphere of sexuality. These attitudes are
consequential to the dualist mind set which suppresses everything related to
body and nature

204.

It is hard to appreciate the deeply debilitating effect this mind/ body split
has upon our self-respect and our ability to use ourfull power to act in the
world. If we believe that no unequivocal good can comefrom the body, it
becomes extremely hard for us to take our experienced needs and desires
seriously or to act on the basis of them [. ..I Hence, to work with a model in
which spirituality is immanent in, and expressed through, the body is a way
in which we can make some return to a concept of wholeness. 205

In cultures defined by the dualist world view, self-denial and sacrifice primarily
mean denial of pleasure - and more than anythmg, the pleasures related to the
body. Therefore these cultures have developed suffering as the most
acceptable, the most cherished criterion of eligibility for moral standing 205
while any expression of bursting, joyful, life-affirmative attitudes is very likely
to be looked upon with suspicion by most moralists. What is that? The
Christian inheritance? Masochism? Hypocrisfl We seem to be immersed in a

suBero, ergo sum! paradigm.
Pity and suffering have for a very long historical period been the appropri-

ate pretext for moral claims. Consequently, ecological awareness is now still
almost exclusively presented in this negative mode - essentially based on a n
Fb~zak,1979: 318-319
204 See text and quotes between footnotes 29 and 33 above.
205 Goodison, op.cit.: 148-149
206 Peter Singer [...I suggests that 'no matter what the nature of the being, the principle
of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering in s ofar as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being'. (Midgley, 1983:
89) This quote is related to text between footnotes 46 and 48 in the previous
chapter.
203

underlying attitude toward suffering a s prefered evidence of morality. This
attitude is manifested in two aspects. One is the cataclysmic view a t environmental issues. It also shows how fear is more effective than life-positive emotions a s a motivation for environmental (and generally moral) concerns - which
are more easily instigated upon the fear of ecological and environmental disasters, than upon a vision of better life conditions. The other aspect of the suffero-ergo-sum-basis of the current mode of ecological awareness is the unnecessary lack of comfort provided or promised by most alternative technologies

-

presumably a form of suffering to appease the guilt feeling, and to atone for the
damage generally inflicted upon natural environment and the eco-system.
In the standard vision of ecological consciousness, there is no joy of life.
Unless transcendence, a s salvation from and reward for earthly suffering, is
accepted a s a source of joy, and as a n essential sublimation of ecologicallyminded being
world view

-

207.

which is Ken Wilber's position in his book about ecology a s a
Such a life-negative perspective can be connected to ecology

only by a tremendous stretch of cerebral speculation. As I have comprehensively argued throughout this chapter, ecology is a concept inherently defined by
immanence. And that means a re-connection of dualized notions of spirituality
and nature (within humans and without), a n overcoming of the dualization of
body and spirit, and re-inclusion of sensual and sexual aspects of life into a
dignified sense of being. Ecological consciousness, therefore, entails a n

immanent ethic of joy as an ultimate expression of liveliness 208.
207

208

Let the Earth and Cosmos and Worlds dissolve, and see Spirit still shining in the
Emptiness, never arising, never dissolving, never blinkuzg once in the worlds of
created time. 'Thatjoy, " says Teresa, "is greater than aU thejoy of earth, and
greater than all its delights, and all its satisfactions; and they are apprehended,
too, very d~fferently,as I have learned by eqerience." (Wilber, 1995: 293)
Consciousness wmes about t h m u g h h I...I Indeed one of Uze reasons why
Aquinas preferred Aristotle over Plato was that the former was less suspicious of
pleasure. Aristotle refutes Plato's arguments against pleasure [...I though of course
i f is necessary to distinguish authenticfiom inauthenticpleasures. (Fox, 1992: 34,
emphasis mine)
Some scholars have described Minoan lve as "perfectly expressive of the idea
of homo ludens" - of "man" expressing our higher human impulses throughjoyful
and at the same time mythically meaningfid ritual and artistic play. Others have
tried to sum up Cretan culture with words and phrases like "sensitivity," 'brace of
life," and "loveof beauty and nature." (Eisler, 1987: 32) It is difficult to assert that

This essay can be perceived a s a consequent endeavor to present a n ecological culture a s a life-positive alternative, a liberatory vision which offers the
possibility of more joyous ways of life 209. However, the principal appraisals of
the current culture, a s well a s the typical environmental and ecological
projections, are mostly rendered in grim and grey terms. The cataclysmic
preoccupations of environmental warnings induce a n overwhelming feeling of
despair 210. The entire postmodernist critique of our social reality casts a
shadow of pessimism and hopelessness:
Nothing remains for us to base anything on. 21 1

And, generally, the deconstruction of the present cultural patterns - which is a
necessary prerequisite for a n insight into possible alternatives - reveals a gloomy picture. As I have emphasized earlier

212,

deconstruction needs to be succe-

eded by reconstruction, by a new, positive vision. However, from the current
cultural environment, characterized by the suflero-paradigm, it is much easier,
and seemingly much more acceptable to present and critique the negative
aspects. It is not so easy to offer projections and visions because they tend to
be perceived a s naive unless they spell gloom and doom. It is not easy to write
about joy. One feels it is somewhat out of place in a "serious" treatise to show
life-positive feelings like enthusiasm, joy, hope. There is a n acceptable form
where these feelings are (or at least used to be) comfortably sublimed - art.
The breadth of human-ecological perspective necessitates a n integration
not only of natural and social sciences, but, even more importantly, of sciences

209

210
211
212

such a reconstruction can reflect a remote historic reality, but this is certainly a
vision worth pursuing in the emergent cultural evolution.
The classic Blueprint for Survival states that an important condition of a stable
and sustainable society is also b social system in which the individual can eyoy,
rather thanfeel restricted by the conditions of a stable society". (Goldsmith et al.,
1972: 23)
See quote at footnote 153 above, and text around footnote 48 in chapter 5.
Baudrillard, 1976: 4-5. See also quotes at footnotes 13 and 14 above.
See text and quote between footnotes 15 and 18 above.

and art

213.

The disciplinary boundaries, which now pigeonhole human

creativity, will thus become interfaces of interrelatedness and interaction.
Consequnetly to the entire discussion above, I perceive ecological
consciousness a s supporting and encouraging creativity. Moreover, it is itself
the sphere of creativity a s a n expression of joy of life, permeated with a strong
urge of life energy - a n urge to love, to work, to create, to burst with joy, to
feel, to meet people and to meet nature, to live without resignation, youthfully
and sincerely. Ecological consciousness entails a creativity a s a n ektropic
(counter-entropic) process

214,

or a s the thrust of @Ianvital 215. And, more than

anything, it involves a creativity defined by a non-violent and post-dominational
attitude to life, body, sensuality and sexuality - a creativity of tenderness
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214

215
216

216.

I have pointed this out in chapter 1, between footnotes 72 and 73; see in that
connection also the discussion of the objectivity issue between footnotes 106 and
108, and between 1 1 7 and 121 above.
Human work can be 'ektropic',it can decrease the entropy of a partial system
(Martinez-Alier. 1987: 78, 80) See also text between footnotes 52 and 53, and
between 66 and 67 in chapter 3.
See text and quotes between footnotes 61 and 64 above.
See the opening quote to this chapter.

Epilogue:
Hope and Utopia

The purpose of this essay is to present an integral overview of an
ecological culture and to explore the interrelatedness of its aspects. The
currently prevailing culture is characterized by inclination to identify and
delineate a problem, and seek solutions and remedies. However, problems are

not isolated phenomena, but intricately interrelated systemic processes.
Pinpointing one problem and seeking its solution typically results in focusing on
symptoms rather than systemic interconnections. Therefore, this essay is not
oriented toward offering solutions to the environmental crisis, or a set of
remedies that would enable transition to a n ecological culture.
I have followed the interconnectedness of my principal components of an

ecological culture. Sustainability - a s a n economy of metabolic exchange with
the environment, of inclusion into natural cycles of renewal, and of creativity
and mutuality - is interdependent to a culture of post-domination. Postdomination - a s human relations based on individuals' responsibility for their
social and natural environment, and on surpassing the authoritarian structures
of subordination of humans and nature - is interdependent to a redefined
spirituality - a spirituality of immanent ethic and sensitivity.
Nevertheless, a recapitulation of the elaborate discussion presented in this
essay can emerge a s a set of solutions. Deconstructivism often appears more
acceptable because it avoids the naivety of offering solutions. It is much easier
to be negative.
Systems, even when they are based on radical indeterminacy (the loss of
meaning),fall prey, once more, to meaning. They collapse under the weight of
their own monstrosity, like fossilised dinosaurs, and immediately
deoompose. [...I ?his is why the only strategy is catastrophic [...I 1

Against the gloom of postmodernist deconstruction and the doom of some
environmentalist predictions, I will summarize the outcomes of this essay as:
the joy of revived sensitivity for nature within and without ourselves;
the joy of relying on our own inner ethic - our sense of truth (both rational
and 'gut-felt", intuitive) in relations with our natural and social
environment;
the joy of a sense of the spiritual conceived of and felt a s immanent - a
spirituality that is inseparable from our bodily existence and our
interrelatedness to nature in us and around us;

the joy of having (or regaining) one's own responsibility

-

a responsibility

based on inner sense of belonging and interdependency to our immediate
a s well as broader eco-system - the responsibility for people and nature,
and for our own lives;
the joy of shedding the fear of taking responsibility for one's own life - the
fear of authority, deeply ingrained in our bodily attitudes;
the joy and relaxation of living without the relationships of domination - either
subordinating other people and nature, or being subordinated ourselves;
the joy of mutuality and tenderness;
the joy of taking responsibility and caring for the ways we live and satisfy our
needs;
the joy of living in a community - of experiencing togetherness with other
people and nature, the integrity of life - of feeling and knowing that the
impact of our existence is not entirely irrelevant against the over-sized
social, economic and technological structures;
the joy of participating in a sustainable, life-centered economy, technology
and social organization;
the sheer joy of it all - of an ecological culture.
When a vision of a "better world" is conveyed a s a list of "to do's" or "to
be's" - even if these are presented a s source of joy - such a vision is easily
taken for a utopia or a dictum. There is a thin line between utopias and
totalitarianism. As I have elaborated in the chapter on domination, we have
been so long and so deeply immersed in the culture of authoritarian
relationships, that we typically either rebelliously decline other people's
suggestions about our own life, or succumb to them if they become imposed
rules. It is difficult to open up to a post-domination perspective.
The Western mind's overriding compulsion to impose some fonn of
totalizing reason - theological, scientijk, economic - on every aspect of life is
accused of being not only self-deceptive but destructive. 2

2

Tarnas, 199 1: 400. See also quote by Robertson at footnote 9 below.

I will wrap up with excerpts from texts by other people 3. These quotations
illustrate the essential utopistic character of an inquiry into the future of
human cultural development. They express both utopia and reality, hope and
despair, but I wish to emphasize life-positive attitudes: joy and liveliness.

The century to come will be the environmental century - either because
we use the basic principles of ecology to design a new economic system or
because we fail to, andfind that continuing deterioration of the economy's
environmental support systems leads to economic decline. 4
There is, at present as in the past, a deep, unbridgeable GAP between the
dream of Lge and the ability to live WFE in man. 5
The word "Utopia"is synonymous with a happy, desirableform of
society. Utopia, in this respect, represents mankind's dream of happiness. 6
We call ideal places utopias, a word made up in 1515 by Thomas More
from the Greek words meaning "no-place".But the trouble about utopias is
that the people who think them up usually imagine themselves as the rulers
and the rest of us as the ruled. And who wants to be a worker or a slave in
someone else's utopia? 7
If today or tomorrow the authoritarian state organization were suddenly
abolished so that people could do as they pleased, chaos, notfreedom,
would result. Years of utter disorientation would have to pass before the
human race would learn to live according to the principles of natural selfregulation.
This deep-rooted biopathic organization of man appears to the careful
student of human behavior as the most outstanding reasonfor the failure of
all previous attempts to secure humanfreedom. 8

The choice offutures which seems toface us are: business as usual; diand the
saster; the totalitarian conservationist;the hyper expansionist 0;
3

4

5
6
7

8

In the Introduction (after footnote 7). have already given a n explanation of the
somewhat unorthodox use of quotations in this essay. Here, I will add that, from a
systemic perspective, I have been putting ideas of different people into a new
context, thus revealing interrelations, interconnections and interdependences. I
avoided retelling what others wrote in order to make these interrelations overt.
Sheldrake's morphic fields (see text and quotes between footnotes 60 and 62, and
text between 1 15 and 116 in chapter 9) can be perceived a s media of interconnectivity and exchange of ideas. Fritjof Capra has used a diagram (Capra, 1996: 38) to
illustrate the paradigm shift from perception of objects to beholding
relationships. It reminds me of the story about a literary critic who objected to a
writer that his book was merely a linkage for material written by others. When a
systemic viewpoint is applied, the linkages become important.
Brown et al., 1999: 19
Reich, 195 1/ 1980: 55
Berneri, 1982: 2
Ward,1974:9
Reich, l949/ 1973: 133-135

sane, human, ecological (SHE).[...I We need to understand all these dzfferent
views. because the actualfuture will almost certainly contain elements of all
_five.[...I The actualfuture will be shaped by each interacting with the
others. Other people approach thefuture dzfferently from ourselves. 9
Ifthe majority represents what is natural and the few are the exceptions
from the "normal,"as so m a n y want us to believe, then there is no hope of
ever overcoming the split in the cultural setup, the wcirs emergingfrom this
split, the splitting of character structures, the hate and universal murder.
Then we would have to conclude that all the misery is a natural
manifestation of the given, unalterable order of things.
IJ on the other hand, the majority is the exceptionfrom the natural, and
thefew creators are in agreement with nature, then things would look better.
[. ..] Then, i f our exposition of the annoring is correct, man could return home
to nature and what appears today as exceptional in a very few could
become the rulefor all. 10
Both men and women must challenge the dualised conception of human
identity and develop an alternative culture whichfully recognises human
identity as continuous with. not alienfrom, nature. The dualised conception
of nature as inert, passive and mechanistic would also be challenged as part
of this development. [...I In doing so [men and women] will cornefrom
dzxerent historical places and have d@erent things to contribute to this
process. 11
A slow but most effectiveprocess of softening up the rigidities in the armored character structures will inevitably take place. [. ..] And thus,for the
first time in the history of man, the rigidity in the human structure will begin
to crack, to soften, to yield, [...I In this manner, the blocking of natural contact with the selfand the surrounding world will slowly, possibly over
several centuries, diminish. andfinally, as the prevention of annoring in the
newborn generations succeeds, will completely vanishfrom the surface of
this earth.
This is no prophecy. Man, and not fate, is burdened with thefull
responsibilityfor the outcome of this process. 12
The ecology movement has emphasized the need to live within the cycles
of nature, as opposed to the exploitative, linear mentality of forward
progress. 13
Spiral unites the cycle, the arrow, and the dot in a single movement which
constantly funsback onto itsel$ but every time on a dzfferent plane. 14
Instead, in writzng 'herstory', women have used a circular or a spiral
model suggestzng a kind of cyclical return to our origins, which are always
incorporatedfroma vantage point of greater understanding in order to inform
9
10
11
12

13
14

Robertson, 1978,9,19
Reich, 1951/ 1973:294-295
Plumwood, 1993:36
Reich, l%l/ 1973:296298
Merchant, 1980:xvii
Melucci, 1996: 12

another cycle of learning in human culture. In other words, we always start
again, but neverfrom quite the same point. 15
We are human only in contact and conviviality with what is not human.
Only in reciprocity with what is Other do we begin to heal ourselves. 16
I was sony for Polina, I swear, but it was a strange thing -from the
moment I touched the roulette table the day before and begun raking in piles
of money, my love seemed to have retracted into the background. 17
[. ..] Preserve the tenderness of l$e.

18

Under the new view of cultural evolution, male dominance, male
violence, and authoritarianism are not inevitable, eternal givens. And rather
than beingjust a "utopiandream," a more peaceful and equalitarian world is
a real possibility for ourfuture. 19
Love, work and knowledge are the well-springs of our l$e. They should
also govern it. 20

-

15

16
17

18
19

20

Goodison, 1992: 264-265
Abram, 1995: 3 15
Dostoyevsky, 1966: 140
Lawrence, 1928/1977: 125
Eisler, 1987: 73
Wilhelm Reich, motto of all his books
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